Corporate Evaluation

Implementation Challenge:
Lessons from Five Citizen Security Projects

ABSTRACT

Successful implementation is necessary for projects and programs to be effective. In this comparative project evaluation, OVE analyzes the effectiveness of the implementation strategy of five IDB-supported citizen security projects in Central America and the Caribbean. The evaluation uses evidence and best practices from implementation research, multisectoral work, and donor supervision as evaluative benchmarks. The findings reveal that projects showing the most successful implementation also included most of the elements identified in the specialized literature: participatory preparation leading to communities' buy-in, sensitive situational diagnostics, skills-based trained practitioners and protocols, presence of community officers to maintain motivation and ensure close follow-up of beneficiaries, and a relatively simpler project design involving a limited number of ministries and a more direct route for service delivery. However, the evaluation shows that in many of the projects, coordination arrangements and specific incentives and accountability mechanisms among participating entities were either ineffective or missing; thus projects that involved several line ministries and municipalities appeared too complex to be implemented as designed, in particular given the institutional constraints, resources, and timeframes available. Finally, IDB supervision facilitated implementation in some cases, but hindered it in others, suggesting that incentives, resources, and training were generally not adequate for Bank staff to supervise projects beyond the procurement and fiduciary aspects.

PREFACE

This evaluation is novel in three ways. First, it is a comparative project evaluation—a new type of evaluation for OVE. It aims to bring more operational insights by looking at the commonalities and differences among projects in a single sector. Over time, a body of comparative project evaluations will contribute to building, in a practical and regular way, the institutional memory of the Bank in different sectors. Second, it is an evaluation of one of the newest sectors in the Bank, citizen security. As such, it aims to contribute to the knowledge agenda on this important topic. Third, it is an evaluation that focuses on project implementation processes. In other words, it does not look at results as traditional impact evaluations do, but at what project features influenced implementation and what can be generalized beyond the singularity of each context. Our hope is to provide practical suggestions for the IDB on how to maximize the chances for citizen security projects to be implemented, which would allow the institution to then rigorously evaluate them and learn from the experience.

This project evaluation is part of a sector evaluation on citizen security at the IDB that analyzes the institution's strategic position to address this multi-pronged challenge, and identifies its comparative advantage in the sector. With this evaluation, we hope to participate constructively in IDB's learning process geared toward better serving governments and citizens of the Region who face the dauntingly complex challenge of preventing violence and crime.

A British scholar, David Byrne (2009:4) has put into words OVE's understanding of the complexity of the task at stake and how we hope to help: the IDB needs to develop implementable projects that respond to a complex challenge, violence and crime prevention, while considering the specificities of each context and selecting interventions on based available empirical or theoretical evidence, and then to learn from the experience. His words are a good introduction for this new series of OVE evaluations:

> We cannot establish universal laws applicable always and everywhere but we can find what works in particular sorts of places or institutions and transfer this understanding to other places or institutions of the same kind. This of course reflects the reality of path dependency in any social causation. […]
>
> Systematic action research opens up the possibility of strategy development that can meaningfully engage with the complexities of the real world. In this respect it is a challenge to the rolling out of "best practice," to "strategic planning," and to the models of linear causation that dominate our organizational and political landscape. These consistently fail because they are based on an assumption that intervention outcomes are relatively straightforward to predict if only we can get enough of the right sort of evidence. […]
>
> This is not a dismissal of evidence. On the contrary, [… this argues] for the deployment of evidence in relation to the context. […] Social contexts are not passive and unchanging. Rather they are transformed interactively by intervention. […] We can use systematic case comparison […] to establish what might work in a context – a meaningful and necessarily limited mode of the transfer of best practice – but that intervention will always acquire a new and shifting context through the combined agency of those who deliver it and those to whom it is delivered.

Cheryl Gray, Director

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACAO	Assistant Community Action Officer
CAO	Community Action Officer
CBO	Community-based organization
CPE	Country Program Evaluation
CSJP	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
GDP	Gross domestic product
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INIM	Institute for Women, Nicaragua
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MIDES	Ministry of Social Development in Panama/*Ministerio de Desarrollo Social en Panama*
MINED	Ministry of Education, Nicaragua
MNSJ	Ministry of National Security and Justice
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OSEGI	Comprehensive Security Office/*Oficina de Seguridad Integral*
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Successful implementation is necessary for projects and programs to be effective. Implementation can be particularly important in complex and multisectoral approaches to development, such as the citizen security projects supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, or Bank). Nevertheless, implementation is generally under-researched and under-evaluated by development practitioners in general and by multilateral development agencies in particular.

In this comparative evaluation, the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) examines five citizen security projects approved by the IDB over the past decade to identify and assess what explained the differences between projects that were effectively implemented and those that could not be implemented as designed. Indeed, how can we know whether the IDB has been successful in helping to prevent violence and crime in the Region if most of its citizen security projects so far have faced significant obstacles during implementation? How can we define the institution's comparative advantage in citizen security if its projects cannot be adequately or fully implemented?

OVE reviewed the literature on implementation, multisectorality, and donor supervision to identify evidence and best practices for successful implementation. These elements included participatory preparation leading to communities' buy-in, sensitive situational diagnostics, skills-based trained practitioners and protocols, presence of community champions to maintain motivation and ensure close follow-up of beneficiaries, and clear coordination arrangements, specific incentives, and accountability mechanisms among participating entities. The team then used these elements as benchmarks for the analysis of the IDB's experience with the five citizen security projects. The approach aimed to generate a better understanding of what works and what does not work in implementing complex projects, particularly in the context of citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean. The projects reviewed were designed between 2000 and 2005. The evaluation did not include projects approved by Bank more recently, because they are not yet in advanced stages of implementation.

The findings reveal that projects showing the most successful implementation also included most of the elements identified in the specialized literature. However, the evaluation also shows that in many of the projects, coordination arrangements and specific incentives and accountability mechanisms among participating entities were either ineffective or missing; thus projects that involved several line ministries and municipalities appeared too complex to be implemented as designed, in particular given the institutional constraints and the resources, and timeframes available.

The projects that had the most successful implementation, Jamaica I and II, included most of the elements identified as best practices. In particular, their participatory preparation allowed high buy-in by communities as well as a sensitive situational diagnostic. The use of nongovernmental organizations to deliver interventions meant that skills-based trained practitioners and protocols were already in place for many of the interventions (at least for the first phase of the project). The number of ministries involved was limited to one or two, and the presence of community officers identifying,

motivating, and following up on beneficiaries at the community level proved to be a very valuable feature of the program.

The project with the least successful implementation, Honduras, lacked most of these elements. For instance, it did not involve community participation; because core elements of interventions were not identified, implementers did not have enough guidance on carrying out the interventions; and practitioners were not trained as required and did not receive feedback or coaching. The multiplicity of actors with inefficient coordination, incentive, and accountability mechanisms made the project far too complex to be implemented as designed—a factor that shows a lack of adequate preparation, understanding of the situational and institutional context, and context readiness for the project.

The other projects, Nicaragua and Panama, had intermediate levels of success in implementation, but for different reasons. In Nicaragua, after the project made no progress for three years, the main executing agency was changed from the Ministry of Interior to the National Police; then, because the social ministries participating in the project were weakly staffed and resourced, project implementation was dominated by the National Police. The leadership of the National Police proved effective at executing the project, and at coordinating participating line ministries. However, there was also opacity about the selection of beneficiaries, the training of practitioners, and protocols of interventions. In Panama, the lack of incentives and accountability mechanisms led some of the line ministries to disengage, and the program was unable to rely on municipalities for service delivery because of their weak technical and financial capabilities.

The evaluation also shows that the degree of complexity of projects mattered for their successful implementation. The Jamaican projects' degree of complexity was appropriate for the institutional context, whereas for the other three, the overly complex design impeded or significantly delayed implementation.

The analysis also reveals that institutional diagnostics were not sufficiently taken into account in the design. IDB teams prepared or commissioned institutional diagnostics during the preparation of each project. They used them to support the creation of ad-hoc executing agencies, but did not use them to adjust the level of complexity of the design. Instead, they referred to them to develop the institutional strengthening component of each project, when most issues highlighted were actually structural. This should have alerted the Bank to the need to match the adequacy of the project design to the institutional capacity of the borrower.

The literature highlights communication as important for informing beneficiaries of the project's objectives and for building a common understanding around the rationale for the project and the way it works. Ethnographic studies, surveys, and focus groups commissioned by OVE in the countries clearly show that many of the prime target beneficiaries of the projects had never heard of the projects or did not know what they were about. This raises questions about the selection of the beneficiaries and about the scope of the programs vis-à-vis the magnitude of the problem being addressed.

Finally, OVE reviewed the characteristics of IDB's supervision of the projects. It found that IDB did not provide adequate incentives and resources for staff to supervise projects in a strategic manner. Supervision was geared toward procurement and fiduciary issues or problems when they emerged, but not toward the content or the process of implementation. This is a crucial question that OVE will look into in more depth in a future evaluation, because supervision can contribute substantially to improving implementation and thereafter results.

I.   INTRODUCTION

A.   Background

1.1   **Over the past three decades, many forms of violence and crime[1] have rapidly increased in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to become what the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) has called a "social pandemic."** In LAC the probability that an individual—and particularly a young man—will be killed or injured is among the highest in the world. Homicide rates have increased by 50% since the 1980s, and have reached epidemic levels—well above 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (with the world average at 11 per 100,000 inhabitants)—in several cities, including Medellin, Tegucigalpa, and Rio. Domestic violence is one of the most prevalent forms of violence in LAC, although it is hard to measure and tends to remain invisible: surveys have estimated that up to 50% of women have been physically maltreated by their male partner,[2] leaving aside such sexual and psychological abuse as threats, unwanted sex, controlling behaviors, and recurrent insults. Child maltreatment and elder abuse in the home are also considered to be frequent, although systematic data are lacking. Studies have suggested that up to 6 million children in the Region have been victims of severe maltreatment,[3] but surveys on elder abuse remain rare.[4]

1.2   **Youth violence, particularly gang violence, is the phenomenon that draws the most attention, for it is often showcased in the media and has been the subject of numerous studies and documentaries.** In LAC, as indeed everywhere in the world, young males (aged 15-29 years) have the highest probability of being victims or perpetrators of street violence (the type that is most visible and reported). Youth violence is often attributed to gangs or *pandillas*—groups of youth that gather and are characterized by idleness—even though those groups encompass a large variety of forms and activities (more or less related to violence and crime). The phenomenon varies from country to country and even city to city, and can go from small gatherings of delinquents to organized criminal

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[1]   This evaluation adopts the World Health Organization (WHO) definition of violence: "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (WHO, 2002). Crime refers to activities that are against the law.

[2]   Morrison, Ellsberg, and Bott 2007, referring to the 2005 World Health Organization survey in 15 sites in 11 countries that shows that 48.6 percent of women in urban Peru, 61% in rural Peru, and 33.8% in rural Brazil have suffered physical violence at some point in their lives (p. 2).

[3]   This does not include child trafficking and child prostitution organized by criminal organizations.

[4]   In Colombia, for instance, it is estimated that 10,000 elderly people were abused between 2004 and 2011. See Colombian Legal Medicine Statistics, available at: http://medicinalegal.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=363:urge-visibilizar-la-violencia-al-adulto-mayor&catid=9:publicaciones&Itemid=9

organizations, like the Central American *maras*. Their presence often embodies insecurity.[5]

1.3 **Other forms of violence include self-directed violence (suicide), sexual violence (rape or sexual abuse), and discriminatory violence (against ethnic groups; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons; disabled people; and members of certain professions), but relevant data are rare in most countries.** Many types of "daily" crime, violent or nonviolent, such as robberies or assaults, also contribute to the feeling of insecurity in the population. Citizens surveyed across Latin America place insecurity as the first or second priority for their country, with or just after unemployment.[6] A 2010 co-publication of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, or Bank) and the World Bank also shows that about 60% of LAC citizens do not feel safe walking at night, the lowest percentage worldwide;[7] and even though perceptions of violence and insecurity do not necessarily match data on crime and violence, they negatively affect the quality of life.[8]

1.4 **The costs of high levels of violence and crime not only impose a heavy burden on societies, families, and individuals, but also affect countries' sustainable development.** According to a recent study, 13% of GDP on average is lost because of the violence in Latin America.[9] This figure, which includes the direct costs to health and mortality and the costs to the business climate, is nearly three times the share of public expenditure dedicated to education in countries like Brazil and Mexico (respectively, 5.1% and 4.8% of GDP in 2007).[10] Other indirect costs and negative effects range from victims' loss of productivity and earnings, to child victims' lower school attendance or witnessing of abuse in their home or community, to a tendency for children to reproduce violent behaviors when adults.[11] Thus the consequences of violence can last for generations.

1.5 **When governments in the Region asked for support to finance strategies to address violence and crime, the IDB responded with citizen security stand-alone loans.** The first projects were approved in 1998 for Colombia and Uruguay. The state of knowledge then was even weaker and more fragmented than today, and the Bank had no previous experience in the sector. However, considering the

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[5]   See Rodgers 1999, 2006, 2007; Briceño-León 2001; Zubillaga and Briceño-León 2000.

[6]   Latinobarometro 2009:77.

[7]   Lora et al. 2010.

[8]   See Briceño-León 2001:19-20, who emphasized the impact on mobility, among other things.

[9]   Soares and Naritomi 2010, cited in IDB 2010, OP502-4, p. 19.

[10]   World Bank EdStats 2010.

[11]   Willman 2009: 63-64. It is important to note that the relationship between experience of violence during childhood and violent behaviors in adulthood should be understood retrospectively and not predictively: most of the adults who are violent have suffered from experiences of violence in their childhood. However, not all children who experience violence as witnesses or victims will become violent adults.

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severity of the situation, a group of specialists, with the support of IDB President Iglesias, decided to take up the challenge and accompany countries in their search for solutions. When other governments, mainly from Central America and the Caribbean, asked for support, the Bank used the Colombian experience as a model, for it was one of the very few successful examples in the Region at the time.[12] Since 1998, 18 loans have been approved in 15 LAC countries, including 10 in Central America and the Caribbean, which include the countries with the highest rates of violence and crime in the world.

1.6 **Since 2009, the demand for citizen security projects has rapidly increased in the Region, and the Bank is giving renewed priority to the issue while seeking to improve its response to best serve its clients.** Over the past three years, the Bank has begun preparing or has approved nine operations for a total of US$350 million—nearly as much as the entire portfolio in citizen security over the previous 12 years. Management issued preliminary guidelines in 2002 and revised them into operational guidelines in 2009. In 2010, the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) undertook a first evaluation of citizen security projects, looking at the 11 projects approved from 1998 to 2009. The evaluation concluded that it was impossible to attribute results to the IDB projects because they lacked design evaluability; it recommended that the Bank base its future interventions on empirical or theoretical evidence, and ensure that rigorous evaluation mechanisms are in place to enable learning from the experience of these projects. In 2011, IDB President Moreno affirmed that violence and crime prevention was one of the key priorities for the Region to sustain its growth,[13] and the following year, the Institutional Capacity of the State unit developed a conceptual framework[14] and a protocol for citizen security projects in Latin America,[15] both of which took account of the available evidence.

1.7 **Given the wide variety of situations and needs of governments in the Region, the Bank's recent efforts to develop its in-house knowledge should be complemented with additional work on implementation processes.** The efforts so far have focused on taking stock of evidence of what works and what does not work to prevent violence and crime worldwide. This is, of course, a necessary step that needs to be constantly renewed and updated; yet it is not sufficient. Any evaluation of individual programs and interventions shows their effectiveness under certain conditions, but cannot guarantee that the same results would be achieved under other circumstances. In particular, countries and cities in LAC display tremendous differences in terms of availability of data, institutional capacity, human resources, and local expertise. As previously explained, the Bank's integrated approach was mainly inspired by its work in Colombia — an approach that aimed to address multiple and interrelated risk factors, as

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[12] Fèvre (forthcoming).

[13] Moreno 2011.

[14] IDB 2012.

[15] Sherman 2012.

highlighted in the ecological model. However, Colombia is a very different context from many Central American and Caribbean countries; [16] and some of the Bank's citizen security projects faced significant execution problems, leading to either the partial cancellation of activities or components, or major delays (see OVE 2010 evaluation).

1.8 **Understanding implementation processes and identifying factors that facilitate effective implementation can be of particular importance for complex and multisectoral approaches to development, such as the citizen security projects supported by the IDB.** To determine the impact of interventions that were effective elsewhere, countries first need to implement those interventions correctly and then rigorously evaluate them. For this to happen, the factors determining implementation success (e.g., high fidelity to the original model) must be identified. Despite the crucial role of implementation, it is generally under-researched and under-evaluated by development practitioners in general and by multilateral development agencies in particular.

B. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation

1.9 **This comparative project evaluation aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation strategies of a sample of citizen security projects and identify which generalizable factors played an essential role (either positive or negative).** By doing so, OVE hopes to contribute to the Bank's efforts to better understand how to design and supervise citizen security projects to take full advantage of its experience, and to the regional knowledge agenda on what works and what does not to prevent violence and crime. As implementation researchers have summarized, "Desirable outcomes are achieved only when effective programs are implemented well" [17] —which presupposes that they are implementable in the first place. This comparative project evaluation is part of an OVE sector evaluation on citizen security at the IDB that seeks to analyze the Bank's contribution to this complex challenge and help identify its comparative advantage in the sector.

1.10 **The evaluation is structured as follows:** Following the introduction, Chapter II presents the evaluative framework used to assess the implementation performance of citizen security projects, and describes the five projects under study; Chapter III describes the findings on the implementation performance of the projects; and Chapter IV concludes.

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[16] In particular, Colombia had a rare continuity of commitment at the municipal level, even when the party in Government changed. There was also a commitment to reform the police, and a very low or nonexistent level of corruption in the municipal governments that undertook the projects

[17] Fixsen et al. 2005:12.

II.   EVALUATION DESIGN AND PROJECTS ASSESSED

A.   Evaluation design

2.1   **This evaluation refers to implementation strategies or processes as "a specified set of activities designed to put into practice an activity or program of known dimensions."**[18] There are several ways to assess the effectiveness of implementation strategies. For the purpose of this analysis, and drawing from the literature on implementation research, we define implementation success as a high fidelity to the original model or design.[19] To analyze the effectiveness of implementation strategies, this evaluation examines five citizen security projects implemented in LAC in four different countries.

2.2   **OVE developed an evaluative framework building upon an extensive review of the literature on implementation research, multisectorality, and donor supervision.** These reviews aimed to identify evidence and best practices on what contributes to *implementation success* (i.e., high-fidelity implementation); *successful multisectoral work,* which characterizes IDB's stand-alone citizen security projects; and *supervision features* that are conducive to successful implementation.[20] The framework is based on current knowledge of a nascent science that nevertheless has produced knowledge from which valuable lessons can be drawn.[21] Implementation is extremely complex, and more research is needed to better understand the multiple variables that interact throughout the process. The criteria presented below have been summarized from a systematic review of nearly 400 implementation articles, including 22 that reported results of experimental analyses (randomized group or within-subject designs) or meta-

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[18]   Fixsen et al. 2005:5

[19]   Implementation success in the context of MDBs' loans is often assessed in terms of disbursement rates. These are the most commonly available indicators on implementation progress. For this evaluation, we look at disbursement rates, but we put the emphasis on fidelity to the initial design because these are key dimensions of the learning process. To be able to evaluate the results of citizen security projects, we first need to have a clear understanding of what was implemented from the initial design. This does not mean that successful implementation requires rigidity and does not allow adaptation based on changing circumstances. It does nevertheless embrace the need to be as loyal to the original design as possible in order to be able to learn from the experience; constant changes make such an exercise much more difficult.

[20]   Because the Bank does not implement projects, but supervises them, we included supervision in the evaluative framework.

[21]   As Fixsen et al. 2005: 77 summarize: "The science of implementation is beginning to yield data and information that can help ensure that what is known through science is implemented with integrity. Research, policy, and practice agendas related to implementation need to be nurtured, debated, studied, and translated into practical advice that can transform human services. We are optimistic that learning and practice can advance all human services as common principles, procedures, and practices are illuminated through research and the development of communities of science and practice."

analyses of implementation variables.[22]   Put together they do not guarantee that implementation will be effective. They nevertheless provide a benchmark that was necessary for an evaluative effort, and that operational teams might find useful to consider when designing and supervising projects. Annex A presents the findings of the reviews.

2.3   **The reviews identified five criteria that matter to effective implementation.**

- *Context-based knowledge.* Is the project design based on adequate knowledge of the country context, the beneficiaries and their needs, and the policy and regulatory frameworks at the national, regional, and local level?
- *Core elements of intervention.* Does the project design include the essential features for the intervention to produce the expected outcome, and a clear protocol for implementation?
- *Context readiness.* Has the community been appropriately involved? Are the implementing agencies prepared? Has budgetary provision been made for the practitioners who will deliver the intervention to be selected, trained, coached, and evaluated on their performance (all on the basis of skills and practice)? Have champions been identified who will advocate for the intervention or program implementation? Do all partners understand and agree to the roles they are expected to play? Do partners share an understanding of the issues and an approach to collaboration and management? Are appropriate incentives and accountability mechanisms in place?
- *Communication.* Has the project management communicated appropriately and effectively with the community about the project?
- *Good-quality supervision.*   Have appropriate staff and budgetary resources been allocated? Do supervision team leaders have appropriate training and experience? Are supervision activities relevant? Are appropriate institutional mechanisms in place?

2.4   **Because implementation is a process, it evolves through different stages. The framework criteria might apply to some or all of them.**   Stages can be separated as follows: (i) exploration and adoption; (ii) program installation; (iii) initial implementation; (iv) full operation; (v) innovation; and (vi) sustainability.[23] The distinction between stages is not frequent in implementation research, but is useful to the extent it acknowledges that certain criteria might be fulfilled at different stages of the process. However, some criteria, such as community involvement (within context readiness), will be essential throughout all those stages. All of the projects under review were either at the full operation,

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[22]   The review of the articles spanned a variety of disciplines from agriculture, business, engineering, medicine, manufacturing, and marketing (Fixsen et al. 2005: vi-6).

[23]   See Fixsen et al. 2005.

innovation, or sustainability stages, which enabled a complete assessment of the criteria.

2.5 **We used these five criteria as the evaluative framework for this paper (see Figure 2.1). Box 2.1 describes the methodology used to collect the data for the overall comparative evaluation**.

Figure 2.1. Evaluative framework for assessing the effectiveness of implementation strategies

Effective implementation

Amount of resources spent; relevance of supervision activities; IDB staff preparedness; institutional mechanisms

Adequate and quality donor supervision

Soundness of situational diagnostic and regulatory framework

Strength of context-based knowledge

With the community during preparation and throughout the implementation

Communication

Identification of core elements of selected interventions

Clear protocols for intervention

Context readiness Mechanisms for successful multisectoral work Clarity of partners role

Community involvement; Agencies' preparation; practitioners' selection, training, coaching and performance evaluation (all based on skills and practice); presence of champions

Partners' characteristics and roles; incentives and accountability mechanisms; partners' shared understanding

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Box 2.1. Methodology for data collection

The evaluation used different empirical evaluative exercises that combined quantitative and qualitative methods:

(i) process tracing based on in-depth interviews with key informants and review of project documentation;
(ii) review of specialized literature;
(iii) review of budgetary data on violence prevention;
(iv) assessment of project beneficiary outcomes through tracer studies;
(v) assessments of the service delivery and supply context of different projects;
(vi) in-depth semistructured interviews of key informants;
(vii) life histories of beneficiaries;
(viii) ethnographic studies of ex-*pandilleros*;
(viii) analysis of legal frameworks and mapping of services related to domestic violence; and
(ix) observation.

This combination of methods aimed to triangulate findings and thus strengthen their validity to fulfill the evaluation's objectives. It also served to bring in original data and show how to strengthen the learning process even when statistics systems are weak and incomplete.

Finally, interviews with Bank specialists working on citizen security projects as well as with staff of the Vice-Presidency for Countries aimed to ensure that OVE fully and sensitively understood Bank staff's needs and the constraints on them before drawing any conclusions and proposing any guidance.

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B.   Overview of projects reviewed

2.6   **The evaluation covers five IDB citizen security projects implemented during the 2000s in four Central American and Caribbean countries: Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama**. OVE chose projects that either had closed or had disbursed at least one-third of their initial amount—that is, projects with enough progress in their implementation to enable the team to understand the relevance of the integrated approach in each context and the factors influencing the implementation.[24] Table 2.1 presents the profiles of the projects.

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[24]   Since the reviewed projects have either similar or long titles, throughout this paper, we identify them by the country to simplify the presentation and avoid acronyms.

Table 2.1. Citizen security project profiles

Country and project title	Approved amount, Approval Date & Status	Objective	Components
Jamaica: Citizen Security and Justice Program (JA105)	$16M; 2001 Closed 2009	Enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica: (i) prevent and reduce violence; (ii) strengthen crime management capabilities; and (iii) improve the delivery of judicial services.	Four components: • National crime and violence prevention strategy • Capacity building of the Ministry of National Security and Justice • Strengthening of the criminal justice system • Community action
Honduras: Peace and Citizen Coexistence Project for the Muni-cipalities of the Sula Valley (HO0205)	$20M; 2003 Closed 2011	Improve levels of peace, coexistence, and citizen security in the 17 municipalities in the Sula Valley Region, contributing to a reduction in insecurity and violence among young people aged 12-25 years.	Four components: • Institutional strengthening • Social prevention of violence and juvenile delinquency • Support for the community police and/or crime prevention project in Sula Valley Region • Communication and social awareness strategy
Nicaragua: Citizen Security Program (NI0168)	$7.21M; 2004 Closed 2010	Contribute to improve the level of citizen security through supporting the reduction of youth violence in specific localities.	Four components: • Institutional strengthening, especially of the authority responsible for policy on citizen security • Integration and strengthening of juvenile violence prevention services using an intersectoral care and prevention model at the municipal level • Expansion and consolidation of the community policing program initiative • Public information program to encourage inclusion of the topic on the social agenda and to educate the public to the need for values and standards to achieve social harmony.
Panama: Integral Security Program (PN-L1003)	$22.7M; 2006 Active	Help improve citizen coexistence and security in communities with the highest rates of violence through strategic, comprehensive, interagency, participative actions to prevent juvenile violence.	Two components: • Institutional strengthening (Ministry of Interior and Justice, information system and observatory, M&E, national police force, MIDES, Ministry of Education, municipal governments) • Citizen security programs (primary prevention: at school, youth at risk, communities in high-risk zones, domestic violence; secondary prevention; tertiary prevention)
Jamaica: Citizen Security and Justice Program II (JA-L1009)	$21M; 2009 Active	Contribute to the reduction in crime and violence in 28 high-crime urban communities, by financing prevention and strategic interventions to address identified individual, family, and community risk factors.	Two components: • Community action (mobilization and governance, services, community centers, restorative and community justice tribunals, social marketing and public campaigns) • Institutional strengthening of the Ministry of National Security (TA and equipment, interagency)

Source: Project documents, IDB, available on IDB operational portal.

2.7   **The projects responded to different situations in terms of levels of violence and crime.** OVE prepared background papers to document the main forms of violence and crime (depending on the availability of data, they included homicides, domestic violence against women, sexual violence, child maltreatment, school violence, and property crimes such as robberies) and their evolution over the past decade.[25] Between 2000 and 2010, homicide rates in Central America increased from an average of 25.6 to 39.4, and in the Caribbean from an average of 14.3 to 25.3, per 100,000 inhabitants. These averages conceal large differences among countries. For instance, throughout the past decade Honduras and Jamaica were constantly above the averages of Central America, the Caribbean, and Latin America, while Nicaragua was constantly below them. Panama was, and stayed, below the Central American and Caribbean averages, but in 2007 went above the Latin American average.

2.8   **The five projects aimed to improve citizen security principally through a combination of institutional strengthening and social prevention interventions.**

- *Jamaica I* (2001-2009) and *II* (2009-present) had a community-based focus, beginning with 9 communities and expanding to 28 and then to 50 in the second phase. Interventions in the first phase consisted mainly of remedial education, life skills, parenting, and vocational training delivered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and those in the second phase shifted to scholarship and internship programs for inner-city students at the secondary and tertiary levels, maintaining previous community activities, but increasingly providing them through community-based organizations (CBOs). In addition, both projects worked with the criminal justice system to improve criminal investigation, create restorative justice tribunals, create a system for facilitating information-sharing among institutions, and provide police with training in community policing.

- *Honduras* (2003-2011) was a regional-level project, including all municipalities of the Sula Valley Region, each of which was expected to propose the activities it wanted the project to finance. San Pedro Sula was the main executing agency, coordinating with the 16 other participating municipalities of varying sizes and resources. The interventions mainly provided recreational activities (sport, culture) for youth, and vocational training. The project also aimed to build regional capacity in citizen security by improving data collection and analysis through the creation of a regional observatory and training police on community policing, among other activities.

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[25]   The background papers provide a fuller diagnostic of the situation, covering country-specific trends for various forms of violence and crime. The background papers are available for Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Panama.

- *Nicaragua* (2004-2011) was designed at the national level and covered 15 territories (11 municipalities and 4 territories in Managua). It included six line ministries and the national police. The Ministry of Interior was initially designated as the executing agency, but after three years of project inactivity, program implementation was transferred to the National Police. NGOs and churches were initially included in the project design and implementation, but they were dropped from the project early on. The social interventions (mainly recreational activities, vocational training, and parenting classes) were delivered through each participating line ministry's networks of volunteers (*promotores*). The project also included the creation of a violence-and-crime observatory and the development of a citizen security national policy. However the observatory's funding fell through and the component was not implemented.

- *Panama* (2006-present) was also coordinated at the national level and involved the participation of four line ministries in addition to the National Police and four municipalities. Social interventions (recreational activities for youth, activities for *pandilleros*, and domestic violence prevention activities) were implemented in four municipalities where local committees for violence prevention were formed to share information and jointly plan interventions. The executing agency, specially created for the implementation of the project, was placed first within the Ministry of Interior and National Security, and then, when that ministry was divided into two ministries in 2007, within the new Ministry of National Security. The project included tertiary prevention components—the construction of a new juvenile detention center and the development of a reinsertion model for youth offenders—as well as a national violence-and-crime observatory and the development of a national citizen security strategy (which was recently adopted).

2.9   **In terms of implementation, three of the five were restructured or re-scoped during implementation**. Table 2.2 summarizes the main features of the implementation of the five projects according to available data (mainly monitoring and completion reports).

- *Jamaica I* and *II* saw the fastest disbursement rates, according to project completion reports. In particular, Jamaica II was able to disburse significantly faster than expected. [26] It was expanded in 2012 with UK£2.75 million (over US$11 million) of additional funding from the UK's Department for International Development, which allowed for an increase in the number of treated communities from 28 to 50.

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[26]   It should be noted that this is partly due to the implementation of the education scholarships component, which proved easy to disburse and was very popular with beneficiaries.

- *Nicaragua*'s implementation was also considered satisfactory, but its implementation faced significant initial delays (three years) and some components were not implemented.
- *Panama* also faced important delays in its initial implementation, and has disbursed about 50% of its approved amount after five years of implementation. However, it has achieved important milestones, such as the preparation and approval of the national strategy for citizen security, and at the time of this evaluation it seems to have accelerated the pace of execution.
- *Honduras* faced substantial issues, failed to meet a large part of its implementation targets, and was about to be cancelled at least two times before finally closing in 2011.

Table 2.2. Main features of the implementation of citizen security projects

Country (approval date)	Implementation rating / disbursement %	Time between approval and effectiveness	Implementation duration since effectiveness	Duration of project beyond plans	Substantial project changes
Jamaica I (2001)	Satisfactory	1 month	7.3 years (88 months)	3 years (39 months)	Re-scoped
Honduras (2002)	Unsatisfactory	7.75 months	8.3 years (99.75 months)	3.3 years (39.7 months)	Restructured 2008
Nicaragua (2004)	Satisfactory	9 months	5.2 years (63 months)	1.5 years (16 months)	
Panama (2006)	50.14% (09/2012)	2 months	6.2 years (75 months)	1.2 years (15 months)	Extension in 2011 (2 years, until 08/2013)
Jamaica II (2009)	98.93% (09/2012)	1 day	3 years (36 months)	NA	NA

Source: Project Completion Reports and Project Monitoring Reports.

2.10 **It is important to acknowledge that for each of the projects, external events or major political shifts affected implementation**.

- In 2004, Hurricane Ivan hit the Caribbean Basin, producing severe damages and losses that altogether amounted to 8% of *Jamaica*'s 2003 gross domestic product (GDP).[27] Between 2004 and 2007, US$2.7 million from the first Jamaica project were either transferred to the emergency produced by Hurricane Ivan or partially cancelled because of fiscal constraints.

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[27]   http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/1/20501/L636-completo.pdf

- In 2006, the part of the *Nicaragua* project financed by the Korean Government fell through ($2 million), as many donors in the international community left the country following the presidential elections.[28]
- In 2004, at the very beginning of the *Honduras* project, allegations of misuse of funds by the program's director[29] caused significant delays and affected the credibility of the program. In October 2008, Tropical Depression Sixteen hit Honduras and caused floods in 16 of the 17 departments, affecting 271,179 people—and nearly 60,000 severely— through extensive damage to or loss of shelter and/or livelihoods.[30] US$6 million of the original US$20 million of the citizen security loan was transferred to address reconstruction efforts in 2008. Shortly after, in June 2009, the IDB paralyzed disbursements for 10 months, following the political crisis surrounding the irregular presidential transition that took place in the country. An additional six months would be required to take stock of the project's implementation status, and develop an action plan to close it.
- In *Panama*, the project was significantly delayed—as were many projects in the portfolio in Panama—because the Government did not make proper budgetary allocations for the 2012 fiscal year.[31] The citizen security project stopped for four months.[32]

2.11 **The results of the closed projects in terms of violence and crime prevention cannot be rigorously evaluated, as the 2010 OVE evaluation explained**. The following results are therefore at best tentative and should be considered with caution. Project completion reports of the three closed projects suggest the following results:

- *Jamaica I* (2001-2009) exceeded its target objectives in terms of reduction of homicides and major violent crimes in targeted communities.[33]
- *Honduras* (2003-2011) lacked any tracking of results, but the poor implementation indicates that its outcomes were probably not achieved.

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[28] The Korean financing was to finance the violence observatory, which was not implemented. The Central American Bank for Economic Integration, which also cofinanced the citizen security project, increased its loan amount, but its additional contribution was not allocated to the violence observatory.

[29] See Foro Social de Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras 2004.

[30] That is, they suffered a total loss of shelter and livelihoods, and required immediate humanitarian assistance; see http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/flash-appeal-honduras-2008

[31] Reasons provided by stakeholders during in-country interviews was that the budget allocated higher priority to other sectors, including infrastructure, thus affecting the Bank's portfolio.

[32] It is important to note that the IDB's approval of the project extension had been delayed; therefore, when Panama's 2012 budget was prepared, the project was not included since the extension was not formally approved. Thus the effect of the Government's shift in priorities was exacerbated by the inappropriate timing caused in part by the IDB.

[33] However, the IDB could not appropriately measure the project's impact on perceptions of safety, which were among the main outcome indicators of the first phase of the project.

- *Nicaragua* (2004-2011) showed mixed results: the annual national crime growth slowed down, but homicide rates did not decrease; and the population's reported trust in the national police deteriorated throughout the project's implementation (again, attrition is not evaluable, so these results refer to the context changes more than the impact of the project as such).

III. FINDINGS: PERFORMANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

3.1 **Project success or failure is usually assessed against a predetermined set of project targets, typically identified at design, which either are or are not met.** However, for this reflexive comparison to be useful, it is fundamental to properly understand the underlying causes of success or failure. As was mentioned in Chapter II, the specialized literature provides some guidance. Implementation success or performance is defined as a high fidelity to the original model or design. The factors that are typically associated with higher likelihood of implementation success can be grouped into five categories: (a) strength of context-based knowledge; (b) identification of core elements of selected interventions; (c) context readiness (including mechanisms for successful multisectoral work); (d) communication; and (e) adequate and good-quality Bank supervision. Annex B presents a systematic rating of the five projects for each category.

A. Context-based knowledge

3.2 **Knowing the context includes having a good understanding of (i) the situation in terms of different forms of violence and crime; (ii) existing services and infrastructure that have objectives similar or complementary to those of the project; and (iii) the country or local institutional context, relevant regulatory and legal framework, and policy environment.**

1. Situational diagnostic

3.3 **Overall, diagnostics provided sound information about trends and forms of violence and crime.** [34] Most diagnostics presented data at the national and subnational levels, disaggregated data by gender and age (at least minors and adults), and included several types of common crimes and nonlethal forms of violence, such as thefts, kidnappings, rapes, and domestic violence. They all presented the evolution over the past years so as to identify current trends, and combined different sources of information—although no diagnostic had a systematic discussion of the reliability of data in each country (this was addressed case by case, mainly when dealing with domestic violence).

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[34] See Annex C for an explanation of the criteria chosen to assess the soundness and robustness of diagnostics, as well as the results per country.

3.4   **However, four main weaknesses characterized most of the diagnostics:**

- **They consistently underrepresented certain forms of violence, such as school violence, child maltreatment, and elder abuse.** Many times—as in the diagnostics of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—certain forms of violence were not documented because of a lack of reliable data. OVE faced this same constraint during this comparative study; there were few reliable and comparable sources of information for some forms of violence and crime. However, there are other tools that can give an idea of the scope or nature of these forms of violence, and thus provide a more complete picture of the violence and crime situation in a country, municipality, or neighborhood (see Box 3.1).

- **Because situational factors or circumstances were lacking, no behavioral patterns could be discerned.** The level of information about situational and circumstantial factors varied greatly among and within countries in Central America and the Caribbean. For instance, Jamaica has a relatively good administrative register of various forms of violence and crime (including child maltreatment, from the Office of the Children Register, and sexual aggressions, from the Jamaica Constabulary Force) and has developed a series of surveys over the years that capture both victimization and risk factors.[35] In Honduras, the case of Puerto Cortés shows that detailed situational and circumstantial information can be collected at the municipal level through the creation of a call center and an incentive-based collaboration between the national police and the municipality.[36]

- **Risk factors for youth aged 20 to 29 were consistently missing.** Most of the diagnostics focused on adolescents (ages 13-19) and did not document risk factors for the older group (ages 20-29), even though they were included in most projects. These two age groups do not have the same activities, habits, friends, and so on, and they do not have the same legal status: youths older than 18 or 21 are no longer minors. Therefore, specific age-disaggregated analysis would have been relevant.

- **No diagnostic discussed gender dimensions, in particular context-specific factors (cultural, institutional, or other) related to the fact that the overwhelming majority of perpetrators and victims of lethal violence were young men.** Various studies have highlighted how gender identities (certain understandings of masculinity, but also femininity)

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[35]   See, for example, two victimization surveys 2006 and 2009; Jamaican Youth Risk and Resiliency Behavior Survey 2006; Jamaica Survey of Reproductive Health 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008; Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions 2000, 2002, 2008. The background paper on Jamaica draws on these various sources of information for its diagnostic. It is available on the OVE website.

[36]   *Diagnóstico de Seguridad Ciudadana de Puerto Cortés*, unpublished.

provide keys to understand the phenomenon of *pandillas*. [37] To complement these references, OVE commissioned a series of life histories of young male and female beneficiaries of Jamaica I and II who live in inner-city communities, as well as an ethnographic study of *pandilleros* in Nicaragua, to identify the characteristics and risk factors of these young people. Both exercises showed the importance of the gender dimension.[38] Nevertheless, the gender dimension was systematically undermined or ignored in diagnostics and project designs. [39]

Box 3.1. How to plan in the absence of reliable data

Lack of data and unreliable data represent major impediments to sound policymaking. Criminal statistics are usually highly sensitive, and their quality, availability, and reliability vary widely across countries, and even within countries. In addition, many forms of violence are underreported for a variety of cultural and institutional reasons. However, if we do not know the scope and scale of the problem and we have no information about the circumstances, victims, and perpetrators, then designing any relevant project or public policy is difficult at best. Moreover, a poor data environment can be indicative of more fundamental institutional problems in the sector and should guide the type and scale of projects to be developed. The lack of reliable statistics and cooperation between agencies in charge of data collection (national police, forensic/legal medicine, health system, justice system) is typically not accidental: it reveals structural issues in data collection, political resistance to transparency of data, or a lack of priority for the issue.

Lack of reliable data should not, however, impede action. Waiting for strong statistical systems to be in place would be unrealistic, and would leave the people who are most in need without assistance. When reliable statistics are lacking or are incomplete, quantitative and qualitative exercises can be developed to gain a better understanding of the situation: victimization surveys, health surveys, surveys in schools or communities, safety marches, in-depth interviews, life histories, and focus groups. Such exercises complement available data and help prioritize interventions at the local level, reducing (to some extent) prejudicial blind planning. For this evaluation we undertook the following exercises: life histories in Jamaica, ethnographic study of *pandilleros* in Nicaragua, mapping of domestic violence services in Panama, focus groups in Honduras and Jamaica, survey of violence prevention services in Nicaragua, and observation in schools in Panama. Each exercise was designed to strengthen our understanding of the context when data were not available or sufficient.

Across LAC, efforts are being undertaken to strengthen information systems. The Bank supports its partner countries' efforts in this area, particularly through the regional initiative on the harmonization of indicators and the creation of observatories. A constructive assessment of the quality of observatories in the Region would help identify which requirements or conditions have proved to make an observatory more useful and which might not be used or might not produce relevant information. Examples from the five projects show that observatories might become irrelevant for public policy if the information and analysis are not disseminated (Panama) or if they face serious difficulties in gaining information and legitimacy (Honduras).

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[37]   See, e.g., Zubillaga and Briceño-León 2000; Salazar 2002; Gómez Alcaraz and García Suárez 2006; and Mauricio Rubio 2003, 2004, 2006.

[38]   The life histories in Jamaica and the ethnographic study of *pandilleros* in Nicaragua are available as background papers on the OVE website. In addition, Annex D presents excerpts from a life history of a young woman in Jamaica that highlight some gender-related factors.

[39]   With no intention to undermine the complexity and sensitivity of questions related to gender identities, we nevertheless stress the fact that ignoring such questions altogether cannot help clarify possible cultural risk factors for violence. Knowledge has expanded on promoting peaceful and collaborative masculinities and femininities, in Latin America and elsewhere.

> **Finally, sound information systems should include epidemiological vigilance systems**—that is, public health information systems used to systematically collect sociodemographic variables and characteristics and circumstances of cases. Such systems can capture risk factors. Without this type of information, designing interventions and projects risks being an ideological exercise rather than one informed by scientific evidence. Colombia has shown the path in developing such epidemiological systems, and a series of guides and initiatives exist in this respect (see World Health Organization, PAHO, and others). The Bank has already collaborated on a number of initiatives toward this goal, but still needs to include it in projects.

2. Diagnostics of existing services related to violence and crime

3.5 **Few project documents did a good job of describing the services available in each country at the time of the project preparation.** This is not surprising, given the limited space in project documents; however, complementary documents or technical files did not cover this information either. During OVE's missions in each of the four countries, the team found it difficult to learn what services were available that could serve purposes similar or complementary to those of the citizen security projects. Therefore, to gain a clearer understanding of existing services and infrastructure, we commissioned a study in Honduras, a survey in Nicaragua, and a diagnostic of domestic violence-related services in Panama.

- *Honduras.* The exercise showed that municipalities had very limited violence prevention services—either infrastructure or public services that could serve to develop violence prevention activities and social activities for at-risk groups. As a result, the project could not rely on existing services in the different municipalities. The project design did not identify these constraints and did not take them into account in such activities as vocational training for youth or parenting activities.
- *Nicaragua.* The survey on the availability of youth services in the poorest neighborhoods in Managua found that public services are not available and the only institutions with strong presence are the Catholic Church and evangelical organizations. Youth and parents do not use—and are generally unaware of—activities organized by the police, NGOs and other state institutions.[40] This raises questions about the relevance of using the police to deliver or coordinate services for at-risk youth in marginalized communities.
- *Panama.* The diagnostic of domestic violence-related services found that the country has three shelters—in Colón, Chiriquí, and Panama City— none of which is providing services to women victims of domestic violence.[41] The shelter in Panama City, whose renovation was part of the citizen security project, had not yet been officially inaugurated at the time

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[40] See background paper on Nicaragua, available on OVE website.

[41] The shelter in Chiriquí is located far away from the city without good transportation connections (by bus or other mode), does not have telephone coverage, and has problems with water provision. These issues dissuade women who might need the shelter's services, according to interviews with women's networks members. The shelter in Colón is still under construction.

of the last OVE mission in September 2012; however, it was open to the public, and staff had been trained to implement the Victims Attention Plan in the shelter.[42] Yet no women were sheltered there, or at the two other shelters. The project also did not contain a diagnostic of the *ruta de atención* that women face, so it is difficult to assess how relevant shelters are in the overall domestic violence problematic. A follow-up and complementary analysis would be necessary to learn whether women victims of domestic violence are going to the Panama City shelter, and if not, why not.

These exercises provided valuable information that could have been used in project design to ensure greater relevance of intervention selection and delivery modes.

3. Analyses of country institutions, legal framework, and policy environment

3.6   **The institutional analyses commissioned for the preparation of the projects identified structural issues that could affect project implementation, but they were not used appropriately for the design of the projects.** During project preparation, Bank teams commissioned institutional analyses that identified the strengths and weaknesses of the expected participating entities in each project. In fact, most studies warned about the structural weaknesses of the borrower's institutional capacity.

- In *Jamaica I*,[43] the institutional analysis focused on the Ministry of National Security and Justice (MNSJ) and emphasized the limited experience that the MNSJ had in executing externally funded projects.
- In *Honduras*, the institutional analysis was also explicit regarding the numerous gaps in terms of technical and managerial capacity among participating municipalities, as well as for the National Police and the education system.
- The institutional analysis in *Panama* clearly showed the lack of capacity at both the national and local levels, and rated the risks for working with each of the entities as substantial or high.

3.7   **The Bank teams used the institutional analyses to create ad hoc executing agencies.** Yet, there is no evidence that these studies were used in designing the scope of the project, for example, with respect to the degree of complexity.

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[42]   The Institute for Women manages the shelter in Panama City, which has the capacity to house up to eight families (women and their dependents).

[43]   Jamaica II did not have an institutional analysis, for it was the second phase of a previously approved project.

Instead, they were used to develop the institutional strengthening component.[44] In other words, these studies were used in a limited fashion to design operations (or revise the operation design) to ensure that their degree of complexity was in line with the available capacities in each country.[45] The fact that initial institutional weaknesses hinder implementation is an amply documented phenomenon both in the specialized literature and at the IDB. For example, recent assessments of the Bank's performance in these countries have also highlighted this limitation as a main constraint in project effectiveness.[46] Nevertheless, it is also important to acknowledge that this type of project was new for the institution, and that the political economy between the Bank and its borrowers weighted in the final design of the project.

3.8 **Understanding the political economy for reform is particularly important for issues as complex and politicized as citizen security.** In most countries around the world, the security debate is controversial and highly ideological. This increases the complexity of evidence-based policy-making, particularly in contexts with high violence and crime rates, high inequality levels, and weak institutions.[47] Such analyses might require resources that go beyond the preparation of a project,[48] but other tools could shed light on the situation in the country to provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses in governance. In particular, the IDB supports DataGob, which provides a number of indicators related to governance that "can contribute to the assessment of governance performance, the identification of priority areas for reform and donor investment,

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[44] In addition, none of the recommendations referred to lessons learned in the country at stake; therefore no strong evidence was provided to believe that these recommendations would make the project implementable by reducing multi-pronged institutional constraints.

[45] For example, the institutional analysis for Honduras clearly emphasized serious issues related to the education system, putting forward the lack of classrooms, teachers, and overall quality, and asking for an in-depth study of the situation in terms of violence at school, and programs implemented in the different municipalities. In this context, it is difficult to understand how the project could foresee developing materials, training, and interventions in all primary and secondary schools in the 17 municipalities. This seems a priori very difficult to implement, given the identified issues in the Honduran education system, and it would have required a pilot to assess how to intervene. The institutional analysis also mentioned that students were more victims than aggressors; in particular, they were victims of *mareros* in the surrounding schools. Therefore a more detailed analysis would have been necessary (ATN/KT-7457-HO- *Consultoría de apoyo municipal y comunitario*, IDB, 2002).

[46] See, for example, OVE's Country Program Evaluation (CPE) in Honduras, which identifies "designing interventions that are overly complex and too demanding regarding coordination requirements." See also CPE Honduras 1990-2000, 2001-2006, 2007-2010; CPE Nicaragua 1991-2001, CPE Panama 1991-2003; CPE Jamaica 1991-2002 ("Implementation was also affected by complexity of projects and over ambitious components and targets as well as the need to meet prior conditions and procurement rules," p. ii).

[47] See Hinton and Newburn 2009: 1-27.

[48] Budgetary limits constrained the number of studies that could be funded for project preparation.

and the analysis of the impact of country reform efforts."[49] This resource was not available at the time of project preparation, but could now be used. Nevertheless these are parameters that could usefully be taken into account for future projects at very limited extra costs.

3.9 **Although understanding legal frameworks is particularly relevant when dealing with criminal activities, none of the projects took the country's legal framework into consideration.** Doing so might have informed the relevance and effectiveness of some interventions related to young offenders and domestic violence. In Panama, for instance, OVE undertook a brief analysis of the criminal legal framework for juvenile offenders to assess the relevance of the juvenile detention center component to Panama's context. The analysis found that changes in legislation over the past decades (see Box 3.2) might lead to the transfer of young offenders to adult jails to finish their sentence. Presently, there is a juridical vacuum for these situations, and the judge alone decides whether a youth can stay in the juvenile detention center until completion of his time. This is directly relevant to one important component of the citizen security project—the reinsertion model—because an eventual transfer to adult jails might jeopardize its impact.

Box 3.2. Evolution of Panama's legal framework for young offenders

In 1999, Law 40 introduced a special penal regime for teenagers, differentiated from the adults' (*Régimen Especial de Responsabilidad Penal para Adolescentes*). Along with this new law, the *Instituto de Estudios Interdisciplinarios* was created to design and implement resocialization programs in the juvenile centers. Law 40 has been modified several times (in 2003 and 2007). The main changes are as follows:

- Increase in the maximum pre-trial detention period from 2 months in 1999 to 6 months in 2003 and 9 months in 2010. For homicides, the period can last until the termination of the process.
- Increase in the time allowed for investigation from 30 days in 1999 to 90 days and then 180 days in 2003, and to 240 days in 2007. For homicides, the initial period is one year, and it may be extended to another year.
- Increase in the criminal penalties (maximum length in prison) from 5 years for such crimes as homicide, rape, kidnapping, theft, robbery, drug trafficking, and terrorism to 7 years in 2003 (when intentional injury was added to the list), and to 12 years in 2007 for aggravated homicide (and extortion, illicit association, and gang membership were added to the list).
- Decrease of penal age from 14 to 12 years old in 2010. However, for children of 12 to 14 years old, social rehabilitation is the only applicable sanction.

3.10 **Finally, understanding government priorities and assessing the political commitment to violence and crime prevention indicates the potential sustainability of the activities supported by IDB citizen security projects**. When there is no policy framework related to citizen security (whether or not

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[49] See http://www.iadb.org/datagob/. "A key feature of the web tool is the information provided in respect to each indicator about the methodology used to build it and the implications this has for the indicator's reliability, validity and suitability for making comparisons across countries and over time."

there is a national strategy or public policy to guide the government's action on the issue), the analysis of the budget allocation can be valuable tool,[50] as budgets provide a clear measurement of government priorities. Indeed, a budget analysis shows the priority given to citizen security within the overall budget, as well as the relative weight given to social prevention activities versus the criminal justice system. None of the five citizen security projects included an analysis of the importance given to violence and crime prevention in the government's budget. OVE undertook a budget analysis for Nicaragua. The analysis shows that the budget allocation in Nicaragua was concentrated on the National Police, and little funding was allocated to social line ministries such as the Youth Institute and Ministry of the Family, which raises questions about the sustainability of the interventions under the project.[51]

B.   Core elements of selected interventions

3.11   **Identifying the features that are necessary for the intervention to produce results—or the *core elements* of the intervention—facilitates both high-fidelity intervention and quality supervision (as it enables relevant feedback processes).** The term *core elements* is used in implementation research to identify the characteristics that need to be present when replicating an intervention that has proven to be effective elsewhere. The core elements vary by type of intervention. For instance, for a sport-based activity to become a violence prevention one, research has shown that best practices or core elements include the presence of skills-based trained sport coaches, a safe and engaging environment, follow-up within the community, and activities that develop youth's life skills (e.g., self-esteem, leadership, communication) in addition to the sport.[52]

3.12   **All five projects identified a series of relevant interventions, but only Jamaica I identified the core elements for each intervention to produce the intended results.** [53] The interventions financed by the projects were consistent with available evidence and specialized literature: parenting, recreational activities, remedial education, vocational training, community organization, community

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[50]   The usefulness of budget analysis depends on the level of disaggregation of the line ministries' budgets—if data are not available at a disaggregate level, it is not possible to adequately identify the type of expenditure. In addition, it requires some level of interpretation to assess which programs correspond to social prevention versus control activities (which might also be seen as prevention activities, but for the sake of the exercise we needed to distinguish between categories).

[51]   The analysis of the budget is available in the Nicaragua background paper on OVE's website.

[52]   See Morris, Sallybanks, and Willis 2003.

[53]   This is in addition to the fact that risk and protective factors were not sufficiently identified in the diagnostics and the selection of interventions was not based on evidence, as the 2010 OVE evaluation underlined ("The interventions have not been based on solid scientific evidence on the effectiveness of similar interventions carried out in other places," OVE, 2010:26). Since the 2010 OVE evaluation, the IDB through its Institutional Capacity of the State Unit has developed its analytical framework with two recent publications—Sherman 2012 and IDB 2012—that both emphasize the need for evidence-based programming.

policing. However, the interventions may have been less relevant than they could have been because the core elements that made them become violence prevention interventions were not identified.[54] The specialized youth-at-risk and violence literature indicates that for a social intervention to serve a violence prevention function, a series of modalities need to be followed: the targeted beneficiaries should be well and precisely defined, and the interventions should have a clear protocol and should be implemented by trained personnel—all lessons that are consistent with the implementation research findings mentioned in Chapter II.[55] For instance, recreational activities, and in particular sports activities for the positive use of free time, require a protocol of intervention involving well-trained adults who work with the youth to develop a set of life skills such as respect, efforts, and team play. Indeed, unless these core elements are clearly identified, interventions might end up focusing on infrastructure only, as happened in Honduras and Nicaragua—and construction of sports infrastructure alone is unlikely to be an effective violence prevention tool.[56] In Jamaica, by contrast, the identification of core elements prevented such issues.

3.13 **The Bank did not consistently identify core elements of the interventions**. This is particularly important for secondary and tertiary prevention interventions, which target populations (*pandilleros* and young offenders) characterized by high volatility and very specific needs.

- **With regard to secondary prevention, youth in *pandillas* are particularly impulsive groups who require a process of trust-building to initiate any serious work.** In Panama, the program led by the Ministry of Social Development (*Ministerio de Desarrollo Social*, or MIDES) did not have any protocols of intervention, and inconsistencies during the first phase undermined the program, losing the youth and jeopardizing their participation in any future programs, as the program manager explained. The cessation of the program in Phase II seems to confirm this.

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[54] Another issue must be underlined: the IDB does not have significant knowledge and experience in some of the components it included in its citizen security projects—for example, activities related to the penitentiary system. OVE will examine this question in depth in the sector evaluation on crime and violence prevention at the IDB, since it is directly linked to the institution's comparative advantage in the sector and to its reputational risk.

[55] See Garcia 2006. For instance, p. 79: "Existen algunos consensos entre los investigadores […] sobre lo que funciona en la prevención de la violencia y en la promoción del desarrollo[…] Son los programas que: […] seleccionan, entrenan y dan apoyo a un equipo calificado para implementar el programa con eficacia; que incorporan y adaptan intervenciones científicamente fundamentadas para proveer las necesidades de las comunidades locales a través del planeamiento estratégico, de la evaluación y de la mejora continuas."

[56] See Garcia 2006: 74: "Los programas con mejores resultados son los bien implementados (fieles a las guías, manuales e instrucciones), relativamente intensos, aplicados uno a uno, aplicados por profesores muy bien entrenados y supervisados."

- **With regard to tertiary prevention, the reinsertion of young offenders is a novel area for the Bank, and a particularly complex one.** In Panama, the IDB agreed to finance the construction of a new juvenile detention center with a new model of attention to social reinsertion of youth based on international best practices. However, the elaboration and implementation of the protocol depend on the Ministry of Interior, while the construction of the detention center depends on the Ministry of National Security, so delays and difficulties have resulted. If the protocol were not implemented, this would create a severe negative precedent for IDB's rationale to engage in tertiary prevention, and would involve high reputational risks for the institution.

3.14 **Only Jamaica identified core elements.** In *Jamaica I*, the project was designed to deliver life skills, remedial education, and parenting through NGOs, which were selected through a competitive process. Such an approach offers the advantage of working with practitioners who not only know the targeted population, but also have already developed their protocols of intervention and are therefore ready to implement them when the project starts; at the same time, their experience might lead them to resist implementing a new protocol that the Government or the Bank would like to evaluate. *Jamaica II*, in shifting from the NGO to the CBO service-delivery model, would benefit from the identification of the core elements of the interventions that would be implemented by the new, less experienced practitioners (CBOs). OVE commissioned tracer studies of beneficiaries in two countries, Nicaragua and Jamaica, to assess to what extent identifying core elements might affect results (see Boxes 3.3 and 3.4).

Box 3.3. Tracer study of project beneficiaries in Diriamba, Nicaragua

The tracer study was intended to assess whether young men and women who participated in the personal development and technical training financed by the project showed differences in terms of employment and satisfaction in life in comparison with those who participated in only the personal development workshops. (A full description of the exercise and the results are available in the Nicaragua background paper, available on the OVE website.)

The youth violence prevention component of the Nicaragua project included personal development workshops and technical training programs in the 11 municipalities it targeted. The beneficiaries were young males and females aged 15 to 29 years. OVE selected Diriamba—a small town of 57,542 inhabitants near Managua with high rates of violence and crime—because of the mayor's willingness to participate in the study and the availability of data on workshops and vocational training (i.e., beneficiaries lists/registries).

The objective of the personal development workshops was to contribute to the integral development of at-risk youth (both males and females) through processes of awareness, recognition, and self-development, focusing on the construction and strengthening of values and social conscience and the practice of positive attitudes in their daily lives. About 400 youth participated in these workshops from 2007 to 2010.

The technical training aimed to contribute to the integral development of young males and females at risk by facilitating their social integration into the labor market. The fields offered included plumbing, computer operation, basic auto mechanics, motorcycle repair, paint and body work, residential electricity, cash management skills, welding, woodwork/carpentry, and a basic beauty

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course. Not every field was offered every year of the program. Courses were given five times a week for three months, with each session lasting four to five hours. About 310 youth participated between 2007 and 2010.

The results of the tracer study show that youth who took the technical course were more likely to be occupied in activities during the day—typically in informal but non-remunerated occupations—but there were no significant gains in employment.. Differences in risk behavior outcomes were also negligible. This suggests that employment outcomes for youths at risk were likely not affected by the citizen security project's interventions, at least in Diriamba.

The relevance of the technical training to the local labor market and its quality and intensity all influence effectiveness of such programs. However, a rigorous assessment of the provision of the technical training is outside of the scope of this evaluation.

Box 3.4. Tracer study of an NGO's beneficiaries in Jamaica

In 2003, the IDB began to support RISE, an NGO in Jamaica, to conduct programs targeting at-risk youth living in three communities in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. By 2005, three more communities were incorporated into the program. Between 2003 and 2012, 3,582 adolescents (8-14 years of age) and 2,708 youths (15-25 years of age), both males and females, were enrolled in programs provided by RISE. RISE also conducted parenting workshops in all six communities.

In 2012, OVE commissioned a tracer study of the beneficiaries of the RISE program conducted in Jamaica to determine whether the intervention had observable effects in terms of employment, satisfaction with life, and development of life skills among beneficiaries. The tracer study had two components. First, an econometric analysis of data from a survey of RISE participants and a control group was carried out. The study involved a survey of roughly 800 youth and the comparison of beneficiaries with controls who had similar socio-demographic, income, and family characteristics but who did not participate in the program. Second, focus groups with beneficiaries, both parents and youths, were conducted.

The preliminary results from the econometric analysis show that RISE beneficiaries (both adolescents and youths) stay longer in school and are less likely to drop out. These are important protective factors. However, the empirical results did not show statistically significant differences in risk behavior between RISE beneficiaries and the control groups, such as carrying a gun, drinking and using drugs, or gang involvement. Despite this result, it should be noted that RISE beneficiaries interviewed in the focus groups indicated that they believed that the program not only helped them with school and educational outcomes, but that it also helped them avoid risks and gang involvement. The life histories commissioned as part of the evaluation also are clear in identifying compelling cases in which youth were helped by the program. Although the study did not attempt to reconcile these disparate findings, it raises the possibility that the program may have had a targeted impact on risk factors for a subset of youth, which although significant, is not sufficiently widespread to be detectable in the average (with respect to a control group), particularly with relatively small samples.

C. Context readiness

3.15 **Implementation research has highlighted several effective evidence-based practices regarding context readiness:** (i) selection of experienced practitioners, skills-based training, skills-based coaching, and frequent feedback/performance evaluation; (ii) community involvement; (iii) agencies' preparation for implementing evidence-based interventions; and (iv) the presence of champions in the community to constantly push and advocate for the intervention or program implementation.

1. Practitioners: Selection, training, coaching, and evaluation

3.16 **Citizen security projects combine many different types of interventions, each requiring practitioners with specific characteristics and training.** Focusing on social prevention activities (therefore leaving aside police training in community policing and domestic violence, or crime-and-violence observatory staff training for data analysis), we found a large variety of situations among the five projects and types of social interventions.

- *Jamaica I* carefully selected the NGOs that would implement the activities financed by the project, using selection criteria that included

administrative capacity and experience in the relevant sector. OVE finds this to be a best selection practice that is consistent with the effective implementation practices described in the literature. In addition, this practice facilitated skills-based training and coaching, for NGO practitioners were already implementing similar interventions before the program began and had an in-house coaching system. Finally, the program included a one-year contract-based performance evaluation, which facilitated the recurrent monitoring and evaluation of the practitioners. All of this is also in line with the effective practices of implementation research. The shortcoming of such an approach is the time needed for the selection process (which took 12-18 months); however, this might be time well invested if it prevents later delays in implementation. Another shortcoming might be the limited number of potential candidates: only four NGOs matched the criteria. That number was adequate for a project covering initially nine communities but became a constraint to expanding the coverage.[57]

- *Jamaica II* expanded the number of beneficiary communities by regrouping service delivery at the community level (instead of by NGO's area of specialization), and by increasingly using CBOs. Thus, the selection of practitioners for the second phase was based not on experience, but on efficiency and cost.[58] However, the results of this change in the selection of the practitioners will depend on the training, coaching, and performance evaluation mechanisms that will be put in place (these mechanisms were still unclear at the time of the evaluation). OVE suggests assessing this new CBO service delivery and comparing it with the NGO provision to judge the impacts in terms of quality of services and intervention results.

- In *Honduras*, practitioners were not identified in the design or during the early stages of the implementation. Two main foundations joined the project during its execution: Fundación Rieken, with experience in community libraries, and the Instituto Centroamericano operated by the Fundación para la Educación Técnica Centroamericana for technical training of youth at risk. The main issue highlighted by Bank team leaders was the shortcomings of the type of contract through which both partners were associated with the project. These contracts did not include a proper accountability mechanism, as stakeholders could disengage from the project without consequences.

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[57] Finally, several interviewees highlighted the cost of contracting out NGOs as another constraint to scale-up the initial model. This cost consideration would deserve a cost-benefit analysis. Replacing NGOs by CBOs might be less costly in absolute terms, but this cost needs to be assessed in terms of quality of intervention and results.

[58] In reality, the project decided to reallocate its resources to be able to finance new activities, such as scholarships for secondary and tertiary inner-city students and for internship programs, which were in high demand in the inner-city communities, according to community consultations undertaken at the beginning of the second phase of the program, while expanding to 28 and then 50 communities.

- In *Nicaragua*, social services were delivered by *promotores*, volunteers from the networks of different ministries. [59] Nicaragua opted to systematically use *promotores* for public services delivery. The advantage of such system is its low cost, which increases the potential sustainability of the interventions. However, OVE found it difficult to obtain clear information on how the networks worked. In particular, in terms of training and coaching of the *promotores,* it was impossible to obtain specific information, except for those of the school counseling units (within the Ministry of Education, or MINED, and Institute for Women, or INIM).[60] In both cases, the training methodology was unclear and did not appear to be skills-based. In addition, the project financed the creation of a sports institute to train sports teachers, but field interviews with diverse stakeholders suggest that the trained sports teachers worked only in schools, did not participate in recreational activities in neighborhoods as initially planned in the project, and did not receive specific training for working with at-risk youth. According to available information, there were no coaching or performance evaluation mechanisms for the *promotores* or the sports teachers.

- In *Panama*, teachers' participation in the Ministry of Education-led program was voluntary, but they all belonged to schools that had a psycho-educational *gabinete*, which was a form of pre-selection. Teachers received manuals from an Israeli consulting firm that was selected to develop the methodology for the intervention. However, according to interviews with the Ministry, the firm did not provide the training to the teachers. In addition, no coaching or performance evaluation was in place at the time of OVE's evaluation. Sports trainers for the football clinics and the tournaments came from the communities where the sport activities were to be implemented, which ensured a degree of knowledge of the context. However, the program had some difficulties in finding volunteers, for the stipend offered to trainers was very low. According to

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[59]   NGOs did not participate in the implementation of the project, even though they were initially included in the design and the early implementation stage and municipalities had a minor role. Several interviews with project stakeholders and NGOs suggest that political tensions between civil society and the 2007-elected Government explained why NGOs did not participate in the implementation of the project. This said, OVE's survey of youth at risk, their parents and community leaders in low income neighborhoods in Managua show that NGOs, the police, and other entities which interact with youth have very limited presence in neighborhoods, at least at the time of the survey (last trimester of 2012).

[60]   MINED works with a network of voluntary teachers for school counseling, as well as with several school counseling units throughout the nation. They include 17 departmental delegations (the 15 departments and 2 autonomous regions), and units in three districts in Managua. The voluntary teacher network comprises 2,331 teachers in approximately 1,560 education centers nationwide, according to a MINED school counseling representative interviewed by OVE. The teachers of these networks are trained in informal education techniques, and almost 100% have received a diploma from local universities accrediting them as school counselors. For the INIM, training of personnel is carried out through "training of trainers" on the theme of gender, disseminated by female leaders or *promotoras* identified by the INIM in the different municipalities. The INIM has no departmental delegations.

interviewees, this created difficulties in terms of commitment and optimization of resources. Finally, to implement the MIDES-led *pandilleros* program, the MIDES Office of Secure Social Development Office of Secure Social Development selected a lead consultant with broad experience in the topic, but little managerial experience. According to an external evaluation of the program's first stage, the program took longer than expected and lost momentum. It is unclear whether the difficulties were due to the field team's lack of training and organization, or issues in the coordination between MIDES and the field team.[61]

2.   Community involvement

3.17   **Community involvement facilitates effective implementation when it implies community participation in the decision-making process**. There are different degrees of community involvement, from information to consultation to decision making. A greater degree of participation usually ensures greater buy-in of the final beneficiaries in the proposed interventions or programs for evident reasons: when beneficiaries have a say in what corresponds best to their needs and their voices are taken into account before the program starts, they are more likely to be interested in participating in it.

- In *Jamaica*, communities were consulted during the preparation of the first project for needs identification and intervention selection. Jamaica continued with a participatory approach throughout phases I and II, with yearly consultations. The project also sought to strengthen community organizations through supporting regular meetings of Community Action Committees. OVE organized different meetings with beneficiaries and Community Action Committee members in Kingston and Montego Bay. These interviews suggested that Jamaica's community participation mechanisms worked well, allowing the project interventions to respond to communities' needs and self-determined priorities and increasing the participation of community members in the project activities.
- In *Honduras*, community participation depended on the municipalities and was generally weak. In addition, the municipal consultation mechanism (regional meetings) failed. OVE could find evidence of only ad hoc participation with large municipalities, such as El Progreso. This lack of participation and community involvement might help explain why potential beneficiaries were not aware of the project and why most municipalities lost interest shortly after its launch.
- In *Nicaragua*, community involvement was organized through police-led meetings. OVE found mixed opinions of such meetings, which aimed to inform rather than organize communities. Interviewees concurred that these meetings were often perceived as partisan and depended on the

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[61]   Currently, the OSEGI is evaluating the possibility of implementing the second and third stages through local NGOs that are better connected to the communities.

quality of the relationship between the *jefe de sector* and the community. Nonetheless, the National Police had strong convening power, and its leadership role for such community meetings was considered legitimate.

- In *Panama*, no direct community participation mechanisms were included in the project. However, the municipal committees for violence prevention allowed the participation of representatives of local organizations, schoolteachers, parents' associations, and international donors, together with the mayor and ministries' representatives (when they attended).

3. Agency preparation

3.18 **In terms of agency preparation or agency leadership, the projects under review also show important differences.**[62] In Jamaica, the main executing agency's leadership was remarkably stable, committed and charismatic across projects, whereas in Honduras, the project experienced a high turnover among directors of the executing agencies. In Nicaragua and Panama, leadership stability was mixed, with the director or the agency changing after initial years of immobility or slow disbursement. Once the National Police became the executing agency in Nicaragua, project implementation improved significantly. The National Police indeed showed effective leadership and influenced the effort of other agencies involved. In Panama, the project was initially delayed because all members of the original executing unit were dismissed following a change in Government. The project then had to start again.

4. Presence of champions in the community

3.19 **Finally, in *Jamaican* communities, the constant presence of the Community Action Officers (CAOs) and Assistant Community Action Officers (ACAOs) helped establish a fluid and continuous link between the project and the beneficiaries, as well as ensuring close and personalized follow up**. In effect, their role was equivalent to that of social workers in communities. The importance of their role was systematically highlighted during interviews OVE undertook during its mission in Jamaica. In *Honduras*, such champions could not be identified. The case of *Nicaragua* shows the difficulty of finding champions where social capital is underdeveloped and community organization is carried out by either political parties (*Gabinetes del poder ciudadano* in particular) or churches.[63] In *Panama*, OVE identified community champions, but they were outside the project. Civil society is weak in Panama, and finding community champions in such contexts is clearly a challenge.[64] These characteristics should

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[62] No information was found on executing agencies' preparedness. We therefore discuss leadership stability, which also influences successful implementation.

[63] The ethnographic study of *pandilleros* is informative in this regard -- see background paper on OVE website.

[64] Nevertheless, OVE met with charismatic personalities, "community champions" that were transforming their community. The Director of *Por una Nueva Generación* organization is one of them.

have been taken into account during project preparation. In the Panama project, for instance, this might have allowed, among other things, exploring ways to complement efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development to strengthen civil society.

5. Mechanisms for enhancing multisectoral work

3.20 **Like most IDB citizen security projects, these five used a multisectoral approach.** Multisectoral programs and projects are traditionally more complex than single-sector ones, for they involve multiple actors with varying interests, resources, and organizational cultures (Box 3.5 analyzes the degree of complexity of the five citizen security projects, and Box 3.6 at the end of this section discusses the level of management and intervention). Research has identified several mechanisms that can help make multisectoral work successful. Two types of mechanisms in particular stand out as fundamental: institutional coordination mechanisms, and incentives and accountability mechanisms.

Box 3.5. Complexity of citizen security projects

The main criteria for assessing the *a priori* degree of complexity are (i) the number and characteristics of participating entities, (ii) the number of groups of beneficiaries, and (iii) the number of places where interventions need to be implemented. The higher the number for each criterion, the more complex the project, since it will involve a lot of coordination (among actors that do not necessarily share the same organizational culture or motivation), management, and supervision (of different interventions for different needs in different settings at once). These numbers are then compared with the borrower's institutional capacity as defined in the institutional analysis prepared for the project. Indeed, the *real* complexity of a project depends on the context, in particular the level of technical and institutional capacities, the political will and leadership, and the scope of the challenges to be tackled.

According to OVE's analysis, *Jamaica I* was *a priori* the most manageable, with only one ministry involved and five entities that depended directly on it, and an intervention scope in nine communities only. On the opposite spectrum, *Honduras* was *a priori* highly complex, with interventions spanning different levels of government and sectors, and involving 17 different municipalities for a regional scope. Nicaragua and Panama were very complex, and Jamaica II was complex. *Panama's a priori* complexity was driven by the need to coordinate across different line ministries, as well as across four municipal authorities. *Nicaragua*, too, involved the need to coordinate across line ministries and municipalities. However, this was attenuated somewhat by the prominent political presence of the National Police, and its ability to influence other line ministries. Finally, *Jamaica II* was *a priori* more complex than Jamaica I because of the higher number of ministries and entities participating, and the larger scope (28 and then 50 communities).

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a) Institutional coordination mechanisms

3.21 **Most coordination mechanisms included the creation of inter-institutional committees at the municipal level (Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama)**

and/or the national level (Nicaragua and Panama), with regular meetings for dialogue.[65] These committees produced different results in the three countries:

- *Honduras.* Even though 17 committees (chaired by mayors) were formed by the end of the project, the committees did not serve a coordinating function because neither their roles and responsibilities nor their relationship with the executing agency (the *Office of Peace and Coexistence*) were clearly defined. In particular, until the final years of the project mayors often highlighted the lack of transparency in implementation and in allocation of funds,[66] and a common grievance was that they did not receive financial or human resources or sufficient capacity building to adequately plan and execute their decisions. In addition, the fact that another municipality (San Pedro Sula, whose mayors changed four times during the project, with each having a different vision for the project) led the project generated tensions among mayors and eventually distrust from the main participating entities (municipalities and the National Police) regarding the real objectives and rules of the project.[67]

- *Nicaragua.* Inter-institutional committees were formed at the national and territorial levels, with a delegate from each participating line ministry at both levels. The coordination officially worked at both levels for three main reasons: (i) *political*: the President ordered line ministries to collaborate in the project; (ii) *cultural*: Nicaragua enjoys large volunteer networks, including for the provision of line ministry services at the territorial level; volunteers often deliver services for several programs or ministries at once, thus facilitating de facto coordination;[68] and (iii) *convening power*: the National Police was considered less politicized than most actors in the Nicaraguan political context, and through the years its proactive communitarian model gave it greater legitimacy than other public authorities; thus it had convening power at both the national and

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[65] In addition to special inter-institutional committees, projects included the signature of agreements or memoranda for participation between main participating entities. These agreements were usually required as conditions for the effectiveness of the project. However, they seem to have had limited overall impact on the motivation of the participating entities to collaborate.

[66] When a new Director took the helm of the Office of Peace and Coexistence, he worked with the new IDB team leader, showing great efforts and leadership to close the project in the best conditions possible. It is important to underline that the IDB team leader proactively and closely supervised the final steps, which allowed 35% of the total funds of the project to be disbursed in the final two years. The mayor of San Pedro Sula also showed support for the new orientation of the project and the construction of infrastructure in many of the participating municipalities.

[67] Rules that were discredited early in the project because of a case of corruption of the first project director.

[68] At the territorial level, volunteers (*promotores*) would be focal points, often the same person for several issues, and the police would manage coordination needs through the *jefe de sector* (the police representative at the territorial level). The *gabinetes del poder ciudadano*, a politicized organization present in all communities, might have participated in the process, even though they were not formally included. Civil society was expressly excluded after the project was restructured in 2007 and the National Police became the executing agency.

territorial levels. However, the power disequilibrium between a well-funded and well-organized National Police and underfunded and understaffed social ministries and municipalities [69] transformed the coordination mechanisms into execution tools, without empowering the participating entities.

- *Panama.* The national inter-institutional committee met at irregular intervals during the first years of implementation, mainly because the Ministry of Interior and then the Ministry of National Security did not have hierarchical convening power over the other line ministries. At the municipal level, however, field interviews indicated that committees gathered regularly, with the mayors chairing and a number of local and international entities participating. Delegates from line ministries were often not present at these meetings, though, and the lack of capacity and resources at the local level (given Panama's weak decentralization process) severely limited the influence of these committees. [70] In particular, they remained dependent on the good will of the line ministries for service delivery and for contracting, which was managed directly by the executing unit (OSEGI).

3.22 **In Jamaica, a clear hierarchy at the national level and a streamlined process at the community level facilitated institutional coordination**. Since CSJP did not involve multiple line ministries, the complexity at the national level was minimized. In both phases, most participating entities depended first on the Ministry of National Security and Justice (MNSJ), and then on the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Justice, which still shared a common organizational culture.[71] Community-level coordination was managed through a streamlined process involving directly consulting with communities and contracting NGOs for service delivery. Then the CSJP (the executing agency within the MNSJ) selected the beneficiaries and supervised implementation, either directly or through its CAOs.[72] The parishes were not involved because of their

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[69] Not to mention the heterogeneity in capacities and resources among the 11 municipalities in the project.

[70] In particular, the municipal committees had neither resources nor diagnostic tools to gain capacity and autonomy, and the project did not build their capacity in that regard.

[71] However, the absence of other line ministries might give rise to sustainability issues, given the nature of the activities organized and services provided (student scholarships, parenting, life skills, remedial education, youth centers, vocational training, and so on).

[72] At the community level, the CAOs and ACAOs played central roles, both in community organization and participation, and in linking with other public agencies working in the same communities (for example, Programme of Advancement through Health and Education, the Jamaican Conditional Cash Transfer and Human Employment and Resource Training Agency, the Jamaican vocational training institute). In addition, the dedication of CSJP's leadership and team, and the phasing of the project, explain to a large extent the smooth coordination the team witnessed.

weak capacities and high polarization,[73] so the coordination was direct and personalized. The model changed in the second phase, when the participation of NGOs was reduced in favor of service delivery by CBOs and direct transfers from the CSJP for scholarships.[74] The executing agency maintained that the change was needed for cost reasons, particularly since the program was substantially expanded,[75] and that it responded to community demand for educational scholarships. Nevertheless, the change in model also shows the differences in the views of the NGOs and the ministry regarding the most appropriate way to proceed, and ultimately in the organizational culture between civil society and ministries.

b) Incentives and accountability mechanisms

3.23 **The unequal success of the coordination arrangements among the five projects highlights differences in incentive mechanisms.** The diverse experiences from the projects show that maintaining collaboration among stakeholders requires incentives to overcome costs; thus experience confirms the best practices found in the literature.

- *Honduras.* Infrastructure building and service delivery to different municipalities were not enough to motivate mayors, since the project lost credibility and its objectives were unclear. There were no other incentives for mayors—or for other entities, such as the National Police—to participate in the project. This had a negative effect on a component of the project: without clear incentives, the police did not communicate crime-related data, and certain components that depended on the police, such as the crime observatory, were not implemented. Furthermore, police participation was lacking in many of the different municipalities. In Puerto Cortez, however, the municipality was able to make substantial investments in police equipment and infrastructure, and thus obtained a much higher degree of interest and effort.[76]

- *Nicaragua.* An interesting incentive was enrolling 50 police officers in a master's program on citizen security. According to key informants, this program was an important incentive to enhance staff commitment to the project, while it simultaneously built local capacity. However, no other

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[73] Some interviewees in Jamaica mentioned the lack of participation of parishes as a weakness for the sustainability of the project. However, they also recognized that, given the structural weaknesses of the parishes, it made sense to begin without them. The potential involvement of parishes is currently in discussion within the Ministry of National Security, and OVE does not have enough information to comment further. However, the IDB could help provide the analysis to inform the discussion.

[74] This new service-delivery model with greater responsibilities given to CBOs might create difficulties in terms of quality assurance mechanisms and monitoring, particularly given the speed of the scaling-up process (see Jamaica background paper for a more detailed discussion).

[75] Since NGO provision was expensive it could not be an implementation model, especially while the number of served communities was being expanded.

[76] *Diagnóstico de Seguridad Ciudadana de Puerto Cortés*, unpublished.

incentives existed for the actual service providers (both line ministries and volunteers), except the mandate given by the President to the line ministries involved and a clear discourse around sharing responsibilities for violence and crime prevention.

- *Panama.* No formal incentives were planned, other than the resources provided by the project to the line ministries and the municipalities. For the social ministry (MIDES), for instance, these incentives were not sufficient.[77] Furthermore, according to interviews, line ministries did not consider that project-level results were directly linked to their own performance. This created an asymmetry in which the cooperation of line ministries could produce positive outcomes, but these outcomes would accrue for the project-executing unit (and the Ministry of Interior), but not for the particular line ministries.

- *Jamaica.* Careful selection and yearly contracting of NGOs were incentives for delivering good service quality, along with planned evaluations.

3.24   **Only Jamaica included efficient accountability mechanisms through a specific service delivery**. In the other projects, accountability mechanisms were either absent or poorly defined, and they were not geared toward quality.

- *Jamaica*. The Jamaican model reduced the "route" between beneficiaries and service providers: services and activities were directly organized and provided by NGOs and then CBOs in the communities, and more recently scholarships were paid directly to student beneficiaries and secondary and tertiary education institutions for the payment of the fees. Thus service providers were directly accountable to beneficiaries and CAOs/ACAOs (CSJP staff) in the communities.[78] However, to be effective, accountability should be geared toward quality of services. In this respect, as previously mentioned, Jamaica II's new service delivery modality raises some questions about the quality of the activities organized by CBOs, which do not have the same experience and knowledge as NGOs.[79]

- *Nicaragua.* Participating ministries were accountable to the President, who ordered collaboration; but at the territorial level, accountability mechanisms were poorly defined and mainly depended on the personality of the *jefe de sector* and his or her relationship with the local authorities

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[77]   Indeed, the coordination with the MIDES has been difficult throughout implementation, and the ministry has not given enough attention and priority to the subcomponent on secondary prevention; thus only the first of three phases has been implemented, without a formal protocol of intervention.

[78]   This effective service delivery system gave credibility to the program because the promised services were delivered quickly by providers installed in the communities. This was possible in Jamaica because of the experienced NGOs already working in the communities.

[79]   As mentioned earlier, all NGOs participating in the Jamaica projects (Phases I and II) were selected strictly on the basis of their capacity and experience.

and service providers (mayors, *promotores* of line ministries, *gabinete poder ciudadano*).

- *Panama.* The municipal committees of violence prevention could be seen as a type of accountability mechanism, as they increased information-sharing and joint planning among different stakeholders; however, the absence of key line ministries, and the fact that resources were not allocated to municipalities for implementing their strategies, reduced the project's impact and sustainability. Moreover, the fact that civil society is weak and disorganized in Panama reduced the participation of citizens as watchdogs of public initiatives.

- *Honduras.* There was no significant community participation. Also, the National Police responded to the national Ministry of Interior and not to the mayors. Although each mayor was autonomous,[80] all had limited latitude in local prevention policies, given the centralized nature of the country, where municipalities have limited responsibilities and few financial resources. A new local tax was created to finance local citizen security plans (which could have been seen as both an incentive and an accountability mechanism from the taxpayers), but for large cities only; and in 2012 this tax was centralized, making the access to resources dependent on the elaboration of a local security plan in collaboration with civil society and other relevant local and national stakeholders. However, the formula for distributing the resources was unclear.

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[80] There was neither a mechanism nor sanctions to limit mayors' withdrawal from the project, even though they signed an agreement at the beginning of the project.

Box 3.6. Level of management and intervention

A question that gained importance throughout the comparative analysis was, What level of management and intervention[a] is most appropriate? Each project worked at multiple levels but following a different scheme. In Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras, local-level involvement was limited to receiving interventions, while management was centralized (**top-down approach**).

- In *Honduras*, a highly centralized country, the project was planned at a decentralized level, the region including San Pedro Sula and 16 other surrounding municipalities of different sizes and capacities, as well as different political parties. The central level endorsed the loan but totally disengaged from it, in part because the reputation of the project suffered with the corruption case that appeared in the press in the initial years of the project. This arguably led some entities not to collaborate—for example, the police, which was accountable to the central level and not to the mayors.
- There were similar issues in *Nicaragua*. The project was centrally managed (by the National Police since 2007) and was executed by networks of volunteers in 15 territories. The mayors had little power in terms of planning or content of interventions, and did not manage resources directly. They had no capacity for updating a local diagnostic, and most of the municipalities were poor, with limited human and financial resources of their own.
- In *Panama,* the project was implemented in four of the largest municipalities where the issue of violence and crime was most salient. However, the overall project was managed centrally by the OSEGI, the executing agency in the Ministry of Security. As decentralization in Panama is still in its infancy, municipalities have neither legal responsibilities nor specific resources to plan and finance local strategies for violence and crime prevention. They were recipients of programs delivered by line ministries and funded by the project. Thus their ownership and sustainability are doubtful unless specific resources and capacity building are provided to empower municipalities to prevent violence and crime, as the new 2012 strategy foresees.

In *Jamaica*, the project intervention and management scheme was closer to a **bottom-up approach**. The communities were directly and regularly consulted on the choice of the interventions (from a preselected list), and the CSJP responded by managing the organization of activities and the delivery of services accordingly. In addition, the project strengthened communities' organization and governance by creating and supporting community action committees and CBOs.

To determine which level of management and intervention is the most appropriate in each context, findings from the comparative analysis suggest that the following criteria could provide useful guidance:[b] (i) stage of decentralization (including legal responsibilities, resources, types of services available, and human capacities at the local level); (ii) main stakeholders to be involved in the project and level of accountability (for instance, if the education system is centrally managed and the curricula and teachers' training depend on the Ministry of Education, the Ministry needs to be involved to ensure coordination among schools); and (iii) size and capacities of different levels (municipalities have different sizes, resources, challenges, and capacities; the level of management will probably be different for a small rural municipality than for a large rich city that collects its own resources and has secretaries to take care of different aspects of the local administration).

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[a] The level of management is where resources are decided and allocated, whereas the level of intervention is where a project's activities are delivered.
[b] These criteria are by no means exhaustive; they are simply the ones that result from the analysis of the five projects under review here.

D. Communication

3.25 **Three main types of communication are relevant to a citizen security project**: (i) policy-oriented communication, (ii) project-oriented communication, and (iii) behavior-oriented communication. [81] All three are very valuable, and they complement each other. However, when resources are limited, the criteria for prioritization depend on the country's stage of advancement in terms of common understanding of violence and crime prevention, and on the main forms of violence and crime to be tackled.

3.26 **Communication was not treated as a priority in the implementation of the projects.** The review of project funds budgeted and executed shows that the communication component was systematically reduced—and in two cases eliminated altogether. Findings from interviews suggest that in *Honduras*, *Nicaragua*, and *Jamaica I*, communication was not considered a priority. In *Panama* and *Jamaica II*, communication had begun to be considered important at the time of the evaluation, as shown through the contracting of communication firms. The challenge with communication components is evident in the cases reviewed: faced with scarce resources, communication appeared less imperative, and part (or all) of the initially planned resources was reallocated to other components. Moreover, communication was at times considered risky because of the potential use for propaganda motives. The fact that communication is the single component that was reduced in all five projects suggests that the role of communication might be misinterpreted, and is certainly underappreciated as part of effective implementation processes. Staff and directors of project executing units were unanimous in identifying the lack of incentives and know-how as important challenges in implementing the communication components.

3.27 **Because a project-oriented communication strategy was not implemented, community knowledge of the interventions and their objectives suffered, and potentially so did the ability to recruit advocates both inside and outside government**.

- *Jamaica.* Communication about the project was not given high priority. Beneficiaries were contacted and selected through ACAOs who lived in the communities and reached out to individual young people, drawing on their own contacts and knowledge of issues in the community.
- *Honduras.* Mayors and other stakeholders complained about not knowing about the objective and the different components of the project—a factor that contributed to many mayors' disinterest in and distrust of the project. Beneficiaries did not know about the project either, as several focus groups undertaken for the evaluation suggest.

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[81]   See, for example, Muñoz, Gutiérrez, and Gerrero 2004, and Mockus, Murraín, and Villa 2012.

- *Nicaragua.* Beneficiaries were not aware of the overall project, which raises questions about the transparency of the beneficiaries' selection in a highly politicized context. The fact that none of *pandilleros* interviewed in Barrio Shick, one of the most violent neighborhoods of Managua, was aware of the project or any of its activities reinforces this concern (see ethnographic study commissioned for the evaluation, available on OVE's website).
- *Panama.* The OSEGI did not publicize the project, which arguably made the project less visible within the Government, and raised little interest from some of the line ministries.

E.   Adequacy and quality of supervision

3.28 **A sufficient amount of good-quality supervision facilitates effective implementation,** provided (i) enough resources are devoted to supervision (both in staff time and budget); (ii) supervision activities are relevant (covering not only procurement and fiduciary aspects but also feedback on core elements of interventions); (iii) supervision staff are well prepared (they have operational experience, as well as institutional tools such as training, manuals, and toolkits for supervision); and (iv) institutional mechanisms are conducive (for example, there are incentives for quality supervision, clear and updated procedures for information collection and reporting by the executing agency have been adapted to the context, and capacity building is part of the country strategy).

3.29 **The Bank, through its supervision of projects, influences (or can influence) implementation performance.**[82] Implementation depends first and foremost on the capacity of the implementer (executing agency of the borrower government). Project design should take this capacity into account, for no supervision can replace the work of leading and managing implementation processes.[83] This is particularly important in the area of citizen security, where institutional capacity is generally weaker in the line ministries and other institutions involved than in other sectors, in particular at the local level. However, because the mandate of a development bank is to help countries reduce poverty and inequality through technical and financial resources, the Bank has the responsibility to ensure that its grants or loans are spent appropriately (i.e., toward the project objectives) and effectively (i.e., with the greatest development impact possible). It does so through a set of reporting mechanisms and activities that aim to review the quality

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[82]   See wider discussion on principal agent theory and incentives for supervision (Kilby 2000, 2001) (Chauvet et al. 2006).

[83]   As the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank warns: "Over-optimism, at preparation or appraisal, about the borrower's implementation capacity is a major cause of project failure. Since the [World] Bank cannot hope to provide enough help with implementation to make up for incompetent project management, staff should realistically assess implementation capacity and design projects accordingly."
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/8C498B21EC4BDD72852567F5005D838C.

and timeliness of the implementation. Thus supervision allows for the timely identification of problems, the development of relevant solutions, and modifications to the initial project design in case of substantial changes in the context (political, social, or economic changes, natural disaster, etc.). Even though each project has its specificities, the Bank's accumulated experience should in theory accelerate the process of identifying and developing timely and effective solutions to common implementation difficulties when they arise. This assumes, of course, that the Bank has enough tools and institutional memory mechanisms to build on this experience systematically and efficiently.

3.30   **The comparative analysis shows how IDB's supervision can enhance or hinder project's implementation**. In *Honduras,* for instance, the project's team leaders changed five times during the first six years of implementation, and stakeholders interviewed complained about the lack of IDB supervision during those years. In contrast, in the last two years before closing the project, the new director in the executing agency and a proactive new IDB team leader succeeded in disbursing 35% of the total amount to be disbursed. In *Nicaragua*, the proactive supervision helped the project to be implemented in five years despite three initial years of inactivity. In *Panama*, the project had no citizen security specialists supervising it for four years. [84] Beyond team leaders, other team members are also crucial to good supervision—for example, fiduciary and procurement specialists play essential roles during project implementation, and their permanence and adequate supervision can do much to ensure smooth implementation. This is not to say that teams must never change, but to point out that IDB staff rotation also hinders the process and needs to be taken into account. [85]

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[84]   The team leader who followed the supervision during this time belonged to the Fiscal and Municipal Management Division in Panama.

[85]   The IDB realignment was intended to reinforce the permanence of teams throughout the project cycle, by having the team leader who designs the project also be in charge of implementation, at least until the relationship and dialogue with the client is satisfactory to both parties and a transition period is agreed. OVE will analyze the realignment processes and achievements in a 2013 corporate evaluation.

Box 3.7. Incentives for effective supervision

The question of IDB's supervision on implementation processes requires asking what conditions are in place for team leaders to adequately supervise complex and still relatively new citizen security projects. Institutional incentives geared toward project approval and reducing costs and time for preparation and supervision may generate a conflict between adequate supervision and the number of loans approved. If this is the case, this would not be specific to citizen security, but might particularly affect these projects, which are (i) increasingly visible, (ii) particularly sensitive because of the topic they address, (iii) potentially one of the future comparative advantages of the IDB, provided it could show results, and (iv) increasingly demand by partner countries, in contexts that require, as we mentioned before, a close *acompañamiento* to mitigate hindrances produced by high personnel rotation and overall weak capacities.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

4.1 This comparative project evaluation on citizen security presents five main findings that could guide the Bank's agenda on the implementation of its newly approved citizen security projects and those looking forward.

4.2 **Having a clear understanding of the context (in terms of different forms of violence and crime, but also of institutional capacity and regulatory framework), and using this information to match the design complexity to the borrower's actual context, is important for successful implementation.** This would require strengthening diagnostics, revisiting instruments for a better appreciation of the borrower's institutional capacity, and taking the findings of the analysis into account when designing future projects.

4.3 **Identifying relevant types of intervention is necessary but not sufficient.** This effort must be complemented with the identification of core elements of successful (or evidence-based) interventions so as to be able to implement the selected interventions with high fidelity, and then evaluate them. This would allow a clearer understanding of the essential characteristics and specificities of violence prevention interventions, help content-based supervision, and contribute to building the external validity of the selected interventions.

4.4 **Given the difficulty of multisectoral work, there is a need to give more attention to coordination mechanisms and to incentives and accountability mechanisms.** The Bank would benefit from developing a research agenda geared toward identifying (i) the core elements of the most frequent evidence-based interventions it includes in its citizen security projects, and (ii) the factors that facilitate multisectoral work in each country.

4.5 **Early and continuous buy-in by the community is essential, which requires appropriate communication**.Most projects did not pay enough attention the role of communication throughout implementation. Thus, developing mechanisms for community buy-in and tools for positive non-partisan communication are two additional priorities for the Bank.

4.7   **Finally, supervision matters for successful implementation. In that respect, sufficient time, resources and incentives for Bank staff need to be available to ensure adequate and content-based supervision.** This is particularly important for an issue as complex as preventing violence and crime in the Region is. For this agenda on implementation performance to develop, an inter-division task force would be an ideal mechanism.

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ANNEX A. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: RESEARCH FINDINGS

This annex summarizes some of the research findings on which the evaluation team based the framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation strategies of the citizen security projects supported by the Bank.

A.   High-fidelity implementation

1.   **The implementation research literature presents evidence on what contributes to high-fidelity implementation.** *High-fidelity implementation* (or *implementation success*) focuses on what we know about practices and methods that contribute to the implementation of effective evidence-based interventions. The objective is to reproduce correctly an intervention that has proven effective in other conditions, and assess its impact in the new context. In a thorough review of the literature on implementation research, a team of researchers from the University of Florida synthesized current knowledge on factors that influence implementation either positively or negatively (Fixsen et al. 2005). The researchers reviewed 743 studies from the implementation evaluation literature across disciplines (agriculture, business, engineering, medicine, child welfare, health, juvenile justice, manufacturing, mental health, nursing, social services, and marketing), including 20 that were experimental studies using within-subject or randomized group designs and two that were meta-analyses of experimental studies.[86]

2.   **Fixsen and colleagues (2005) identify five critical steps for the successful implementation of evidence-based interventions.**

-   **Context.** Know the context and the beneficiaries to assess whether the intervention should be implemented in the first place.
-   **Core elements.** Identify the core elements of the intervention to be implemented—that is, the essential features that need to be present for the intervention to produce the expected outcome. If the selected intervention is based on evidence—that is, has internal validity— having clear procedures or protocols for the intervention is the most important factor for successful implementation.
-   **Decision chain.** Identify the chain of decision within the organization or participating entity and make sure administrative support and adequate resources are available for timely training, supervision and coaching, and regular evaluations—in other words, that the context is ready for implementation.
-   **Staffing.** Select and train the practitioners who are to implement the

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[86]   See Fixsen et al. 2005: 68-69 for a detailed explanation of the methodology used for this review, references supporting each finding, and a wider discussion of implementation research.

intervention. This includes deciding on the type of training to provide them, the type of coaching, and the frequency of performance assessment.

- Policies and regulations. Know the relevant policy and regulatory framework (at the national, regional, or local level) that creates a hospitable environment for implementation. (This fifth step could be included in the analysis of the context.)

3. **At each step of this framework, the evidence shows that certain practices or methods have proven to be either effective or ineffective for high-fidelity implementation.** Table A.1 groups these practices and methods by strength of evidence. The strongest evidence shows that information dissemination alone and traditional knowledge-based training alone are not sufficient to change the behaviors of implementers/practitioners or implementation outcomes. What works includes skill-based training (i.e., based on experience) and recurrent performance evaluation of practitioners, and practice-based coaching and practice-based selection of practitioners. Thus the crucial elements focus on experience (selection, skills, and practice), feedback (coaching), and performance evaluation of the practitioners/implementers.

Table A.1. Implementation methods by strength of available evidence

Strength of evidence	Effective implementation methods	Ineffective implementation methods
Best evidence (experimental studies)		- Information dissemination alone (research literature, mailings, promulgation of practice guidelines) - Training by itself
Strong evidence	- Skill-based training - Practitioner performance evaluation	
Good evidence	- Practice-based coaching - Practice-based practitioner selection	2.1
Sparse evidence	- Program evaluation - Facilitative administrative practices - System intervention methods	2.2
Little evidence	- Organizational and system influences on implementation - The mechanisms for their impact on implementation efforts	2.3

Source: Fixsen et al. 2005: 70-78.

4.   Table A.2 explains the practices and methods that are effective in the initial implementation stage.

Table A.2. Effective practices and methods for initial implementation

Practice/method	Explanation
Definition of context and characteristics of community	Having a good understanding of the needs of the community to be served, the available services, and the interest groups
Preparation of agencies for implementing evidence-based interventions	Having clearly identified what must be in place to achieve the desired results, i.e., what are the indispensible features of an intervention to ensure successful implementation?
High level of involvement of implementers	Selection and training of practitioners/implementers
Community involvement	Ensuring the buy-in of the community through its participation in decision-making seems to facilitate implementation processes.
Communication and common understanding	Communication on what is to be developed, why, and how is necessary to ensure commitment for implementation
Clarity of roles	Having a clear division of functions with reachable objectives
Presence of champions	Having local leaders or advocates who are present and consistently push for the implementation
Clear theory of change	Making the case for the intended changes

Source: Fixsen et al. 2005.

5.   The lessons from implementation research on what facilitates effective implementation of evidence-based interventions can be grouped in five categories, which form the basis for our evaluative framework.[87]

- **Context-based knowledge:** diagnostic and regulatory framework.
- **Core elements of intervention:** protocol.

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[87]   External factors—organizational change, political change, rotation of personnel, change in policy or strategies, etc.—also influence implementation and need to be taken into account. As Fixsen et al. (2005:72) summarize: "Many human service organizations are thinly resourced and face high rates of turnover at practitioner and leadership levels that are disruptive to any attempts to systematically implement practices of any kind." This evaluation does not include external factors in the analytical framework, because it focuses on generalizable factors that facilitate effective implementation.

- **Context readiness:** community involvement; agency preparation; selection, training, coaching, performance evaluation of practitioners (all based on skills and practice); presence of champions).; and clarity on partners' roles;
- **Communication.**

B.   Working multisectorally

1.   **As we have noted, the integrated approach used for citizen security projects translates into multisectoral work**—that is, two or more sectors are involved, generally through different line ministries or municipal secretaries (or both, depending on the level of intervention). Multisectoral work aims to address an issue through the interaction of diverse entities, often called partners. Therefore, the results depend on the interaction and collaboration of different parts that become interdependent to reach the common objective, but otherwise may have different sets of interests, priorities, skills, incentives, and even language. This is why multisectoral work is commonly considered complex.

2.   **Nonetheless, recent studies have identified features and mechanisms that were conducive to successful multisectoral work.** An extensive review of the literature in public management, political science, and sociology literature, among other fields, as well as an in-depth analysis of two case studies on multisectoral work in nutrition (in two countries, Colombia and Senegal) identified five conditions that facilitate the success of multisectoral work. Most of these conditions are endogenous (i.e., they can be influenced by the design of a project or program), but some are exogenous (i.e., they are dependent on external factors and are difficult to influence). (See Garrett and Natalicchio 2011, for further discussion.)

    - Presence of leaders and quality of leadership across levels (*exogenous*).
    - Developing a shared understanding among partners regarding the issues, their causes, and their solutions (*endogenous*).
    - The main actors/partners need to share an approach to collaboration and management (choosing partners and clarifying partner relations) (*exogenous or endogenous, depending on the context*).
    - Roles and accountability mechanisms must be clearly defined (and differentiated, based on the type of partnerships) (*endogenous*).
    - Incentives for institutional partnerships need to overcome the costs of participation, and must be adjusted according to the type of partnerships (*endogenous*).

3. **Leadership, management, and external context have also been identified in the literature as factors in the success of multisectoral work, although the discussion is less precise in that regard** (Figure A.1 summarizes these factors).

- **Leadership.** The authors explain that traditional institutional mechanisms for working multisectorally involve either a line ministry taking the lead on an initiative that involves other line ministries, or the prime minister or president leading the effort and distributing responsibilities to different ministries. However, they found both problematic. In the first scenario, a line ministry has no hierarchical power over others, therefore participation and coordination might be difficult. In the second, the difficulty lies in the sustainability of the top leadership as many priorities compete for attention and tend to be frequently replaced. Without solving the question of who should lead, they introduce the concept of "lateral leadership" for situations in which no clear hierarchy exists: "In lateral leadership, leaders employ processes of creating shared understanding (a common framework to replace otherwise rigid points of view), changing power games (forming viable connections among participants' divergent interests), and generating trust (making concessions in hopes of receiving concessions in return)" (Garret and Natalicchio 2005:32, building on the work of Kühl, Schnelle, and Tillmann 2005).

- **Management.** The choice of the executing agency is, not surprisingly, very important. However, the authors suggest criteria that are rather general: leadership, vision, capacity, and the need to develop incentives and take into consideration partners' organizational structures, values, cultures, and experiences.[88]

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[88] Garrett and Natalicchio (2011: 29-30, chapter 3) further explain: "Among the internal organizational characteristics that shape the collaboration are the following: • **Leadership:** Is there a champion or champions to take the lead in initiating or implementing the collaboration, including the creation of political space? What behaviors and characteristics are associated with their leadership and guidance? • **Vision:** Do organizations have a common sense of purpose, a vision of the problem, solutions, and collective goals? Do they share objectives, priorities, an understanding of the issues, and definitions of success? • **Capacity:** Does the organization have adequate technical and managerial capacities (including human resource management, negotiation, and mediation), experience, and financial resources, separately or in partnership with others, to carry out design, implementation, and evaluation? • **Organizational structures, values, culture, and experience:** Do organizational and individual attitudes, behaviors, and methods of acting or sharing knowledge encourage collaboration? Is there a history of working with others in other sectors and being open to new ideas? Are decision-making structures appropriate to needs, capacities, authority, legal frameworks, and values? Do they encourage participation and ownership, such as transparency in decision making processes and the existence of some authority to make decisions? Does decision-making align with organizational deadlines (or other considerations of timing) and resources? Are institutional structures and decision-making arrangements flexible enough to adapt to differences in needs, capabilities, and structures within and across partners? • **Incentives**. Are there tangible or intangible economic, financial, political, and personal incentives that encourage working together?"

- **External context.** Multisectoral work is most successful when development priorities (for the country or the municipality or the organizations), the level of urgency, and the environmental context converge toward the issue at stake.

Figure A.1. Main features influencing successful multisectoral work

Source: Author's presentation, based on Garret and Natalicchio (2011), *Conceptual framework: Working multi-sectorally* (Chapter 3)

ANNEX B. RATING OF IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE CRITERIA USED FOR THE EVALUATION

				Definition/Assessment criteria	Rating scale and meaning		Jamaica I	Jamaica II	Honduras	Nicaragua	Panama
A	**Context-based knowledge**										
A1	Situational diagnostic			Situation in terms of different forms of violence and crime - pls see table Annex B	Pls see table Annex B (rating/4)	/4	Missing- using project doc-9/40 (0.9)	Missing- using project doc-11/40 (1.1)	36/40 (3.6)	28/40 (2.8)	21.5/40 (2.15)
A2	Existing services and infrastructure in violence and crime prevention				2: full diagnostic; 1: partial diagnostic; 0: no diagnostic	/2	0	0	0	0	0
A3	Institutional context, relevant regulatory and legal framework and policy environment	3.1	Institutional analysis		3: diagnostic used to adapt complexity of project to institutional situation; 2: diagnostic used for institutional strengthening component only; 1: diagnostic not used; 0: no diagnostic	/3	2	0	2	2	2
		3.2	Political economy for reform		1: analysis of the broader situation in terms of political economy of reform; 0: no analysis	/1	0	0	0	0	0
		3.3	Legal framework analysis		2: analysis used to adapt project design; 1: analysis present but not used; 0: no analysis	/2	0	0	0	0	0
		3.4	Budget analysis		2: analysis used to adapt project design; 1: analysis present but not used; 0: no analysis	/2	0	0	0	0	0
Total A						/14	2.9*	1.1*	5.6	4.8	4.15
B	**Core elements of intervention**			Relevance of selection of interventions	3: selection based on evidence; 2: relevance of selection even when not supported; 1: partially relevant; 0: not relevant	/3	2	2	2	2	2
				Essential features for an intervention to produce expected outcomes	2: pre-identification of core elements; 1: protocols of intervention and mechanisms ; 0: no identification	/2	1	0.5	0	0	0
Total B						/5	3	2.5	2	2	2
C	**Context readinesss**										
C1	Practitioners: Selection, training, coaching (feedback) and evaluation			Practice-based selection, skills-based training (i.e based on experience), practice-based coaching, and recurrent evaluation of practitioners	4: all of the phases are skills-based; 3: selection and training are skills-based; 1: only selection or training is skills-based; 0: none are skills-based	/4	4	2.5	0.5	1	1
C2	Community involvement				3: participation of community in diagnostic and decision making process; 2: participation of community in diagnostic only; 1: consultation of community; 0: no involvement of community	/3	3	3	1	1.5	2
C3	Agency preparation/continuity				3: Strong leadership and stability; 2: stability; 1: mixed stability; 0: high turnover/no stability	/3	3	3	0	1	1
C4	Presence of champions in the community				2: strong presence of champions; 1: initial presence; 0: no presence	/2	2	2	0	1	0.5
C5	Mechanisms for enhancing multisectoral work	5.1	Institutional coordination mechanims		3: effective coordination mechanisms; 2: planned and existing coordination mechanisms but unclear effectiveness; 1: ineffective coordination mechanisms; 0: inexistent	/3	3	3	1	2	1.5
		5.2	Incentives		3: effective incentives; 2: planned and existing but effectiveness unclear; 1: ineffective; 0: inexistent	/3	3	3	1	3	0
		5.3	Accountability mechanims		3: effective accountability mechanisms; 2: planned and existing but effectiveness unclear; 1: ineffective; 0: inexistent	/3	3	2.5	0	0	1
Total C						/21	21	19	3.5	9.5	7
D	Communication				2: clear communication with community throughout implementation; 1: unclear communication; 0: no communication	/2	1	1	0	0	1
Total D						/2	1	1	0	0	1
E	Good quality supervision				4: proactive and facilitating supervision; 3: neutral supervision; 2: mixed supervision; 1: unclear supervision; 0: no supervision	/4	3	3	2	4	2
Total E						/4	3	3	2	4	2
TOTAL						/46	30.9	26.6	13.1	20.3	16.15

ANNEX C. ASSESSMENT OF THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE SITUATIONAL DIAGNOSTIC

According to the scope of the objectives,[89] we evaluated diagnostics as strong when they provided the following information:

- Trends and scope of different forms of violence and crime at the national and subnational levels, so as to be able to see the evolution of major forms of violence and crime through time and space since violence and crime characteristics are very context-based.

- Discussion of risk and protective factors, so as to identify what distinguishes violent and criminal individuals or groups from others, and to be able to address causes instead of just the symptoms.

- Situational and circumstantial factors, such as when and where main types of violence and crime occur, motives, use of firearms, alcohol consumption, etc., so as to identify patterns, and from these, quick measures that could help gain popular and/or political support necessary for longer term interventions.

We reviewed the studies commissioned for the preparation of each of the five projects and rated them according the level of relevant information they included. Results are below.

Criteria for situational diagnostic assessment	NI-0168	HO-205	PN-L1009	JA-0105*	JA-L1009*
How: Does the diagnostic have a clear methodology?	4	4	3 (Ra), 4 (Ru)	0	0
How: Does it discuss the sources and the availability or reliability of data for different forms of violence and crime (police, hospitals, victimization surveys)?	3	3	2 (Ra), NA (Ru)	0	1
What and how much: Does it identify the magnitude and distribution of different forms of violence and crime and other risky behaviors (homicides, common crimes, sexual violence, school violence, domestic violence, child maltreatment, and violence against elderly, disabled persons, sexual preferences, ethnic origins, etc.)?	3	3	3 (Ra), NA(Ru)	1	1
What: If not, does it explain why not (e.g., lack of available or reliable data), and use	NA	3	NA (Ra), 4 (Ru)	NA	0

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[89] Since projects aimed to improve citizen security in general, we assessed the diagnostics from this perspective, looking at different forms of violence and crime. However, the criteria for assessing the robustness of diagnostics should be set according to different objectives (and their level of specificity) and might therefore vary.

alternative methods to address the data shortcomings (safety marches, focus groups, surveys in school or community, etc.)?					
What: Does it provide a trend over time to show the evolution of major forms of violence and crime in the country/at the municipal level?	4	4	4 (Ra), NA(Ru)	1	1
Who: Does it identify characteristics of victims of different forms of violence and crime, and the relationship with the aggressor?	2	3	3 (Ra), 0(Ru)	1	1
Who: Does it identify characteristics of perpetrators of different forms of violence and crime?	3	3	3 (Ra), 3(Ru)	1	1
Who: Does it adopt a gender perspective (disaggregated data, analysis of relational dynamics)?	4	2	3 (Ra), 4 (Ru)	1	1
Why: Does it identify risk and/or protective factors for each form of violence and crime?	4	2	0 (Ra), 4 (Ru)	1	2
Where and when: Does it identify situational factors for the main forms of violence and crime (when and where they occur)?	1	3	0 (Ra), NA(Ru)	0	1
Where and when: If not, does it use alternative methods to better understand the situation (safety marches, focus groups, surveys in school or community, etc.)?	0	3	0 (Ra), 0(Ru)	0	0
How and why: Does it provide information on main circumstances (motive, use of firearms, alcohol consumption, etc.)?	0	3	0 (Ra), 3 (Ru)	1	0
What responses, which stakeholders: Does it identify what has already been undertaken to address the issues at stake (government programs, NGOs, donors)?	0	0	0 (Ra), 0(Ru)	2	2
TOTAL /40	28	36	21 (Ra), 22 (Ru)	9*	11*

The rating is as follows: 4 points per question: 4 full; 3: most; 2: some; 1: not enough; 0: null. The total of 40 points would correspond to a strong diagnostic (there is a total of 12 questions, but 2 are follow-up questions if a negative answer was provided in the previous question).

Note: OVE developed this list of questions on the basis of the review of literature, particularly guides to epidemiological vigilance systems for violence prevention (Duque et al. 2007; Concha and Villaveces - PAHO 2001; Holder, Peden and Krug - WHO 2001).

*The original diagnostics for Jamaica I and II have not been found. They have not been saved on the IDB archives, and, since they were prepared more than 10 years ago), nobody could provide them to us. Therefore, we used the descriptions in the project documentations, even though they could not contain the same level of details as a preparatory study.

Diagnostics revised: Panamá: Ramos, C. (2001) *Magnitud y caracterización de la violencia en Panamá y República Dominicana*, report prepared for the IDB.

Honduras: Rubio, M. (2002). *La Violencia en Honduras y la región del Valle de Sula*, Serie de Estudios Económicos y Sectorales (RE2-02-004), IDB: Washington, DC.

ANNEX D. EXCERPTS FROM LIFE HISTORIES IN JAMAICA

Name: Kerry

Age: 19

Sex: Female

Siblings: Kerry's mother first got pregnant at the age of 16 or 17. Kerry and her 9 brothers and sisters are all the children of the same father. Kerry's parents were not married and do not live together now.

Household: Kerry lives with her mother, grandmother, aunts, and brother in one family yard.

Education: Kerry's mother finished high school. She does not know her father's education status.

Kerry's sole means of support is her mother, who contributes as much as she can. Her father abandoned her early, and Kerry does not consider herself as having a male parent.

Varying factors have caused and continue to cause her personal discomfort. She recounts that when her mother "left" while she was in 5th grade, everything "turned upside down." In an effort to improve life for the family, Kerry's mother transported drugs to Barbados. She was caught and imprisoned. In response, Kerry's grades and behavior plummeted. Her aunt's abusive treatment of her compounded her despair. Although the violence imposes constraints, she feels most repressed within her house, which she describes as a very divisive context.

Kerry has grown to accept certain beliefs, which reproduces fears that limit her progress. For example, her grandmother has convinced her that her dead grandfather is attempting to kill her. She believes that her "unexplained" illnesses, which occur during major exams, are byproducts of his continued attempts. Further, she classifies the house as haunted and surmises that this is causing poor family relations. With some reason she concludes that the problem may reside with the family and not the house.

Kerry is angry and has been for some time. She fears that this anger will spill over and affect her daughter. Already, she admits yelling at her two-year old when annoyed. Kerry knows that she needs to exercise self-control and requires help in learning to navigate her household.

Excerpts:

Moderator: Tell me about Camperdown High and why weren't you happy?

Kerry: I could care less about what happen...[recording jumps]. My aunt and I, we got into an argument and she told me not to come back inside the yard and I had to be staying with my friends. I was 12 and had to be on the road

Moderator: You were 12?

Kerry: 12! Because she wanted to beat me and I decided that I wasn't going to take any more of her beating because they were nonsense! She would beat me if she saw me with friends and a guy was there. She would say "You have man" and the works. She has done me a huge amount of bad! She did a lot of cruel things to me for that 2 years…a lot. I got spanked every day for nonsense, for no reason at all. Sometimes my punishment was no dinner. Other times, she closed the door and no matter how my grandmother told her to open the door and let me in, she cursed. She told my grandmother that I should sleep outside and I had to be staying with a friend for a couple months. Even when Mommy came back… I was on holidays to go into 8th grade in September and when my Mommy came back I wasn't even at the house. I wasn't even living with her at the time. I knew that she left in the days and she left with my brother and because she left, I snuck into the house to take out some clothes and then my other aunt told me that my Mommy was coming and I told her I don't care because I don't live here. At that point in life I just felt that it was over. I did basically no work in 7th grade. I came about 31 out of about 42 students. I did nothing.