

# IDEV

Independent Development Evaluation  
African Development Bank

*From experience to knowledge...*  
*From knowledge to action...*  
*From action to impact*



## Chad:

# Evaluation of the Bank Group Country Strategy and Program in Chad (2002–2012)

### Summary Report




AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

July 2014

# IDEV evaluation types





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An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation

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# Evaluation of the Bank Group Country Strategy and Program in Chad (2002–2012)

### Summary Report

July 2014



AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

## **Guy-Blaise Nkamleu**

Evaluation Task Manager

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### **Chad: Evaluation of the Bank Group Country Strategy and Program in Chad (2002–2012) – Summary Report**

IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation, July 2014

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
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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ADF</b>	African Development Fund	<b>NDP</b>	National Development Plan
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank	<b>NGGS</b>	National Good Governance Strategy
<b>BADEA</b>	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	<b>NHP</b>	National Health Policy
<b>BTP</b>	Public Works and Civil Engineering	<b>NPRS</b>	National Poverty Reduction Strategy
<b>BWI</b>	Bretton Woods Institutions	<b>NTS</b>	National Transport Strategy
<b>CAE</b>	Country Assistance Evaluation	<b>OCMP</b>	Public Procurement Authority
<b>CCSRP</b>	Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee	<b>OPEC</b>	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
<b>CEMAC</b>	Central African Economic and Monetary Community	<b>OPEV</b>	Operations Evaluation Department
<b>CEP</b>	Country Environmental Profile	<b>OSFU</b>	Fragile States Unit
<b>COJO</b>	Bids Opening and Review Committee	<b>PAGE</b>	Economic Management Support Programme
<b>CPIA</b>	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment	<b>PAMFIP</b>	Public Finance Improvement Support Programme
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategy Paper	<b>PARG</b>	Governance Reform Support Project
<b>DGREP</b>	General Directorate for External Resources and Programming	<b>PCR</b>	Project Completion Report
<b>DW</b>	Drinking Water	<b>PDRPL</b>	Préfecture du Lac Rural Development Project
<b>ECCAS</b>	Economic Community of Central African States	<b>PIU</b>	Project Implementation Unit
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States	<b>PP</b>	Problematic Project
<b>EITI</b>	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	<b>PPER</b>	Project Performance Evaluation Report
<b>ESS</b>	Economic and Sector Studies	<b>PPP</b>	Potentially Problematic Project
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>PRGF</b>	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
<b>FA</b>	Focus Area	<b>RH/SW AP</b>	Human Resources /Health Workers Capacity Building Project
<b>FER</b>	Road Maintenance Fund	<b>RISP</b>	Regional Integration Strategy Paper
<b>FSF</b>	Fragile States Facility	<b>RP</b>	Risky Project
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product	<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>GER</b>	Gross Enrolment Ratio	<b>SDEA</b>	Water and Sanitation Master Plan
<b>HIPC</b>	Heavily Indebted Poor Country	<b>SME</b>	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund	<b>TDFO</b>	AfDB Country Office in Chad
<b>INSEED</b>	National Institute of Statistics and Economic and Demographic Studies	<b>TFP</b>	Technical and Financial Partner
<b>IsDB</b>	Islamic Development Bank	<b>TFPC</b>	Technical and Financial Partners Committee
<b>MCSU</b>	Management Counselling and Support Units	<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goal	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
		<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
		<b>WPMC</b>	Water Point Management Committee
		<b>WUA</b>	Water Users' Association



Libya

Chad

Niger

Sudan

Nigeria

Central African Republic



# Executive Summary

## Evaluation Objective

The objective of this evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the African Development Bank Group's assistance strategy and role in Chad over the period 2002–2012. The term "Assistance" includes aid in the form of loans and grants as well as non-financial activities, and takes into account operations approved during the period 2002–2012. The underlying evaluation issues are the relevance, efficacy and impact of Bank assistance, as well as the issues of sustainability, institutional development impact and stakeholder performance.

## Chad's Development Challenges

Chad's socio-political context is characterized mainly by political instability dating back to the second half of the 1960s. During the last decade, difficulties in reaching a national political consensus sparked off recurrent conflicts resulting in insecurity and humanitarian problems. However, in the last four years, the political situation has been relatively stable owing to the national reconciliation process embarked upon in 2007.

Economically, Chad's development challenges, as a country with a chequered past and just coming out of a long-drawn conflict, are many. The country is grappling with a huge infrastructure deficit due to the destructions of war and many years of inaction which gave rise to poverty and food insecurity. The country is one of the continent's poorest and recent trends in its economy show irregular growth rates, portraying the vulnerability of Chad's economic growth which varies according to economic and climate contingencies. Natural resource management is also a real challenge.

Agriculture and stock breeding, the country's main economic activities up to the early 2000s, have been relegated to the background by the exploitation of the Doba oil deposits in the south of the country from 2003, which has given a new boost to the economy. The result has been a major structural change in the economy, with a far-reaching impact on the country's economic and social policy. Prior to the oil era, the agricultural sector accounted for about 36% of the GDP and nearly all exports of the country. With the development of oil production (40% of GDP in 2004 and 27% in 2011), the agricultural sector accounted for only 19% of GDP in 2011, although it continues to be the main job supplier with close to 80% of the active population involved in agriculture.

The Government's strategic vision during the last decade has been to promote medium- and long-term economic growth with a view to reducing poverty and the vulnerability of many segments of the population. The long intervals between national strategy documents have, however, created a break in the country's development strategy. The last National Development Plan (NDP) 2013–2015 was adopted by the Chadian Parliament in July 2013.

Significant economic and social achievements are visible in Chad. In just a few years (since 2008), Chad has made giant strides in economic development and social transformation, recording high, albeit erratic, growth rates. After the signing of peace agreements with Sudan in 2010, economic development has become a real Government priority. Although the challenges to be met are many, the ground already covered is considerable.

Governance remains a major problem to the country, undermining the business climate, among other

things. Some actions by the authorities are geared towards transparency. Many instruments and decrees to improve governance have been signed, but their application is still limited. To date, Chad is the only country that has not reached the completion point of the HIPC Initiative.

## Relevance of the Bank's Strategies in Chad

On the whole, the Bank's assistance strategies in Chad have been deemed relevant and consistent with the priorities of the country and the Bank. During the evaluation period (2002–2012), Bank assistance concerned 32 operations, for net commitments of UA 200 million. In terms of investment, the agricultural (44%) and transport (25%) sectors alone accounted for 70% of Bank commitments.

The successive Country Strategy Papers covered by this evaluation (CSPs 2002–2004; 2005–2009; and 2010–2014) were constant with respect to the pillars that guided the Bank's strategic action, namely (i) good governance promotion and (ii) basic infrastructure development. The strategic objective of the first pillar was to enhance transparency and accountability in public finance management as well as contribute to improving the business climate. The second pillar, initially focused on agricultural and rural development, was later extended to embrace the development of all basic infrastructure in a bid to create conditions for sustained, inclusive and diversified growth of the entire economy. These two pillars have shown constant and marked alignment with national priorities.

However, regarding its strategic positioning, the Bank has been relatively absent from Chad's private sector, despite very recent initiatives in the area of dialogue and studies. The private sector's potential to supplement and replace Bank operations is not well developed and incorporated into the Bank's strategy.

Moreover, although Chad is considered by the Bank as a Fragile State, such fragility has not been sufficiently reflected in the Bank's strategies and operations in Chad. The fragile context is not specifically considered in Chad's CSPs. Chad is eligible only for window 3 of the Fragile States Facility (FSF) and is the 3rd biggest beneficiary of this window. An addendum to the 2010–2014 CSP makes specific recommendations for Chad's access to this window. However, this window has the least amount of funds and the FSF's overall allocation to Chad is below the average allocation of Fragile States. Given their limited amount, operations under the FSF cannot make a great difference.

In developing its strategy, the Bank can count on its positioning as the preferred partner of the Chadian Government and the other technical and financial partners (TFPs). Through its Field Office, the Bank has succeeded in setting up a dynamic group of TFPs which it chairs. The Chadian authorities and the other partners have a very good impression of the Bank, and are of the opinion that the Bank should play a more important advisory and support role.

## Bank's Contribution to Chad's Development Outcomes

On the whole, assistance effectiveness is deemed moderately satisfactory. The impacts of the Bank's assistance in Chad are significant and appreciable in the area of infrastructure, but less so in the area of governance. The Bank's contributions in the agricultural sector have helped to increase the sector's share in the Chadian economy (19% of GDP), thereby shifting towards greater economic diversification. Bank support has helped to open up the country and agricultural production areas in particular thanks to the construction of paved roads, crossing structures and rural roads. Moreover, Bank intervention in the area of road infrastructure has contributed to improving the movement

of people and goods in the south of Chad and along the Douala–Ndjamena corridor. In contrast, implementation of the good governance promotion strategy has not been very successful owing to failure to achieve the specific objectives of budget execution improvement, public service efficiency and public procurement management, as well as failure to achieve the justice reform objectives. The overall impact in terms of contribution to development results remains limited.

The sustainability of Bank assistance outcomes is deemed moderately satisfactory and fragile. Infrastructure sustainability is a cause for concern, owing to the lack of actions for infrastructure sustainability and weak maintenance and upkeep entities. However, there is growing awareness. With respect to governance, the awareness aroused by Bank assistance will help to maintain the limited outcomes beyond the lifespan of programmes and projects.

The Bank's impact in Chad is moderately unsatisfactory as it is limited by the non-optimal use of infrastructure. Although the construction of health centres and schools is a laudable initiative, their impact will only be effective if these centres are equipped and provided with the appropriate quantity of qualified staff. Although most Bank-constructed infrastructure are properly used, many of those constructed by the Government have proven to be "white elephants". Assistance has little impact in the area of governance, given its low effectiveness level.

Impact on institutional development is also unsatisfactory. Despite considerable infrastructure investments, institutional development around these investments is lacking. Even when institutions are established for this infrastructure, they do not operate normally. Investments in "hardware" have evolved much faster than in "software", especially in the health and education sectors. There is still lack of consistency in the actions of the various ministries, and in many sectors, the institutional

and legal context of Bank actions is imprecise, incomplete and inconsistent.

Lastly, the effectiveness of Bank assistance in the areas of infrastructure and governance is deemed unsatisfactory. Assistance transaction costs within Chad's prevailing fragility context are high. The level of Bank programme and project efficiency has been undermined by implementation problems stemming from weak institutional capacity. Consequently, projects experienced long delays generally caused by low implementation capacity and problems related to the application of procurement procedures due to the low expertise and integrity of procurement board members.

On the whole, Bank performance is deemed satisfactory although there is still much to be done. The Bank has been able to adapt to the country's difficult environment while continuously supporting the key growth sectors and providing direct solutions to the lack of infrastructure and to governance problems. In addition, Bank assistance has had virtually unquantifiable stabilizing effects. Bank projects and investments have often been stabilizing factors for the country as they indirectly helped to avert conflicts. The Bank has often taken risks by financing projects in risky areas or during conflict periods, thereby attracting other donors in its wake. This role of an institution present alongside the country during difficult periods and the ensuing expression of gratitude on the part of Chadian authorities are an asset which the Bank needs to preserve and build on.

On the contrary, Government performance is deemed unsatisfactory owing to its low project and programme implementation capacity, its limited aid coordination role and the low consistency and efficiency of national institutions responsible for designing and implementing national development strategies. The existence of administrative vested interests is an additional hindrance to Government's efficiency.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

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On the contrary, Government performance is deemed unsatisfactory owing to its low project and programme implementation capacity, its limited aid coordination role and the low consistency and efficiency of national institutions responsible for designing and implementing national development strategies. The existence of administrative vested interests is an additional hindrance to Government's efficiency.

On the whole, Bank Group assistance performance in Chad over the period 2002-2012 is deemed moderately satisfactory. Investments made in the area of infrastructure and the resulting development of all basic infrastructure have helped to create conditions for the sustained and inclusive growth of the entire

economy. However, Bank intervention in the area of economic governance and public sector management has not been successful, thereby limiting its positive role in the country's overall economic growth. Beyond purely economic aspects however, the Bank has had a stabilizing effect that is difficult to quantify and that has indirectly allowed avoiding conflicts.

To improve the performance of future assistance to Chad, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. **Strengthen and focus the support to good governance taking opportunity of the Bank's position as privileged partner.** This is about helping the country instituting a sustainable and efficient formal reform design and coordination framework, and support Government's efforts to develop an analytical policy framework for governance reform decisions.
2. **Include as objective private sector development making use of possible synergies between the Bank's domains of action.** This is about formulating strategies for more active involvement through support to actions aimed at improving the business climate and direct private sector support.
3. **Invest in analytical and diagnostic studies to better understand the country's problems and options.** This is about devoting more efforts to Economic and Sector Studies for helping to further inform Government strategies and development master plans, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, properly consolidate the Bank's assistance strategy, its participation in policy dialogue and its investment options.
4. **Ensure better consideration of the problem of results sustainability,** especially in the area of infrastructure, through support mechanisms such as building the capacity of all the stakeholders and adopting a post-operation monitoring policy, but also continue to support Government's efforts

to build its quality control and infrastructure maintenance technical and financial capacity.

5. **Lay more emphasis on the administration's human resource development and institution building.** This is about supporting

the Government to broaden and deepen the participation of civil servants at all administrative levels to preserve institutional memories and developing global approaches for institutional capacity development in partnership with the other actors. ■



# Management Response

Management is very satisfied with the findings of the evaluation conducted by the Independent Development Evaluation Department (IDEV) concerning the Bank Group's assistance to Chad over the period 2002–2012 and its contribution to the country's development. Management broadly endorses the conclusions of this report, which stresses the need to further enhance the sustainability of certain outputs relating to infrastructure, ensure long-term consolidation of achievements in the area of governance, step up support to the private sector and conduct further analytic work for formulation of Country Strategy Papers (CSP). Lastly, it conveys the need to continue building the country's institutional capacities as well as strengthen the human resources of the ADB country office in Chad. The various conclusions and recommendations will be taken into account in formulating the new strategy for Bank assistance in Chad (2015–2019) and in the different operations ensuing.

The evaluation, which concerns the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for 2002–2004, 2005–2009 and 2010–2014, was carried out using as criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, Impact and Sustainability. Its scope of analysis covers the formulation of CSP, implementation and incorporation of sector and crosscutting issues in light of the Bank's recommendations and strategic orientation. This retrospective work thus enriches reflection on the Bank's positioning and the choice of interventions in Chad for the coming period.

## Relevance

Management is pleased with the IDEV affirmation that all three successive Bank strategies for assistance to Chad (CSPs 2002–2004; 2005–2009; 2010–2014) have been pertinent and consistent with the country's priorities. The pillars have been in line with the pillars guiding the Bank's strategic action, namely: i) promotion of good governance and ii) development of basic infrastructure has actually been characterized by their relevance and alignment with the country priorities. The Bank's new strategy for assistance to Chad (2015–2019), which is under preparation also falls in line with these priorities. The Bank's areas of focus in Chad will be aligned on the

2013–2015 National Development Plan (PND), but also follow the thrusts defined for the upcoming five-year plan (2016–2020). These were officially presented to all Chad's development partners on the occasion of the conference for mobilization of resources to finance the PND gap and the National Food Security Programme (PNISA) conducted from 20 to 21 June 2014 in Paris. The CSP under preparation will also take into account the Bank's Ten-Year Strategy (2013–2022); the strategy in situations of fragility; the Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan(2014–2018); the Private Sector Development Strategy (2013–2017), the Gender Strategy (2014–2018) and the new Bank Group Regional Integration Strategy (2014–2023). In addition, a study on fragility, scheduled by the Transition Support Department, will enable these issues to be better take into account in the Country Strategy Paper being drawn up, and the Bank's interventions which will be prepared within this framework.

## Effectiveness

According to the evaluation report, the efficacy of Bank assistance was deemed only fairly satisfactory over the period of analysis. The outcomes of Bank

assistance to Chad are more significant and appreciable with regard to infrastructure than to governance. Management is pleased with the IDEV observation recognizing the Bank's contribution to the improved rate of access to drinking water, but also the fact that it is the sole donor intervening in the rural sanitation sector. Management also notes that progress concerning transport infrastructure has been satisfactory. This has indeed contributed to opening up the hinterland, improving the country's external access and increasing economic resilience. Internally, the efforts at bringing these areas out of isolation have resulted in easier access to agricultural produce markets, thanks to the increase in agricultural supply, development of feeder roads, thus contributing to diversification of the economy.

From the external standpoint, the development of infrastructure, mainly relating to roads, has helped increase goods trade and improved mobility within the sub-region. The Douala N'Djamena Corridor Transport Facilitation programme cited in the evaluation report has largely contributed to this result. Also of note in that regard is the recent agreement signed on 3 June 2014 between Cameroon and Chad for the establishment of a commission to oversee the extension of the railroad towards Chad.

The Bank will continue to give priority to transport development within the framework of the next CSP. This will help create a higher number of economic opportunities that can raise the level of growth, particularly in the agriculture and industry sectors.

Regarding the promotion of good governance, the evaluation considered Bank assistance to Chad unsatisfactory. This assessment is based on the three following criteria:

- The extent of implementation of the CSP during the period under review;

- The degree of realization of the reforms and measures under the programmes and projects actually implemented; and

- The extent of fulfilment of the specific objectives of projects implemented.

Management takes due note of this observation while indicating that the budgetary support operation envisaged for 2010 could not be realized, as Chad had not succeeded in concluding a programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The efforts undertaken by the Committee of Technical and Financial Partners, under the leadership of the African Development Bank, with a view to improving economic and financial governance, will be continued and amplified in the next strategy for assistance to Chad. This will allow for better positioning of each partner and improved coverage of all this sector's components.

## Efficiency

The IDEV evaluation rates the efficiency of Bank assistance overall, based on the portfolio performance results. The efficiency of projects has been quite limited in the areas of agricultural infrastructure and governance, and thus generated substantial transaction costs. This situation has recently taken a positive turn, due to Management's adoption of optimal measures to reduce the project implementation period. In addition, project quality at entry has been improved, as seen from the shortening of the average period between the date of approval and the first disbursement (9 months compared to an average of 14 in 2012). Several actions have been carried out to enhance efficiency of the Bank's assistance including:

- The organization of results-oriented portfolio reviews backed by the monitoring and evaluation system for each project;



- The utilization of logical frameworks as instruments to measure the progress achieved in fulfilling the development objectives of the projects and the CSPs covering the 2010–2014 period;
- The organization of training to build the capacity of the stakeholders involved in project implementation, based on the modules selected during fiduciary clinics; and
- The organization of close project monitoring meetings by the Field Office, advisory support sessions by financial management, procurement and disbursement specialists based in TDFO and discussions of supervision mission checklists at the most appropriate administrative level.

## Sustainability

The Bank takes note of the evaluation report observation that deems the sustainability of Bank assistance results unsatisfactory. The report acknowledges that the aspect of durability of these outcomes, which falls first and foremost under the responsibility of the Government, poses a major challenge, given the paucity of the national human and financial resources required to ensure their optimal functioning. Management is satisfied with IDEV's acknowledgement that action was taken, more especially regarding sector governance in the energy and transport sectors. Management intends to continue to support and promote the placing of project implementation units within the technical directorates of the overseeing sector departments, rather than creating parallel project management units. In addition Management has, through the different portfolio performance reviews, convinced the Government of the need to implement performance contracts within projects. It has also urged and encouraged project teams to conduct technical audits for new projects. In addition, outreach components are provided for in the projects especially infrastructure projects to enhance

ownership of the works carried out in the projects and ensure their sustainability. In the transport sector, measures have also been taken aimed at building the capacity of maintenance facilities.

## Crosscutting Areas

Management has taken due note of the observation contained in the evaluation report concerning Bank assistance relating to gender, fragility and regional integration the results of which are deemed fairly satisfactory.

The evaluation report stresses that the progress observed in these two areas is not sufficiently highlighted in the various Country Strategy Papers.

**Environment.** Management underscores the Bank's growing involvement in the environment. It is currently the leading technical and financial partner involved in the safeguarding of Lake Chad, which remains a vital environmental issue for Chad and the other countries with territories around this lake. It has already financed the Lake Chad Sustainable Development Programme (PRODEBALT) for an amount of UA 30 million; this is under implementation and to be completed end-2016. To meet the demands of the Lake Chad Basin commission (CBLT) countries and, following the Round Table organized by CBLT in June 2014 in Bologna (Italy) towards the financing of its five-year plan, the Bank and the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) decided to contribute to the funding for the Lake Chad Rehabilitation Support programme (PARLT) for an estimated amount of almost UA 70.12 million. PARLT which will consolidate the achievements of the Lake Chad Sustainable Development Programme.

**Gender.** The various projects of the portfolio have laid emphasis on the creation of economic prospects and opportunities for women, in fulfilment of the Bank's commitment to making gender equality part and parcel of economic development (literacy, training in best practices for effective preservation

of fishery products, procurement of equipment to support income-generating activities and to ensure women's empowerment). This concern is reflected in the new projects, notably the Kyabé-Singako Road, which envisages the financing of multifunctional platforms for women. In formulating the new Country Strategy Paper (CSP), the gender and environmental dimensions will be further strengthened. Management will thus ensure the effective participation of gender and environment specialists in all the preparatory phases of the operations envisaged under the new Bank strategy of assistance to Chad (2015-2019).

**Fragility.** Management shares the IDEV view that fragility has not been properly taken into account in the Country Strategy Papers produced between 2002 and 2012. However, since the approval by the Bank Boards of the CSP Addendum of March 2011, enabling Chad to access the resources of the Transition Support Facility, the Bank has implemented several projects. Despite the financing limitations, the results already achieved through these operations with regard to building the administration's capacity have been favourably received by the government. The continuation of these interventions and the conduct of a study on opportunities for Chad's resilience to fragility and conflict, which will be steered by the Transition Support Department (ORTS) will, on the one hand increase the efficiency of the administrations benefitting from these financings, and on the other hand, enhance the integration and refine the targeting of Bank interventions in Chad.

**Regional Integration.** The IDEV evaluation report cites the good intentions, however noting that they were not significantly followed through. Management recognizes that, after several decades, progress in this domain remains very limited, given the low level of commitment by the States and the weak capacity of the regional institutions in charge of implementation of regional projects. Management intends to reinforce the implementation of the Bank Group's Regional Integration Strategy Paper (2014-2023) and adopt an approach that capitalizes on the areas in which the countries have been most receptive and supports

reforms that will serve the purposes of integration in the region. For Chad, the point is to take maximum advantage of its geographic position which makes it one of the important actors of sub-regional

**Economic integration.** Already, certain programmes have yielded tangible results, and a good example is the Douala N'Djamena Corridor Transport Facilitation programme. The inter-route traffic has been eased on this corridor that is vital to the Chadian economy. In addition, the Multinational Road Project linking Chad and Niger to Algeria was approved by the Bank Board on 11 December 2013 and will contribute to improving Chad's connection with the other countries of the sub-region, opening up the country and thereby strengthening sub-regional integration. The Project under study to improve river navigation between Congo, CAR and Chad also falls within this purview. The forthcoming CSP will provide the occasion to identify projects that can support this process.

## Bank's Aid Management

Management welcomes the assessment contained in the evaluation report with regard to the Bank's active and catalytic role within the Committee of Technical and Financial Partners (CPTF) of Chad and its different thematic groups. The Bank Office's input involving support and advisory services, training of project management teams, coordination of activities amongst the technical and financial partners and ongoing dialogue with the national authorities, has made the Bank a privileged Government interlocutor in its dealings with the international financial community. This role of coordination and facilitation within the community of technical and financial partners will be continued under the next CSP, considering the challenges confronting the country. The achievement of the HIPC completion point and the need to consolidate gains in that regard, and recourse to co-financing for national and regional projects constitute the greatest challenges and will lead the Bank to support Government efforts.

## Management Action Record

Management takes due note of the lessons drawn from the evaluation conducted by IDEV and largely shares the views conveyed in the recommendations made. These lessons and recommendations will be taken into

account in formulating the new strategy (2015–2019) for Bank assistance to Chad and all the operations envisaged thereunder. Management also takes note of the need to establish an efficient monitoring and evaluation system for the implementation of the CSP 2015–2019. ■

Recommendation	Management response
<p><b>Recommendation 1:</b> <i>Accentuate and focus support on good governance, making judicious use of its position as privileged partner.</i></p>	
<p><i>Help the country institute a formal sustainable and effective framework for design and coordination of reforms, and support government efforts to craft an analytic framework to guide its decisions relating to governance reform.</i></p>	<p><b>Agreed</b> – One of the CSP (2015–2019) pillars under formulation involves the promotion of good governance. The objective of interventions in this focal area will be to consolidate and pursue the Bank’s support to the Government’s reforms in the economic and financial sector (including reaching the HIPC completion point). The continuation of these reforms will bolster the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency in public expenditure management and will enhance the mobilization of budgetary resources (outside oil sector).</p> <p>The first thrust of the Governance Pillar of the CSP (2015–2019) under preparation will entail support to public finances in concert and synergy with the other donors. This support will target the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Extension of the tax base (income tax reform);</li> <li>■ Improved information systems for administration and budget planning services (MTEF, Programme Budget);</li> <li>■ Capacity building of officials in public administration and civil society on the management of public finances.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendation 2:</b> <i>Include an objective relating to private sector development and leverage any synergies with Bank areas of intervention</i></p>	
<p><i>Formulate strategies for more active involvement by supporting action to improve the business climate and directly assisting the private sector.</i></p>	<p><b>Agreed</b> – The second thrust of the Governance Pillar of the CSP (2015–2019) under preparation will help to improve the business climate. It will focus on the promotion of the private sector for strong, inclusive and job-generating growth.</p> <p>In conjunction with the other Technical and Financial Partners (TFP), and adding to the action already defined under the Project to Support Improvement of the Business Climate and Diversification of the Chadian Economy (PACADET), approved by the Bank Board of Directors in December 2013, the next CSP (2015–2019) will include the following interventions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Operationalization of the Commercial courts (in Ndjamena and in two other towns in the hinterland);</li> <li>■ Aligning national instruments with provisions of OHADA Treaty; Building the capacity of bodies responsible for the establishment of an</li> <li>■ upgrading programme for SME/SMI (CCIAMA, ANIE, etc.);</li> <li>■ Support to the management of cadastral and State lands. (These operations are under the responsibility of the Bank private sector departments and will be the first to become effective in this sector in Chad).</li> </ul>

Recommendation	Management response
<p><b>Recommendation 3:</b> <i>Invest in analytical and diagnostic studies so as to better grasp the issues as well as the options open to the country.</i></p> <p><i>Devote further efforts to the Economic and sector work, in order to better inform and guide the government's strategies and development master plans, as well as firmly establish the Bank's assistance strategy, its participation in dialogue and its investment choices.</i></p>	<p><b>Agreed</b> – This recommendation has been taken into account for the Country Strategy Document (2015–2019) which is under preparation.</p> <p>Two studies have already been conducted. A third one is ongoing. They provide a basis for supporting and channelling the Bank's intervention in different areas, orienting the Government's strategic choices and improving TFP coordination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The study on mobilization of Chad's public domestic resources outside the oil sector (2013) has contributed to the formulation of the Ministry of Finance and Budget Plan of action to meet the challenge posed by the limited non-oil tax burden. The Project to support the Attainment of the HIPC Initiative Completion Point has been initiated to back government efforts in that regard. (It has a component dedicated to the effort to mobilize fiscal resources). Interventions have been initiated by other TFPs in the same vein, ultimately contributing to better harmonization of the action.</li> <li>■ The recommendations of the study on private investment environment in Chad (2012) and that which is being finalized on the promotion of SME/SML in the diversification of the Chadian economy have been among the foundations of the Project to Support Improvement of the Business Climate and Diversification of the Chadian Economy (PACADET).</li> <li>■ The findings and recommendations of these three studies as well as that on the opportunities of Chad's resilience to fragility and conflict, steered by the Transition Support Department, will be taken into account in the Bank's new assistance strategy to Chad. This will contribute to improving the quality at entry of operations to be implemented as part of the new strategy and strengthen dialogue with the Government. As an illustration, the two studies on the private sector in Chad will, at the request of the Government, serve as working papers at the national conference on the private sector to be organized in 2015.</li> </ul>

Recommendation	Management response
<b>Recommendation 4:</b> <i>Ensure that the issue of outcome sustainability is better taken into account</i>	
<p><i>Take outcome sustainability into account through support mechanisms such as capacity building for all stakeholders and adoption of a post-operation monitoring policy.</i></p> <p><i>Support to Government efforts to build its technical and financial capacities relating to quality control and infrastructure maintenance.</i></p>	<p><b>Agreed</b> – This recommendation will be taken into account in the formulation of the new Country Strategy Paper (2015–2019). Management intends to promote and support the Government’s efforts at ensuring sustainability of outcomes through the following steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Encourage the Government to build the capacities of the project implementation units that already have substantial experience with the Bank;</li> <li>■ Support to ensure durable project management bodies through the integration of project executing units into their supervising departments;</li> <li>■ Targeted support to build the capacities of the units responsible for maintenance of the structures built, notably the road maintenance fund (FER) under the next CSP (2015–2019).</li> </ul>
<b>Recommendation 5:</b> <i>Lay greater emphasis on the development of human resources of the administration and on the</i>	
<p><i>Encourage the Government to extend and deepen staff participation at all administrative levels, to preserve the institutional memory and develop the global approach to institutional development in partnership with other stakeholders. This means paying more interest to building the country’s institutions and human capacity to manage and take ownership of its development, which supposes, among other things, monitoring and evaluation capacity building.</i></p>	<p><b>Agreed</b> – This recommendation has been taken into account in the Country Strategy Paper under preparation (2015–2019). Any new project will henceforth include an institution building component aimed at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Better training the senior staff involved in project management;</li> <li>■ Building the capacity of institutional partners (NGOs, private sector, branches of the administration) involved in project implementation.</li> <li>■ As an illustration, economic and financial governance capacity building project (PARCAGEF) undertook an extensive training programme for national stakeholders involved in public procurement. In the context of a capacity building program in progress, more than 700 senior civil servants were trained on 31 August 2014. Furthermore, the technical assistance and capacity building project for the implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP) and the development of Chad’s Vision 2030 provides for monitoring and evaluation capacity building actions at the national level and also validation workshops at local and central level in view of appropriation of Chad’s Vision 2030.</li> </ul>



# Introduction

## Evaluation Objectives and Scope

This evaluation examines the African Development Bank Group's assistance to Chad over the period 2002–2012 which covers three programming cycles, namely 2002–2004, 2005–2009 and 2010–2014, each of which is based on a Country Strategy Paper (CSP). The objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Bank's development operations through its contribution to the achievement of the goals outlined in the Government's and the Bank's strategy papers, and possibly, the achievement of other cross-cutting development goals. The term "assistance" includes aid in the form of loans and grants, as well as non-financial activities, that is, economic and sector studies, institution building, technical assistance, counselling and policy dialogue, portfolio review, aid coordination and resource mobilization. Lastly, the evaluation draws conclusions and relevant lessons from the experiences acquired over the period under study to inform the Bank's future policies and strategies and improve the quality of its operations in Chad.

## Methodological Approach

The approach adopted for this evaluation is based on Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) good practice standards recommended by ECG (Evaluation Cooperation Group) and DAC (Development Assistance Committee)<sup>1</sup>, and uses the Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) methodology. Standard evaluation criteria have been used, namely: relevance, efficiency (achievement of objectives), effectiveness, sustainability, impact on institutional development, impacts, Bank and Borrower performances. The evaluation strove to provide answers to the following evaluation questions:

- i. To what extent have the intervention strategies adopted and the Bank's positioning in Chad been relevant with respect to Chad's development issues?
- ii. Has Bank assistance to Chad achieved its objectives? If yes, were they efficiently achieved in relation to investment costs? And to what extent are Bank achievements viable in the long term?
- iii. What has been the impact of Bank assistance on the major economic aggregates and to what extent have Bank operations built the country's capacity to better manage its economy, reduce poverty and stimulate sustainable development?
- iv. To what extent has the Bank played a role in policy dialogue and influenced aid coordination and resource mobilization in Chad?
- v. To what extent have the Bank's organizational resources and internal processes been effectively deployed to address Chad's agro-ecological, socio-political and economic vulnerability?

To this end, the analysis is based on documented evidence, portfolio review and the findings of field missions undertaken by the evaluation team. Interviews conducted with relevant Bank staff helped to better fine-tune and focus the work. The field mission provided the opportunity to conduct interviews with Chadian authorities, various project officials and other development partners. A high-level national workshop organized in September 2013 made it possible to discuss this evaluation's preliminary conclusions and recommendations.

Discussions were guided by the Logical Framework of Bank Operations in Chad (Annex 1). The evaluation is based on three key thematic studies: two thematic evaluations were conducted around the two pillars which underpinned the three Bank CSPs during the period under review (Infrastructure and Governance), and a third evaluation was devoted to the reflection of fragility and vulnerability in the Bank's strategies and operations. An interim report was produced for each of the evaluations.

### Report Limitations and Structure

This evaluation, the first of its kind in the country, faced some problems linked especially to the scarcity of ex post evaluations conducted by the Bank, flaws in the information system and lack of monitoring and

evaluation at the national level. Another limitation inherent in this type of evaluation is the problem of powers. However, the methodological approach adopted helped to gather the essential lessons that can be learnt from Bank operations in Chad.

The rest of the report is structured into six (6) chapters: Chapter 2 summarizes the country's development strategies and challenges. Chapter 3 examines the Bank's strategies and commitments in Chad, while Chapter 4 analyses the impacts of Bank operations and evaluates the Bank's contribution to Chad's development objectives over the entire period 2002–2012. Chapter 5 deals with the performances of the Bank and Government during the period under evaluation. Lastly, the last chapter presents the recommendations stemming from this evaluation. ■



# Chad's Development Strategy and Challenges

## Development Challenges

**As a country with a difficult past coming out of a long-drawn conflict, Chad's development challenges are many.** The country is grappling with a huge infrastructure deficit due to the destructions of war and many years of inaction which gave rise to poverty, food insecurity and recurrent periods of famine. Most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are considered as unachievable (Annex 6).

**There are significant human development challenges.** The gross primary enrolment ratio increased from 73% in 2000 to 95.5% in 2008–2010. In secondary schools, it was 10.7% and 24.2% respectively. The adult illiteracy rate is not only high, but has been on the rise over the years, from 67% in 2003 to 78% in 2007 with 69% for men and 86% for women. The country's health situation is still very difficult. The infant mortality rate was still 124 per 1000 in 2007, against 122 in 2000. The maternal mortality rate, however, dropped from 900 deaths per 100 000 live births in 2004 to 700 deaths per 100 000 live births in 2008. HIV/AIDS prevalence for the 15 to 49-year age bracket fell from 7% in 2001 to about 3% in 2008. Life expectancy in the country declined between 2007 and 2010, and stood at 49.2 years in 2010 against an average of 54.2 years in sub-Saharan Africa. Chad was ranked last in the 2011 Human Development Index (Annex 6).

**Chad's development results vary greatly, with growth depending on climate and oil production contingencies.** Chad has, however, made considerable strides with respect to economic development and social transformation in just a few years (since 2008), recording high, although erratic,

growth rates and remarkable progress in key areas such as education, and the beginning of industrial and energy development. One of the major problems is governance which undermines the business climate, among other things. To date, Chad is the only country that has not reached the HIPC Initiative completion point. Efforts are however deployed in view of the upcoming signature of a triennial agreement between Chad and the IMF with respect to the Extended Credit Facility.

## Chad's Development Strategy

**The Government's strategic vision during the last decade was to promote medium- and long-term economic growth with a view to reducing poverty and vulnerability.** It is within this context that the Government adopted the first National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS I) document in 2003 to cover the period 2004–2006. The main objective of NPRS I was to halve the poverty level by 2015, in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In October 2006, the Government embarked on the revision of NPRS I in preparation for NPRS II which was adopted in April 2008 for the period 2008–2011. NPRS II sought to consolidate the achievements of NPRS I by reaffirming the latter's strategic priorities, and was based on poverty reduction-oriented macro-economic and sector strategies.

**The NRSP II has in particular shown a realization of the urgent need to solve the governance problem.** "Good governance (peace, security and political, legal and institutional environment conducive to economic growth and appeasement of

**Box 1:** Governance remains a major challenge in Chad

Over the last decades, all key international governance indicators have ranked Chad last in the world and at a level lower than that of the other sub-Saharan Africa countries. The challenges and needs to be met in order to address the governance situation are political, administrative and economic and can be summed up into:

- greater efficiency of public administration;
- efficient and transparent management of oil resources;
- improvement of the legal environment;
- improvement of the business climate and private sector development;
- institutional capacity building;
- human resource development; and
- strengthening of human rights.

political tensions) will do more for the revitalization of Chad's economy and poverty reduction than all the other components of the strategy". This excerpt from NPRS II portrays the Government's conviction that governance plays a decisive role in poverty reduction.

**With the opportunity offered by oil exploitation, the Government's primary objective is to reduce poverty to 40.3% by 2015.** To achieve

this outcome, the Government intends to redouble its efforts to record a non-oil GDP average growth rate of at least 5.5% between 2010 and 2015. The implementation of NPRS II was completed in December 2011 and the Government embarked on the preparation of a National Development Plan (NDP) for the period 2013–2015. The NDP was finally adopted in April 2013 at the Council of Ministers and in July 2013 by the Chadian Parliament. ■

# Bank Assistance Strategies and Programmes in Chad

## Bank strategies and programs between 2002 and 2012

The total amount of Bank allocations to Chad between 1974 (starting date of Bank operations in Chad) and March 2012 stands at CFAF 405 billion through 75 operations in all development sectors nationwide. The exploitation of oil reserves from 2001 gave a new boost to Chad's economy and opened new avenues for Bank operations and its portfolio recorded a marked increase. The Bank established an AfDB Project Coordination Office in Chad in 1999 and the Chad Field Office opened in December 2006.


The period covered by this Country Assistance Evaluation spans three CSP cycles (2002–2004, 2005–2009 and 2010–2014). The Bank's intervention strategies in the country evolved according to the various CSP cycles, and were influenced by NPRSP I and NPRSP II. Under CSP 2002–2004, the Bank provided economic reform support and agricultural and rural development support was among the strategic thrusts of NPRSP I. CSP 2005–2009 targeted economic management institutional capacity building and infrastructure promotion, thereby echoing some of the strategic objectives of NPRSP II. Through CSP 2010–2014, the Bank is continuing its infrastructure support, particularly rural and road infrastructure, and is providing support for public sector governance capacity building.

## Implementation of Bank Strategies: Lending and Grant Operations

During the period covered by this evaluation (2002–2012), Bank assistance concerned

32 operations for net commitments of UA 200 million (Annex 2). The Bank has always been one of Chad's key donors. In 2008, Bank commitments represented more than 25% of overall assistance to Chad, ranking the Bank second among the leading donors after the European Union. However, AfDB's share in development financing in Chad dropped during the entire period 2008–2011. Over this period, the total amount of commitments by donors and concessional creditors stood at about CFAF 1.29 billion. More than a quarter of this amount came from the European Commission (CFAF 347 million, that is 27%), followed by WFP (CFAF 150 million, that is 12%) and AfDB (CFAF 145 million, that is 11%). Lastly, the rest of these commitments were made by the World Bank, the United States of America and other technical and financial partners (TFPs).

Despite the irregular growth in the Bank's financial resource commitments, they were evenly distributed during the evaluation period. Compared to the first half of the decade, the distribution of operations by sector after 2006 improved, with an increase in the weight of the transport sector to the detriment of the education sector. There was also an increase in operations in the water and sanitation sector. The new configuration of the Bank's portfolio remained consistent with the development of CSP priorities, ADF being the exclusive source of financing. Bank operations showed some flexibility characterized by a number of emergency assistance operations which helped to address some cases of epidemics such as meningitis and cholera and to provide assistance to flood victims.


**Figure 1:** Cumulative Bank commitments - UA - (2002–2012)

**Most Bank-financed projects comprised infrastructure components.** These components were mainly concentrated in the agricultural and rural development, road and road transport and water and sanitation sectors. In the area of agriculture, infrastructure construction efforts focused on the improvement of rural and community roads, marketing, storage and processing of agricultural products, rural water supply and agro-sylvo-pastoral equipment. Since the adoption of the Water and Sanitation Master Plan (SDEA) for the period 2003–2020, the Bank has made efforts to improve access to drinking water in urban and rural areas. The “sanitation” component received less attention from the Bank.

**Concerning support for reforms and good governance, achievements were, however, limited despite the fact that successive Bank CSPs included a considerable support programme.** The main reasons for these deficiencies are related to the

various rebellions that broke out in Chad, coupled with the break in relations between Chad and the Bretton Woods institutions from 2006 to 2010 as a result of political and economic governance problems, (elimination of the Fund for Future Generations) between Chad and the World Bank. The same reasons explain the absence of staff-monitored programmes with the IMF since 2009, leading to modifications in the AfDB programme which, during the 2010–2014 programming cycle, had to replace economic reform support with institutional support.

**Beyond programmes specifically devoted to governance, all the other sector non-governance projects included governance-related aspects.** Thus, all the 19 portfolio sector projects implemented over the evaluation period included governance components. Regarding governance criteria targeted in these sector projects, eleven (11) sector projects primarily targeted “accountability/obligation to

**Figure 2:** Commitments by sector (2002–2012)

render account” and “participation”; seven (7) sector projects exclusively targeted “accountability”; 1 (one) project targeted “accountability”, “participation” and “transparency” (Annex 2).

**A special aspect concerning Chad is its fragility and there is a need to ask the question of whether to consider it in the Bank’s portfolio.** It should first of all be noted that Chad is eligible only for FSF Pillar 3, which is a handicap given that this Pillar has the lowest allocation. As at 31 December 2012, the total amount of funds allocated to Chad through FSF Window 3 stood at UA 7.12 million of which UA 5.7 million was committed under 9 projects. The total amount of funds allocated to the 19 fragile States stands at UA 82.37 million. Chad is the 3rd highest beneficiary of this window after Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). From 2002 to 2012, that is between ADF 9 and ADF 12, Chad’s ADF allocations increased by more than 350%

despite the downward adjustments in 2006 and 2007 owing to poor CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) performance over these two years. A comparison between Chad and the other fragile States over the period 2005–2012 shows that Chad’s ADF allocations are quite close to the average of fragile States (Annex 5).

### Implementation of Bank Strategy: Non-financial Activities

**One of the weaknesses of AfDB’s non-financial activities in Chad is the few economic and sector studies (ESS) conducted.** Over the decade 2002–2012, the Bank conducted a small number of studies in Chad which were mostly feasibility and pre-investment studies that could not help the Bank’s positioning and guide its reflection on the country’s developments. Generally, lack of exhaustive, reliable

and regular production of national statistics is a constraint which affects the quantity and quality of economic and sector analyses that may be produced. In future, the Bank could play a more important role, particularly in growth support. An economic and sector study is ongoing to grasp the difficulties faced by the private sector and SMEs/SMLs, and to reflect on ways and means of diversifying the Chadian economy.

**With respect to aid coordination and policy dialogue, the Bank played an important role in the move to organize and coordinate Chad's TFPs.** A Chad Technical and Financial Partners Committee (TFPC) was established in 2011 on the Bank's initiative. The Committee is an exchange and consultation platform for key TFPs, namely: multilateral and regional development institutions, embassies, technical cooperation agencies and financial cooperation agencies. Chaired by the Bank, the Committee has helped to strengthen the coordination and harmonization of the projects and programmes of all bilateral and multilateral partners, in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Development Aid Effectiveness.

**Concerning partnership and resource mobilization,** Chad adhered to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2007. Since then, the Bank has pursued its policy of seeking co-financing. Three of the six national projects in the Bank's portfolio that is still active in July 2012 were co-financed by Arab funds (BADEA, OPEC and IsDB). However, it is necessary to take into account problems inherent in this kind of operations, particularly those carried out with other financial partners without local representations in Chad as they could face serious coordination problems related, among other things, to lack of field contact and insufficient number of joint supervision missions.

## Conclusions of Previous Evaluations

**Despite heavy Bank involvement in Chad, no ex post evaluation of country assistance was conducted for the country.** However, during the study period, 2002-2012, the Bank conducted many auto- evaluations in Chad, particularly portfolio reviews. Portfolio reviews conducted in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2012 generally show an overall improvement over the past years after the difficulties noted up to 2006, with an aggregate rating which increased from 1.8 (on a scale of 0 to 3) in 2002 to 2.23 in 2012. However, these reviews also show that the portfolio still has lingering problems which undermine the effectiveness of Bank operations, namely: (i) low technical capacity within the public administration; (ii) slow public procurement process and non-mastery of Bank rules and procedures; (iii) low ownership of operations by responsible ministries; (iv) unpredictability and late payment of counterpart contributions; and (v) technical shortcomings of SMEs responsible for project/ programme works.

**In 2009, the European Commission conducted an independent evaluation of its cooperation strategy in Chad between 1967 and 2007.** The findings of this evaluation which corroborate this study showed that the Commission's strategy was relevant and consistent, and that physical outcomes targeted by these strategies were largely achieved in the focus areas of road transport and water and sanitation. On the contrary, health sector results were mediocre. In the areas of macro-economic support and good governance promotion, results were deemed average and fragile. Lastly, the evaluation pointed out the project implementation difficulties related to insufficient human resources and high transaction costs. ■

# Evaluation of Bank Assistance Results

## Relevance of Bank's strategies and programs

The successive CSPs have been constant with respect to the pillars that guided the Bank's strategic action, namely: (i) **Good Governance Promotion**, and (ii) **Basic Infrastructure Development**. The first pillar's strategic objective is to enhance transparency and accountability in public finance management as well as contribute to improving the business climate. Initially devoted to agricultural and rural development, the second pillar was later extended to the development of all basic infrastructure in order to create conditions for sustained inclusive and diversified growth of the Chadian economy.

*Bank strategies in Chad have been consistent with assistance policies developed by the Bank and relevant to the needs and priorities of Chad, with respect to the choice of beneficiaries and the sector split of interventions around the two pillars. Some weaknesses can however be seen with respect to taking into account fragility and prioritizing private sector development and environment management (Table 1).*

**The Bank has constantly supported Government's efforts in the area of governance.**

One of the Bank's assistance pillars during the period 2002–2012 was Good Governance Promotion by targeting the five traditional governance criteria which underpin the Bank's strategy in this area, namely:

(i) accountability/the obligation to render account; (ii) transparency; (iii) participation; (iv) legal and judicial reforms;; and (v) the fight against corruption. At the centre of the Bank's strategy is the explicit and justified recognition of the importance and role of the capacity to plan, programme and coordinate (absorption capacity) and implement programmes and projects (execution capacity), as well as the urgent need to promote them. The objectives of multi-sector programmes of CSP 2002–2004, CSP 2005–2009 and CSP 2010–2014 covered all the good governance needs identified above. The Bank also properly developed Chad's governance profile in the programmes implemented during the period under review.

**In the area of infrastructure, the Bank went beyond agricultural and rural development, hitherto considered as Chad's national priority, to raise basic infrastructure development in its broadest sense to a priority pillar in its CSPs for Chad since 2005.** Such broadening of scope has helped to simultaneously plan the development of all basic infrastructure in order to create conditions for sustained growth of the entire Chadian economy. The objective will be attained through three thrusts: (i) rural infrastructure improvement to increase agricultural yield and ensure better management of sylvo-pastoral and transhumance resources; (ii) upgrading the road network to open up agricultural production areas and link Chad to the other countries of the sub-region in order to strengthen regional integration; and (iii) improvement of access to basic services through the development of community drinking water supply, sanitation, electricity, telecommunication, health and education infrastructure.

**Table 1:** Relevance Rating

Sector	Rating <sup>2</sup>
Infrastructure	Very satisfactory
Governance	Satisfactory
Fragility	Unsatisfactory
Private Sector	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>

**Over the entire evaluation period, the Bank's sector operations evolved to support Government public policies.** Bank operations thus covered Government's needs and, to a large extent, the needs identified by the Bank during funded project/programme preparation/appraisal. The Bank also adopted a flexible attitude which helped it to take into account countries' specific circumstances and to learn lessons from the past. The analysis of CSPs 2002–2004, 2005–2009 and 2010–2014 shows an improvement in their quality, especially greater selectivity and better positioning of the Bank, as well as a determination to build on past achievements in order to consolidate results. However, while the Bank complied with CSP formulation frequency, the same does not apply to the country. NPRS I was completed in 2006, while NPRS II was effectively launched only in 2008. Similarly, NPRS II was completed in December 2011, while the NDP was adopted only in July 2013. Such gaps do not facilitate the alignment of TFP support with national priorities.

**A few aspects come besides as tuning down the relevance of Bank strategies. In contrast, there is a disparity between the number of programmes effectively implemented and the Bank's intervention forecasts.** Furthermore, **the Bank's portfolio in Chad is characterized by the absence of private sector window commitment.** This sector is, nevertheless, an obvious Bank priority. The sector's potential to supplement and replace Bank operations is not well developed and incorporated into the Bank's vision. Lastly, the reflection of fragility in Bank strategies and operations in Chad

is unsatisfactory. CSPs do not examine the fragility context and, as such, are not different from the other Bank CSPs.

## Effectiveness of the Bank's assistance

### *Effectiveness of Bank's assistance in infrastructure*

**On the whole, Bank-supported programmes in the infrastructure area were effective** (Annex 4f). Thanks to Bank assistance, the construction of many roads was financed and many health centres and schools equipped with water points and latrines were constructed. High schools were constructed and administrative buildings were either constructed or rehabilitated, thereby helping to restore the public administration. However, it should be noted that the achievement of institutional capacity building objectives in the area of infrastructure is still limited.

**After a downtrend from 2005 to 2007, agricultural production recorded a marked increase (+85%) in 2010 thanks to investments in agriculture, fisheries and stock breeding.** Bank support helped to open up the country, especially agricultural production areas, thanks to the construction of paved roads, crossing structures and rural roads. This contributed to improving access to inputs and tools required to improve production in rural areas and promote the



processing of agro-sylvo-pastoral products. The construction of the Ngueli Bridge helped to facilitate the supply of agricultural products to markets and inter-regional trade. Despite Bank assistance, various crop yields remain relatively average compared to the area's natural potential<sup>3</sup>. More efforts are required to bridge productivity gaps and address the inadequate rural road network and its sometimes complete impracticability in the rainy season. Bank contributions in the agricultural sector also helped to increase the sector's share in the economy, thereby fostering greater diversification of the economy. On the whole, the agricultural and rural development results of Bank assistance are deemed satisfactory, despite a few shortcomings, especially the sector's productivity which is still relatively low.

**Concerning roads and road transport, the surfaced network development objective has almost been achieved thanks to Bank assistance** which funded seven road projects for close to 20% of cumulative financial assistance given to Chad since the first operation in 1974. The impact of these operations could lead to significant improvement in the movement of people and goods in the south of Chad. The movement of people and goods between Chad and Cameroon has been rendered much easier following the construction of Ngueli Bridge linking both banks of the Logone River.

**Regarding water supply and sanitation, the country developed a Water and Sanitation**

**Master Plan (SDEA) thanks to the Bank's institutional support.** The National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (PNEAR) being completed helped to construct and equip boreholes, water points, drinking water supply mini-networks, institutional and community latrines, hand-wash facilities and the popularization of family latrines in Chadian towns and villages (Annex 4d). PAEPA (Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Eight Secondary Centres and Rural Areas) whose implementation has just started will also continue along the same lines.

*The effectiveness of the Bank's assistance is deemed moderately satisfactory (Table 2). Concrete results have been achieved in concentration sectors related to infrastructure. Impact in this area is also overall satisfactory, in particular in supporting economic growth, but is reduced by a sub optimal use particularly domains related to human development. Effectiveness and impact remain modest with respect to governance, integration of fragility and cross-cutting issues such as regional integration, gender and environment. By taking risks and by its position as one of the main donors of Chad, the Bank has however also had an impact that goes beyond the economy to encompass social and political stability.*

**Table 2:** Relevance Rating

Sector	Rating
Infrastructure	Satisfactory
Governance	Unsatisfactory
Fragility	Unsatisfactory
Regional integration, gender and environment	Moderately satisfactory
<b>Aggregate Rating</b>	<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>

### Box 2: Bank Operations in the Road Sector

The Bank provided assistance for:

- i. the construction of surfaced roads;
- ii. the construction of rural roads in the Lake region and the highly agricultural and stock breeding areas;
- iii. the facilitation of transport on the Douala-Bangui and Douala- N'Djamena corridors;; and
- iv. (the flagship project to upgrade and pave the Koumra-Sarh road.

**In the education sector, the gross primary enrolment ratio increased** from 73% in 2000 to 76.2% in 2002–2004, 78.1% in 2005–2007 and 95.5% in 2008–2010. Concerning secondary education, it was respectively 10.7%, 15%, 17.3% and 24.2% (Annexe 4d). Bank- financed Education Programme IV and Education Programme V contributed to these outcomes.

**Although the impact of Bank operations seems appreciable in the areas of education and health infrastructure, the abundance of infrastructure and effective use of such infrastructure need to be properly improved.** Although most Bank-constructed infrastructure are properly used, many of those constructed by the Government have turned out to be “white elephants”. The schools built are not used because of lack of teachers or pupils. The construction of many health centres has not produced any substantial drop in infant mortality because no physicians have been posted to the centres. The infant mortality rate was still 124 per 1000 in 2007 against 122 in 2000. The rate of access to drinking water for

the entire Chadian population currently stands at close to 50%, that is, more than double the 23% rate in 2001. The goal is to attain 60% by 2015. The rate of access to sanitation remained low, standing at around 11% in 2011 against 30% expected at end-2012.

**On the whole, value added for the Bank in the area of infrastructure seems to be positive despite the difficulties pointed out earlier on.** In the long term, it is hoped that the Bank and the Government will consolidate the achievements made so far in order to transform them into factors of development, regional integration, economic growth, stability and improvement of living conditions in rural and urban areas.

### *Effectiveness of the Bank's assistance in Governance*

**The effectiveness of Bank assistance in the area of governance in Chad is deemed unsatisfactory.** The efficacy evaluation covered three dimensions, namely: (i) the level of implementation of CSPs

### Box 3: Bank Achievements in the Area of Education

Education Programme IV (improvement of the quality of secondary education), which closed at the end of September 2002, helped to rehabilitate and equip 118 high school classrooms as follows: Kélo (40), Doba (31), Ati (17), Mongo (21) and Faya (9). The 40-classroom Ndjamen Grammar School was constructed and transformed into a girls' High School together with all its equipment. Education Programme V (upgrading of technical education and vocational training) developed in 2001 and approved in 2004 faced serious implementation problems and enabled only partial achievement of its objectives which were to: (i) construct 6 training centres and rehabilitate and equip 10 other establishments; (ii) train/retrain 230 trainers and supervisory staff; (iii) retrain 22 senior officers of the central and regional administration and beneficiary entities; (iv) establish an operational school information and guidance system; and (v) prepare methodological tools and procure school textbooks.

during the period under review; (ii) the level of implementation of reforms and measures of the programmes and projects effectively implemented; and (iii) the level of achievement of the specific objectives of projects implemented.

**In terms of overall indicators, Chad's performance was low during the period under review.** Chad's Mo Ibrahim Accountability Index ranking was generally low compared to that of sub-Saharan Africa but higher than that of Central Africa up to 2007. In 2007, it was above that of Central Africa by 1% but represented only 61% of that of sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011, it respectively represented only 98% and 59% of those of Central Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. The drop was therefore significant between 2007 and 2011. Moreover, Transparency's Corruption Index, Competitiveness Index (139<sup>th</sup>/139 in 2010) and "Doing Business" all ranked Chad among the last, if not the last country, in the world.

**The implementation of good governance promotion activities of CSP 2005–2009 and CSP 2010–2014 was particularly poor.** This was partly as a result of the break in relations between the State of Chad and the Bretton Woods institutions, notably because of poor management of oil resources, on the one hand, and Bank alignment with the positions of these institutions, on the other hand. The rate of implementation of all multi-sector programmes implemented was estimated at 54.8%, which is quite low<sup>4</sup>.

**On the whole, the specific objectives that were supposed to help improve budget**

**implementation, public service efficiency and public procurement management, and to continue justice reforms were only very partially achieved.** More generally, the CSP good governance promotion objectives were only partially achieved (Annex 4e). The few improvements observed here and there are not decisive enough to really change the situation. Their progress rate is not fast either.

**Assistance in the governance sector has had little impact owing to its low effectiveness level.** Macro-economic stability has not improved. For example, with respect to budget implementation, the frequency of discrepancies between amending finance laws and initial finance laws has become the rule. Extra-budgetary expenditures caused by such discrepancies lead to non-compliance with fiscal discipline. The transfers of oil revenue laid down by law to fund other sectors are carried out more or less normally but the rate of absorption of the revenue by priority sector ministries is relatively low (Annex 6). Public administration efficiency was undermined by many conflicts which led to the low implementation capacity of all ministries. The situation was worsened by the instability of public officials. It was compounded by low salary motivation, the source of the drain of competent senior officers to better equipped and better-paying development projects. The audit reports of 14 ministries completed in 2004 are pending approval. The biometric census of State employees designed to populate the databases set up in 2004 is not completely effective. Implementation of the computerized personnel management system is dragging on owing to slow decision making.

#### Box 4: Bank Contribution in the Governance Area

The Bank's action in the governance sector contributed moderately but positively in the following areas: (i) the continued functioning of INSEED; (ii) the existence and functioning of the public procurement code, OCMP, COJOs, CCSRP, EITI Coordination despite their shortcomings; (iii) the preparation and implementation of NGGS and NPRS; (iv) the transfer of oil resources to the priority sectors of agriculture, rural development and stock breeding in general, and increased rate of oil resource absorption by the agricultural and stock breeding sectors in particular; (v) significant progress recorded in the area of human resources thanks to improved gross enrolment ratio (GER) and health coverage (section 4.2); and (vi) building the capacity of, and empowering, rural women.

Control of the number of civil servants is not effective and no measure is taken to improve salary equity adversely affected by many exceptional pay systems.

### ***Effectiveness of Bank's assistance in Cross-cutting Areas***

**Consideration of fragility in Bank strategies and operations in Chad is unsatisfactory.** The Bank's operations have not enabled the country to formerly get out of its fragility situation. The operations that could have helped the country in that respect, that is, governance projects and programmes and FSF projects, were not successfully implemented or have not all been implemented. The low CPIA and Mo Ibrahim Indicator show that this is the weak link and the most important vector of the country's fragility. The 2012 Mo Ibrahim Index ranked Chad 50<sup>th</sup> among 52 countries with a 32.8 rating, below Central Africa's average (40.3) and that of Africa (51.2). Between 2001 and 2008, the average CPIA rating of African countries increased from 3.1 to 3.2. That of Chad between 2004 and 2008 was 2.8, the same as those of DRC, CAR and Guinea-Bissau (Delfin and Korman, 2009). In 2011, the country's rating dropped to 2.4 ahead of Sudan, Eritrea and Zimbabwe. In November 2012, however, new projects were approved under FSF and could better help the country to move out of the fragility situation, in particular the Governance Enhancement Project and the EITI Support Project.

**There is a strong political will to deny the fragile State status.** In fact, this political will to claim the path of emergence for the country cannot tolerate the qualifier "fragile". Is the choice of an NDP other than an NPRS related to such ambition on the part of the political authorities? The challenge for the Bank is to respond adequately to this political will to deny the fragility status.

**Regarding regional integration, the impacts of the Bank's intervention remain limited despite**

**its good intentions,** and the implementation of multinational projects is slow due to their complexity. The Bank developed a strategy, RISP 2011–2015, which is too recent to deliver results. However, road infrastructure projects prior to RISP have supported regional integration by contributing to open up the countries concerned, especially through the CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme which helped to broaden the Ndjamena-Ngueli road and build a bridge over River Logone at the border with Cameroon. However, the volume of trade amongst ECCAS member countries is still low (0.5% in 2010). The project on the interconnection of electrical grids between Chad and Cameroon initially planned under the CSP has been rescheduled for 2015. Multinational projects being implemented were designed in a complex manner and are posing implementation problems. Such is the case with the Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Programme (PRODEBALT) which seeks to improve the productivity and the management of the Lake Chad Basin ecosystems thanks to increased productivity of farmlands, livestock and fish spawning areas resulting from improved hydrology conditions in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition, in 2004, the Bank approved an ECCAS Secretariat General Institutional Capacity Building Support Project and provided for a CEMAC Executive Secretariat Institutional Support Project. The latter has not yet been implemented. The project to provide institutional support to the ECCAS Secretariat General was effectively implemented in 2011.

**As concerns gender, efforts were made to promote women's participation** in the exercise of political power (18% of women members of parliament and 10% women ministers). In 2011, however, Chad was ranked 145<sup>th</sup> among 187 countries with respect to gender inequality. CSPs included in this evaluation included a very succinct level of analysis for this question.

**Regarding the environment, the Country Environmental Profile (CEP) conducted in**

**2006 and updated in 2010 concluded that the degradation of the country's natural resources is on the rise.**

The Bank has contributed a lot to scaling up the rate of access to drinking water, but has had little influence on the "sanitation" component. However, the Bank remains the only donor operating in the rural sanitation sector. The drying up of Lake Chad is the country's major environmental and climate change problem. The situation could lead to the disappearance of ecosystems around the Lake Chad Basin on which rural populations depend for survival. PRODEBALT is relevant in that respect and could be quite useful if its implementation is revived. There is no national environmental protection strategy despite a few initiatives such as the preparation of the National Action Plan for Desertification Control, the National Biological Diversity Strategy and Action Plan and the National Climate Change Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA).

In light of the foregoing, the results of Bank assistance in the area of regional integration, gender and environment are deemed **moderately satisfactory** and there is a need for considerable efforts.

### Efficiency of the Bank's assistance

The Bank portfolio was rejuvenated after ageing in 2006. The average age of active portfolio projects increased from 4.7 years in 2002 to 6.3 years in 2006, and later dropped to 5 years in 2009 and 2012 with the introduction of new operations into

the portfolio. The country's resource absorption capacity has improved. The disbursement rate which was 26.6% in 2002 rose to 40.18% in 2006 and 32.95% in 2009. In 2012, it stood at 40.9%. Slippages on loan effectiveness are a generic problem which impedes portfolio performance. On average, Bank operations require a time lapse of more than 11 months between approval and first disbursement. However, it should be noted that this is a good score compared to the Bank's average which stands at about 20 months.

*Despite some progress recorded during the evaluation period, on the whole, Bank assistance is deemed unsatisfactory (Table 3). Recent evolutions are however positive.*

**There were a few remarkable improvements in the Bank's portfolio in Chad in terms of reduction in the percentage of problematic projects** which increased from 20% in 2002 to 70% in 2006 and dropped to 0% in 2012. This trend should be credited to efforts made by the Bank and the Government. However, generic problems affecting the portfolio are to a large extent enduring. The presence of risk projects has remained high, and even increased with time. The proportion of risk projects, which was 40% in 2002, hit a record 90% in 2006, before falling to 33% in 2012. Bank projects in Chad are

**Table 3:** Relevance Rating

Sector	Rating
Infrastructure	Satisfactory
Governance	Unsatisfactory
Fragility	Unsatisfactory
Regional integration, gender and environment	Moderately satisfactory
<b>Aggregate Rating</b>	<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>

however among those best managed compared to projects in Fragile States as a whole (Table 4). The proportion of risk projects<sup>5</sup> was previously still relatively high compared to all of the continent's fragile States. Since 2011, Bank portfolio in Chad no longer comprises problematic projects. This implies that all risk projects are potentially problematic projects (PPP). The implementation of new tools by TDFO, for monitoring project execution for example, has effectively contributed to an improvement of the portfolio quality<sup>6</sup> after the period covered by the evaluation.

**On the whole, project/programme efficiency in all the infrastructure areas was low**, resulting in waste of human and financial resources and many delays in project/programme implementation. As a result, assistance transaction costs were high and the extension of project/programme implementation deadlines remained the rule. Unfortunately, project implementation problems reduced the level of efficiency of Bank operations. In the "Agriculture and Rural Development" sub-sector, the deadlines for the implementation of activities planned during project preparation were almost always exceeded, thereby paving the way for extension of closing dates and amendments to works and service contracts. Concerning roads and road transport, the resources used were generally more than those earmarked for the operations, with a constant rise in the cost of a kilometre of road due not only to an increase in the price of diesel oil, but also to a change in the

asphalting system from a single-layer to a 5 cm asphaltic concrete surface. The absence of analytical studies was also a cause of cost underestimation. Some delays were also due to disputes and the low participation of local contractors in competitive biddings (consequence of the low capacity of local contractors and control firms), leading to the cancellation of such biddings considered as unsuccessful. However, some projects were considered to be exemplary. The Project to Upgrade and Pave the Koumra-Sarh Road (PAR-KS) neither required extension nor faced litigation problems and was implemented within the stipulated deadline. It was inaugurated before the deadline in February 2013 whereas the closing date was 31 December 2013. This was to enable the completion of some related works on rural roads and the finalization of road support activities, especially support to the Koumra Women's Association. In the water and sanitation sector, the only project implemented, that is PNEAR, faced less problems but its closure was delayed by a year due mainly to project implementation delays.

**The efficiency of Bank assistance in the governance sector is also unsatisfactory.** Transaction costs were too high for the average results achieved in this area. Efficiency is difficult to evaluate when costs and benefits are not monetized. However, it can be noted that efficiency was impeded by considerable delays resulting from low institutional capacity, lengthy procurement processes and cash-

**Table 4:** Comparative Trends in Risk Projects (RPs) and Problematic Projects (PPs) in Chad

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Problematic Projects in Chad (%)	20	10	..	33.3	70	6.7	5.27	10	..	0	0
Problematic Projects of all Fragile States (%)	48.9	..	..	48.9	..	..	21	14	6	7	..
Risk Projects in Chad (%)	40	40	44.4	90	64	74.3	62	50	83	67	33
Risk Projects of all Fragile States (%)	55.34	48.74	46.8	64.6	46.8	63.8	47	45	35	49	..

Source: Compiled by author

flow problems which made it difficult to release national counterpart contributions. Mention should also be made of the high number of conditions and/or measures or reforms to be implemented despite the low absorption and implementation capacity.

**Lastly, regarding the fragility aspect, the levels of disbursement of FSF funds allocated to Chad were low.** As at 31 December 2012, commitments had reached 80.32% while the disbursement rate was barely 27.33% compared to the 43% average level of fragile countries.

## Sustainability and impact of institutional development

Notwithstanding the generally poor outcomes in the governance sector, awareness brought about by Bank assistance will enable the meagre results achieved to be sustained thanks to strengthened absorption and implementation capacities. The infrastructure situation seems a little bit more disturbing given the lack of action to ensure the sustainability of the said infrastructure and weak maintenance and upkeep entities. Road maintenance, for example, is an area which causes a number of worries. This problem is compounded by that of stakeholder ownership. Limited attention was paid to the issue of organizing the population, notably the establishment of community asset management associations.

**With the establishment of the Road Maintenance Fund (FER) in 2001, control systems and the**

*The sustainability of Bank assistance results is deemed moderately unsatisfactory (Table 4). In the area of governance where, on the whole, poor results were obtained, awareness triggered by Bank assistance will enable the meagre governance outcomes obtained to be maintained beyond the Bank project and programme lifespan. In the area of infrastructure and despite some improvements, the lack of actions to ensure infrastructure sustainability and weak maintenance entities remain an issue.*

**transparency of road sector maintenance financing mechanisms have improved somewhat.** However, it should be noted that given the FER's insufficient resources, an increasing proportion of maintenance works is normally financed using non-FER resources. Thus, rural roads are maintained with oil revenue and the entirety of periodic national road maintenance is financed with oil revenue or State budget allocations. Faced with this challenge, FER resources of which 70% are used for road maintenance, increased significantly from CFAF 2 billion in 2000 to CFAF 13 billion in 2012. However, they are insufficient, given that the allocation required for the maintenance of Chad's entire road network is estimated at CFAF 40 billion. In rural areas, the Government has, with Bank support, established a water point operation mechanism managed by Water Points Management Committees

### Box 5: Implementation delays generated additional costs

For the three multi-sector programmes, there was no initial budget overrun; at times even, there were rather cancellations. In contrast, non-financial costs of transactions were high owing to the long delays generally caused by low implementation capacity and procurement procedure-related problems. SAP III was supposed to be implemented in 12 months, but it was implemented in 24 months, recording a slippage of 9 months and 12 months respectively on initial starting date and completion date. PAGE, which was a UA 2.32 million grant of which a tiny part was cancelled, witnessed a 6 months slippage on effectiveness, and a 23 months slippage on completion date. PARG recorded slippages on initial effectiveness date (5.8 months) and completion date (18 months).

(WPMCs) which are functioning satisfactorily. However, in secondary centres managed by Water Users' Associations (WUAs), the system of private operator lease management, with the support of Management Counsel and Support Units (MCSUs), has proven to be less efficient owing to their low technical capacity to repair various breakdowns. Irrigated and developed areas are managed and maintained by beneficiary communities organized into village and cantonal committees. However, some maintenance costs are often beyond beneficiaries' financial capacity and the know-how of local artisans.

**On the whole, the impact of Bank assistance on institutional development is unsatisfactory.**

Despite significant investments in infrastructure, there has been no institutional development around these investments. Even when institutions are created around infrastructure, they do not function properly. Investments in "hardware" have evolved much faster than in "software". Generally, the lack of consistency of the actions of various ministries has persisted. The resulting weak collaboration between ministries affects implementation of the national strategy. In the water and sanitation sector, the institutional and legal context of Bank actions is unclear and inconsistent. Institutions, including the ministry and directorates responsible for water and sanitation, undergo too frequent changes

which lead to loss of consistency of already fragile and insufficient national actions, memory and experience. There is no single point of contact in the sector and the reasons for intervention are not harmonized despite a precise sector policy. In rural areas, Bank operations have contributed to building stakeholders' managerial capacity. Irrigation water users' committees and rice producers' associations, with committees elected to manage facilities, exist and are strengthened under projects. The role of these associations is to establish an appropriate pricing system, collect fees and maintain and manage facilities. However, these committees are subservient to projects or to the central administration, which raises the issue of their sustainability and their survival after the project's lifespan. Despite the laudable construction of health centres and schools in the health and education sectors, these centres still need to be adequately equipped and staffed. Many State-constructed schools are not used for lack of teachers. Some health centres do not have physicians. Concerning governance, Bank operations have triggered a process of inculcating the need for a change in mentality and behaviour with respect to governance and corruption. However, change takes a long time and ten years of Bank assistance have not been enough to revolutionize the functioning of Chadian institutions. Nevertheless, the process is underway, albeit slowly. ■

**Table 5:** Sustainability Rating

Sector	Rating
Infrastructure	Moderately unsatisfactory
Institutional Development	Unsatisfactory
Governance	Moderately unsatisfactory
<b>Aggregate Rating</b>	<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>



# Stakeholder Performance

## Bank Performance

**Bank performance is deemed overall satisfactory** (Annex 4c). The Bank has been able to adapt to the country's difficult environment, although there is need for more effort. Bank performance can be assessed through the examination of strategy design quality, strategy implementation quality, the quality of economic and sector work, and the quality of advisory services, partnership and policy dialogue.

**Concerning strategy design quality**, CSPs for the evaluation period focused on governance enhancement and infrastructure improvement. The Bank's positioning in the governance sector builds on the realization shared by the Government that good governance is as important as the other economic and social components for the revitalization of the Chadian economy and the reduction of poverty. Concerning the infrastructure pillar, the Bank has, since 2005, been able to transcend agricultural and rural development and raise basic infrastructure development in its broadest sense to a priority pillar in its CSPs for Chad.

**Strategy implementation quality was relatively weak.** The planned projects were consistent with the strategies. However, portfolio monitoring was not always satisfactory. Periods of insecurity did not facilitate project monitoring and the absence of a country office did not contribute to close portfolio monitoring. Regarding infrastructure, the volume of operations was too ambitious in relation to the resources committed (financial resources, managerial capacity and technical capacity). The Bank has no Chad-based international sector expert. Intervention areas cover virtually the entire Chadian national territory, and the Field Office does not always have the resources to supervise activities over such

a large geographical area. FSF projects are not supervised at all and the Bank lacks information on the outcomes of its FSF financing in Chad. The Bank's Field Office, together with the Government, recently established a quarterly project and programme review system which enables close monitoring and noticeable portfolio quality improvement.

**As regards the quality of economic and sector studies, one of the Bank's weaknesses in Chad is the insufficient number of analytical studies.**

Chad seems to be in great need of analytical and diagnostic studies capable of helping it to better guide and direct its development efforts. The country is characterized by a low human resource capacity, and a recent history marked by deep-seated socio-political instability. Under such conditions, increased assistance in the area of diagnostic studies would further inform sector strategies and the Government's economic and sector development agenda. For example, public water and electricity corporations, which survived a long-standing planned but not implemented privatization, are suffering from low capacity to conduct studies required to develop strategies to be implemented to increase access to their services by potential consumers whose number is rapidly growing.

**Concerning the quality of advisory services, partnership and policy dialogue**, the Bank has succeeded in positioning itself as the preferred partner of the Chadian Government and the other TFPs. Generally, the quality of dialogue between the Bank and Chad has been strengthened with the opening of the Field Office (TDFO) in February 2007. Despite the strained relations between the Government and the Bretton Woods institutions due to poor budget management, the Bank has, through TDFO, maintained dialogue, particularly on its key

assistance areas, namely: (i) good governance; and (ii) basic infrastructure improvement. This has led to continued sensitization of the authorities on aspects related to the adjustment of the public procurement chain and on maintaining commitments with respect to transparency in oil revenue management. The Bank should also be credited for its participation in the harmonization of procurement procedures for better implementation of donor-funded projects/programmes. In fact, the AfDB, the World Bank and the country have embarked on a process to harmonize procedures that needs to be consolidated and finalized. Chad's various CSPs prepared on the basis of the conclusions of participatory seminars and meetings organized during preparation and Bank- Government dialogue missions helped to shape the content of CSPs. The Chadian authorities have a very good impression of the Bank which they think is capable of better understanding their problem, their mentality and their logic. On the other hand, the other TFPs are counting on the trust that the Government has in the Bank to send across their messages. This places the Bank at the centre stage, thereby giving it the possibility of influencing the course of events. For the Bank to fully play this "mediation role", it must invest much more in the conduct of analytical and diagnostic studies in order to better inform its strategic vision and the messages it sends across.

**The satisfactory performance trend in Bank aid effectiveness should also be pointed out.** Budget assistance increased from 43% in 2007 to 95% in 2010, while financing predictability stood at more than 80% in 2010, and the entire technical cooperation (100%) was aligned with national programmes in 2007 and 2010.

## Government Performance

**On the whole, Government performance is deemed unsatisfactory** (Annex 4b). Government performance was assessed through four parameters: active contribution to the design of strategies,

capacity to successfully implement development projects and programmes, aid coordination and consistency and efficiency of national institutions.

Concerning **active contribution to design of the Bank's overall and sector strategies**, the economic and socio-political context has been difficult since 2002. Recurrent conflicts have seriously undermined the public administration's capacity, resulting in weak institutions at all levels, and the inability to significantly contribute to, or influence Bank strategies. However, the Government regularly produced national strategy documents which, each time, encountered delays that did not facilitate CSP alignment.

**With respect to the capacity to successfully implement development projects and programmes**, Bank-funded projects and studies in Chad were implemented under the supervision of executing agencies placed under the oversight of various technical ministries and coordinated by the Ministry of the Economy, Planning and International Cooperation. Low macro-economic (especially budgetary) and sector planning and programming capacity seriously hampered development project management by Project Implementation Units. The country has a low coordination and monitoring capacity. However, the PIU of the Ministry in charge of Infrastructure and Equipment is a positive exception. Another major problem in the implementation of Bank projects in Chad is time-consuming public procurement. This is due to the lengthy procurement channel resulting from serious difficulties in applying the current Public Procurement Code and the existence of incomplete instruments in the Code which should be reviewed and improved in the short term.

**In the area of aid coordination, the country's relations with donors in general are partly disrupted by the absence of a programme with the IMF.** Relations between Chad and the IMF seem to be improving, but continue to be characterized by

mistrust. This is due to non-compliance with IMF-imposed fiscal discipline. The country has a long tradition of extra-budgetary expenditures (the result of long periods of war). This poses a problem despite improvement in that direction. Thus, the country's extra-budgetary expenditures dropped from 65% in 2008 to 45% in 2012. These expenditures were linked to the purchase of arms and were largely not budgeted. The recent loan agreement signed between the Chadian Government and China seems to further complicate matters. This loan agreement, the terms of which are still secret, tends to move the country farther away from an agreement with the International Monetary Fund which seems to be a major point of disagreement. However, there is no study highlighting what Chad stands to lose/gain by not having a programme with the Fund and/or with the Chinese loan. Such a study would help to better structure policy dialogue and better guide the authorities to make choices that best suit the country's interest. On the whole, aid coordination is difficult in Chad, given the very important place occupied by humanitarian activities in the aid structure to the detriment of development.

**Consistency and efficiency of national institutions.** Inconsistency of the actions of various ministries seems to be a factor of inefficiency. The resulting poor coordination between ministries certainly has an impact on national strategy implementation. This is compounded by the high rate of staff turnover in the administration which implies change of contact persons and even strategies and visions. The administration's institutional memory is consequently weakened, thereby undermining the preservation of policy dialogue achievements. The existence of administrative vested interests

exacerbates inconsistency and is an additional hindrance to the Government's efficiency.

## Exogenous Factors

**During the period 2002–2012, exogenous factors influenced Bank assistance results and the country's development efforts. Climatic hazards, world oil prices and internal and regional conflicts were important factors which influenced results.** These trends portray the vulnerability of Chadian growth. The performance of the agricultural sector almost exclusively depends on rainfall. Farming activities, especially food crop production, contributed significantly to growth thanks to heavy rainfall in the various farming areas. This recovery of the agricultural sector however lost steam in 2010 following poor climatic conditions. Since the country became an oil exporter, it is vulnerable to revenue from that sector. The structural drop in Chad's oil production from 2005 created problems that were exacerbated by the drop in world oil demand in 2008–2009 owing to the global financial crisis. The subsequent exploitation of the Bongor oil deposit helped to revamp the Government's resource mobilization capacity. Internal conflicts and rebellions upset the country's economic context. The consequences of the Libyan crisis on trade and current transfers between Chad and Libya have been considerable in terms of direct investments and customs revenue. Security problems related to the actions of the Nigerian "Boko Haram" Islamic fundamentalist group have negatively affected cross-border trade with Nigeria which is a major trade partner for Chad. ■



# Conclusion and Recommendations

## **This Evaluation of Bank Assistance in Chad over the period 2002–2012 concludes that Bank assistance was moderately satisfactory.**

The Bank's role in the financing of infrastructure, in general, and agricultural and rural infrastructure, in particular, contributed to consolidating and boosting the agricultural sector, and preventing major economic growth fluctuations. Efforts made focused on the improvement of rural and community roads, marketing, storage and processing of agricultural produce, water used in agriculture and water storage, as well as other infrastructure for livestock, fisheries and intra-regional trade. The resulting investments and development of all basic infrastructure helped to create conditions for sustained and inclusive growth of the entire Chadian economy. However, Bank intervention in the area of economic governance and public sector management was not successful, thereby limiting the Bank's positive role in the country's overall economic growth.

## **Beyond purely economic aspects, Bank assistance had unquantifiable stabilizing effects.**

The assessment of the Bank's role in Chad should transcend purely economic aspects and take into account the role of Bank projects and programmes as stabilizing factors which indirectly helped to prevent conflicts. An example is the recent Rural Transhumance Infrastructure Project quickly signed to prevent conflicts between populations. In Chad, the Bank often took risks by, for example, financing projects in conflict areas or periods and attracting other donors, such as BID and BADEA, in its wake. Already in the past, during the difficult years, the Bank was virtually the only institution operating in Chad and its interventions through the fight against poverty and insecure living conditions contributed to alleviating the population's suffering. This role as sister institution

present alongside the country during troubled periods and the resulting expression of gratitude by the Chadian authorities are an asset that the Bank should preserve and put to good use.

Based on these conclusions, the evaluation hereby makes six recommendations which will help to better streamline operations in Chad, and properly align future country CSPs with the Bank's new Ten-year Strategy:

### **1. Strengthen and focus the support to good governance taking opportunity of the Bank's position as privileged partner.**

This is about helping the country instituting a sustainable and efficient formal reform design and coordination framework, and support Government's efforts to develop an analytical policy framework for governance reform decisions. The Bank can support more consistent action by improving the implementation, effectiveness and synergy of actions through the development of texts and instruments, and especially by encouraging the Government to accelerate the revision of the Public Procurement Code, and establish the various related institutions (National Procurement Board; Independent Public Procurement Regulatory Board; Disciplinary Board; and Appeals Board). Beyond, the Bank can support the country in negotiations with the IMF by supporting its efforts to ensure fiscal discipline which partly conditions the attainment of the completion point of the HIPC Initiative, and by encouraging it to honour its commitments and effectively apply the instruments and decrees issued.

- 2. Include as objective private sector development making use of possible synergies between the Bank's domains of action.** This is about formulating strategies for more active involvement through support to actions aimed at improving the business climate and direct private sector support. This will involve initiatives to help the Government to resume State/private sector dialogue and improve the legal framework and judicial system, facilitate access to credit and promote competition, regulatory reform and alignment with the regional community framework. The Bank should support the implementation of the law on the National Investment Charter adopted by the Government in 2007 as part of the Investment Code reform. In addition, the Bank could identify growth niches in the private sector to start pilot investment experiments.
- 3. Invest in analytical and diagnostic studies to better understand the country's problems and options.** Devoting more efforts to Economic and Sector Studies would help to further inform Government strategies and development master plans, on the one hand, and properly consolidate the Bank's assistance strategy, its participation in policy dialogue and investment options in order to support greener and more inclusive growth, on the other hand. To this end, sharing the experiences of other countries would be an additional advantage.
- 4. Ensure better consideration of the issue of results sustainability,** especially in the area of infrastructure, through support mechanisms such as stakeholder capacity building and adoption of a post-operation monitoring policy, but also continue to support Government's efforts to build its quality control and infrastructure maintenance technical and financial capacity.
- 5. Lay more emphasis on the administration's human resource development and institution building.** This is in particular about encouraging the Government to broaden and deepen the participation of civil servants at all administrative levels to preserve institutional memories, and developing global approaches for institutional capacity development in partnership with the other actors. This involves focusing more on building the country's institutions and human resource capacity to manage and own its development, which implies building monitoring and evaluation capacity, among other things. ■





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## Annex 1: Logical Framework of Bank Operations in Chad

Inputs	Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact
1. Assistance strategies 2. Lending programmes and instruments 3. Resource mobilization	1. Project/ programme approval and implementation 2. Aid harmonization and coordination 3. Policy dialogue and counselling 4. Conduct of analytical and sector studies	1. Good governance promotion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>More efficient public administration</i></li> <li>■ <i>Efficient and transparent oil resource management</i></li> <li>■ <i>Improved legal environment</i></li> <li>■ <i>Improved business climate and private sector</i></li> <li>■ <i>Institutional capacity is built</i></li> <li>■ <i>Human resources are developed</i></li> <li>■ <i>Human rights are consolidated</i></li> </ul> 2. Infrastructure development and creation of conditions conducive to economic revival <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>The road network is strengthened to open up agricultural production zones</i></li> <li>■ <i>Access to basic services is improved by developing community water, electricity and telecommunications facilities (x) The sustainable management of natural resources is promoted</i></li> <li>■ <i>Rural infrastructure is improved and access to inputs, capital equipment and tools needed to improve productivity and rural production is facilitated</i></li> <li>■ <i>The processing of agro-forestry and livestock products is promoted</i></li> <li>■ <i>Economic diversification is strengthened</i></li> </ul>	1. Economic growth is strengthened 2. The economic environment and socio-political stability are improved 3. Improved social development	1. Reduction of poverty and vulnerability 2. Achievement of economic development

Source: Compiled by author.

## Annex 2: Governance Aspects Covered by Chad's Sector Projects

Sector Programmes and Projects	Accountability/Obligation to Render Account						Participation			
	Sector Planning and Management	Statistics and Studies	Re-search and Popularization	Administrative Reforms	Financial Systems	Public Finance	Civil Society	Private Sector	Gender	Regional Integration
Natural Resource Management and Development Project	X	-	X	-	X	X	-	-	X	-
National Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Programme	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-
Directorate of Water Resources Institutional Support Project to Update the Inventory of Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Facilities	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Koumra-Sahr Road Upgrading Project	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-
Rural, Pastoral and Transhumance Infrastructure Project	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-
Project to Support the Cotton Textile Sector in Four Countries of the Cotton Sector Initiative (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad)	X	X	X	-	X	-	X	-	-	X
Poverty Reduction and Women's Empowerment Project	X	X	-	-	X	-	X	-	-	-
Pastoral Livestock Breeding System Support Project	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-
Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Programme	X	-	-	-	X	-	X	+	-	X
Douala- Bangui and Douala-N'Djamena Corridor Transport Facilitation Programme	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-
Fisheries Development Programme	X	X	-	-	X	-	-	-	X	-
Electricity Interconnection Study	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X
Préfecture du Lac Rural Development Project	X	-	X	-	X	-	-	X	-	-
Education Sector Support Project (Education VI)	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Natural Resource Management Project	X	-	X	-	X	-	-	-	-	-
ECCAS Secretariat General Institutional Support Project	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X
Project to Support the Lake Chad Basin Initiative on Vulnerability and HIV/AIDS Risk Reduction	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Technical Education and Vocational Training Capacity Building (Education V)	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan Region Cotton and Food Crop Production Project	X	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

## Annex 3: Rating Scale

### *Relevance*

Criteria	Definition
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions are fully aligned on the country's development priorities and selective.
<b>Satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions are aligned on the country's development priorities with a certain degree of selectivity.
<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions are aligned on the country's development priorities but lack selectivity.
<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions are partially aligned on the country's development priorities.
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions meet a limited number of the country's development needs/priorities
<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions does not meet the country's development needs/priorities.

### *Effectiveness*

Criteria	Definition
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector have strongly contributed to all targeted development objectives.
<b>Satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector have contributed to most of the targeted development objectives.
<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector have contributed to some of the targeted development objectives.
<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector have contributed to a limited extent to some of the targeted development objectives.
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector have had very low contribution to development objectives.
<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>	Bank interventions in this sector did not contribute to any development objective.

### *Sustainability*

Critères	Definition
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	Outcomes and benefits will very likely be preserved after completion of Bank interventions
<b>Satisfactory</b>	Outcomes and benefits will likely be preserved after completion of Bank interventions
<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>	Outcomes and benefits may likely be preserved after completion of Bank interventions
<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>	Some outcomes and benefits may likely be preserved after completion of Bank interventions
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	Outcomes and benefits will not likely be preserved after completion of Bank interventions.
<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>	Outcomes and benefits will very likely not be preserved after completion of Bank interventions.

### *Cross-cutting Sectors*

Criteria	Definition
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	CSP make a very good analysis of the country's cross-cutting sector, challenges and strategy and the strategic guidelines of Bank interventions whose effects are tangible.
<b>Satisfactory</b>	CSP makes a good analysis of the country's cross-cutting sector, challenges and strategy, and presents indications of Bank interventions with a few effects.
<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>	CSP makes a good analysis of the country's cross-cutting sector, challenges and strategy, without mentioning any Bank intervention.
<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>	CSP makes some analysis of the country's cross-cutting sector, challenges and strategy, without mentioning any Bank intervention.
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	CSP makes an unsatisfactory analysis of the country's challenges and strategy, and the outcomes of the Bank's interventions are unsatisfactory.
<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>	CSP analyzes neither the country's challenges and strategy nor the Bank's interventions; no effects of Bank actions are observed.

## Annex 4: Tables of Ratings of Bank Assistance to Chad

**Table 4a** Chad – Summary of Overall Evaluation Scores

Evaluation Criteria	Activity	Evaluation	Justification
<b>OVERALL RELEVANCE SCORE</b>		S	The relevance of Bank assistance in Chad is satisfactory
Relevance	Governance pillar strategy	S	Relevant strategies are found mainly in policy and judicial system governance. Relevance is partial for administrative governance whose flagship strategy is continued public service reform. Although this reform is essential as it addresses the need to enhance the efficiency of public administration, its attainment hinges on human resource development and institutional capacity building. Relevance regarding economic governance is also partial.
	Infrastructure pillar strategy	TS	The focus areas of CSPs are consistent with the key objectives of Chad's sector policies on basic infrastructure, particularly agriculture and rural development, roads and road transport, drinking water and sanitation. The selection of thrust areas and target beneficiaries is largely consistent with the priorities outlined in Bank strategies and reflect the Government's priorities as set out in its various sector strategy and policy documents.
<b>OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS SCORE</b>		MS	The effectiveness of Bank assistance in Chad is considered moderately satisfactory.
Effectiveness	Governance pillar effectiveness	U	The implementation of activities to promote good governance of CSP 2005-2009 and CSP 2010-2014 was very poor. This was due partly to the severance of relations between the Chadian Government and the Bretton Woods institutions regarding economic governance, particularly the management of oil resources, on the one hand, and the Bank's support of the stance adopted by the Bretton Woods institutions. On the whole, the specific objectives of improving budget execution, public service efficiency and public procurement management and continuation of judicial system reform have been only very partially achieved. The few improvements observed here and there are not enough to induce genuine change in the situation. Their rate of change is also not rapid.
	Infrastructure pillar effectiveness	S	Overall, the infrastructure sector programmes supported by the Bank were efficient given the tangible results obtained in concentration sectors, namely: "Agriculture and Rural Development", "Roads and Road Transport" (extension of the road network and physical access) and "Water and Sanitation" (increasing the number of drinking water points). Thanks to Bank support, many road construction projects were financed and many health centres and schools equipped with water points and latrines. High schools were built and administrative buildings constructed or rehabilitated, thus helping to restore public administration. However, it should be noted that institutional capacity building in the infrastructure domain is limited.

Evaluation Criteria	Activity	Evaluation	Justification
<b>OVERALL EFFICIENCY SCORE</b>		U	The efficiency of Bank assistance in Chad is considered unsatisfactory.
Efficiency	Governance	U	Transaction costs were very high in relation to the average or poor results achieved in this domain. Effectiveness was hampered by long delays due to weak institutional capacity, long procurement delays and tight cash flow which impeded the payment of the national counterpart contribution. The large number of conditions and/or reforms or measures to be implemented despite weak absorption and implementation capacity should be mentioned.
	Infrastructure	U	U Overall, project/programme effectiveness in all infrastructure domains was very low, resulting in the loss of human and financial resources and long project/programme implementation delays. Consequently, assistance transaction costs in a context of the prevailing fragility in Chad are high and the extension of project/programme implementation time frames remains the rule. Problems related to project implementation hampered the effectiveness of the Bank's operations.
<b>OVERALL SUSTAINABILITY SCORE</b>		MU	The sustainability of Bank assistance in Chad is considered moderately unsatisfactory (combining institutional development)
Sustainability	Governance	MS	Despite the generally poor performance of the governance sector, the awareness triggered by Bank assistance is a mechanism that will help to maintain the mediocre results obtained in governance beyond the lifespan of Bank programmes and projects.
	Infrastructure	MU	Sustainability is weakened by lack of actions to sustain infrastructure and weak capacity of upkeep and maintenance entities. Thus, road maintenance, for example, raises a number of concerns. Inadequate attention was paid to the mobilization of the population for the effective management of infrastructure, particularly the establishment of associations for the management of community assets.
<b>OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT SCORE</b>		U	Institutional development impact is considered unsatisfactory.
Institutional development	Governance	U	The Bank's operations triggered the process of instilling the need for a change in mentality and behaviour regarding accountability, transparency, participation, objectivity of justice and commitment in the fight against corruption. However, the time taken to bring about change is long and ten years of Bank assistance were not enough to revolutionize the way Chadian institutions operate.
	Infrastructure	U	Despite significant investments in infrastructure, there has been no institutional development around these investments. Investments in "hardware" have evolved much faster than in "software", particularly in the areas of health and education.
<b>IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT GOALS (see Table 4d)</b>		MU	The impact on development goals is considered moderately unsatisfactory.
<b>BANK PERFORMANCE (see Table 4c)</b>		S	Bank performance is considered satisfactory.
<b>GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (see Table 4b)</b>		U	Government performance is considered unsatisfactory.
<b>OVERALL SCORE</b>		MS	Bank assistance in Chad is considered moderately satisfactory.

**Table 4b** Government Performance Evaluation

Indicator	Score	Justification
Active contribution to the design of Bank overall and sector strategies	MU	Since 2002, the economic and socio-political context has been difficult. Recurrent conflicts have seriously undermined the economic management capacity of the public administration, resulting in weak institutions at all levels and inability to significantly contribute to, or influence, Bank strategies. However, the Government regularly produced national strategy documents that served as a reference for the Bank's CSPs.
Capacity to successfully implement development projects and programmes	MU	Weak macro-economic (particularly fiscal) and sector planning and programming capacity seriously undermined the management of development projects by parallel units. The country has weak coordination and monitoring capacity. Projects continue to face implementation problems (delays, non-compliance with procedures, irregular audits, etc.). However, the PIU of the Ministry in charge of Infrastructure and Equipment is a positive exception.
Aid coordination	U	The absence of an IMF programme disrupts the country's relations with donors in general. Relations between Chad and the IMF seem to be improving, but continue to be characterized by mistrust. At present, Chad is the only country that has not reached the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative due to non-compliance with IMF-imposed fiscal discipline. The country has a long tradition of extra-budgetary expenditures (the result of long periods of war and unrest).
Consistency and efficiency of national institutions	U	The inconsistency of the actions of the various ministries seems to be a factor of inefficiency. The resulting poor coordination between ministries certainly has an impact on national strategy implementation. Another problem faced is procurement which takes a very long time.
<b>OVERALL SCORE</b>	<b>U</b>	Overall, Government performance is considered unsatisfactory.

**Table 4c** Bank Performance Evaluation

Indicator	Score	Justification
Strategy design quality	S	The Bank's positioning in the governance sector builds on the realization shared by the Government that good governance is as important as the other economic and social components for the revitalization of the Chadian economy and the reduction of poverty, inasmuch as Chad's CPIA and Mo Ibrahim Index are some of the lowest on the continent. Concerning the infrastructure pillar, the Bank has, since 2005, been able to transcend agricultural and rural development hitherto regarded as Chad's national priority and raise basic infrastructure development in its broadest sense to a priority pillar in its CSPs for Chad.
Strategy implementation quality (consistency between planned and implemented projects, portfolio monitoring and evaluation, etc.)	MU	The planned projects were consistent with the strategies. However, portfolio monitoring was not always satisfactory. Regarding infrastructure, the volume of operations was too ambitious in relation to the resources committed (financial resources, managerial capacity and technical capacity). The Bank has no Chad-based sector expert, which makes supervision cumbersome. FSF projects are not supervised at all and the Bank lacks information on the outcomes of its FSF financing in Chad. However, its Country Office, in conjunction with the Government, recently established a quarterly project and programme review system which helps to closely monitor projects and improve portfolio quality.



Indicator	Score	Justification
Quality of advisory services, partnership and policy dialogue	S	The Bank has succeeded in positioning itself as the preferred partner of the Chadian Government and the other TFPs and maintains permanent dialogue with Chadian authorities and other development partners in Chad. Through the Field Office, it has succeeded in establishing a dynamic TFP group which it chairs. However, the drawback to the dialogue between the Bank and non-State actors is its embryonic nature.
Quality of economic and sector studies	MU	One of the Bank's weaknesses in Chad is the insufficient number of analytical studies. Chad, which is emerging from a long period of war and unrest, seems to be in great need of analytical and diagnostic studies to better guide and direct its economic development efforts.
<b>OVERALL SCORE</b>	S	Although the Bank was able to adapt to the country's difficult environment, efforts remain to be made.

**Table 4d** Bank's Contribution to the Achievement of Development Objectives

Development Objective	Bank Contribution	Evaluation of Outcomes
Strengthen economic growth	<p>During the 2002-2004 period, growth was exceptionally strong (18.2%), driven by oil investments. Overall growth fell sharply in 2005-2007 (4.2%) due mainly to the drop in agricultural and oil production. In 2008-2011, growth slipped to 3.5%. The 3.9% drop in oil production would have resulted in negative overall growth (-9.5%) without the strong rebound in agricultural production (+85%) in 2010 due to investments in agriculture, fisheries and stock breeding.</p> <p>The Bank's role in infrastructure development in general and agricultural and rural infrastructure in particular contributed to consolidating and boosting the agricultural sector and preventing major fluctuations in economic growth.</p> <p>However, the Bank's intervention in economic governance and public sector management was not successful, thus limiting the Bank's positive role in the country's overall economic growth.</p>	S
Human development: Health and Education	<p>Despite its inefficiency due to poor quality, the educational sector is making progress in quantitative terms. In fact, the gross primary enrolment ratio rose from 73% in 2000 to 76.2% in 2002-2004; 78.1% in 2005-2007 and 90.3% in 2008-2010. The gross secondary school enrolment ratio was respectively 10.7%, 15%, 17.3% and 24.2% over the same periods. The Bank's Education V and Education VI programmes, in particular, contributed to these results.</p> <p>Generally, however, they are largely due to its long-standing and active presence in Chad in the area of education. It has supported the significant efforts made by Government evidenced by an increase in public spending on education from 1.5% of GDP in 2004-2005 to 2.8% in 2009-2011. However, the high and rising adult illiteracy rate from 67% in 2003 to 78% in 2007, of which 69% for men and 86% for women, should be deplored. Overall, the country still has a low human resource capacity.</p> <p>Despite some efforts, the country's health situation remains very difficult. The infant mortality rate was still 124 per 1000 in 2007, compared to 122 in 2000. The construction of many health centres has not led to a significant reduction in infant mortality because no physician has been posted to the centres. Chad has 3.7 physicians per 100 000 population and 2.1 nurses and midwives per 100 000 population (WHO/AFRO 2010) and who are unevenly distributed over the national territory.</p>	U

Development Objective	Bank Contribution	Evaluation of Outcomes
Rural and Agricultural Development	The projects and programmes of the infrastructure pillar have contributed to these goals through irrigation schemes, intensification of rainfed agriculture and securement of livestock activities. The Bank's support has helped to reduce the country's inaccessibility, particularly agricultural production areas through the construction of paved roads, crossing structures and rural roads, thus contributing to the improvement of access to inputs and tools needed to improve productivity in rural areas, and promote the processing of agro-forestry-pastoral products. Despite this assistance, the yields of the various crops are still relatively small compared to the natural potential of the area.	S
Consideration of the country's fragility and vulnerability	The Bank developed a Fragile States Strategy in 2008. Although its implementation is effective in Chad, the country is only eligible for window 3 and to a paltry amount. The Bank's operations have not helped the country to formally get out of its fragile State situation. The operations that could have helped the country in this respect, that is, governance projects and programmes and FSF projects, were not successfully implemented or have not all been implemented. The low CPIA and Mo Ibrahim Indicator show that this is the weak link and the most important vector of the country's fragility.	U
Regional integration and Environment	Despite its good intentions, the impacts of the Bank's intervention remain limited and the implementation of multinational projects is slow due to their complexity. The Bank's Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP) 2011-2015 is too recent to deliver results. However, road infrastructure projects prior to RISP supported regional integration by contributing to opening up the countries concerned, especially through the CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme which helped to broaden the N'Djamena-Ngueli road and build a bridge over River Logone at the border with Cameroon. However, the volume of trade among ECCAS member countries (0.5% in 2010) remains low due to conflicts and unsuitable national policies. The Country Environmental Profile (CEP) conducted in 2006 and updated in 2010 concluded that the degradation of the country's natural resources is on the increase. Overall, it will be difficult to meet the MDGs relating to environmental conservation, particularly those related to sanitation, by 2015, with the trend regarding access to drinking water being more favourable.	U
Institutional development	The impact on institutional development is generally unsatisfactory. Despite significant investments, particularly in the area of infrastructure, there was no institutional development around these investments. Investments on "hardware" have developed much faster than on "software", especially in the health and education sectors.	U
Socio-political stability	The Bank's assistance has also had unquantifiable effects. Bank projects and investments have served as a stabilizing factor as they have indirectly prevented conflict. In Chad, the Bank has often taken risks, for example, by financing projects in conflict areas or by financing projects to avoid conflicts between two populations.	S
<b>OVERAALL SCORE</b>		MU

Table 4e Summary Table of the Achievement of the Results of the Governance Pillar

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and remarks
<b>Promotion of Good Governance</b>				
Greater efficiency in public administration	PAS III: Elimination of the Constraints of Growth component	60 measures on macro-economic stability, fiscal reforms, external policies, public debt and structural reforms planned	26 measures were implemented, 6 permanent measures were implemented and 28 measures were not implemented (payment arrears, privatization of the Water and Electricity Company of Chad (STEE), Coton Chad, Sotel Chad, public service reform, macro-economic convergence, completion point of the HIPC Initiative)	43% success rate Inadequate implementation due to the context of implementation of public policies and the weak capacity of the State
	PAS III: Targeted Poverty Reduction Actions component	67 measures planned, namely: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Finalization and adoption of NPRS I</li> <li>■ 20% annual increase in resources allocated to priority sectors</li> </ul>	NPRS I finalized and adopted 20% annual increase in resources allocated to priority sectors partially achieved Out of the 67 measures, 40 were implemented, of which 3 permanent measures	59.7% implementation rate Achievements below expectations
	PAS III: Strengthening Good Governance component	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ 40 measures planned</li> <li>■ Adoption of NGGS and its action plan</li> <li>■ Commencement of implementation of NGGS</li> <li>■ Establishment of the Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee</li> <li>■ Auditing of customs services, public procurement and oil bonuses</li> <li>■ Commencement of activities to strengthen good governance institutions</li> <li>■ Drafting of the new Public Procurement Code</li> <li>■ Publication of procurement operations on a quarterly basis</li> <li>■ Accountability in the management of public affairs</li> <li>■ Adoption of the implementing instruments of the new Public Procurement Code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The NGGS and its action plan adopted</li> <li>■ Start-up of its implementation</li> <li>■ The Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee is established</li> <li>■ Customs services, public procurement and oil bonuses are audited</li> <li>■ The strengthening of good governance institutions has been started</li> <li>■ The new Public Procurement Code is drafted</li> <li>■ Procurement operations are published on a quarterly basis</li> <li>■ The implementing instruments of the new Public Procurement Code are not adopted</li> </ul> <p>Out of the 40 measures planned, 28 were implemented</p>	70% implementation rate Performance in the following areas was poor: legal and judicial system, public finance management, accountability in the management of public affairs. The difficulties faced concerned: uncompetitive procurement procedures and corruption in the management of interim debt relief resources Achievements were below expectations

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and remarks
	P ARG1 Enhancement of Public Service Efficiency component	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ Enactment of 25 statutory implementing instruments of the Public Service Rules and Regulations</li> <li>█ Operationalization of SIGASPE</li> <li>█ Streamlining the structures of 24 ministries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ 11 instruments signed and published</li> <li>█ A draft decree laying down the leave plan submitted to the Government</li> <li>█ Three decrees laying down the wage plan signed</li> <li>█ A decree setting out family allowances signed</li> <li>█ A decree setting out mission allowances signed</li> </ul>	40% rate of implementation of planned measures (13 instruments adopted and 10 pending adoption) Out of the 48 measures planned, only 25 were implemented satisfactorily: the rate of implementation is considered low due to weak implementation capacity and problems related to procurement procedures
		Operationalization of SIGASPE	SIGAPSE is not yet operational	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ Streamlining organizational structures and preparing new organizational charts of ministries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ A modern information system applied to five structures</li> </ul>	The operation is ongoing
		Operationalization of the Procurement Authority procurement services and Bids Opening and Review Committees (COJO)	The OCMP, procurement services and COJOs of priority ministries and key institutions are functional	44.4% implementation rate of planned measures
(ii) Efficient and transparent management of oil resources	PA ITIE			is project has not yet been launched
(iii) Improvement of the legal environment	PARG1 ("Strengthening the Rule of Law" component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ 20 measures relating to the following activities: continuation of judicial reforms and the fight against corruption; strengthening of life and property safety; enhancement of public access to information on Government activities</li> <li>█ 195 People trained in OHADA laws, the functioning of trade courts, economic and financial surveys and the management of prison services</li> </ul>	13 measures out of 20 implemented, namely: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>█ 70 persons trained (16 of them in penitentiary administration and the functioning of trade courts and 54 in OHADA laws)</li> </ul>	A 65% implementation rate Achievements below expectations
(iv) Improvement of business climate and private sector development				PASP 2008–2010 not implemented

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and remarks
(v) Institutional capacity building	PAGE (Debt Management Capacity Building component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   The SYDAGE software is installed</li> <li>   The staff of the Directorate of Debt is trained in debt and public finance management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Tool installed and training provided</li> </ul> <p>General satisfaction of the Directorate of Debt</p>	<p>The database installed by UNCTAD has not been validated due to lack of resources</p> <p>Out of the 9 measures planned, only 5 have been implemented satisfactorily: rate of implementation considered low</p>
	PAGE ("Development Programme and Project Programming, Financing and Monitoring Capacity Building" component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Design of a public investment and recurrent expenditure management programme</li> <li>   Preparation of a donors disbursement procedures guide and a recurrent expenditure computing and evaluation methodology</li> <li>   Installation of a computer network in the Directorate of Cooperation and Development Programme and Project Monitoring (DCSPPD)</li> </ul> <p>DCSPPD training in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PIP preparation and implementation</li> <li>• Projects and recurrent expenditure evaluation and monitoring</li> <li>• Negotiation techniques</li> <li>• Public procurement techniques</li> <li>• Computer science applied to project management</li> <li>• Project financial and accounting management</li> <li>• Project auditing</li> </ul>	<p>Methodological tools developed to the satisfaction of DCSPPD, except for the donors disbursement procedures guide</p> <p>DCSPPD's training tools fully developed</p>	<p>The completion report awarded PAGE an overall rating of 2 and training 3</p> <p>Component implemented by the DCSPPD</p>

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and remarks
	PAGE ("Production, Dissemination of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies Capacity Building" component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ The Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCP) is produced each month</li> <li>▮ The PIP is prepared</li> <li>▮ National accounts are produced each semester</li> <li>▮ The trade directory is produced each year</li> <li>▮ The Outlook Note is produced each quarter</li> <li>▮ The macro-economic framework note is produced each year</li> <li>▮ Fifty (50) senior officers of INSEED are prepared for entrance examinations into professional schools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ INSEED's satisfaction: candidates prepared. Gender: however, it should be noted that no female candidate was successful</li> </ul>	
(vi) Human resources development				RH/SW AP 2008–2012 not implemented
(vii) Strengthening human rights				

**Table 4f** Summary Table of the Achievement of the Results of the Infrastructure Pillar

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and Remarks
<b>Infrastructure development and creation of conditions conducive to the revitalization of growth</b>				
(i) Strengthen the road network to open up agricultural production areas	PDRPL (component D)	120 kilometres of rural roads	120 kilometres of rural roads (100%)	PDRPL: delay by four years of project implementation Four extensions Project rated 3 by the report
	PDRDB (Watershed Access Roads Component and Basic Social and Community Infrastructure for Rural Roads Component)	260 kilometres of rural roads rehabilitated 50 kilometres of access roads		PDRDB completion report not available One-and-half year delay and departure of senior project staff Project rated 2 by this evaluation
	PARKS (Paved Road Works Component and Related Feeder Road Works Component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Upgrading and double-layer paving of 110 kilometres of roads</li> <li>   Development of 111 kilometres of feeder roads</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   110 kilometres of double-layer surface roads upgraded and paved</li> <li>   111 kilometres of feeder roads upgraded</li> </ul>	PARKS Project completed before stipulated closing date of 31/12/ 2013 Project rated 4 by this evaluation
	CEMAC Transport Facilitation Programme Component A (Road Upgrading and Rehabilitation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Construction of a 230 metre-long two-lane bridge over River Logone (Ngueli)</li> <li>   Widening of 6 km of 2x 2 lane road between Ngueli and Walia</li> <li>   Reinforcement of 0.5 kilometres of road between Walia and the N'Djamena bridge</li> <li>   Maintenance of 592 kilometres of road between N'Djamena and Touboro</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Construction of a 230 metre-long two-lane bridge over River Logone (Ngueli)</li> <li>   Widening of 6 km of 2x 2 lane road between Ngueli and Walia</li> <li>   Reinforcement of 0.5 kilometres of road between Walia and the N'Djamena bridge</li> <li>   Maintenance of 592 kilometres of road between N'Djamena and Touboro</li> </ul>	Completion Report not available Bank's commitments on the construction of the bridge honoured while those of the Government (lighting, study on the construction of a bus station) are pending Rated 4 by this evaluation

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and Remarks
(ii) Improve access to basic services by developing community water, electricity and telecommunications infrastructure	PVERS	55.5 kilometres of rural roads	55.5 kilometres of rural roads	PVERS Targets revised during project review; the project experienced a three-year delay Achievements rated 2.5 in the completion report Project rated 3 by this evaluation PDRPL: slippage of 4 years on project implementation; 4 extensions; Project rated 3 by this evaluation PNEAR: start-up delay due to the 2008 context (looting of premises and bad weather) 22 months delay, after two extensions Rated 3 by this evaluation DWS rated 4 and sanitation rated 2 in completion report PAEPA commencement in July 2012
	PDRPL (Component D)	105 boreholes equipped with manual pumps (MPs)	105 boreholes equipped with manual pumps (MPs) (100%)	
	PNEAR (DWSS Infrastructure Development Component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 600 boreholes equipped with manual pumps in Tandjilé and 256 boreholes equipped with MPs in West Mayo Kebbi, that is 856 in total</li> <li>▮ 502 latrines equipped with washstands in health centres and schools in the two regions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 875 boreholes equipped with manual pumps constructed and functional (102.2%) serving about 350 000 people, 52% of them women</li> <li>▮ 366 latrines and 502 washstands constructed in health centres and schools in the two regions (72.9%) serving more than 28 000 students, 14 300 of them girls</li> </ul>	
	PAEPA: 8 secondary centres and rural areas (Component A: DWSS Infrastructure)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 4 equipped boreholes and 8 pumping stations</li> <li>▮ two 250-cubic metre elevated water tanks</li> <li>▮ 88 710 metres of piping, 115 standpipes and 450 BP</li> <li>▮ 2 biological removal of iron from water in stations at Fianga and Lai</li> <li>▮ 10 boreholes</li> <li>▮ 10 elevated water tanks (50 cubic metres)</li> <li>▮ 15 000 metres of water supply network, 8 standpipes, 150 BP</li> <li>▮ 416 VIP latrines in 8 councils</li> <li>▮ 300 latrines constructed in schools and health centres in 10 big villages</li> <li>▮ 5000 slabs for family latrines</li> </ul>	Not yet available. 2012 Project under implementation	
	PVERS	▮ 10 drinking water boreholes equipped	11 boreholes equipped with manual pumps	



Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and Remarks
(iii) Promote the sustainable management of natural resources	PGRN (Component B: Improvement of the Productivity of Resources) Natural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ Reforesting of 6 500 hectares of community forests</li> <li>▮ 2000 hectares of deferred grazing land</li> <li>▮ 200 kilometres of fire walls</li> <li>▮ 100 cantonal nurseries</li> <li>▮ 1 000 village fruit and forest tree nurseries</li> <li>▮ 8100 biogas demonstration units</li> <li>▮ 10 000 improved stoves</li> <li>▮ 1 000 hectares of land protected through the activities carried out by DRS-CES</li> <li>▮ 7500 hectares of land fertilized using organic practices</li> <li>▮ 33 000 metres of dykes protected</li> </ul>	Project closed in March 2014. Completion report unavailable	<p>PRGN1 rated 3 by this evaluation. The Project will be closed in March 2014. Under implementation. A funding gap was necessary and was the subject of an additional request whose response is pending.</p> <p>PRODEPECHE rated 3 by the supervision report for the attainment of objectives. Rated 3 by this evaluation.</p> <p>PVERS Targets revised during project review; project experienced a three-year delay. Achievements rated 2.5 by the completion report.</p> <p>Project rated 3 by this evaluation.</p>
	PRODEPECHE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ Protection of 100 kilometres of banks</li> <li>▮ 400 000 metres of buffer zones</li> <li>▮ Creation of 500 hectares of community forests</li> </ul>	Closed in 2012; completion report unavailable	
	PVERS (Surface Water Resources Component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 370 922 metres of stone barrier protecting 1 236 hectares of land</li> <li>▮ 8000 metres of stone barrier</li> <li>▮ 1435 drystone dykes</li> <li>▮ Forest and fruit tree and quickset hedge plantations</li> <li>▮ Production of 530 747 forest tree seedlings</li> <li>▮ 33 family orchards</li> <li>▮ 19.4 hectares of forest plantations</li> <li>▮ 41 617 metres of quickset hedges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 370 922 metres of stone barrier protecting 1236 hectares of land</li> <li>▮ 8000 metres of stone barrier</li> <li>▮ 1435 drystone dykes</li> <li>▮ Forest and fruit tree and quickset hedge plantations</li> <li>▮ Production of 530 747 forest tree seedlings</li> <li>▮ 33 family orchards</li> <li>▮ 19.4 hectares of forest plantations</li> <li>▮ 41 617 metres of quickset hedge and windbreaks</li> </ul>	
	PASEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 170 hectares of trees reduced to 105 during the mid-term review</li> <li>▮ 10 stockbreeding areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ Plantations not established</li> <li>▮ 2 areas planned and 8 identified</li> </ul>	PASEP: delayed. Rated 1 by the completion report and 1 by this evaluation report.

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and Remarks
(iv) Improve rural infrastructure and ease access to inputs, capital goods and tools needed to enhance rural productivity and production	REPAFEM (Component I: Establishment of a Social Development Fund)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 120 community facilities</li> <li>▮ 4357 micro-credits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 210 community facilities (92 wells and boreholes, 103 warehouses, 14 irrigation areas and 1 hydro- solar installation)</li> <li>▮ 4693 micro-credits granted</li> <li>▮ 2 milk processing plants</li> </ul>	<p>RPAFEM: 42-month delay</p> <p>But 96.5% of project implemented</p> <p>Rated 3 by the 2008 completion report</p> <p>Not analysed in this evaluation report</p>
	PASEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 80 pastoral boreholes</li> <li>▮ Ponds</li> <li>▮ 10 equipped livestock markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 45 pastoral boreholes</li> <li>▮ 55 ponds</li> <li>▮ 2 markets built and 8 identified</li> </ul>	<p>PASEP: delayed</p> <p>Rated 1 by the completion report and 1 by this evaluation report</p>
(v) Promote the processing of agro-forestry and livestock products	PASEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 8 council and departmental slaughterhouses</li> <li>▮ 32 slaughter areas</li> <li>▮ 30 butchers' sheds</li> <li>▮ 3 livestock products processing units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 6 council and departmental slaughterhouses</li> <li>▮ 24 slaughtering areas 17 butchers' stalls</li> <li>▮ 2 livestock products processing units</li> </ul>	<p>PASEP delayed</p> <p>Rated 1 by the completion report and 1 by this evaluation report</p>
(vi) Strengthen economic diversification	PGRN (Component B: Improvement of the Productivity of Resources)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ 2 350 hectares of rice growing areas developed and exploited</li> <li>▮ 350 tons of basic seeds produced</li> <li>▮ 15 000 fruit tree seedlings produced</li> <li>▮ 5000 tons of improved seeds produced and sown</li> <li>▮ 10 fishponds developed and functional</li> </ul>	<p>Project closed in 2009</p> <p>Completion report unavailable</p>	<p>PGRN rated 3 by this evaluation report</p> <p>Completion report unavailable</p> <p>The project was not extended, but implemented within the stipulated six-year period</p>
	PRODEPECHE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▮ Production maintained at a sustainable level of 120 000 tons per year</li> </ul>	<p>According to the RBCSP 2009 review, fish production reached 125 000 tons in early 2009</p> <p>According to the combined CSP 2010–2014 Mid-Term Review and Country Portfolio Performance Review Report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 landing piers constructed</li> <li>• 1 market constructed</li> <li>• 100 km of the Kyabé-Lake Iro rural road rehabilitated</li> </ul>	<p>PRODEPECHE closed in 2012</p> <p>Rated 3 by the supervision report for the attainment of objectives</p> <p>Rated 3 by this evaluation</p>

Intermediate objectives and results	Operations that directly supported the objective	Results and indicators		
		Planned	Implemented	Evaluation and Remarks
	PDRPL (Component A: Development of Polders)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   13 polders</li> </ul>	13 polders developed	PDRPL: four-year delay Polder development completed six months before the end of the project Project rated 3 by this evaluation Project rated 2.5 by the completion report
	PDRDB (Watershed Access Roads and Basic Social and Community Infrastructure for Rural Roads Components)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Biological fixation of BV requiring the planting of agro-forestry trees on 700 hectares of improvement</li> <li>   management of 25 000 hectares of rainfed crops using improved seeds and appropriate farming techniques</li> <li>   Development of 300 hectares for irrigated crop and 700 hectares of flood recession crop cultivation</li> <li>   Planting of 500 hectares of fodder shrubs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   Three dams constructed</li> <li>   15 market garden boreholes constructed</li> <li>   Two market garden areas totalling 80 hectares developed</li> <li>   16 443 hectares of arable land developed</li> <li>   500 hectares developed for flood recession crop cultivation</li> <li>   634 hectares developed agro-forestry</li> <li>   5 council markets built</li> </ul>	PDRDB completion report unavailable One and a half-year delay and departure of senior project staff Project rated 2 by this evaluation
	PVERS (Intensification Component)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   9 micro-dams</li> <li>   156 market garden and pastoral boreholes</li> <li>   555 hectares developed</li> <li>   31 hectares developed for market gardening</li> <li>   3800 hectares of intensive crop cultivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>   9 micro-dams</li> <li>   55 market garden boreholes</li> <li>   11 pastoral boreholes</li> <li>   543.5 hectares of flood recession crop cultivation</li> <li>   13.15 hectares developed for market gardening</li> <li>   920 hectares developed</li> <li>   60 hectares developed for market gardening</li> </ul>	PVERS Targets revised during project review Project experienced a three-year delay Achievements rated 2.5 by the completion report and 3 by this evaluation

## Annex 5: Bank Operations in Chad 2002–2012

### Operations approved between 2002 and 2012

Project/Programme Name	Division	Status	Approval date	Signature date	Effectiveness	First disbursement	Currency	Amount approved	Isbursement rate	Sector
<b>Agricultural Sector</b>										
Pastoral Livestock System Support Project (Past)/Loan	OSAN3	Completed	Dec.-02	03/12/2003	15/11/2004	15/11/2004	UA	14 098 508.22	100.00	Agricultural
Pastoral Livestock System Support Project (Past)/Grant	OSAN3	Completed	Dec.-02	03/12/2003	15/11/2004	15/11/2004	UA	930 000.00	100.00	Agricultural
Fisheries Development Project(Prodepeche)/Grant	OSAN4	Ongoing	Nov.-05	23/11/2005	23/11/2005	28/11/2006	UA	10 000 000.00	82.27	Agricultural
Emergency Aid For Bird Flu Control	OSAN3	Completed	April-06	08/02/2007			UA	347 393.51	0.00	Agricultural
Rural Infrastructure Support Project /Loan	OSAN3	Ongoing	Jul.-11	14.11.2011	31/07/2012	07/08/2012	UA	5 200 000.00	0.36	Agricultural
Rural Infrastructure Support Project /Grant	OSAN3	Ongoing	Jul.-11	14.11.2011	16/08/2012	16/08/2012	UA	5 200 000.00	4.01	Agricultural
Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Support Programme/Multi- Grant	OSAN4	Ongoing	Dec-08	19/12/2008	19/12/2008	11/08/2009	UA	30 000 000.00	14.78	Agricultural
Cotton Sector Support Project/Multi-Grant	OSAN2	Ongoing	Nov.-06	08/02/2007	08/02/2007	09/06/2008	UA	5 000 000.00	35.37	Agricultural
Natural Resource Management And Development Project/Loan	OSAN4	Ongoing	April-05	19/05/2005	16/02/2006	31/07/2006	UA	4 270 000.00	43.56	Agricultural - Env
Natural Resource Management And Development Project /Grant	OSAN4	Ongoing	April-05	19/05/2005	19/05/2005	31/07/2006	UA	2 000 000.00	73.18	Agricultural - Env
Pgrm Additional Loan	OSAN4	Ongoing	Jan.-11	04/04/2011	16/04/2012		UA	9 570 000.00	0.00	
Agricultural Study And Training Of Agricultural Bank Human Resources	OSFU	Completed	18 Feb.-09	22/09/2009	22/09/2009	05/10/2009	UA	90 351.00	100.00	Agricultural
Grant Organizado Rd Table Nat Food Sec.Prog.	OSFU	Ongoing	Dec.-11	13/12/2011	13/12/2011	07/05/2012	UA	139 326.00	84.20	Agricultural
Livestock General Census	OSAN	Ongoing	12 Feb.-10		14/05/2010	21/10/2010	UA	587 245.00	43.00	Agricultural
Study On Transhumance	OSAN	Completed	13/08/2009	10/09/2012	22/09/2009	12/01/2010	UA	156 746.00	100.00	Agricultural - Env
<b>Total Agricultural Sector</b>							<b>UA</b>	<b>87 589 569</b>		
<b>Water And Sanitation Sector</b>										
Drinking Water Supply Programme (Pnear)/Grant	OWAS1	Ongoing	Jul.-06	27/10/2006	27/10/2006	17/05/2007	UA	13 000 000.00	89.42	Water and Sanitation
Rural Dvess Inventory	AWTF	Completed	Dec.-07	14/05/2008	14/05/2008	30/12/2008	UA	454 849.25	100.00	Water and Sanitation
Dvess Sub-Programme For Secondary Centres-Loan	OWAS1	Ongoing	Jul.-12	04/10/2012	18/04/2013	23/07/2013	UA	10 710 000.00	1.07	Water and Sanitation

Project/Programme Name	Division	Status	Approval date	Signature date	Effectiveness	First disbursement	Currency	Amount approved	Isbursement rate	Sector
Dvss Sub-Programme For Secondary Centres -Gran	OWAS1	Ongoing	Jul.-12	04/10/2012	04/10/2012	26/04/2013	UA	6 900 000.00	0.73	Water and Sanitation
Dvss Sub-Programme For Secondary Centres -Grant Dvss Sub-Programme For Secondary Centres (fwssstf)	OWAS1	Ongoing	Jul.-12	04/10/2012	04/10/2012	06/05/2013	UA	2 488 882.99	3.91	Water and Sanitation
<b>Total Water And Sanitation Sector Ua</b>							<b>UA</b>	<b>33 953 732</b>		
<b>Social Sector/ Multi-Sector (Education And Health)</b>										
Education Sector Support Project	OSHD2	Completed	March-04	26/05/2004	14/02/2005	4/02/2005	UA	2 400 000.00	100.00	Education
Education Sector Support Project/Grant	OSHD2	Completed	May-05	06/09/2005	13/08/2007	13/08/2007	UA	2 400 000.00	100.00	Education
Eti Support Project	OSGE1	Ongoing	01/11/2012	1/14/2013	1/14/2013	03/09/2013	UA	1 350 031.02	30.54	Multi-sector
Public Finance Support Project	OSGE1	Ongoing	01/11/2012	1/14/2013	1/14/2013	24/07/2013	UA	1 445 001.00	35.79	Multi-sector
Structural Adjustment Programme Iii	OSGE2	Completed	Feb.-02	08/02.2002	18/09.2002	16/10/2002	UA	8 697 876.57	100.00	Multi-sector
Meningitis Control Emergency Aid	OSHD3	Completed	Nov.-09	02/02/2010	02/02/2010	09/03/2010	UA	628 974.00	0.00	Health
Cholera Control Emergency Aid	OSHD3	Completed	April-12	03/07/2012	31/08/2012	31/08/2012	UA	610 035.57	0.00	Health
Project To Support The Lake Chad Basin Initiative (Palih) Hiv/Aids-Related Vulnerability Reduction Multi-Grant	OSHD3	Ongoing	Oct-05	18/11/2005	18/11/2005	31/01/2007	UA	10 000 000.00	73.30	Health
Ministry Of Health Capacity Building	OSHD3	Completed	Sept.-09				UA	460 216.00	97.00	Health
Grant For Statistical Capacity Building	OSFU	Ongoing	Dec.-11	11/22/2011	11/22/2011		UA	1 000 000	51.00	Multi-sector
<b>Total Social Sector /Multi-Sector</b>							<b>UA</b>	<b>28 982 134</b>		
<b>Transport Sector</b>										
Kouma - Sarh Road Project /Grant	OITC1	ONGOING	June-09	20/07/2009	20/07/2009	10.05.2010	UA	31 610 000.00	70.70	Transport
Cemac:transport Facilitation Programme /Multi-Grant	OITC1	ONGOING	Jul-07	07/10/2009	07/10/2009		UA	19 000 000.00	84.70	Transport
<b>Total Transport Sector</b>							<b>UA</b>	<b>50 610 000</b>		
<b>Grand Total</b>								<b>200 735 436</b>		

Source: Compiled by author

**Amounts Approved by Sector (UA)**

Year	Agriculture	Water and Sanitation Education	Education	Multi-sector	Health	Transport	Grand Total	%
2002	15 028 508			8 697 877			23 726 385	12%
2004			2 400 000				2 400 000	1%
2005	16 270 000		2 400 000		10 000 000		28 670 000	14%
2006	5 347 394	13 000 000					18 347 394	9%
2007		454 849				19 000 000	19 454 849	10%
2008	30 000 000						30 000 000	15%
2009	247 097				1 079 190	31 610 000	32 936 286	16%
2010	587 245						587 245	0%
2011	20 109 326						21 109 326	11%
2012		20 098 883			610 036		23 503 951	12%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>87 589 569</b>	<b>33 553 732</b>	<b>4 800 000</b>	<b>12 492 909</b>	<b>11 689 225</b>	<b>50 610 000</b>	<b>200 735 436</b>	
%	44%	17%	2%	6%	6%	25%		

Source: Compiled by author

**Trends in ADF Resources from 2002 to 2012 – In UA million**

CHAD	ADF 9 (2002–2004)	ADF 107 (2005–2007)	ADF 118 (2008–2010)	ADF 12 (2011–2012)	Total (2005–2012)	% 2005–2012
	20.95	25.5	41.18	48.83	115.5	91.5%
Fragile States Average	ADF 9 (2002–2004)	ADF 109 (2005–2007)	ADF 1110 (2008–2010)	ADF 12 (2011–2012)	Total (2005–2012)	% 2005–2012
	nd	29.1	38.5	51.4	119	76.6%

Source: Compiled by author

## Annex 6: Development Indicators for Chad

Table A1 Macro-economic Indicators

	2002–2004	2005–2007	2008–2011
Growth rate	18.2	4.2	3.5
Oil GDP growth	210.4	-2.4	-3.9
Inflation	0.66	2.3	1.5
Primary budget balance	3.2	-28.7	-26.5
Overall budget balance	13	-1	-6.4
Current account	53.4	-8.6	-26.6
Revenue (% of GDP)	10.6	30.2	36.4
Non-oil tax revenue	9.2	9.3	11.8
Oil revenue	1.4	20.9	24.6
Expenditure (% of GDP)	23.6	31	41.6
Wages (% of GDP)	5.3	7	9
Investment (% of GDP)	12.7	12.5	17.1
Domestic financing	2.3	5.8	12.5
External financing	10.4	6.7	4.6
National savings	-5.2	13.3	5.9
Public savings	2.0	8.3	6.6
Private savings	7.3	5	-0.7
Public debt (% of GDP)	45.7	26.6	23.2

Sources: Compiled by author on the basis of IMF data, Art IV Consultations 2006 to 2012

Table A2 Human Development Index

	2000	2001	2002	2005	2009	2010	2011
Value	0.286	..	..	0.312	0.323	0.326	0.328
Rank	166/174	165/174	167/174	170/174	..	..	183/183

Sources: UNDP: Human Development Report 2012

Table A3 MDG trends in Chad

	1900	1995	2000	2007	
<b>GOAL 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger</b>					<b>Unachievable</b>
Employment/Population Ratio, 15 Years +, Total (%)	..	68	67	69	
Employment/Population Ratio, 15-24 Years, Total (%)	..	50	50	49	
GDP per Person Employed (% of Annual Growth)	..	-2	-4	-2	
Malnutrition Prevalence, Weight for Age (% of Children Under 5)	..	..	29.4	..	
Prevalence of Undernourishment (% of Population)	..	..	..	39	
Vulnerable Employment, Total (% of Total Employment)	..	94	..	..	
<b>GOAL 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education</b>					<b>Possible</b>
Literacy Rate, Youth Female (% of Females Aged Between 15 and 24 Years)	..	..	23	35	
Literacy Rate, Youth Male (% of Males Aged Between 15 and 24 Years)	..	..	56	53	

	1900	1995	2000	2007	
Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)	..	..	46	..	
Primary Completion Rate, Total (% of Relevant Age Group)	16	14	22	31	
Total Enrolment, Primary (% Net)	..	..	53	..	
<b>GOAL 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women</b>					<b>Possible</b>
Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%)	..	..	2	7	
Ratio of Female/Male Enrolment in Tertiary Education	..	..	18	14	
Ratio of Female/Male Enrolment in Primary Education	44	48	61	70	
Ratio of Female/Male Enrolment in Secondary Education	..	..	28	45	
<b>GOAL 4: Reduce Child Mortality</b>					<b>Possible</b>
Immunization, Measles (% of Children Aged Between 12 and 23 Months)	32	26	28	23	
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 Live Births)	120	120	122	124	
Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1000 Births)	201	202	205	209	
<b>GOAL 5: Improve Maternal Health</b>					<b>Unachievable</b>
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1000 women Aged between 15 and 19 Years)	..	..	191	164	
Births Attended by Skilled Health Personnel (% of Total)	..	..	16	..	
Contraceptive Prevalence (% of Women Aged Between 15 and 49 Years)	..	..	8	..	
Maternal Mortality Rate (Modelled Estimates, per 100 000 Live Births)	..	..	..	1500	
Pregnant Women Receiving Prenatal Care (%)	..	..	42	..	
<b>GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases</b>					<b>Unachievable</b>
Children Under 5 With Fever Receiving Anti-malarial Drugs (%)	..	..	53	..	
Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100 000 Inhabitants)	125	181	262	299	
Prevalence of HIV, Female (% Aged Between 15 and 24 Years)	..	..	..	2.8	
Prevalence of HIV, Male (% Aged Between 15 and 24 Years)	..	..	..	2	
Prevalence of HIV, Total (% of Population Aged Between 15 and 49 Years)	0.7	2	3.3	3.5	
Tuberculosis Cases Detected Under DOTS (%)	..	36	35	18	
<b>GOAL 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability/Access to Potable Water</b>					<b>Possible</b>
CO2 Emissions (kg per PPP USD of GDP)	0	0	0	0	
CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons per Capita)	0	0	0	0	
Forest Area (% of Land Area)	10	10	10	9	
Improved Sanitation Facilities (% of Population With Access)	5	6	7	9	
Improved Water Source (% of Population With Access)	..	24	34	48	
Improved Water Source (% of Total Population)	..	..	..	9.1	
<b>GOAL 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development</b>					<b>Unachievable</b>
Official Development Assistance (ODA) per Capita (in USD)	51	33	15	33	
Debt Service (PPG and IMF, % of Exports, Excluding Emigrant Remittances)	4	8	14	2	
Internet Users (per 100 People)	0	..	0	0,6	
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	0	0	0	9	
Telephone Lines (per 100 People)	0	0	0	0	
<b>Other</b>					<b>Unachievable</b>
Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman)	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.2	
GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)	260	200	180	540	
GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD billion)	1.6	1.5	1.5	5.8	
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	6.8	13.2	23.3	19.1	
Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years)	51	52	51	51	
Literacy Rate, Adult (% of People Aged 15 and Above)	..	12	26	32	
Population, Total (Million)	6.1	7.2	8.5	10.8	
Trade (% of GDP)	41.4	55.7	51.6	82.9	

Sources: World Development Indicators database, World Bank. Italics indicate periods other than the one specified.



**Table A4** Priority Sector Absorption Rates in 2010 and 2011

	Share in Total Transfers in %		Payments/Commitments in %	
	2010	2011	2010	2011
Justice	1.6	0.52	100	100
Justice	9.7	8.6	96.3	84.44
Health	11.02	8.8	92.11	75.05
Agriculture	8.6	11.1	100	97.12
Stock breeding	0.5	2.4	92.7	100
Infrastructure	50.7	43.5	99.31	98.1
Posts and ICTs	0.8	0.3	85.2	100
Environment and fishery resources	0.3	0.1	100	100
Higher education	7.0	7.8	99.33	99.3
Regional development	2.4	5.2	99.39	100
Oil	5.8	10.6	99.44	100
Water	1.7	0.9	100	97.72
<b>Total</b>	<b>92.658</b>	<b>75.44</b>	<b>88.5</b>	<b>94.5</b>

Sources: 2010 and 2011 CCSRP Reports

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## Endnotes

1. Standards for Country Strategy and Program Evaluations". The key document in this regard is the document published in 2008 by the Asian Development Bank and ECG titled "Good Practice.
2. The rating system is detailed in Annex 3.
3. Data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation: The crop varieties cultivated are generally low-yielding with average yields of about 1.4 t/ha against 1.8 t/ha in testing in farming areas and 4 t/ha for rice trials; 0.6 t/ha against 1.2 t/ha (testing in farming areas) and 2.5 t/ha (trials) for sorghum; 0.7 t/ha against 1.5 t/ha (testing in farming areas) and 3 t/ha (trials) for groundnut; 0.6 t/ha against 0.9 t/ha (testing in farming areas) and 2 t/ha (trials) for cotton, and 0.4 t/ha against 1 t/ha (testing in farming areas) and 1.7 t/ha (trials) for cowpea.
4. SAP IV (2004-2005) provided for under CSP 2002-2004 was not implemented, just like PAGE 2 (2006-2008), PARG 2 (2008-2010), PASP (2008-2010) and the CEMAC Secretariat General Support Project under CSP 2005-2009. Concerning the level of achievement of the specific objectives of Bank-implemented programmes, it was noted that, in all, 94 of the 167 measures or reforms under SAP III were implemented, representing a 56.3% implementation rate. Regarding PAGE which basically concerned the building of the capacity of the administration's entities, 5 of the 9 measures were satisfactorily implemented, registering a 55 % implementation rate. As concerns PARG 1, a total of 25 out of 48 measures were implemented, showing a 52.1% implementation rate.
5. Projects at risk are made up of problematic projects and potentially problematic projects (PPPs) that are those that have recorded implementation progress, but have a high probability of experiencing implementation problems in future.
6. Projects at risk represented only 5.2% of the portfolio as at 31 December 2013.



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## About this Evaluation

This summary report provides an overview of an independent assessment of the African Development Bank Group's assistance strategy and role in Chad from 2002 to 2012. The evaluation focuses on the relevance, efficacy and impact of Bank assistance, as well as on such issues as sustainability, institutional development impact and stakeholder performance.



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