ove Office of Evaluation and Oversight

Thematic Evaluation

IDB's Response to Key Challenges in Citizen Security, 1998-2012

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. BANK STRATEGIES AND PORTFOLIO, 1998-2012 5

A. Bank Strategies and Guidelines on Citizen Security 5
B. Bank Lending for Citizen Security 7
C. Nonlending Activities 14

III. KEY CHALLENGES IN CITIZEN SECURITY AND THE BANK'S RESPONSE 18

A. The Challenge of Complexity 18
B. The Challenge of Risks 20
C. The Challenge of Data and Evidence 25

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29

A. Conclusions 29
B. Recommendations 30

REFERENCES

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION, ELECTRONIC LINKS

TABLE A.1 CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECTS WITH OBJECTIVE AND COMPONENTS

TABLE A.2 ACTIVITIES BY CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECT

TABLE A.3 CITIZEN SECURITY PORTFOLIO RESULTS FRAMEWORKS

TABLE A.4 RIGOR OF SEVEN RECENT PROJECT EVALUATION PLANS

TABLE A.5 CITIZEN SECURITY PUBLICATIONS BY THEME

TABLE A.6 RECENT PROJECTS' RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION MEASURES

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
GDP	Gross domestic product
KNL	Knowledge and Learning Sector
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
POD	Project operational document
RES	Research Department
SES	Regional System of Standardized Indicators for Citizen Security and Violence Prevention (Sistema Regional de Indicadores Estandarizados de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana)
SPD	Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness
TC	Technical cooperation
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the past three decades, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have suffered from pandemic levels of violence and crime. Central America, the Caribbean, and South America have homicide rates of 28.5, 16.9, and 20.0 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively—rates significantly above the world homicide rate of 6.9 (UNODC 2011). Victimization rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are high. In 2012, 33% of the households in the region were victims of acts of violence and crime, although there is important variation across countries (victimization rates are at 18% in Panama and 42% in Mexico) (Latinobarómetro 2012). Over half (55%) of respondents reported feeling less secure than in the previous year, and 83% believed that crime had increased in the past year.

High levels of violence and crime negatively affect social and human capital, and have substantial economic impact. Crime and violence can interfere with economic interactions, the delivery of services like education, or even the government's ability to install or maintain physical infrastructure in the country. The World Health Organization has argued that the direct and indirect costs of violence disproportionately affect developing countries, where death and disability can rob households of their only breadwinners and there is little external support (WHO 2004). Depending on the measurement methodology used, the costs of crime and violence can account for over 10% of GDP in LAC. Disability-adjusted life years lost to violence alone cost the equivalent of 1.2% of GDP in LAC (World Bank 2010). Nonmonetary costs include personal and family suffering and trauma.

Citizen security **refers to the right of all citizens to live free from all forms of violence and crime.** The term, which has been endorsed by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, puts people rather than the state at the center of security issues. Although violence and crime are conceptually different—not all violence is criminal, nor are all crimes violent—the two terms are often used together. *Violence and crime prevention* and *citizen security* are also often used interchangeably in the public policy context to indicate policies that prevent all harmful activities against persons and properties, whatever the location, motive, or victim of such activities.

Citizen security is a complex and risky challenge with scarce regional evidence. Sound policymaking in citizen security in the region has proven particularly complex for at least two reasons. First, violence and crime are multidimensional and multicausal, so that governments often address them through multisectoral approaches that have no obvious lead agency. Second, there is an incomplete or fragile consensus on policy approaches to respond to violence and crime. Citizen security also involves risks. The sector is particularly politicized and sensitive, involving police and penitentiary systems and high turnover of political and technical staff; thus there are potential human rights and reputational risks, as well as risks to project feasibility. Finally, many LAC countries still lack reliable data on crime and violence on which to base sound policymaking. In addition, the region is weak in evidence about both effectiveness and best practices for implementing interventions and policies related to citizen security.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, or the Bank) has been involved in citizen security projects for almost two decades. Since 1999, strategic Bank documents have highlighted the importance of citizen security for the continued development of the region. Over the past 15 years the Bank has approved 17 citizen security loans for $481 million, operating in a clear framework that prohibits the use of Bank financing for activities related to drug and arms trafficking. The lending portfolio grew slowly at first, with only six loans approved in the early 2000s, but demand for operations in the sector has increased rapidly since 2009. Six operations totaling US$263.8 million— more than half of the value of the total portfolio—have been approved in the past four years alone. In addition, the Bank has financed US$24.6 million in technical cooperation in the sector, and has recently approved two special initiatives geared toward strengthening information systems, building evidence, and sharing information. Institutionally, a Citizen Security cluster is leading the Bank's agenda in this area.

The Bank has adopted an integrated, multisector approach to citizen security. Its scope of intervention spans the violence and crime prevention continuum: social and situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary systems. The lending portfolio includes multisector stand-alone operations in a variety of countries, most in Central America. The implementation of the first cohort of projects (1998-2009) has proven difficult, and data are not available to rigorously assess the results of those operations (OVE 2010, 2013). For more recent projects (2010-2012), full implementation has not yet begun.

In light of the Bank's increased focus on citizen security, IDB's Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) has undertaken a two-part evaluation of citizen security at the Bank. The first part of the evaluation, completed in 2013, was an in-depth comparative evaluation of five citizen security projects, intended to give a better understanding of the elements of design and supervision that led to successful implementation. The evaluation found five necessary conditions for successful projects: (i) solid situational and institutional diagnostics that tailor project design to the country context; (ii) the identification of core elements and best practices for selected intervention models; (iii) appropriate project implementation practices, including clear roles for participating agencies, beneficiary participation, training and feedback for practitioners, and multisector coordination; (iv) effective communication and outreach to relevant government agencies, targeted populations, the media, and other stakeholders; and (v) adequate resources and incentives for quality content-based supervision.

This second part of the evaluation is meant to complement the findings of the in-depth project review by looking more broadly at the Bank's engagement in the citizen security sector. It focuses on the Bank's work from 1998 to 2012 and addresses two questions:

- How has the Bank's engagement in citizen security evolved, as measured through its formal strategy and citizen security portfolio?
- What particular challenges characterize citizen security, and how has the Bank responded to these challenges?

While seeking to identify lessons from the Bank's experience, the evaluation does not aim to measure the Bank's overall effectiveness in the sector (beyond the findings of the in-depth project review), particularly as many of the projects are still in the early stages of implementation.

This evaluation concludes that the Bank has played a pioneering role in addressing citizen security as part of the development agenda—most notably from a preventive perspective—but faces significant challenges in building a knowledge base, developing the necessary in-house expertise, and managing the risks of this increasingly complex and risky portfolio.

Strategically, the Bank has defined a broad spectrum of interventions for its support in citizen security, reflecting the complexity of the topic. The Bank first pushed the agenda toward social prevention and an integrated, multisector approach to citizen security. By doing so, it affirmed the need to address multiple causes of violence and crime and played an important role in counterbalancing a persistent tendency toward repressive policies in some countries. Recently, the Bank has expanded its support by financing more sensitive police and penitentiary reforms. Today, its scope of intervention spans five sub-areas (social and situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary systems). This broad scope enables the Bank to respond to diversified demand from its borrowers. However, it also creates significant challenges for the Bank in building in-house expertise and developing its comparative advantage in the area. These challenges are exacerbated by the difficulties of cross-sector collaboration in the Bank, which make it hard to draw on the expertise in other sectors for citizen security initiatives.

At the operational level, Bank's lending portfolio has faced significant and persistent challenges in implementation. Early operations attempted to address the multicausality of violence and crime at a time when there was little regional knowledge about how to respond to the issue. As OVE's in-depth project-level evaluation noted (OVE 2013), those projects have proven complex and difficult to implement, and some of them seem to fit poorly with the national- and local-level institutional capacity. Consequently, they have not produced the expected results. Though OVE has not evaluated more recent projects in depth, these difficulties may remain in the new cohort of projects, which currently face significant delays in early implementation. The continuing challenge is to match interventions to the specific institutional context, a challenge that current operational guidelines do not adequately address.

With regard to risk, the Bank has acknowledged the sensitivity of citizen security interventions and the reputational risks involved, but its current risk analysis and mitigation framework is insufficient. Violence and crime are among citizens' main concerns in the region and are highly sensitive issues. In many countries, high turnover of political appointments and technical staff heightens implementation risks in Bank projects. Citizen security also involves reputational risks for the Bank, particularly when it supports sensitive areas in criminal justice with human rights implications. The Bank has acknowledged the specific challenges of working with police and penitentiary systems since its early involvement, but the corresponding measures it takes are not

adequate to identify and mitigate those risks. In fact, more recent operational guidelines have tended toward greater flexibility rather than greater discipline.

Finally, the Bank has approved a series of initiatives to strengthen information systems and build evidence in citizen security in the region, but it still needs to focus this work. These initiatives are welcome, given the weakness in LAC-specific data and evidence in this area, and the challenge is to focus them to build a strong knowledge base, enhance in-house expertise, and strengthen the design and implementation of Bank projects.

Recommendations

To have a recognized comparative advantage in citizen security, the Bank needs to focus its efforts in areas where it can ensure excellence. This entails building in-house expertise, enhancing project design to fit local contexts and ensure implementation, strengthening risk analysis and mitigation, and carrying forward a focused knowledge agenda. Building on this evaluation and the 2013 companion project-level review, OVE offers four recommendations:

1. **Select and focus on a narrower range of interventions to facilitate the development of in-house expertise and enhance the Bank's capacity to show results.**

    - Use the sector framework paper to define which specific types of interventions the Bank will prioritize by sub-area (social prevention, situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary reform), where feasible adopting a subregional approach to better understand common problems and institutional characteristics across countries.

    - Enhance collaboration across Bank divisions (for example, between citizen security and social protection, education, gender, and urban development) and use double-booking where needed to engage critical staff skills. If no in-house expertise exists in some critical areas selected for engagement (for example, criminal justice), hire specialists.

2. **Simplify project design, pace interventions, and enhance supervision to strengthen operational performance and implementation.**

    - Strengthen institutional analysis and adjust the level of project complexity to the institutional context.

    - Ensure adequate timeframes and sequencing of activities, particularly when data are missing, information systems are deficient, institutional capacity is weak, and/or no strategy has been defined or sustained in recent years.

    - Focus on project supervision and implementation, including by providing staff with appropriate training, time, resources, and career advancement.

3. **Develop a risk analysis tool and adopt new guidelines for risk mitigation to help reduce and mitigate risks.**

   - Consider forming a task force to develop a risk analysis tool, engaging staff from the Citizen Security cluster, other operational sectors relevant to violence and crime prevention, the Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness (SPD), and Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL), as well as external experts. This tool should focus on the political and human rights dimensions of citizen security and should enable a sound analysis of implementation and reputational risks.

   - Consider using the task force to also develop risk mitigation guidelines. These mandatory guidelines should clearly define conditions for operations in sensitive areas, most notably the financing of police and penitentiary systems, where the greatest risks lie. These conditions should cover the whole project cycle from decision to design and implementation.

4. **Define a focused knowledge agenda to help build a stronger evidence base for project design and policymaking.**

   - Use technical cooperation resources, including those provided under the Citizen Security Initiative, to finance and build national and local capacity to undertake victimization and other types of surveys, to better understand the conditions underlying violence and crime, and to monitor and evaluate citizen security interventions.

   - In conjunction with the Bank's Research Department (RES), define a research agenda in the areas of Bank intervention, focusing on the effectiveness of selected interventions as well as context-based factors that enhance successful implementation.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 **For the past three decades, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have suffered from pandemic levels of violence and crime.**[1] Although data collection in the region is highly imperfect, homicide rates can provide some measure of violence in a society. Recent data from UNODC put the Central American[2] homicide rate at 28.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, the Caribbean[3] at 16.9, and South America[4] at 20.0—rates that are significantly above the world homicide rate of 6.9. Regional numbers obscure wide variability between countries: for example, Honduras's homicide rate of 82.1 is almost double that of neighboring Guatemala, and quadruple that of nearby Nicaragua. Homicides are also concentrated geographically within countries. In Mexico 41% of homicides are committed in four states that hold only one-tenth of the population. In the Caribbean, homicide rates in the most populous cities are more than double those in the rest of the country. In Brazil, the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro is three times that in São Paolo. South America, the Caribbean, and Central America also have the world's highest percentage of homicides committed with firearms.[5]

1.2 **Victimization rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are variable, but high.** Although surveys are also imperfect measures of violence in society, Latinobarómetro's latest annual household survey (2012) shows that 33% of the households in the region have been victims of acts of violence and crime during the last year of the survey, ranging from 18% in Panama to 42% in Mexico. Respondents who reported being victims of crime were generally young: 36-37% of 18- to 40-year-olds reported having been victims. Of the crimes reported in the survey, 18% involved violence. Over half (55%) of respondents reported feeling less secure than they had the previous year, and 83% believed that crime had increased in the past year.[6] Contradictions between official crime statistics and the results of victimization surveys also highlight the poor quality of crime and violence statistics in Latin America, where, among other things, lack of trust in the police and judicial systems, fear of reprisal, unequal access to justice, and worries of social stigma can all contribute to the underreporting of crime.

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1 The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) consider pandemic levels are reached when homicide rates are above 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. UNODC defines homicide as unlawful death purposefully inflected on a person by another person, and uses a variety of national and international sources of data based on criminal justice or public health systems.

2 UNODC defines Central America as Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.

3 UNODC defines the Caribbean as Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, and United States Virgin Islands.

4 UNODC defines South America as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

5 UNODC 2011.

6 Latinobarómetro 2012.

1.3 **High levels of violence and crime negatively affect social and human capital.** In addition to causing human suffering, personal and family trauma, and deteriorating social capital, crime and violence can interfere with economic interactions, the delivery of services like education, or even the government's ability to install or maintain physical infrastructure in the country.[7] A 2004 report of the World Health Organization further argued that the direct and indirect costs of violence disproportionately affect developing countries, where death and disability can rob households of their only breadwinners and there is little external support.[8]

1.4 **The economic impact of crime and violence is substantial.** Depending on the measurement methodology used,[9] the costs of crime and violence can account for over 10% of GDP in LAC. In a recent World Bank report,[10] the total cost of crime and violence in Central America ranged from 3.6% of GDP in Costa Rica to 10.8% of GDP in El Salvador.[11] Even in countries like Uruguay, which has low homicide and victimization rates (5.9/100,000 and 16%, respectively[12]), the IDB has estimated that the costs of crime are 3.1% of GDP.[13] Disability-adjusted life years lost to violence alone cost the equivalent of 1.2% of GDP in LAC.[14]

1.5 ***Citizen security*** **refers to the right of all citizens to live free from all forms of violence and crime.** The term, which has been endorsed by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, puts people rather than the state at the center of security issues.[15] Although violence and crime are conceptually different—not all violence is criminal, nor are all crimes violent—the two terms are often used together.[16] *Violence and crime prevention* and *citizen security* are also often used interchangeably in the public policy context to indicate policies that prevent all harmful activities against persons and properties, whatever the location, motive, or victim of such activities.

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7 UNODC 2007.

8 Waters et al. 2004.

9 Buvinic and Morrison (1999) outline accounting, housing and land models using hedonic regression, and contingent valuation methodologies to measuring violence. The Bank uses all three in its violence assessments of the region.

10 World Bank 2010.

11 Here, the costs considered are medical attention, lost production, emotional damage, public security, administration of justice, private security costs for households, private security costs for businesses, and transfers.

12 For these figures, see the UNODC Homicide database and Corporación Latinobarómetro 2012.

13 IDB 2012.

14 World Bank 2010.

15 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (2009:8) defines citizen security as the rights of "all members of a society […] to live their daily lives with as little threat as possible to their personal security, their civic rights and their right to the use and enjoyment of their property."

16 Despite the difference between violence and crime, available and comparable data, such as those presented in this introduction, are usually on violent crime, particularly homicide.

1.6 **Citizen security is a complex challenge.** Crime and violence are multidimensional issues that manifest themselves in a variety of ways. They are context-specific and have many causes. Multiple risk factors have been identified at the individual, community, and society levels, but their salience varies from country to country and even from community to community. Sound policymaking has proven to be challenging because of the uncertainty, political sensitivity, and high risks involved.

1.7 **The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, or the Bank) has been involved in citizen security projects for almost two decades.** Although programming in the sector was not formally identified as a Bankwide priority until the Ninth General Capital Increase in 2010, earlier documents like the *Report of the Working Group on the Institutional Strategy* of 1999, the 2003 *Strategy for the Modernization of the State*, and the 2010 *Strategy for Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare* all highlighted the importance of citizen security for the continued development of the region. The first project with a component explicitly addressing citizen security was approved in 1996, and in 1998 the first two stand-alone projects on the issue were approved. The portfolio grew slowly at first, with only six loans approved in the early 2000s, but demand for operations in the sector has increased rapidly since 2009. Six operations totaling US$263.8 million—more than half of the total portfolio of US$481 million—have been approved in the past four years alone. The Bank's portfolio in citizen security has been developed within a clear framework that prohibits the use of Bank financing for activities related to drug and arms trafficking.

1.8 **In light of the Bank's increased focus on citizen security, IDB's Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) has undertaken a two-part evaluation of citizen security at the Bank.** The first part of the evaluation, completed in 2013, was an in-depth comparative evaluation of five citizen security projects intended to give a better understanding of the elements of design and supervision that led to successful implementation. The evaluation found five necessary conditions for successful projects: (i) solid situational and institutional diagnostics that tailor project design to the country context; (ii) the identification of core elements and best practices for selected intervention models; (iii) appropriate project implementation practices, including clear roles for participating agencies, beneficiary participation, training and feedback for practitioners, and multisector coordination; (iv) effective communication and outreach to relevant government agencies, targeted populations, the media, and other stakeholders; and (v) adequate resources and incentives for quality content-based supervision.

1.9 **This second evaluation is meant to complement the findings of the in-depth project review by looking more broadly at the Bank's engagement in the citizen security sector.** It focuses on the Bank's work from 1998 to 2012 and addresses two questions:

- How has the Bank's engagement in citizen security evolved, as measured through its formal strategy and citizen security portfolio?

- What particular challenges characterize citizen security, and how has the Bank responded to these challenges?

1.10 **Data sources include the following:**

- In-depth review of project documentation, including project operational documents (PODs) and situational and institutional diagnostics.
- Seven case studies—in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Chile, Uruguay, and Buenos Aires Province—designed to give a better understanding of the diversity of contexts in which the Bank has provided support for improving citizen security.
- Five background papers: Knowledge; Project Monitoring and Evaluation; Youth-at-Risk Interventions; Information Systems; and Penitentiary Systems.
- Semi-structured interviews with governmental officials; Bank specialists, managers, and Executive Directors; and staff of partners such as the World Bank, the OAS, and country-based multilateral and bilateral agencies.

1.11 **The evaluation does not attempt to measure the development effectiveness of the Bank's overall engagement,** given the low level of data collection in early projects and the inability to collect results from young projects that have just started their implementation. It nevertheless draws on the findings of the first evaluation regarding the specific results of selected projects.

II. BANK STRATEGIES AND PORTFOLIO, 1998-2012

2.1 **The IDB was the first multilateral development bank to engage in citizen security.** As social inequality in LAC increased, democratization processes proved difficult, and rates of violence spiraled upward, some countries in the region called on the international financial institutions for support in developing and financing comprehensive violence prevention strategies. The link between violence and development was increasingly acknowledged,[17] as were the negative social and economic effects of violence and crime.[18] Loans to El Salvador in 1996 and to Colombia and Uruguay in 1998 began the Bank's support to citizen security in the LAC region.

A. Bank Strategies and Guidelines on Citizen Security

2.2 **From the beginning, the IDB adopted a preventive agenda and advocated a comprehensive approach to the issue of violence and crime.** Although knowledge on ways to prevent violence and crime was weak when the Bank made its initial loans, it was already apparent that prevention was more cost-effective than dealing with the consequences of violence[19] and that a multisectoral approach was needed to address the wide variety of risk factors.[20] The Bank promoted an integrated preventive approach based on the understanding that violence was a learned behavior linked to a series of risk factors that could be prevented.[21] Lacking experience in citizen security per se, the Bank sought to build on its expertise in sectors relevant to violence prevention—such as education, health, social protection, urban development, and justice—and to use its financing to encourage long-term continuity of programming.

2.3 **The first articulation of the Bank's rationale for working in citizen security was included in the *Report on the Working Group on the Institutional Strategy* (1999).** While the document lauded the region's progress toward democratic governance, it also found that state institutions in the region were rarely strong or flexible enough to appropriately promote development. The strategy specifically highlighted corruption and weak judicial, legislative, and civil institutions as drivers of inequality and citizen insecurity. Given the IDB's history of working with public institutions, the strategy outlined social sector reform, state modernization, and competitiveness as strategic areas for IDB intervention that would improve the environment of the region by decreasing inequality and increasing citizen security.[22]

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17 Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998, 2000, 2001; Gaviria, Guerrero, and Londoño 2000.

18 Arriagada and Godoy 2000.

19 Rosenberg and Fenley 1991.

20 WHO 2002.

21 Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 1999; Buvinic and Morrison 1999; Buvinic, Lamas, and Alda 2005.

22 IDB, GN-2077-1.

2.4 **The Bank also justified its involvement in citizen security by noting the social and economic costs of crime and violence to the LAC region.** The 2002 *Preliminary Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects* identified inequality as both a driver of violent acts and the result of violence, which particularly affects poor and vulnerable populations. In addition to the economic and social costs of insecure environments—such as loss of human capital (both for individuals and firms), barriers to investment, and decreases in productivity—the effect of violence on the poor was a major reason the Bank wanted to expand its work on citizen security.[23]

2.5 **While the IDB recognized that risk factors for violence encompassed a variety of sectors, the guidelines identified specific areas for potential Bank operations:** gathering and sharing information on citizen security and violence prevention in the region; strengthening the health care system's ability to identify, refer, and treat victims of violence (especially women and youth); strengthening the education sector to combat violent behavior in school settings, fund after-school programs, and reach out to at-risk youths and young mothers outside of school; strengthening the justice sector's ability to investigate crime, provide timely and fair trials, impose and carry out reasonable sentences while respecting human rights and the principles of due process, handle cases of domestic violence, and provide programs for the rehabilitation of criminals; promoting antiviolence behavior through media systems; strengthening the preventive functions of police forces; rehabilitating prisoners and promoting alternative sentencing and mediation practices, especially for juvenile and minor offenders; and funding situational, social, community-based, and legislative prevention activities.

2.6 **Since 2009 the IDB's strategy has expanded its scope of intervention further into the criminal justice system.** While the Bank maintained the importance of working on prevention, the *Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety* (2009) expanded the scope of Bank engagement related to criminal justice, including comprehensive support for police and penitentiary systems.[24] The guidelines continued to identify excluded areas where the Bank would not provide support and outlined limited ways in which the IDB could address organized crime.[25] In 2012, the IDB complemented the operational guidelines with a conceptual framework (*Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence*) that classified the

23 IDB 2002.

24 The role of the IDB in criminal justice activities was further elaborated in the *Action Plan and Operational Guidelines for More Effective Justice Administration Systems* (2011), which focused on technical assistance to bring criminal justice to international standards, support for models of "problem-oriented" and "evidence-based" policing, training for public officials, media campaigns to encourage support for reforms, and training in the investigation and processing of complex crimes. The document further promoted increased support for collecting crime statistics for knowledge generation, increased access to the criminal justice system through the advertisement of rights and promotion of mobile justice centers, and a focus on decreasing crowding in prisons to improve the ability of the criminal justice system to rehabilitate inmates.

25 IDB 2009.

Bank's citizen security interventions in five specific areas and one broader cross-sectoral area (Table 2.1). The same year the IDB produced guidelines for judicial reforms, to which the conceptual framework refers. [26]

Table 2.1. IDB's Areas of Intervention in Citizen Security

Cross-cutting areas of action	**Institutional capabilities** Enhance state effectiveness and efficiency to prevent crime and violence by increasing policymaking capacities and promoting the use of empirical evidence					**Excluded areas of action**
Specific areas of prevention	**Social interventions**	**Situational prevention**	**Police**	**Judiciary system**	**Penitentiary system**	Military operations, anti-terrorism, intelligence, armed forces, procurement of weapons or war equipment, drug trafficking, money-laundering crime
Key objective	Addressing violent and criminal behavior among young people; substance abuse; and domestic violence*	Reducing opportunities for criminal and violent behavior stemming from environmental factors	Detecting opportunities for crime and deterring its occurrence	Detecting, prosecuting, and sentencing offenders	Increasing the effectiveness of rehabilitation, in order to prevent recidivism after social integration	

Source: IDB, 2012. Conceptual framework and empirical evidence, IDB-DP-232, 2012:2

Note: The table is reproduced from the Conceptual Framework, 2012. The operational guidelines identify three main areas that regroup the five sub-areas and the cross-cutting area of action. OVE chose the conceptual framework presentation because, as the most recent one, it is assumed to reflect the Bank's currently preferred presentation.

* Social interventions to prevent youth from progressing from low-risk to high-risk behavior, which are proximate determinants of violent and criminal behavior. Social interventions also extend to preventing domestic violence, which includes preventing the intergenerational transmission of violent behavior (IDB 2012:1).

B. Bank Lending for Citizen Security

2.7 **The Bank's portfolio in citizen security developed slowly at first.** The Bank sponsored conferences and seminars on crime and violence and financed a series of technical cooperation operations on violence against women as early as 1996;[27] in that year it also approved its first project with a component explicitly addressing citizen security. [28] The first projects that had crime and violence reduction as a primary objective were approved in 1998. From 1998 through 2012 the Bank approved 17 loans in 14 countries for a total of US$481 million (Table 2.2)—and nearly half of that amount was accounted for by six projects approved in the last four years of the period (Figure 2.1). The Bank also financed 200 nonlending technical cooperation activities and a variety of analytic work related

[26] The Bank also financed a protocol for evidence-based intervention in citizen security; see Sherman 2012.

[27] IDB, technical cooperations ATN/SF-5421 to 5427-RG.

[28] El Salvador (ES-00090). This project is not included in the citizen security portfolio because it is not a stand-alone operation focusing on citizen security, even though it was initially designed as such. It was nonetheless a precursor in the Bank's agenda to begin addressing the issue.

to citizen security. In more recent years, it has approved two special initiatives, one to strengthen information systems and the other to gather evidence and disseminate knowledge on citizen security.

Table 2.2. Citizen Security Portfolio

Country	Title	Approval Date	IDB Loan (US$ millions)	Total Cost (US$ millions)	Status
El Salvador	Violence Prevention Strategy Comprehensive Support Program	Dec-12	45	45.0	Approved/Active
Uruguay	Local Public Safety Integrated Management Program	Sep-12	5	7.2	Implementation/Active
Honduras	Program of Support for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Civic Coexistence	Jun-12	66.4	70.4	Implementation/Active
Ecuador	Citizen Security Program: Strengthening Police Effectiveness through Improvements in Management & Crime Info	Sep-11	10	10.6	Implementation/Active
Costa Rica	Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Program	May-11	132.44	187.8	Implementation/Active
Belize	Community Action for Public Safety	Dec-10	5	5.2	Implementation/Active
Jamaica	Citizen Security and Justice Programme II (and additions)	Dec-09	33.708	33.7	Implementation/Active
Argentina	Citizen Security and Inclusion Program	Oct-09	25	36.6	Implementation/Active
Trinidad and Tobago	Citizen Security Program	Mar-08	24.5	35.0	Implementation/Active
Panama	Comprehensive Security Program (PROSI)	Jul-06	22.7	25.1	Implementation/Active
Guyana	Citizen Security Programme	Jun-06	19.8	22.0	Implementation/Active
Nicaragua	Citizenship Security Program	Nov-04	7.19	12.8	Completed, 2011
Chile	Innovation Program for a Safer Chile	Nov-03	8.2	16.6	Completed, 2010
Honduras	Sula Valley Citizenship Security	Mar-03	13.9	22.2	Completed, 2012
Jamaica	Citizen Security and Justice	Sep-01	14.49	17.4	Completed, 2010
Uruguay	Citizens Safety Prevention of Violence & Delinquency	Mar-98	14.2	21.2	Completed, 2005
Colombia	Support for peaceful coexistence and citizen security	Feb-98	33.7	84.6	Completed, 2009

Note: The information in this table was taken from OPS in November 2013. The list includes only stand-alone operations that have the explicit objective of preventing violence and crime/improving citizen security. The 1996 loan to support criminal justice reform in El Salvador (ES-00090) is therefore not included here.
The approved and disbursed amounts for the projects in Honduras and Jamaica take into account subsequent additions.
For "Completed" projects, the effective termination year was assumed to be the year the PCR was approved.
Source: OPS.

Figure 2.1. IDB Lending by Approval Year



Source: OVEDA, 2012.

2.8 **Operations are geographically spread over the region, with Central America having the highest share of projects (41%) and lending amount (61%)** (see Table 2.3). The Caribbean and Southern Cone subregions had the same number of projects approved, although funding in the Caribbean was almost twice that in the Southern Cone. With only two projects, the Andean Group received 9% of funding in the sector. The Bank has also received several requests to prepare operations that have yet to materialize, particularly in Brazil, where preparations have been undertaken three times without resulting loans.

Table 2.3: Citizen Security Lending by Region

Region	Countries in region	% of total countries	# of citizen security projects	% of total projects	Total (USD millions)	% of total lending	% of countries w/ projects in region
Andean Group	5	29.4%	2	11.8%	43.7	9.1%	40.0%
Caribbean	6	35.3%	4	23.5%	92.5	19.2%	66.7%
Central America	9	52.9%	7	41.2%	292.6	60.8%	77.8%
Southern Cone	5	29.4%	4	23.5%	52.4	10.9%	80.0%

Source: OVEDA 2012.
Note: For this exercise, the Bank's regional groups (CSC, CAN, CCB, CID) were used.

2.9 **The Bank has financed projects in a wide variety of contexts.** In Central America, the Bank has financed projects in Honduras and El Salvador, which have the highest homicide rates in the region, as well as in Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica, where homicide rates are significantly lower. The income and

institutional capacity of the Bank's partners in citizen security loans are also highly variable.

2.10 **The Bank has typically used an integrated multisector approach, especially in the earlier interventions.** This approach has focused on five programming areas—strengthening citizen security institutions and policies (including gathering and sharing information), social prevention, criminal justice system, and community participation/communication (Figure 2.2).[29] Social prevention—or working with communities and populations that are at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence—is a clear theme in the portfolio.

Figure 2.2. Components per Project (as a percentage of total budgets)



Notes: Percentages allocated to each component do not add up to 100% because there is always a portion allocated to monitoring and evaluation, contingencies, preparation facilities, and program administration. Percentages are based on the total cost of the project (IDB + Government). Special operations with additional funds are included.
Source: PODs ("Detailed Budget" when available).

2.11 **The specific objectives of projects have shifted over time.** Before 2010, 73% of projects had the specific objective of strengthening the capacity of institutions related to citizen security, while after 2010 only 33% of projects had that objective (Table 2.4). Increasing the efficacy of national police in preventing crime and violence and the integration of at-risk youth, whether or not they had already been in conflict with the law, were increasingly prevalent objectives over the period. The new cohort of citizen security projects includes support for comprehensive police reforms (in Honduras and Costa Rica[30]) or key elements for police strengthening (in Ecuador and Uruguay). The Bank's involvement in

29 The categories that OVE uses here are taken from the project design documents, and therefore specific intentions for a category can be somewhat unclear.

30 This component was restructured following a grant provided by the Chinese Government for the construction of a police academy.

penitentiary reforms in El Salvador and Costa Rica also reflects changes in the 2009 operational guidelines that increased the Bank's flexibility to fund projects within the criminal justice system.

Table 2.4. Typology of Citizen Security Projects' Specific Objectives

	Specific Objectives Typology												
	Institutional Strengthening		Information Systems			Criminal Justice			Youth		Community		
Country - app month/app yr	*Strenghthen Institutional Capacity (National and/or Local level)*	*Assist in the design/implementation of the CS national Policy/Strategy in CS*	*Develop/Improve Information Systems on crime and violence*	*Provide technical assistance in monitoring and evaluation of programs/projects*	*Promote knowledge exchange on succesful local experiences in violence/insecurity reduction*	*Increase the efficacy of National Police in preventing crime and violence*	*Improve Criminal Investigation capacity*	*Improve the delivery of judicial services*	*Promote social integration of Youths*	*Reduce recidivism among Youth in rehabilitation institutions*	*Increase in the perception of safety within community*	*Develop communication campaigns to raise awarness within community*	*Promote engagement/ participation of Civil Society and CSOs*
Colombia (1998)		X	X	X	X								
Uruguay (1998)	X												X
Jamaica I (2001)	X							X					
Honduras I (2003)	X					X			X			X	
Chile (2003)	X	X											
Nicaragua (2004)	X								X				X
Guyana (2006)	X	X				X							
Panama (2006)	X								X				
Trinidad y Tobago (2008)						X					X		
Argentina (2009)											X		
Jamaica II (2009)	X										X		X
Belize (2010)									X	X			
Costa Rica (2011)						X			X	X			
Ecuador (2011)						X							
Honduras (2011)	X					X	X						
Uruguay (2012)						X			X				
El Salvador (2012)	X								X	X			
Total	9	3	1	1	1	6	1	1	5	2	3	1	3
%	53%	18%	6%	6%	6%	35%	6%	6%	29%	12%	18%	6%	18%

2.12 **As the Bank's approach has evolved, so have the types of activities the Bank finances.** In terms of institutions, before 2010, all but one project worked directly on reforming or strengthening policymaking, and all but two worked on police strengthening—mainly support to community policing. Almost 73% of projects worked on strengthening information systems. After 2010, two-thirds of project interventions dealt directly with police reform or strengthening, but only half with policymaking reform or strengthening. Information systems strengthening became an intervention in all projects, and the number of projects that included a penitentiary reform intervention grew to one-third. While before 2010 at least two-thirds of operations promoted community and youth centers, community engagement, school programs, and community-based reinsertion programs for individuals and households, after 2010 the emphasis on community-based interventions decreased: only half of projects included a program in schools or community-based reinsertion programs, and no other type of individual or household-focused intervention was executed in more than two operations (see Table A.2 in Annexes).

2.13 **Though the Bank has engaged in police support since the first citizen security projects, the focus has broadened from community policing to more comprehensive police reforms.** While the first projects included education and training of officials to improve attitudes and performance as public servants and improve relations with the community, more recent ones have aimed to improve

police efficacy by supporting basic and specialized training, increasing investigative skills, and providing equipment for strategic policing. In Ecuador, for example, the IDB has focused on developing new police protocols for data collection, data analysis, and police deployment. In Honduras, the project includes the creation of a new curriculum, codes of ethics, and procedural manuals; the training of new police officers; and the strengthening of the internal accountability body. In Costa Rica, the project originally aimed to increase police efficacy by creating a new police academy and new curriculum as well as internal accountability mechanisms, although this component was restructured following a grant provided by the Chinese Government

2.14 **The Bank's juvenile reinsertion models have evolved to include detention centers.** In Uruguay's 1998 project, the Bank supported the development of a comprehensive reinsertion model for young offenders and the transformation of a hospital into a rehabilitation center. In Panama in 2006, the Bank financed the construction of a juvenile detention center along with the development of a reinsertion model. In both cases, results are unclear. In Uruguay, the implementation of the model was not sustained and the juvenile rehabilitation center, criticized for under-utilization, was eventually transformed into a female prison. In Panama the center was built, but during OVE's mission in 2012 the reinsertion model had yet to be validated by international experts, and its capacity for implementation and sustainability was uncertain (see OVE 2013). In current projects in Uruguay and Belize, the Bank will experiment with new models by combining youth reinsertion programs based in detention centers with individual follow-up upon release.

2.15 **The Bank has also expanded its scope of intervention toward adult prisons in two recent projects.** In Costa Rica, the Bank's project includes the expansion of a rehabilitation model based on educational and work-related activities for inmates and the professionalization of the penitentiary staff. The project also finances the piloting of electronic bracelets and a community reinsertion model based on public-private partnerships to facilitate ex-offenders' employment upon release. In El Salvador, the Bank focuses on infrastructure, equipment, and training for educational and work-related activities for inmates in semi-trust phases. A pilot to introduce electronic bracelets as a means to alleviate prison congestion is also planned.

2.16 **The increased financing of criminal justice reforms responds to clearly identified needs in the region as well as to limited funding availability from other donors.** As Table 2.5 shows, the IDB is the most prominent funder of penitentiary systems for Central America. For police reforms, the United States has provided significant grants (WOLA and IDB 2013), but the Bank is the second-largest funder. Of the US$880 million in international cooperation under implementation in Central America to strengthen citizen security, US$156 million

support police, US$139 million inmate rehabilitation, and US$586 million prevention.[31]

Table 2.5. Citizen Security Interventions (US$) in Central America, 2006-2012

	Police Strengthening		Penitentiary System and Rehabilitation		Local Government Strengthening		Prevention	
	Reimbursable	*Donation*	*Reimbursable*	*Donation*	*Reimbursable*	*Donation*	*Reimbursable*	*Donation*
BID	**52,209,349**	**959,000**	**73,191,364**		**3,666,427**	**552,960**	**90,814,317**	**526,998**
USA		60,870,148		40,216,193		14,213,439		174,698,130
Canada		8,418,288		1,428,331				3,704,125
European Comission		4,105,140		8,521,485		7,894,736		28,874,912
Spain		16,586,297		4,000,763		9,935,651		47,296,992
Suecia								14,364,985
Italy				110,000		2,590,304		1,862,270
Netherlands		1,470,588				1,202,613		12,794,401
Germany		1,179,540		11,004,706				56,065,403
Norway		577,000						
Dinamarca								90,000
Reino Unido								88,874
World Bank							108,100,000	2,545,000
UN		760,615		915,800		1,492,579		19,433,953
BCIE	5,000,000						2,860,000	
Taipei China ***		2,000,000		14,508				
Japan		1,669,228						4,000,000
South Corea							15,077,000	5,670
Australia								1,051,700
Open Society Foundations		50,000						97,500
Ford Foundation						34,500		1,165,000
Oxfam								100,000
W.K. Kellogg Foundation								325,000
Soros Foundation								66,291
Total	**57,209,349**	**98,645,843**	**73,191,364**	**66,211,785**	**3,666,427**	**37,916,782**	**216,851,317**	**369,157,204**

Source: WOLA and IDB 2013.

******* Use of the phrase 'Taipei China' does not in any way reflect a position by the Bank or any of its member countries regarding issues of national sovereignty or diplomatic recognition

2.17 **OVE's 2013 evaluation found that the Bank's citizen security projects faced considerable difficulties in project design and implementation.** Although projects' situational diagnostics provided sound information about crime and violence trends, they consistently underrepresented certain forms of violence and often lacked evidence on specific situational and risk factors affecting crime and violence. Projects rarely analyzed available services, institutions, legal frameworks, and policies, and institutional assessment findings were rarely incorporated into project design. Even when Bank projects addressed relevant development challenges, they did not identify core elements for intervention success. Bank projects also had mixed success in engaging key policymakers. The more complex projects, which depended on interagency coordination to achieve objectives, saw little success. On the whole, neither project communication nor supervision appeared to be a Bank priority. OVE additionally found that results matrices designed before 2009 were inadequate for gathering evidence. The Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL) identified similar issues in a complementary review.

[31] These figures include only the cooperation to Central America. Data for other subregions are not systematically available.

2.18 **The new cohort of projects shows improvement in design, but continues to lack clarity.** In some, the Bank has addressed the pitfalls associated with overly complex projects. Among the new cohort of projects, those in Ecuador and Uruguay stand out for more precise design, a stronger theory of change, and reduced complexity. These projects are exceptional, however; the majority of projects continue to be unduly complex and to lack clear intervention models. On the whole, results matrices have greatly improved (see Table A.3 in the Annexes), providing potential for more precise results measurement once implementation is completed. Nonetheless, problems with implementation persist in recent projects, as evidenced by the slow or nonexistent disbursement of the new cohort (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. Disbursement Rate by Citizen Security Project



Notes: Black bars indicate completed projects; dotted bars indicate a project for which disbursements have been made in at least one of its components; gray bars indicate projects for which disbursements to date correspond to an "Anticipo de Fondos" "advance of funds" that has not been assigned to a particular component. Values in parenthesis indicate % disbursed corresponding to project's components. Special operations (increasing the total approved amount of a project) are included in calculations.

Source: Information taken from LMS1 System on 11/14/2013.

C. Nonlending Activities

2.19 **The Bank has provided US$24.6 million for knowledge-related activities over the past 15 years;** [32] **half of this amount (US$12.6) is currently in implementation.** Since 1998, the Bank has financed 137 publications related to citizen security, 8 economic and sector work projects, and a number of conferences, workshops, and other technical assistance activities. It has also approved two special initiatives to address knowledge gaps in citizen security: the Regional System of Standardized Indicators for Citizen Security and Violence

32 This corresponds to about 5% of its lending portfolio over the years.

Prevention Initiative (called SES for its Spanish acronym)[33] (US$ 2.55 million), and the Special Program and Multidonor Fund for Citizen Security (Citizen Security Initiative) (up to US$20 million), approved in 2008 and 2012 respectively. The SES seeks to support consensus-building on concepts and methods for measuring crime and violence both among the countries in the region and between the institutions responsible for this information in each of them.[34] The objective of the Citizen Security Initiative is to improve the effectiveness of public policies in the region though three activities: (i) generating, analyzing, and disseminating data; (ii) strengthening the capacity of state entities to manage and evaluate public policies on citizen security; and (iii) promoting more sharing of knowledge and good practices through regional dialogue and bilateral cooperation.[35]

2.20 **Publications do not seem to respond to a clear research agenda**. As part of the evaluation, OVE commissioned a review of the publications financed or sponsored by the Bank. The review found that the thematic emphasis of Bank publications has changed over time—first focusing on violence at the macro level, then intrafamily violence, violence prevention, and finally on citizen security policies at the macro level—but there has not been a clearly defined research agenda (see Table A.4 in Annexes).[36]

2.21 **The Bank's technical cooperation activities have financed regional violence and crime diagnostics, but have not been well coordinated with the operational portfolio.** An analysis of the 59 technical cooperation (TC) activities executed between 2008 and 2012 shows that half had a regional scope. Only 15% focused on Central American[37] and Caribbean countries, where most loans have been approved during the period. The focus of these TCs has not generally coincided with the primary objectives of citizen security operations. For instance, only 7 out of 59 TCs (about 12%) studied topics related to criminal justice systems (see Table A.4 in Annexes). Overall, TCs seem to be used on an ad hoc basis for short-term objectives rather than for strategically improving operation design and implementation.

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33 Sistema Regional de Indicadores Estandarizados de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (SES): Consolidación, expansión y diseminación. This is a regional public good program. Regional technical cooperation (RG-T2205), co-executed with the Institute CISALVA of the University of the Valle, in Colombia.

34 www.seguridadyregion.com

35 Proposal for the Establishment of the Special Program and Multidonor Fund for Citizen Security ("Citizen Security Initiative").

36 Reports made up 20% of the total publications in citizen security, articles for discussion 18%, and technical notes 15%. Studies and evaluations made up only 14% and 3% of published documents, respectively. Publications typically focused on the region on the whole (46%), on Colombia (14%), and on international issues (8%). Only 8% of publications were focused on the Caribbean and 12% on Central America.

37 This excludes Mexico.

2.22 **So far, the Bank's research and evaluation work has not produced rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of specific approaches or interventions, even though this was identified as a strategic priority by the Bank** (IDB 2012a, 2012b). Recent improvement in evaluative frameworks has greatly increased the potential for learning, though indicators of impact are still difficult to identify and indicators of the quality of outputs continue to be inadequate (see Table A.3 in Annexes).

2.23 **The timing of evaluations may limit the Bank's ability to show results in pending evaluations.** Using the Maryland scale,[38] a study commissioned by OVE showed that nearly 70% of most recent projects include rigorous evaluations (experimental or quasi-experimental).[39] That said, in at least three countries (Uruguay, El Salvador, and Honduras),[40] the terms of reference for those evaluations will be determined only after three years of implementation, giving little time for results to appear. Evaluations for most recent projects depend on information systems that will be developed or strengthened as part of the project itself, which might jeopardize the availability of data at the beginning of the interventions, even if the project is successful in achieving its objectives. Furthermore, no attempts have been made so far to test specific combinations of interventions. In social prevention, for instance, such exercises would be extremely valuable: they would involve comparing different levels of intervention with additive designs to test the effects of additional features or services on outcomes in particular contexts.

2.24 **In terms of knowledge dissemination and information strengthening, the Bank has played a valuable convening role for policymakers, experts, and civil society in the region.** The Bank is one of the founding members of the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence, which promotes a preventive agenda and aims to enhance dialogue and share information among stakeholders.[41] The Bank has also organized a number of conferences, workshops, and study tours in the region, has strengthened regional networks of experts, and has participated in (and at times led) coordination efforts among donors on citizen security in countries such as Nicaragua, Honduras, or Jamaica. Through its regional SES program, the Bank has pushed for better information systems, data collection, and policymaking in the region. Despite the participation of 15 countries, this work has yet to translate into technical improvements in countries. The Bank has also begun a comparative analysis of crime and violence observatories through the SES program. This ongoing exercise deserves careful attention because it could be used to more clearly identify the conditions under

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38 The internal validity of an evaluation refers to the capacity to determine whether observed effects can be attributed to the project. Sherman et al. (1998) describe the Maryland scientific method scale as a five-level scale with which to assess the internal validity of an evaluation design.

39 Of the operations, 20% had experimental evaluation plans (level 5), 48% had quasi-experimental evaluations (level 4), and 32% had level 2 evaluation frameworks (see Table A.4 in Annexes).

40 No dates are available for Jamaica II and Belize.

41 See http://www.oas.org/dsp/IACPV/ingles/cpo_que_hacemos.asp.

which such bodies are relevant for policymaking. In the coming years, the 2012 Citizen Security Initiative is expected to improve the effectiveness of citizen security policies, though it is still too soon for it to have produced results.[42]

[42] Proposal for the Establishment of the Special Program and Multidonor Fund for Citizen Security (April 2012).

III. KEY CHALLENGES IN CITIZEN SECURITY AND THE BANK'S RESPONSE

3.1 A number of inherent challenges make citizen security a particularly difficult sector in which to work and to achieve results. Three of the biggest challenges are the complexity, the high level of risks, and the high barriers to collecting meaningful data and evidence on what works in this sector.

A. The Challenge of Complexity

3.2 **Addressing issues of citizen security is one of the most complex challenges of public policy and administration, particularly in developing countries.** There are many manifestations of violence and crime—homicide, rapes, domestic violence, child maltreatment, elderly abuse, robbery, extortion, and others. Addressing each type requires working with specific groups of victims and perpetrators, most of whom belong to the most vulnerable or disadvantaged groups and can be hard to reach. Perpetrators might also have different motives, so that a set of specific knowledge and skills is necessary for working with them.[43] Also, different forms of violence reinforce each other and evolve along a continuum of violence (Moser and Shrader 1999; Moser 2006; Whitzman 2008).[44]

3.3 **In addition to being multidimensional, violence and crime are also multicausal and context-specific**. Even though several disciplines have studied the issue and propose competing theories to explain violence and crime, they all acknowledge the multicausality of the phenomenon (Buvinic and Morrison 1999; WHO 2002; World Bank 2007, 2011; UNDP 2013).[45] The World Health Organization, among others, has promoted the use of an ecological model to identify risk factors at the individual, relationship, community, and societal levels (WHO 2002). Even though many factors are similar across settings, the specific combination and particular salience of some of them depend on each context.[46]

3.4 **The multidimensionality and multicausality of violence and crime have led development agencies and experts to advocate a multisector approach, which has its own challenges.**[47] No one sector is an obvious counterpart for multisector

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43 For instance, street children or youth involved in *pandillas* (gangs) are particularly volatile populations, and working with them involves specific methodologies, training, and skills (de Oliveira, Baizerman, and Pellet 1992; Hecht 1998; Lusk 1989; Bielh 1999).

44 In particular, being witness or victim of domestic violence and child maltreatment can lead to a greater propensity to perpetrate violent behaviors (Maddaleno, Concha, and Marques 2006; Willman 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010).

45 Instead of causes, experts prefer referring to risk factors, following an epidemiological approach. Risk factors are characteristics that increase the likelihood that an individual will behave violently or be victim of violence (WBI 2011).

46 See OVE 2011 for a description of risk factors. For example, poor parenting skills and harsh punishment have been identified as a facilitating factor to violent behavior perpetration. In some countries, studies show that punitive discipline is widespread, thus justifying particular attention to this issue.

47 See, for instance, Buvinic and Morrison 1999; Buvinic, Alda, and Lamas 2005; WHO 2002; UNDP 2013; World Bank 2007, 2011.

issues. Citizen security strategies require coordination among ministries and agencies that are not necessarily accountable to one another. Only when government leaders—such as the president, prime minister, or mayor—take the lead do multisector projects tend to attain priority status for all parties (Whitzman 2008; Garrett and Natalicchio 2011). Multisector work has also proven difficult to implement, as it often requires coordination among such stakeholders as social ministries, criminal justice institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private sector actors, community-based organizations, and faith-based organizations, which are not accustomed to working with one another (OVE 2013). The need for some projects to be implemented at both the community and national levels can further complicate the political economy of action.[48]

3.5 **The consensus on how to strengthen citizen security is also fragile, with a persistent tendency to rely on traditional criminal justice-centric approaches.** As violence and crime ultimately deal with life, death, and trauma, citizens demand quick and visible results. Impunity and rising violence and crime have made security a top priority for citizens (Latinobarómetro 2012), who sometimes hire private security guards or even proceed to arbitrary self-help mechanisms (Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión 2011; LAPOP-UNDP 2012) when governments are unable to produce desired results immediately. Though governments in the region understand the importance of prevention, funding has tended to favor rule-of-law approaches that punish infractions rather than addressing root causes, in part because such approaches produce more visible and timely impacts. In Central America in particular, some governments have responded to rising crime and violence by making sentences harsher and implementing *mano dura* (iron-fist) policies, including resorting to the use of the military for law enforcement duties.

3.6 **Since beginning its involvement, the Bank has recognized the complexity of the topic and has advocated an integrated, multisector approach to violence and crime**. Beginning in the 1990s, the Bank pushed for an emphasis on prevention when most public policies in the region were emphasizing *mano dura* approaches. The Bank used its convening power to gather international experts and enhance public debate and evidence to move the dialogue toward prevention. With broad experience in multiple sectors relevant to violence and crime prevention—education, health, social protection, justice, and urban development—the Bank believed it could successfully finance both sector-specific components and stand-alone multisectoral operations. Over the years, multisector citizen security loans have become the primary instrument of the Bank's direct support to citizen security.

3.7 **The use of multisector stand-alone operations has advantages, including giving visibility to violence and crime prevention inside and outside the Bank**. Having an organizational unit in charge of citizen security institutionalizes

[48] In fact, certain institutions depend on the national level, such as the police or the penitentiary system, while interventions must be tailored to the specific local context, sometimes at the neighborhood or community level (World Bank 2011). Authorities at the local level might not have hierarchical power over institutions such as the police.

the issue in the Bank's development agenda and facilitates dialogue with borrowing countries and partners. It clarifies what the Bank can offer, highlights the need for an integrated approach, and facilitates knowledge-sharing across countries.

3.8 **However, the integrated stand-alone approach also has disadvantages, and in practice has led to a broad spectrum of interventions without clear prioritization.** As the previous chapter discussed, the Bank's interventions span the entire violence and crime prevention continuum.[49] While the flexibility and client-responsiveness are commendable, prioritization has been lacking and the broad range of activities has made it difficult to monitor and measure results.

3.9 **Ensuring expertise across the range of interventions has also been a major challenge.** The five sub-areas of intervention are very different from each other, and each requires specialized knowledge and skills; and the sub-areas themselves sometimes have varied components, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. Having sufficient knowledge and skills in all sub-areas would be challenging for any organization and is a particular challenge for the relatively small team in IDB, particularly given the lack of clear priorities among the sub-areas. Limitations on cross-sector collaboration heighten the difficulties. The Bank has responded to internal skill constraints by contracting experts in the region[50] and developing training activities for its staff,[51] but major challenges remain.

3.10 **Difficulties in cross-sector collaboration[52] have inhibited the Bank's ability to draw on expertise in other sector units for citizen security work.** No citizen security projects have used double-booking,[53] and only in the Belize project has a specialist from another sector unit (in this case education) been fully involved in the design and supervision of a component of a citizen security project.

B. The Challenge of Risks

3.11 **Citizen security is a particularly politicized and sensitive area that entails risks for both the Bank and client countries.** One risk results from the high turnover of counterparts—both political appointees and technical staff—which creates instability in strategies and complicates project implementation.[54] The

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49 That is, the Bank can finance activities and programs related to social and situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary, including the institutional strengthening of all institutions involved throughout this continuum (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).

50 According to interviews undertaken for this evaluation.

51 The Citizen Security cluster in VPS has organized specialized clinics and training sessions, in particular in youth violence prevention and criminal justice, including with leading institutions such as John Jay College of Criminal Justice (as a joint effort with SPD and KNL).

52 These difficulties are documented in OVE's recent evaluation of the Realignment, *Evaluation of the Results of the Realignment.*

53 Double-booking is a mechanism that allows two divisions to share the leadership of a project.

54 Of the eight countries where OVE conducted case studies, in at least three—Honduras, El Salvador, and Argentina—the Minister of Security changed no fewer than three times in one four-year administration.

potential for human rights abuses brings reputational risk, most notably for activities involving police[55] and penitentiary[56] reforms. Minimum conditions necessary for success need to be defined as part of risk analysis to prevent lending in situations that could entail violations of human rights.

3.12 **The Bank has hoped to counteract the risks of instability in policy and personnel by providing long-term financing for prevention policies.** As early as 2002, the Bank identified its long-term financing as a comparative advantage in the sector (see preliminary guidelines CP-2191-2), and believed it was well placed to enhance continuity of programs and policies through loans that bridged administrations. It further hoped to play a catalyzing role by promoting prevention policies through joint efforts with other development agencies, communities, and civil society organizations that could enhance support for program continuity.

3.13 **Though instability of policies and counterparts continues to affect Bank projects, the Bank has successfully fostered a longer-term perspective in certain countries.**[57] One example is in Jamaica, where the Bank approved a first loan in 2001 and a second loan in 2009, and is now negotiating the third phase with the Government. The program, called Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) for its initials in English, has evolved throughout the period and has received continuous support from the Government despite changes of Ministers of Security. Moreover, other development agencies, such as those of the U.K. and Canada, have channeled their funding through the Bank because of the continuity of the program. According to stakeholders interviewed, the Bank has been instrumental in building a common understanding of violence prevention and enhancing the continuity of the program in Jamaica, and it should continue to do so in the third phase currently under negotiation. [58]

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55 Surveys undertaken by such agencies as Latinobarómetro and Transparency International have documented that in many countries of the region citizens do not trust the police, viewing them as abusive, corrupt, and/or inefficient. Latinobarómetro found that on average fewer than a third of citizens surveyed over the period 1996-2011 trusted the police (Latinobarómetro 2011). This makes police reforms all the more pressing, but also challenging. Real progress is feasible, as for example in Chile and Colombia, but it is a complex, long-term, and political endeavor (Dammert and Bailey 2005, Hinton and Newburn 2009, Hinton 2006).

56 Inmates in penitentiary systems are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations. Because alternative sentencing mechanisms are often ineffective, citizens tend to see jails as the only way to punish criminal behavior. Many LAC countries face increases in jail populations, worrisome overcrowding (often linked to pretrial detention), a deterioration of inmates' quality of life, and low levels of public investment to improve infrastructure and rehabilitation (UNDP 2013).

57 In Panama, despite significant delays in implementation, the Bank has catalyzed additional external funding and supported the development of a national strategy, though the continuity of the program remains uncertain at the municipal level. In Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, the Bank has been acknowledged as an important catalyst and a source of continuity, in particular in building technical capacity (Chile) and enabling informed debates (Uruguay, in domestic violence).

58 Today, as the Bank and the Government of Jamaica are negotiating the third phase, a new question arises: how to ensure the institutionalization of the program as a violence prevention public policy, beyond the Bank's support.

3.14 **Implementation risks resulting from policy and personnel turnover can also be addressed through project design.** However, ambitious project objectives have in some cases led to overly complex projects (see OVE 2013) with implementation difficulties and very slow disbursements (Chapter 2). Lofty objectives—such as reducing violence and crime in general—may respond to the political need to address pressing situations in countries, but may also reflect the lack of a clear and focused strategy. Setting up expectations for a reduction in national homicide rates in a short timeframe and as a result of one project may be counterproductive.

3.15 **To guard against human rights abuses, the Bank has excluded some interventions from its support.** The guidelines specifically exclude activities involving "high reputational risk and the potential for the abuse of human and civil rights and interference in countries' political affairs" (GN-2535:10) (see excluded areas in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). These guidelines are not sufficient, however, to avoid severe risks. For instance, the Bank can finance police academies where officers are trained in the use of firearms, even if the Bank does not directly finance firearm training per se. Similarly, patrol vehicles can be financed, though supposedly only to implement neighborhood-policing strategies with community involvement. It is difficult to conceive how the Bank could enforce such restrictive use.

3.16 **To complement the list of prohibited activities, the Bank has adopted a case-by-case approach for police support and has developed risk mitigation mechanisms.** Given the diversity of situations in the region, a case-by-case approach makes sense. However, the Bank has not specified criteria that would guide its decisions. In particular, the 2009 operational guidelines do not clarify necessary conditions for its support to "sensitive areas." Risk mitigation mechanisms for police support consist in strengthening internal[59] and external accountability mechanisms. They include mechanisms for civilian oversight (by community or NGOs of recognized expertise) and strengthening the internal affairs bodies within the police force (to avoid excesses in the conduct of police work). To assess whether police forces were accountable to the citizenry and to civilian authorities, the Bank's guidelines proposed a series of questions. Those questions became more general in the 2009 operational guidelines as compared with the 2002 preliminary ones (see Table 3.4).

[59] The guidelines specify that strengthening internal affairs bodies includes ensuring that internal affairs areas are independent from police high command and senior ministry officials, that the legal system guarantees due process for victims of abuse and police personnel, that internal affairs areas and police career path are linked, that independent tribunals channel investigations by the internal affairs areas, that police action is governed by protocols that will ensure an adequate flow of information among areas involved, that police personnel are required to declare their assets, and that there are safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest and to prevent the coopting of civil society representatives participating in oversight bodies (see GN-2535:11, para. 2.4).

Table 3.4. Critical Questions to Consider before Financing Police Forces

Critical questions	2002 Preliminary Guidelines	2009 Operational Guidelines
Accountability	Is there an internal affairs division charged with investigating and sanctioning cases of police misconduct? How well does the internal affairs division function?	Is there an independent mechanism to oversee police conduct? Does it have investigative powers and effective means?
	Are the police held fully accountable to civilian authorities, for example via budgetary and performance reviews?	Are there independent disciplinary tribunals for dealing with cases investigated by the internal affairs units? Is there coordination between two areas?
	Are there specific mechanisms available that promote the accountability of police to the citizenry, such as civilian review boards and community consultative committees? How well do these mechanisms function?	What is the degree of administrative transparency in the areas of human resources and pay, licenses, promotion and advancement, personal wealth declarations, and documentation and follow-up on cases of human rights violations and inappropriate use of force?
	Are there mechanisms in place to detect and punish corruption and violations of citizens' human rights violations? How well do they function? Do human rights organizations participate in the training of police officers?	ND
General / unforeseen requests	Will the intervention substantially reduce crime and violence?	ND
	Does support for the intervention risk involving the IDB in the political affairs of the country?	ND
	Might project funds be used to finance activities associated with human rights abuses?	ND
Feasibility for comprehensive reform of national, state or city police forces	Does the reform effort have the support not only of civilian leaders, but also of the police leadership?	ND
	Have statuary and legal changes integral to the reform (if any are contemplated) already been approved by the relevant political authority?	ND
	Are the police leaders willing to prioritize reforms and activities that are designed to promote police accountability, both internal and external to the force?	ND
	Are the police leaders willing to tackle the issues of corruption and abuses of human rights?	ND

Source: CP-2190-2 and GN-2535.

Note: ND: Not determined.

3.17 **Despite the Bank's consideration of risks related to human rights, the current risk mitigation framework for police support remains incomplete**. The Bank's guidelines do not provide guidance on how to assess the strength of commitment for police accountability. Despite acknowledging "the political ties of police forces, police forces with certain military features, and severe shortcomings in the internal and external police oversight and accountability mechanisms" (GN-2535: 10), the Bank does not assess the feasibility of strengthening accountability mechanisms. Even if such reforms are implemented, the guidelines do not consider the potentially slow pace of change. How will the Bank prevent risks throughout this process? What if the process fails to strengthen

internal and external accountability mechanisms? These are important questions for the Bank to consider.

3.18 **The limitations of the Bank's risk analysis and mitigation framework are evident in recent projects financing police reform and police-related activities in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Uruguay.** The documentation for these projects does not fully discuss the critical questions laid out in the guidelines. Three of the four projects identify risks; the Uruguay project does not (see Table A.5 in Annexes). The Costa Rica project identifies police professionalization as low risk and involves the OAS multidimensional security secretary in monitoring police management according to international standards. The Ecuador project identifies the implementation of the program as high risk, in particular because of the high turnover of police personnel. The Honduras project also identifies implementation as high risk, considering potential resistance to reform and potential loss of political support. It also identifies reputational risks for the Bank, acknowledging the National Police Force's shortcomings in terms of accountability mechanisms (both internal and external), though there is no discussion of whether and how commitment to strengthening such accountability was assessed. Yet it is unclear whether these levels of risk are fully reflected in project design or size. The high-risk Honduran project was approved for US$60 million, while loans with lower levels of risks were significantly smaller (US$10 million for Ecuador and US$5 million for Uruguay). Costa Rica stands apart, with the largest loan (US$132 million) and a low-risk environment.

3.19 **The Bank has adopted three conditions for supporting penitentiary systems:** (i) respect of international conventions on prisons and treatment of inmates with the support from specialized bodies;[60] (ii) integrated interventions that will go beyond construction or upgrade of penitentiary infrastructure to include alternative and restorative justice programs and judicial oversight mechanisms through sentence enforcement courts, among others, within a "broader process of modernizing and reforming the system" (GN-2535, para. 2.7 and 2.8); and (iii) focus on resocialization for juvenile detainees. While these are important safeguards that are in line with the Bank's mandate, they cannot be considered as risk mitigation mechanisms to safeguard human rights. The first condition reflects minimum international standards, and the area of expertise, role, and sequence of interventions of the "specialized entities" is unclear. When human rights violations are identified, there is no protocol to define how the Bank would

[60] This includes use of force and management of prisons, working conditions of prison personnel, overall treatment of detainees or persons in conflict with the law, and physical standards for prison facilities.

respond.[61] The second prevents the Bank from exclusively financing bricks and mortar, but does not involve other risks. The third is a rationale for the Bank's involvement rather than a risk mitigation measure.

3.20 **The expansion of Bank interventions to adult prisons might entail additional risks.** Despite the limitations of the Bank's risk mitigation framework, risks have been limited so far. This may be in part because the Bank's early involvement focused on reinsertion of young offenders. Recent projects may involve increased risks. In projects in Costa Rica and El Salvador, the Bank is financing adult inmate rehabilitation models, construction of corresponding infrastructure, and the piloting of electronic bracelets. Risks in El Salvador are likely to be particularly high.

C. The Challenge of Data and Evidence

3.21 **The LAC region overall still lacks the reliable and available crime and violence data that are needed for sound policymaking.**[62] While there have been improvements in the 2000s—for example, in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, and Uruguay—major data issues still exist. Integrating data from the police, justice, and penitentiary systems remains difficult, public access to victimization surveys is limited in most countries, and the collection of criminal statistics is only partial in some countries.[63]

3.22 **One result of poor data is that evidence about the effectiveness of interventions and policies related to citizen security is weak.** Most evidence on the effectiveness of programs addressing crime and violence is based on programs in the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia. For instance, the 1998

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61 To safeguard human rights adequately, the Bank would need to provide specific (and satisfactory) answers to questions such as the following: Are these entities expert in architectural plans for prisons, inmates' rehabilitation models for minors and/or adults, and ensuring human rights safeguards, or on certain aspects only? How many agencies in the region gather such expertise? What is the ILANUD capacity to be involved in a number of countries at once? Once these questions have been clarified, when should they intervene—before an intervention to guide Bank's decision whether or not to support the penitentiary system in a specific country? During preparation, to design the component/project? During implementation, to help the Bank supervise and evaluate the project? What if they report violations of inmates' human rights during monitoring? What would the Bank do in such a case?

62 In fact, police deployment requires time and spatial information, by type of crime and violence, and social interventions need to respond to specific characteristics of the population, whether they are victims or perpetrators, or at risk of becoming perpetrators. Similarly, social reinsertion of offenders requires enough information on inmates' profile to adequately target interventions. Finally, continuous public dissemination of good-quality data allows better understanding and evolution over time and space; it also enhances public debate based on empirical evidence, which in turn enables greater accountability of citizen security public policies.

63 In the region, only a few countries carry out periodic national victimization surveys. Chile, for instance, does it yearly since 2005, Costa Rica every two years since 2004, Mexico since 2009, Peru since 2010, and Colombia since 2012. In other countries, victimization surveys are still sporadic, disparate, or nonexistent. For instance, in Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, victimization surveys are disparate; they are rare in Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Panamá; and Honduras and Guatemala do not use them at all.

Sherman Report evaluated more than 500 interventions to reduce crime and violence in the United States; the Campbell Collaboration systematically reviews the effects of interventions in education, justice, and social welfare; and the WHO has published a report on the effectiveness of interventions to prevent intimate partner violence,[64] to name but a few initiatives. In contrast, only a few programs in LAC have been evaluated.[65]

3.23 **Improving information systems in the region has proven difficult for technical, financial, and political reasons.** The transparent and accurate dissemination of criminal statistics often conflicts with political motives, in particular because these data reflect the effectiveness of the police, justice, and penitentiary systems, and their interpretation might not serve the interests of these institutions.

3.24 **Information strengthening has been an ongoing priority for the Bank and has been included as a component in almost all citizen security projects.** In the 2002 preliminary guidelines and the 2009 operational guidelines, regional data shortcomings were clearly identified and information strengthening was identified as a line of action where the Bank could add significant value. Out of 17 projects, 14 have financed activities related to information systems strengthening.[66] Through technical cooperation, the Bank has also financed diagnostics that sometimes included victimization surveys.

3.25 **The Bank has also financed other initiatives to improve data in LAC.** The SES, approved for US$2.55 million in 2008, seeks to support consensus-building on concepts and methods for measuring crime and violence, both among the countries in the region and between the institutions responsible for this information in each of them.[67] So far, the SES has achieved the participation of 15 countries and two capital cities. It provides technical assistance to countries and yearly meetings to exchange experience and best practices. But these efforts have yet to be translated into technical improvement at the country level.

3.26 **Despite those efforts, the extent of improvement in information systems has varied.** Improving data collection and analysis requires more than financial

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64 The Office of Justice of the US Government has also developed a website gathering evidence-based projects in criminal justice, juvenile justice, and crime victim services. More information can be found at www.crimesolutions.gov.

65 These include the community-based prevention programs *Fica Vivo* in Belo Horizonte and *My Safe Neighborhood* in Dominican Republic, which have reduced homicide rates by 69% and 68%, respectively, after six months of implementation. In Diadema, Brazil, a combination of measures, including restricting the sale of alcohol at certain hours, has led to a 44% reduction in homicide rates. *Programa H* in Brazil has shown that it is possible to change men's attitudes toward gender norms; this might lead to a reduction in intimate partner violence, since support for inequitable gender norms was associated with both physical and sexual violence against a partner.

66 Those components included different types of activities—for example, surveys in Uruguay, violence and crime observatories in Honduras and Panama, and police data collection and analysis strengthening in Ecuador.

67 www.seguridadyregion.com.

support, and many efforts have been only partially implemented at best. The political economy of data collection and information sharing was in fact often underestimated in Bank projects. In Honduras, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Panama, crime observatories were either not developed or not used to guide policymaking (OVE 2013).[68] The project in Argentina initially envisioned consolidating a unified information system and strengthening an emergency system (911), but it was restructured several times and has had no implementation six years after approval. Only where political interests are strongly aligned with information goals have projects been able to go forward successfully.

3.27 **With regard to evidence, since 2009 the Bank has made significant progress in researching available evidence, justifying the selection of interventions, and developing rigorous project evaluation plans.** In 2010, OVE drew attention to the lack of theoretical or empirical basis for the selection of interventions and the weak evaluability of the first cohort of projects (OVE 2010). Since then, the Bank has taken stock of available evidence by sub-area of intervention as documented in its conceptual framework (Abizanda et al. 2012). It has also commissioned a protocol for improving the evidence-informed design of citizen security projects (Sherman 2012). Over two-thirds of recent projects envision rigorous (experimental or quasi-experimental) evaluation,[69] though it is too soon for OVE to judge the extent of their implementation.

3.28 **In 2012, the Bank also approved the Citizen Security Initiative with the objective of improving the effectiveness of citizen security policies in the region** by (i) generating, analyzing, and disseminating data on citizen security policies; (ii) strengthening the capacity of state entities to implement and evaluate those policies; and (iii) promoting the sharing of knowledge and good practices through regional dialogue and bilateral cooperation.[70] The initiative was approved for up to US$20 million over a four-year period, which is nearly equivalent to the Bank's investment in technical cooperation over the past 15 years (US$26 million, see Chapter 2). In addition, the Bank's research department has developed a Visiting Research Scholars Program on Citizen Security.[71] This program aims to enhance collaboration among academics in the region, Bank

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68 The Bank is currently carrying out a comparative study to identify the conditions that ensure the quality and relevance of such observatories, which have blossomed in the region with no consensus on what made them useful.

69 The study shows that 20% of operations had experimental evaluation plans (level 5 on the Maryland scale, see footnote 38), 48% had quasi-experimental evaluations (level 4), and 32% had level-2 evaluation frameworks.

70 Proposal for the Establishment of the Special Program and Multidonor Fund for Citizen Security ("Citizen Security Initiative") (April 2012).

71 This program was developed in collaboration with the Institutions for Development department, where the Citizen Security cluster is organizationally located.

staff, and government officials, and covers a variety of possible research topics related to citizen security.[72]

3.29 **Although these efforts are encouraging, the Bank's response to the evidence challenge has some limitations.** First, as Chapter 2 noted, the sequencing of interventions may impede implementation, as the large majority of evaluations depend on information systems that will be developed or strengthened as part of the project itself.[73] Second, the Bank's TC activities in citizen security have financed diagnostics and studies on an ad-hoc basis rather than building on each other and coordinating with Bank lending to support a specific learning agenda. An analysis of 59 TCs implemented between 2008 and 2012 shows that TCs topics do not correspond to the main areas of intervention in Bank loans. For instance, 7 of the TCs (about 12%) studied topics related to criminal justice systems[74] (see Table A.4 in Annexes), though this is a growing area of intervention in Bank loans. Finally, the 2012 Citizen Security Initiative aims to finance more evaluations, but the selection criteria for proposals are currently quite general and do not include guidelines toward specific learning goals or areas.[75] Given that the initiative is planned for four years, it would be useful to refine the scope.

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72 Research topics include (i) social and situational prevention; (ii) policing strategies to reduce crime; (iii) judicial system and its role in reducing crime; (iv) prevention of recidivism and the rsocializing role of the prison system; (v) programs to prevent youth violence and other public policies to confront the emergence of gangs;(vi) domestic violence and public policies to prevent and confront it; and (vii) public policies to reduce violence accelerators (substance use, disarmament policies, etc.). See http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/research-opportunities,3160.html.

73 In addition, in at least three countries (Uruguay, El Salvador, and Honduras), the evaluation's terms of reference will be determined only after three years of implementation, giving very little time for results to appear. The notes are available for Jamaica II and Belize.

74 Where the Bank has no previous experience and is nevertheless engaging (see Chapter 2).

75 The criteria for selecting proposals include (i) their catalytic effect on the design and implementation of citizen security policies; (ii) their degree of innovation; (iii) their potential to generate applied knowledge; (iv) their potential for replication in other contexts; and (v) their potential for having an impact on the design, implementation, and evaluation of policies and programs related to citizen security (Special Initiative, 2012:16, para 2.11).

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

4.1 **This evaluation concludes that the Bank has played a pioneering role in addressing citizen security as part of the development agenda—most notably from a preventive perspective—but faces significant challenges in building a knowledge base, developing the necessary in-house expertise, and managing the risks of this increasingly complex and risky portfolio.**

4.2 **Strategically, the Bank has defined a broad spectrum of interventions for its support in citizen security, reflecting the complexity of the topic.** The Bank first pushed the agenda toward social prevention and an integrated, multisectoral approach to citizen security. By doing so, it affirmed the need to address multiple causes of violence and crime and played an important role in counterbalancing a persistent tendency toward repressive policies in some countries. Recently, the Bank has expanded its support by financing more sensitive police and penitentiary reforms. Today, its scope of intervention spans social and situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary systems. This broad scope enables the Bank to respond to diversified demand from its borrowers. However, it also creates significant challenges for the Bank in building in-house expertise and developing its comparative advantage in the area. These challenges are exacerbated by the difficulties of cross-sector collaboration in the Bank, which make it hard to draw on the expertise in other sectors for citizen security initiatives.

4.3 **At the operational level, the Bank has developed a lending portfolio of multisector stand-alone operations that have faced significant and persistent challenges in implementation.** Since 1998, the Bank has approved 17 citizen security loans for $481 million. Early operations attempted to address the multicausality of violence and crime at a time when there was little regional knowledge about how to respond to the issue. As OVE's in-depth project-level evaluation noted (OVE 2013), those projects have proven complex and difficult to implement, and some of them seem to fit poorly with the institutional capacity at the national and local level. Consequently, they have not produced the expected results. Though OVE has not evaluated more recent projects in depth,[76] these difficulties may remain in the new cohort of projects, which currently face significant delays in early implementation. The continuing challenge is to match interventions to the specific institutional context, a challenge that current operational guidelines do not adequately address.

4.4 **With regard to risk, the Bank has acknowledged the sensitivity of citizen security interventions and the reputational risks involved, but its current risk analysis and mitigation framework is insufficient.** Violence and crime are among citizens' main concerns in the region and are highly sensitive issues. In

[76] Country case studies focused on understanding the contexts in which the Bank operates, and recent projects are not advanced enough in implementation for an in-depth analysis.

many countries high turnover of political appointments and technical staff heightens implementation risks in Bank projects. Citizen security also involves reputational risks for the Bank, particularly when it supports sensitive areas in criminal justice with human rights implications. The Bank has acknowledged the specific challenges of working with police and penitentiary systems since its early involvement, but the corresponding measures it has taken are not sufficient to adequately identify and mitigate those risks. In fact, more recent operational guidelines have tended towards greater flexibility rather than greater discipline.

4.5 **Finally, the Bank has approved a series of initiatives to strengthen information systems and build evidence in citizen security in the region, but still needs to focus this work going forward.** These initiatives are welcome, given the weakness in LAC-specific data and evidence in this area. The challenge is to focus them to build a strong knowledge base, enhance in-house expertise, and strengthen the design and implementation of Bank projects.

B. Recommendations

4.6 To have a recognized comparative advantage in citizen security, the Bank needs to focus its efforts in areas where it can ensure excellence. This entails building in-house expertise, enhancing project design to fit local contexts and ensure implementation, strengthening risk analysis and mitigation, and carrying forward a focused knowledge agenda. Building on this evaluation and the 2013 companion project-level review,[77] OVE offers four recommendations:

1. **Select and focus on a narrower range of interventions to facilitate the development of in-house expertise and enhance the Bank's capacity to show results.**

    - Use the sector framework paper to define which specific types of interventions the Bank will prioritize by sub-area (social prevention, situational prevention, police, justice, and penitentiary reform), where feasible adopting a subregional approach to better understand common problems and institutional characteristics across countries.

    - Enhance collaboration across Bank divisions (for example, between citizen security and social protection, education, gender, and urban development) and use double-booking where needed to engage critical staff skills. If no in-house expertise exists in some critical areas selected for engagement (for example, criminal justice), hire specialists.

2. **Simplify project design, pace interventions, and enhance supervision to strengthen operational performance and implementation.**

    - Strengthen institutional analysis and adjust the level of project complexity to the institutional context.

[77] In particular, recommendation 2 is drawn directly from the comparative project evaluation (OVE 2013).

- Ensure adequate timeframes and sequencing of activities, particularly when data are missing, information systems are deficient, institutional capacity is weak, and/or no strategy has been defined or sustained in recent years.

- Focus on project supervision and implementation, including by providing staff with appropriate training, time, resources, and career advancement.

3. **Develop a risk analysis tool and adopt new guidelines for risk mitigation to help reduce and mitigate risks.**

    - Consider forming a task force to develop a risk analysis tool, engaging staff from the Citizen Security cluster, other operational sectors relevant to violence and crime prevention, the Office of Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness (SPD), and the Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL), as well as external experts. This tool should focus on the political and human rights dimensions of citizen security and should enable a sound analysis of implementation and reputational risks.

    - Consider using the task force to also develop risk mitigation guidelines. These mandatory guidelines should clearly define conditions for operations in sensitive areas, most notably the financing of police and penitentiary systems, where the greatest risks lie. These conditions should cover the whole project cycle from decision to design and implementation.

4. **Define a focused knowledge agenda to help build a stronger evidence base for project design and policymaking.**

    - Use technical cooperation resources, including those provided under the Citizen Security Initiative, to finance and build national and local capacity to undertake victimization and other types of surveys, to better understand the conditions underlying violence and crime, and to monitor and evaluate citizen security interventions.

    - In conjunction with Bank's Research department (RES), define a research agenda in the areas of Bank intervention, focusing on the effectiveness of selected interventions as well as context-based factors that enhance successful implementation.

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TABLE A.1. CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECTS, WITH OBJECTIVE AND COMPONENTS

Project		Approval Date	IDB Loan (OPS) (US$ millions)	TOTAL COST (OPS) (US$ millions)	% Disbursed IDB (OPS)	Status	Objective	Components
El Salvador	Violence Prevention Strategy Comprehensive Support Program	Dec-12	45.0	45.0	0.0%	Approved/Active	To contribute to youth crime prevention by: (i) improving the coordination of prevention services by the MJSP at the national level; (ii) increasing social and w orkforce integration of youth at risk in the beneficiary municipios; (iii) reducing juvenile recidivism.	I: Institutional strengthening of the MJSP II: Youth violence prevention at the local level III: Strengthening of the rehabilitation and social reintegration process
Honduras	Program of Support for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Civic Coexistence (and additions)	Jun-12	66.4	70.4	1.1%	Implementation/Act ive	To contribute to crime prevention and prosecution by improving: (i) the effectiveness of the institutional and operational management of the Department of Security (National Police Force); (ii) criminal investigation capacity; (iii) management on the subnational level of civic coexistence and public safety in the beneficiary municipios.	I. Institutional strengthening of the Department of Security/National Police Force II. Strengthening the criminal investigation system III. Strengthening of community security
Uruguay	Local Public Safety Integrated Management Program	Sep-12	5.0	7.2	16.5%	Implementation/Act ive	To help reduce violent crime in the city of Montevideo through specific prevention actions in three territories and their vulnerable populations: (i) to make the police force more effective in crime prevention and clearance in the selected territories (ii) to enhance the rehabilitation of juveniles w ho exhibit high risk factors associated w ith violence and crime in the program target areas.	I. Development of a problem-oriented policing model II. Strengthening a social netw ork for secondary and tertiary prevention of juvenile violence
Costa Rica	Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Program	May-11	132.4	187.8	1.4%	Implementation/Act ive	To help reduce violent crime in the country: (i) to make the police force at the national level more effective; (ii) to reduce criminal behavior among at-risk youth in the project's areas of influence; (iii) to reduce the recidivism rate among the population in conflict w ith criminal law .	I. Strengthening of the institutional capacity of the MSP and MJP. II. Social prevention targeting at-risk children and young people in critical areas III. Social reintegration for individuals in conflict w ith criminal law .
Ecuador	Citizen Security Program: Strengthening Police Effectiveness through Improvements in Management & Crime Info	Sep-11	10.0	10.6	22.1%	Implementation/Act ive	To improve police effectiveness in detecting, tracking, and preventing crime through improvements in the generation and use of criminological information: (i) improve quality in the compilation and analysis of criminological information so that the police can boost capacity to identify crime patterns and causality (ii) support the design and implementation of police operations and mechanisms for reducing crime.	I. Improve the quality of information. II. Improve the process of information analysis. III. Support for the design and implementation of informationbased operational police strategies.
Belize	Community Action for Public Safety	Dec-10	5.0	5.2	10.6%	Implementation/Act ive	To contribute to the reduction of youth involvement in major violent crime in Belize City: (i) reducing youth involvement in criminal activities and youth violent behavior in the schools w hich are beneficiary of the program resources (ii) reducing recidivism among youth in the intervened juvenile rehabilitation institutions (iii) enhancing the government's capacity to formulate and implement evidence-based policies on public safety.	I. School-based Positive Youth Development II. Support for Juvenile Social Rehabilitation III. Interagency Public Safety Management Information System (IPSMIS)

Project		Approval Date	IDB Loan (OPS) (US$ millions)	TOTAL COST (OPS) (US$ millions)	% Disbursed IDB (OPS)	Status	Objective	Components
Jamaica	Citizen Security and Justice Programme II (and additions)	Dec-09	33.7	33.7	90.4%	Implementation/Active	To contribute to crime and violence reduction in 50 volatile and vulnerable communities through the financing and implementation of prevention and strategic interventions to address identified individual, family and community risk factors. (i) contributing to the reduction in the levels of homicide, major crimes (robbery, burglary and larceny) and interpersonal violence; and (ii) increasing the perception of safety. Two expansions were allocated to Component I of the CSJP II with the following objectives: (i) establish the integrated CSJPII Program/CSI organizational structure; (ii) pilot the further expansion and deepening of the CSJPII Program (service provision continuation); (iii) ensure continuity of program delivery to new communities.	I. Community Action II. Institutional Strengthening of Ministry of National Security (MNS)
Argentina	Citizen Security and Inclusion Program	Oct-09	25.0	36.6	2.8%	Implementation/Active	To help reduce levels of crime, violence, and insecurity in the province of Buenos Aires by improving the capacity of the province's Ministry of Security, strengthening community participation, and introducing prevention programs that will promote factors for protection of communities, families, and individuals.	I. Development of the Ministry of Security's institutional capacity II. Strengthening of mechanisms for citizen participation III. Enhancement of gender-based violence response services and violence prevention programs.
Trinidad and Tobago	Citizen Security Program	Mar-08	24.5	35.0	39.3%	Implementation/Active	To contribute to the reduction in crime and violence in 22 high crime pilot communities through the financing of preventive interventions addressing the most proximal and modifiable risk factors.	I. Community Action II. Support for the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service III. Institutional Strengthening of the Ministry of National Security
Panama	Comprehensive Security Program (PROSI)	Jul-06	22.7	25.1	66.9%	Implementation/Active	To help improve citizen coexistence and security in the municipalities with the highest rates of violence: Colón, David, Panama City, and San Miguelito, through strategic, comprehensive, interagency, participative actions to prevent juvenile violence: (i) to boost the management capacity of the national and local institutions involved in the program to plan and effectively perform its institutional role in the area of citizen security (ii) to reduce the rate of participation by young people between the ages of 12 and 29 in violence or crime in the beneficiary municipalities.	I. Institutional strengthening component II. Citizen security programs
Guyana	Citizen Security Programme	Jun-06	19.8	22.0	93.0%	Implementation/Active	To enhance citizen security and coexistence by contributing to the reduction in levels of crime, violence and insecurity in Guyana: (i) identify, prevent and counteract risk factors and increase and promote protective factors in communities, families and individuals (ii) strengthen the capabilities of MoHA and GPF to implement crime preventive programmes at the national and local levels (iii) strengthen social cohesion within communities and their preventive capacity.	I. Capacity building of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) II. Capacity building and modernization of the Guyana Police Force III. Community action

Project		Approval Date	IDB Loan (OPS) (US$ millions)	TOTAL COST (OPS) (US$ millions)	% Disbursed IDB (OPS)	Status	Objective	Components
Nicaragua	Citizenship Security Program	Nov-04	7.2	12.8	99.8%	Completed, 2011	To improve the level of citizen security by helping to reduce violence and juvenile delinquency in the communities to be targeted under the program: (i) to raise the effectiveness of institutions in charge of citizen security; (ii) to increase the level of social integration among young people (iii) to reinforce municipal and community responsibility.	I. Institutional strengthening of MIGOB II. Social prevention of juvenile violence III. Strengthening and expansion of the PN community-policing program IV. Public information
Honduras	Sula Valley Citizenship Security	Mar-03	13.9	22.2	100.0%	Completed, 2012	To improve the levels of peace, coexistence and citizen security in the 17 municipalities in the Sula Valley Region, contributing to a reduction in insecurity and violence among young people from 12 to 25 years of age	I. Institutional strengthening. II. Social prevention of violence and juvenile delinquency III. Support for the community police and/or crime prevention project in the Sula Valley Region IV. Communications and social awareness strategy
Chile	Innovation Program for a Safer Chile	Nov-03	8.2	16.6	100.0%	Completed, 2010	To contribute to a reduction in violence and crimes, as well as the insecurity associated therewith, in selected municipalities and in neighborhoods in Chile's metropolitan, fifth, eighth, and ninth regions, which are affected by drug trafficking and organized crime.	I. Strengthening of the citizen security policy II. Safe municipality III. Safe Neighborhood VI. Strengthening of Carabinero-community integration
Jamaica	Citizen Security and Justice	Sep-01	14.5	17.4	100.0%	Completed, 2010	To enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica: (i) prevent and reduce violence (ii) strengthen crime management capabilities (iii) improve the delivery of judicial services.	I. Development of a national strategy II. Capacity building of the MNSJ III. Strengthening of the criminal justice system IV. Community action V. Social marketing and public education
Uruguay	Citizens Safety Prevention of Violence & Delinquency	Mar-98	14.2	21.2	100.0%	Completed, 2005	To prevent and deal with interpersonal violence and to reduce the perception of insecurity in Uruguay.	I. Building up institutional capacity II. Young people as agents of prevention III. Community based prevention initiatives
Colombia	Support for peaceful coexistence and citizen security	Feb-98	33.7	84.6	100.0%	Completed, 2009	To reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities by strengthening efforts to prevent, counteract, and control factors associated with cirminal acts and violence: (i) Provide the tools required at the national level to develop an awareness of and evaluate the many forms of crime in colombian cities, and establish a consensus concernin which causes should be tackled through policies (ii) Help the naitonal authorities to establish national policies an programs (iii) support activities at the municipal level to promote peaceful coexistence and prevent and control urban and domestic violence (iv) help cities monitor and evaluate projects on peaceful coexistence and security and encourage their development by providing loans and technical assistance (v) encourage the exchange of successful experiences among cities	I. National subprogram to assist the Colombian government in designing and implementing a State policy to promote peace and community harmony II. Municipal subprogram to enhance harmonious

TABLE A.2. ACTIVITIES BY CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECT

	Infrastructure improvements	School Programs	Parenting/Domestic Violence Progs.	Community/Youth Centers	Labor Market Programs	Community engagement	Attention to gang members	Attention to offenders	Rehabilitation services for addicts	Information systems strengthening	Policy-making /strengthening	Police Strengthening*	Justice System reform/strengthening	Penitentiary syst. reform/strength.
Colombia (1998)		X				X		X			X	X	X	X		
Uruguay (1998)		X		X				X				X	X			
Jamaica I (2001)				X		X		X				X	X			
Honduras I (2003)		X			X	X		X			X	X	X			
Chile (2003)				X		X		X			X	X	X	X		
Nicaragua (2004)		X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X			
Guyana (2006)				X							X	X	X			
Panama (2006)		X		X			X	X			X	X				
Trinidad y Tobago (2008)	X			X		X					X	X	X			
Argentina (2009)		X		X		X					X		X			
Jamaica II (2009)	X	X	X	X	X	X						X		X		
Belize (2010)		X		X				X			X					
Costa Rica (2011)		X		X	X					X	X	X	XX			X
Ecuador (2011)											X		X			
Honduras (2011)	X		X							X	X	X	XX			
Uruguay (2012)								X			X		X			
El Salvador (2012)		X				X		X			X	X				X
TOTAL	**3**	**8**	**3**	**10**	**4**	**7**	**2**	**8**	**2**	**12**	**11**	**12**	**2**	**1**

* XX: Comprehensive police reform

Source: OVE own analysis.

TABLE A.3. CITIZEN SECURITY PORTFOLIO RESULTS FRAMEWORKS

Country - approval month/year	Is there vertical Logic (outputs lead to outcomes which lead to impacts? (1-4)	Are impact indicators directly related to the general objective of the intervention? (1-4)	Are the outcome indicators directly related to the specific objectives of the intervention? (1-4)	% (SMART/ Proposed Indicators)
Colombia (1998)	2	1	1	0%
Uruguay (1998)	3	3	2	43%
Jamaica I (2001)	3	3	2	50%
Honduras I (2003)	2	1	2	32%
Chile (2003)	1	2	1	33%
Nicaragua (2004)	3	2	2	50%
Guyana (2006)	3	2	3	0%
Panama (2006)	2	2	3	56%
Trinidad y Tobago (2008)	2	3	2	40%
Argentina (2009)	1	3	1	60%
Jamaica II (2009)	3	3	2	100%
Belize (2010)	2	3	2	40%
Costa Rica (2011)	2	3	4	81%
Ecuador (2011)	3	4	3	73%
Honduras (2011)	3	2	4	64%
Uruguay (2012)	4	4	4	100%
El Salvador (2012)	3	4	3	64%
Average	*2*	*3*	*2*	*52%*

Note: CS projects' Impact and Outcome indicators under the SMART methodology. A selection between "Yes" and "No" was made based on the following criteria:
(S) Specific: indicator is precise and unambiguous.
(M) Measurable: indicator is susceptible to measurement, calculation, or computation, and amenable to independent validation.
(A) Achievable: project should have a realistic chance of affecting the indicator in a significant manner in the evaluation timeframe.
(R) Relevant: indicator is capable of being attributable to the intervention.
(T) Time-bound: there is a specific time (or several times) for the indicator to be measured.

Source: OVE 2013.

TABLE A.4. RIGOR OF SEVEN RECENT PROJECT EVALUATION PLANS

Level of Internal Validity	1	2	3	4	5
Jamaica (L1009)					
Component I - Subcomponent I		X			
Component I - Subcomponent II				X	
Component I				X	
Component II		X			
Belice (L1014)					
Component I				X	
Component II		X			
Uruguay (L1062)					
Component I – Community policing and strategies of conflict resolution				X	
Component I – Training to police and investigators		X		X	
Component II (1st strategy)				X	
Component II (2nd strategy)		X			
El Salvador (L1025)					
Component I - Subcomponents I y II		X			
Component I - Subcomponent III				X	
Component II				X	
Component III				X	
Ecuador (L1098)					
Total effect in Guayaquil (quasi-experimental)				X	
Total effect in Guayaquil (experimental)					X
Honduras (L1063)					
Component I – Police Academy		X			
Component I - Municipalities				X	
Component II		X			
Component III				X	
Costa Rica (L1031)					
Components I+II+III				X	
Component I - Police Academy				X	
Component II – Sport/Music schools					X
Component III – Productive units					X
Component III – Electronic bracelets					X

Source: Garcette, N. 2013, analysis prepared for this evaluation.

TABLE A.5. CITIZEN SECURITY PUBLICATIONS BY THEME

TEMAS	Num. Publicaciones	%
Diagnostics of Violence and prevention policies	17	12,4
Cost of Violence/Crime	13	9,5
Justice System (Reform / Strengthening)	12	8,8
Intra-family Violence	12	8,8
Youth/Youth Violence	11	8,0
Guidelines on Violence Prevention/Evaluation. Evidence from General Evaluations	11	8,0
Crime/Victimisation	10	7,3
Gender/Domestic Violence	8	5,8
Description/Evaluation of a Single Project of Violence Prevention	7	5,1
Magnitude of Violence/Crime	6	4,4
Perception of Insecurity/Fear of Crime	5	3,6
Police (Police Reform)	4	2,9
Civic/Citizen Culture. Culture of Violence	4	2,9
Indicators/Measures	4	2,9
Gender Bias in the Judiciary	4	2,9
Description/Evaluation of Diverse Projects in Violence Prevention	4	2,9
Trust/Social Capital	3	2,2
Gangs Maras	3	2,2
Happiness/Well-Being	3	2,2
Schools/School Violence	3	2,2
Community Policing	2	1,5
Determinants of Crime/Violence/Insecurity	2	1,5
Community Engagement/Participation	2	1,5
Education for Peace	2	1,5
Information Systems	2	1,5
Drugs/Alcohol	2	1,5
Peacemaking (post-conflict)	2	1,5
Economic Impact of Violence	2	1,5
Project Implementation	2	1,5
Media	2	1,5
Situational Prevention	1	0,7
Homicide	1	0,7
Violence Monitoring System	1	0,7
Legislation (Reform)	1	0,7
Migration/ Displacement	1	0,7
Armed Conflict	1	0,7
Prison System	1	0,7
Child Abuse	1	0,7
Finance of Public Security	1	0,7
Indigenous Peoples	1	0,7
Gender Bias	1	0,7
Social Exclusion	1	0,7
Media	1	0,7
Children	1	0,7
Female Trafficking Trata de Mujeres	1	0,7
Sport Programmes	1	0,7
Borders	1	0,7
Corruption	1	0,7
Street Children	1	0,7
Human Rights	1	0,7
Violence and Development	1	0,7
Municipalities/Local Intervention	1	0,7
Conceptual Issues Related to Citizen Security	1	0,7
Others	3	2,2

TABLE A.6. RECENT PROJECTS' RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Project	Risk level	Risk	Mitigation measure
Honduras	**High**	**Reputational risks** Given shortcomings of internal and external control and accountability mechanism in the National Police Force.	Citizen control mechanisms to be exercised in the framework of the program executive council and social oversight.
			Strengthening of the entity responsible for police disciplinary affairs, through the strengthening of the DIECP, to supervise, take actions, and contribute to the transparency of police management.
			Close coordination with countries in the region through South-South cooperation mechanisms.
	High	**Execution risks**	
		Weakening of the commitment of the borrower and/or executing agency.	Establishment of a program executive council with key stakeholders from the Department of Security, national police, and external stakeholders such as office of public prosecutor.
		Opposition to the program by internal and/or external groups who fear interests will be affected.	Under program execution arrangements, broad social dissemination of operating plans and progress in execution.
		Reputational risk for the National Police Force, given the poor image and credibility of the security sector.	Formulation and implementation of an internal and interagency communication strategy for the Department of Security and National Police Force, with involvement of civil society, international donors.
Costa Rica	**Low**	**Execution** Difficulty to promote an organizational culture change within police force towards greater professionalization, accountability and transparency, and service to the community.	Strengthening of the Legal disciplinary unit for greater accountability, and OAS multidimensional secretary to monitor police management according to international standards at initiation, medium, and final term of project
Ecuador	**High**	**Execution**	
		High turnover of police personnel.	The Ministry of the Interior would stipulate, through a letter to the General Command, the administrative transfer of the staff who will take part in executing the project throughout its duration.
		The lack of trained human resources where the project was to be implemented.	New personnel will take a virtual training course of four 40-hour modules, plus one in-person module covering software packages (SPSS, MINITAB).
		The difficulty in rigorously evaluating quality of police operations.	An international bidding process to hire an international expert, who will be present at the evaluation process during the four years, supported by a team of experts hired on a part-time basis.
Uruguay	**ND**		

Source: PODs and corresponding risk matrix.