



# IDEV

Independent Development Evaluation  
African Development Bank

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An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation

## Mali: Evaluation of the AfDB's Country Strategy and Program (2005-2019)

Summary Report

September 2020



AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

September 2020

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ADF</b>	African Development Fund	<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank Group	<b>IDEV</b>	Independent Development Evaluation
<b>CNPM</b>	Conseil national du patronat du Mali (National Employers' Council of Mali)	<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>CNSC</b>	Conseil national de la société civile (National Civil Society Council)	<b>PABG</b>	Good Governance Support Project
<b>COML</b>	AfDB Country Office in Mali	<b>PAGODA</b>	Pillar Assessed Grant or Delegation Agreement between the AfDB and the European Commission
<b>CREDD</b>	Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development	<b>PAUGRE</b>	Governance and Economic Recovery Support Program
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategy Paper	<b>PCR</b>	Project Completion Report
<b>CSPE</b>	Country Strategy and Program Evaluation	<b>PRED</b>	Sustainable Recovery Plan
<b>DWSS</b>	Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation	<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper
<b>ESIA</b>	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment	<b>PUARE</b>	Emergency Economic Recovery Support Program
<b>ESMP</b>	Environmental and Social Management Plan	<b>RBCSP</b>	Results-Based Country Strategy Paper
<b>ESW</b>	Economic and Sector Work	<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Program
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product	<b>SNDR</b>	Delivery, Performance Management and Results Department, AfDB
<b>GoM</b>	Government of Mali	<b>TFP</b>	Technical and Financial Partner
<b>GPRSP</b>	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	<b>TMSS</b>	Transition Management Support Strategy
<b>GPRSSP</b>	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Support Program	<b>TSF</b>	Transition Support Fund
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome	<b>UA</b>	Unit of Account



FEMME





# Executive Summary

## Introduction

The evaluation of the strategies and programs (or assistance) of the African Development Bank (AfDB or "the Bank") in Mali over the period 2005-2019 is intended to help the Bank improve its development effectiveness through the lessons learned, and to brief the Board of Directors. More specifically, the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation will inform the Board's decision during the review of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) proposed for the period 2020-2024.

This evaluation was confronted with two constraints: incomplete data and the impossibility of cross-checking the reliability of certain secondary data. There is no monitoring-evaluation system for measuring development outcomes at the beneficiary level. Owing to insecurity and travel restrictions, the evaluation team did not have access to project sites to collect primary data from beneficiaries, and therefore relied on secondary data sources to strengthen the evaluation database. Uncertain or inconsistent data were ignored.

## Country Context and Development Challenges

Mali is in the center of West Africa. It accesses the sea through five neighboring countries<sup>1</sup> and is connected by paved roads to all its neighbors except Algeria. In 2019, the country had a population of 19.6 million inhabitants, 49.7% of whom were women and 57.6% lived in rural areas (2018). Furthermore, 47.3% of Mali's population is under 15 years of age. After two decades of political stability, Mali experienced a coup d'état in March 2012 followed by recurrent outbreaks of violence, revealing the depth of the country's fragility and vulnerability.

The real economic growth rate deteriorated overall over the period (from 6.5% in 2005 to 5% in 2019), but the Malian economy has remained resilient and its performance is better than the average for the sub-region (3.7%) and Africa (3.4%) in 2019. The social indicators are below the sub-regional average. The country faces several major challenges: an insufficiently diversified economy that is vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices and climate change; an agro-industrial and manufacturing sector that is struggling to develop; a vast and landlocked country that lacks infrastructure to link its regions to each other and connect itself with its neighbors; high population growth; weak State agencies; high levels of corruption; and inequalities in terms of income, access to land, employment, health, education, life expectancy, etc., between women and men, between urban and rural areas and between Northern and Southern regions.

## Country's National Development Policies

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2002-2006) aimed to reduce the incidence of poverty from 63.8% in 2001 to 47.5% in 2006 and to create 10,000 jobs annually in the non-agricultural formal sector. The second generation PRSP (2007-2011) adopted in November 2006 also known as the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP I) aimed to promote redistributive growth and poverty reduction by boosting productive sectors and consolidating public sector reforms. The GPRSP II (2012-2017) had two focal points: "Strengthening peace and security" and "Consolidating the stability of the macro-economic framework," and proposed three lines of action: (1) promoting accelerated, sustainable, pro-poor growth that would create jobs and generate income; (2) strengthening the long-term foundations for development and equitable access

to quality social services; and (3) improving institutional development and governance. After the 2012 coup d'état, the 2013-2014 Sustainable Recovery Plan (PRED) was prepared. The 2013-2018 Government Action Program (GAP) was proposed by the new authorities that emerged from the 2013 election, in line with the 2012-2017 GPRSP. The 2016-2018 Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (CREDD) was aimed at achieving Sustainable Development Objectives (SDOs) by 2030, based on the potential and resilience capacities of the State and the population. The 2019-2023 CREDD was validated in 2019.

### Bank Assistance to Mali (2005-2019)

The priority of the Bank's assistance was to build the capacity of the State and communities, as well as to develop basic socio-economic infrastructure (hydro-agricultural developments, energy, roads, schools, water and sanitation facilities, etc.), to support inclusive growth that would address the country's persistent fragilities. The Bank allocated UA 241 million, UA 220 million and UA 268 million respectively to the 2005-2009/2011 Results-Based Country Strategy Paper (RBCSP), the 2013-2014/2015 Transition Management Support Strategy (TMSS) and the 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper (CSP). Agricultural and multi-sector operations (which concurrently provide several basic services) absorbed an average of 58.7% of the above amounts. The remainder was shared among three to five other sectors considered as a priority by the Government. Non-lending operations<sup>2</sup> accounted for about 15% of the portfolio during the period, with 11 economic and sector-based studies planned and an average implementation rate of 27%.

### Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation, which covers the period 2005-2019, focuses on the use of the results and the evaluation process itself to inform decisions and improve performance. It has reviewed: (a) 64 operations approved between 2005 and 2019 and not cancelled; and (b) 45 operations approved before 2005 and completed or closed between 2005 and 2019.

Nineteen (19) evaluation questions were formulated based on: (a) 44 individual and group semi-structured interviews (SSIs) with stakeholders, 16% of whom were women; and (b) commitment of the Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) to the modalities of the Country Strategy and Program Evaluations (CSPE). The 19 questions concern relevance (1), effectiveness (3), sustainability (3), efficiency (2), impact (2), institutional performance of the Government of Mali (3), and the Bank (5). Five other questions related to ongoing thematic evaluations at IDEV were added: (a) Independent evaluation of the Bank Group's Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa. 2014-2019 (2), and (b) Evaluation of the Bank's Self-Evaluation Systems and Processes (3).

The evaluation combined a few primary data with a large amount of secondary data. In addition to the above-mentioned interviews, 68 supplementary interviews were conducted. The data analysis was guided by the evaluation matrix and the reconstructed theories of change. Indicators<sup>3</sup> defined for each evaluation question and criterion were assessed and scores assigned depending on the frequency and the sum or average obtained in each of the six key sectors of Bank assistance to Mali, as per the rating scale. The final score is the simple arithmetic mean, rounded down on the scale of 1 to 4. An outcome-harvesting or outcome-mapping approach was used for impact-related questions.

## Evaluation Results

**Relevance:** Satisfactory. The Bank's assistance is tailored to the needs of the people and the Government's expectations, both at the CSP and operational levels. However, the involvement of civil society and the private sector could provide additional strategic leverage to stimulate inclusive growth. Dysfunctions in government services and project implementation units led to the cancellation of 8 operations or 11% of the portfolio.

**Effectiveness:** Unsatisfactory. The Bank has fallen short of its potential. Margins could be gained in the achievement of CSP objectives and the delivery of operational outputs through portfolio performance improvement plans designed and implemented in a results-based manner.

**Implementation difficulties** identified include: (i) delays; (ii) lack of capacity, expertise and/or staff; (iii) inadequate involvement of devolved State services (delegated project owner); (iv) poor quality of operations at entry; (v) frequent change of project officers at the Bank (high staff turnover rate); (vi) inadequacy of the resources (financial and human) available for assistance to Mali; (vii) sluggishness of procedures at the Bank level and/or poor mastery of disbursement procedures by service providers (non-governmental organizations – NGOs) and companies, especially the supporting documentation requirements; (viii) lack of a credible system for measuring development outcomes; and (ix) inappropriate national and/or local context, due to political conflicts and resistance to reforms. Governance sector operations were specifically affected by the uncertainty surrounding the use of the funds left over at the end of the project and the limited amount of budget support.

**Sustainability:** Satisfactory. From the design stage to the implementation of the operations, the Bank involved the beneficiaries, built local capacity, introduced various mechanisms aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the gains of the operations (apart from mobilizing local resources for the upkeep and maintenance of the works) and providing post-completion services. The Bank satisfactorily ensured compliance with the requisite environmental and social safeguard measures, despite two petitions regarding land grabbing and unfair compensation of displaced persons.

**Efficiency:** Satisfactory. The increasing demand from the authorities and project officers for multi-sectoral operations offering several basic services to the target population segments is indicative of the efficiency of the services. However, significant efforts still need to be made in terms of on-budget performance and compliance with implementation schedules, including the timeframes for obtaining the Bank's no-objection notices. Disbursement rates are low due to the difficult national context and the inadequate staffing of the Country Office.

**Impact:** Unsatisfactory. Fifteen years of the Bank's capacity-building efforts have certainly prevented the collapse of the State but failed to deliver inclusive growth. The private sector, especially SMEs in high-potential sectors such as agribusiness and energy, could play a greater strategic role alongside the State in achieving greater development outcomes.

**Factoring of crosscutting aspects:** Satisfactory. In the CSPs and operations, the Bank has explicit objectives related to the environment, resilience, gender mainstreaming and youth employment. However, CSP and project preparation teams do not always have the necessary make-up to properly address these issues.

**The Bank's institutional performance** was rated unsatisfactory. The Bank faced recurrent problems related to portfolio management (as mentioned above), although it allocated its resources and helped the Government to mobilize resources from other sources for the country's priorities. While the Bank succeeded in involving communities in the design and implementation of operations in most sectors, it failed to include non-state actors in the policy dialogue held during the preparation of CSPs. The Bank's communication with civil society in Mali is not commensurate with the recognition it enjoys in the eyes of the public and the authorities.

**Fragility and resilience:** Unsatisfactory. The Bank took fragility into account in the design and implementation of CSPs and operations, and has made significant progress in building the resilience capacity of the State and the population. However, these efforts have not been enough to sustainably address fragility and achieve inclusive growth.

**The Bank's Self-Evaluation System** was also deemed unsatisfactory. Most of the required reports on the CSP and the operations are produced but are difficult to obtain independently; they focus more on the outputs delivered and less on the development outcomes achieved. Data are sometimes inconsistent from one report to another. From an operational perspective, the self-evaluation system is relevant and coherent, but its contribution to learning for the achievement of greater development impact in the country is not obvious.

## Lessons from the Evaluation

1. Selectivity and flexibility can be combined in the configuration of Bank assistance.
2. The Bank can achieve substantial and tangible outcomes, even in difficult contexts, by (i) developing strategies and operations in a participatory manner with the Government and civil society; (ii) developing projects in synergy with other TFPs; (iii) establishing clear results frameworks on the basis of which results can be monitored and measured; (iv) adopting more flexible approaches in situations of fragility; and (v) more responsive to emergencies.
3. Effective collaboration between the Bank and other TFPs is essential in Mali, even without the leadership of the GoM.
4. Building the capacity of the State, which is seen as the sole actor, is not enough to contribute decisively to inclusive growth in Mali.
5. It is not enough to identify bottlenecks and formulate a plan to improve portfolio performance. Other elements are needed to achieve higher levels of performance.

## Recommendations

### Greater Impact of the Bank on the Country's Development

1. Increase the private sector's share in the portfolio, mostly in sectors of the real economy with high growth potential like agro-industry, transport and energy. This includes encouragement and support to expedite the study of projects initiated by private enterprises.
2. Increase the Bank's contribution to knowledge by conducting more ESWs and build data collection capacity so that sector choices and operational designs should be based on cogent and credible factual data.

### Media Presence and Enhanced Field Office Engagement with Different Categories of Development Partners in Mali

3. Develop and implement in the Country Office a communication and civil society involvement plan. The Office could develop products like a prospectus on the results of each operation (using the incident mapping or collection method).

### Better performance in the implementation of operations

4. Review current PPIP design and implementation practices and, if possible, involve an independent facilitator; this facilitator will help the Office to determine why measures adopted every year in PPIPs since 2005 have not had any significant impact and find a holistic solution to portfolio management problems that hinder the achievement of the Bank's development outcomes in the country.
5. Encourage project managers to take full advantage of the lessons of the operations academy to improve the quality-at-entry of operations: systematically articulate the results of each operation with the results of the pillar to which they contribute; create a coherent and feasible framework for measuring results, especially with clear links between outputs and outcomes (assessable); define mechanisms for beneficiary ownership and sustainability of project achievements; conduct financial evaluation; and examine critical aspects of project management (human resources, etc.). Project managers will organize the same type of training sessions for national implementation teams following procedures suited to the country context and available resources. These measures will strengthen results-based management and enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency.



# Management Response

*Management welcomes the findings of the evaluation conducted by IDEV on the Bank Group's assistance to Mali during the 2005-2019 period and its contribution to the country's development. The purpose of the evaluation is to draw on relevant lessons and propose recommendations for improving the CSP 2020-2024 and the Bank's future operations in Mali. In general, Management agrees with the recommendations of the evaluation. The evaluation concludes that the performance of the Bank's intervention strategies and programmes in Mali during the period under review is considered satisfactory in terms of relevance, sustainability, efficiency and consideration of cross-cutting aspects, but unsatisfactory in terms of effectiveness, impact and institutional performance.*

## Introduction

Management welcomes the findings of the evaluation which will inform the Bank's future operations in Mali. The recommendations of the IDEV evaluation are already taken into account in the combined CSP 2015-2019 Completion Report and Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR), which was submitted to CODE on 8 June 2020, together with the formulation of focus areas (pillars) of CSP 2020-2024. In addition, the Bank's Country Office in Mali (COML) has already taken into account the evaluation's findings and recommendations to revise the Mali CSP 2020-2024, which is being finalised, to be submitted for review and approval by the Board of Directors on 28 September 2020.

One of the main lessons learned from the evaluation is that it is possible to combine selectivity and flexibility in the configuration of the Bank's assistance and to achieve significant and concrete results, even in difficult contexts. Through the application of the prism of fragility and resilience in the design of its strategic and operational commitment, the Bank will continue to combine selectivity and flexibility in the configuration of its assistance to Mali, a country which has been in state of intense fragility for more than 8 years. In that regard, all Bank interventions in 2020 will focus, principally, on the COVID-19 budget support program approved by the Board of Directors

on July 22, 2020 for an amount of UA 36 million. The current situation requires the Bank to be realistic and modest in programming its loan program in Mali for 2020, but also for the years to come. The country has been facing a double crisis for a few weeks which could have relatively long consequences: that of COVID-19, as well as the crisis linked to the unconstitutional change of regime since August 18th, 2020.

Finally, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, investment operations that are categorized under environmental category 1 are unable to be investigated given that they require in person meetings between the assessing team and concerned stakeholders. This is difficult to undertake under the restrictive measures imposed under COVID-19 and therefore such meetings have been postponed.

## Relevance

Management welcomes the fact that the evaluation of the relevance of the Bank's interventions is considered satisfactory overall. The evaluation confirms that the Bank's interventions have responded to the country's development challenges and priorities as well as to the population's needs.

However, Management recognises the Bank's inadequate focus on the private sector and civil society. Management stresses that this inadequate focus is linked to the fact that the Bank allocated a significant part of its resources to capacity building in the last 3 CSPs (between 2005 and 2019), especially since the outbreak of the security crisis in 2012, which made the issue of state stability a high priority. However, Management notes that, although the Bank's direct support to the private sector portfolio operations was weak over this period, the Bank had supported the implementation of activities conducive to the private sector, including business environment improvement and infrastructure development.

In line with the ambitions displayed during the last discussions on the Seventh General Capital Increase of the Bank (GCI-VII), as well as the operational priorities approved at the conclusion of the replenishment of the fifteenth cycle of the African Development Fund (ADF-15), COML will work in coordination with the Department in charge of Non-Sovereign Operations (PINS) and the Coordination Office for Transitional States (RDTs) to increase private sector investment and will make private sector development, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises/industries (SMEs/SMIs), the engine of the new strategic programming for the 2020-2024 period. In this context, greater use of risk reduction and guarantee instruments - such as the private sector credit enhancement facility (PSF), partial credit guarantee (PCG) and partial risk guarantee (PRG) - will be explored. In addition, the Bank will pay particular attention to the key role of the private sector both in dialogue with the government and throughout the project cycle (from identification to completion of operations).

## Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the Bank's interventions in Mali has been deemed unsatisfactory overall because the Bank fell short of its potential. While agreeing with the evaluation that was conducted, Management would

like to specify that the Bank's interventions in Mali took place in an extremely difficult context marked by a multidimensional crisis (security, political, socio-economic, cultural and identity) since March 2012, hampering sustained and inclusive development efforts. This required a strong adaptation capacity from the part of development partners – including the Bank – to avert a complete collapse of the country.

Management notes with satisfaction the main findings of the effectiveness evaluation, namely: (i) the strategic objectives of the CSP (pillars) were achieved at an average of 53%, i.e. 67%, 50%, 49% and 45% respectively in agriculture, social, water and sanitation and governance (multi-sector) and (ii) the various aspects of operational effectiveness considered by the Bank's assistance were satisfactory in all sectors considered, except in the water and sanitation sector where the results are considered unsatisfactory.

Management recognizes that underperformance in operational effectiveness is related to the various challenges identified in the evaluation. Management would like to clarify that the country's extreme fragility and the frequent changes in Government, linked to political instability, significantly affected the implementation of the Bank's operations in Mali. In addition to problems of fragility, including insecurity in certain project areas, the Bank also faces problems of non-payment by national counterparts as well as governance and capacity issues due to the recruitment of project staff without competition. The Trans-Saharan Highway project (TSH 2) was, for example, delayed by the security crisis in the north of the country. The absence of a government since June 11, 2020, has delayed the signing of agreements, and political instability (frequent changes in the government) has negatively affected the implementation of projects. The Bamako City Sanitation project was canceled three years after being approved due to the inability to meet the first disbursement conditions, despite numerous efforts to engage in dialogue with the Malian authorities.



In order to address these shortcomings, the new 2020-2024 strategy will build on new financing parameters for Mali based on the Policy on Expenditure Eligible for Bank Group Financing. These parameters were established taking into account the current severe budgetary constraint and the magnitude of the investment needs. For example, the Bank could cover the costs of investments in new projects, up to 100% instead of the usual 90%, in order to remedy the problem of mobilising the national counterpart, without prejudice to the principle of national ownership. These recommendations will help to address some of the major constraints, including: the State's financial fragility to support certain expenditures; the problem of payments for infrastructure-related compensation (a major source of delay); and the difficulty of mobilising the national counterpart.

In addition, Management will ensure that the objectives of the new CSP (2020-2024), under development, are both realistic and achievable given the context of fragility, mentioned above. Lastly, the Bank will focus on preparing results-based portfolio performance improvement plans. This plan will take into account the recruitment of PMU staff through competition. The Bank will strengthen monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the effective implementation of the actions identified. In line with its framework of selectivity, it will promote large-scale projects which will have rapid and visible impacts and are beneficial to concerned communities. In addition, through the application of the prism of fragility and resilience, the Bank has launched a review on portfolio management as part of the preparation of the new 2020-2024 CSP. This

is focused on improving quality at entry of operations and ensuring that necessary screening is undertaken at an early stage.

## Crosscutting Domains

Management notes the main finding in the evaluation of crosscutting aspects, namely that the Bank satisfactorily took into account crosscutting issues related to, strengthening structural, social and economic resilience, environmental protection, resilience, gender and youth employment, with explicit relevant objectives.

Under CSP 2020-2024, the Bank will strengthen its interventions in favour of vulnerable groups, particularly young people and women, especially in conflict areas where vulnerability is most acute. The 2020-2024 lending programme also incorporates projects that will target the fight against the effects of climate change and its regional impact.

## Sustainability

The evaluation notes that the sustainability of Bank-financed operations is considered satisfactory. However, the report noted pockets of dissatisfaction in (i) the water and sanitation sector, where half of the projects did not sufficiently integrate beneficiary ownership into implementation and (ii) the governance sector, where high staff mobility and the weak capacity of public administrations hamper the sustainability of the Bank's achievements in managing the assistance provided to the country.

Management agrees with the conclusions of the report and would like to stress the soundness of its approach to project ownership in the water and sanitation sector. Indeed, the only project in the sector still under implementation (PAEP Bamako Project) has recruited nine local SME service providers and contractors, supervised by the Public Water Corporation, to provide piped water connections. The involvement of local companies will enable the development and sustainability of local expertise. As for the supervision of activities by the public utility company, it will allow the latter to take over the subsequent maintenance of the works.

As regards the governance sector, although the results are tempered by staff mobility and the weak capacity of administrative bodies, the Bank's technical assistance helped to improve the country's legislative and regulatory framework, particularly in the area of investment promotion (establishment of a Single Window for SME creation, upgrading of the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register (RCCM), adoption of a new investment code, etc.) as well as the development of government programmes, in particular the SME Development Support Programme (PAD-PME).

## Efficiency of Bank Assistance

The Bank's efficiency in operations was deemed satisfactory overall, despite some areas of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction relates to implementation delays coupled with low disbursement rates in the social sector and budget overruns in the social and water and sanitation sectors. This is due in particular to the Bank's staff shortages and the resulting excessive workload for project officers in the face of poorly equipped Project Management Units (PMUs), in addition to shortcomings relating to the quality at entry of operations.

Management agrees with this analysis. Unfortunately, the unconstitutional change of regime that took place on August 18th, 2020, including related consequences such as the suspension of disbursements, will further deteriorate the performance of the portfolio and present the risk of stalling markets by companies due to non-payments.

In July 2020, we conducted a review of portfolio management at all stages of this process. This review enabled us to identify improvement actions that we incorporated into (i) the action plan of the second part of this document, (ii) the Portfolio Performance Improvement Plan (PPIP) of the new CSP 2020-2024. The review also led to the adoption of a checklist for the design of future operations during the period of the new CSP and a reorganisation of the office's assistance to PMUs; this review note is documented in CSP 2020-2024.

As regards budget overruns, they concern sectors where Mali has enormous primary needs, particularly in drinking water supply and various social centres.

## Other Areas

Management notes that the impact of the Bank's operations on the population and on inequalities has been judged unsatisfactory, and that a rigorous results measurement system is lacking, even though the Bank's interventions, and in particular emergency humanitarian aid in 2013 and credits granted to SMEs, made a satisfactory contribution to alleviating insecurity in the country.

On the other hand, Management is pleased to note that the evaluation underscores the Bank's key role in the harmonisation and coordination of aid to Mali. The Bank is currently leading the Infrastructure Thematic Group and participates actively in the meetings of the groups and sub-groups as well as

those of the Troika. It has been chairing the Energy sub-group since 2008, leading TFP in 2011, and chair of the Private Sector Development sub-group from 2012. It also led the Economy and Finance theme group from 2013 to 2016.

Management is pleased that the evaluation finds communication among Mali's development partners satisfactory, that the Government of Mali has fulfilled its commitments to the Bank in a satisfactory manner, and that the Bank has involved all stakeholders in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of its interventions in a satisfactory manner.

Management recognizes the need to improve the Bank's institutional performance and enhance the Bank's visibility and operations in Mali, especially among non-state actors (civil society, local press, private sector, etc.). Management will strengthen the framework for collaboration with non-state actors during the implementation of CSP 2020-2024. The Bank will strengthen the participation of civil society

by, inter alia, contracting with local actors residing in fragile areas (local enterprises, local NGOs, local civil society in general, basic community organisations residing in these inaccessible fragile areas).

Finally, Management also recognizes the challenges associated with having insufficient staff in difficult working environments, such as that of Mali. In line with ADF-15 commitments, Management is aware of the commitment to improve the working and living conditions of staff working in fragile countries. Stronger incentives should be designed to attract highly qualified professionals as well as rewarding performance of staff currently at post. The ongoing review of the Total Compensation Framework, the development of the new People Management Strategy and the Strategic Staffing exercise offer the Bank the opportunity to make significant progress in this area. The summary of Management's actions below presents specific measures in relation to the recommendations made in the evaluation report.

Summary of Management Actions	
Recommendation	Management Response
<p><b>Recommendation 1</b> - Increase the private sector's share of the portfolio, particularly in sectors of the real economy with high growth potential such as agro-industry, transport, energy, etc. This includes encouraging and supporting faster appraisal of projects initiated by private companies.</p>	<p><b>APPROVED.</b> In a context where the state is fragile with a lack of capacity and faced with governance issues, these non-state actors represent a strategic opportunity for achieving the goals of inclusive and sustainable economic growth. As part of preparation of the new country strategy for 2020-2024, and with a view to stepping up intervention in favour of the private sector with greater involvement of civil society, the following actions will be carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The indicative lending programme for the period 2020-2024 will be expanded to strengthen the Bank's support for the private sector and civil society participation in development projects and programmes. This programme includes 4 large-scale non-sovereign projects to be financed under the Bank's private sector window (<b>COML, Q4 2021 and Q4 2022</b>).</li> <li>■ Management will continue the conduct of the Economic and Sector Work study entitled: "How to increase the level of private sector participation in large-scale government projects". This study will present the necessary instruments to attract private sector participation in the country's development projects (<b>COML, Q4 2020</b>).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendation 2</b> - Increase the Bank's contribution to knowledge in Mali through the conduct of more economic and sector works and the strengthening of statistical collection capacities in order to base sectoral choices and the formulation of operations on factual, relevant and credible data.</p>	<p><b>APPROVED.</b> Management takes good note of these recommendations that will be implemented under the new CSP 2020-2024. Management would also like to emphasize that the Bank has been active in building the capacity of the National Statistical System (SSN) through the activities carried out by the Statistics Department (ECST) which has, among other things, supported the general census of economic units (RGUE). The Bank will continue to provide this support in the RMCs, and in the context of Mali will carry out the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Economic and sector work will be strengthened in CSP 2020-2024. At least one economic and sector work study will be produced each year (<b>COML, Q1 2021, Q4 2021, Q4 2022, Q4 2023 and Q4 2024</b>).</li> <li>■ CSP 2020-2024 Non-Lending Programme will also include: (i) at least 1 technical assistance per year (<b>COML, Q1 2021</b>); (ii) at least 1 country dialogue per year (<b>COML, Q4 of each year between 2021 and 2024</b>).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendation 3</b> - Develop and implement a civil society communication and involvement plan within the country office; among other outputs, the office could develop a brochure on the results of each operation (using the mapping method or the collection of impacts).</p>	<p><b>APPROVED.</b> Management takes good note of these recommendations that will be implemented under the new CSP 2020-2024. A dialogue workshop was organised in Q4 2019 with civil society actors as well as consultation with most of the private sector umbrella organisations in Mali during the mission to prepare the CSP 2020-2024.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Management will develop an overall communication plan for the Office's activities in Mali and prepare various communication materials highlighting the Bank's impact on the ground in collaboration with the Bank's Communications Department (PCER). A consultant (communication expert) has been recruited for this purpose within the framework of PAGODA (<b>COML, Q4 2021</b>).</li> <li>■ Management will develop an institutional film and brochure on the Bank's activities in Mali. A communication agency has been recruited for this purpose (<b>COML, Q1 2021</b>).</li> <li>■ Management will strengthen the dissemination of the Bank's knowledge products, particularly within universities and with other development partners (<b>COML, Q4 2022</b>).</li> </ul>

Summary of Management Actions	
Recommendation	Management Response
<p><b>Recommendation 4</b> - Conduct a review of current practices in the design and implementation of PPIP, and where possible involve an independent facilitator, to enhance the impact of PPIP on the Bank's development outcomes in the country.</p>	<p><b>APPROVED.</b> Management conducted a reflection on portfolio management by reviewing all stages from design to implementation. The findings of this reflection have been documented in the new CSP 2020-2024 and will contribute to improving the performance of the portfolio. In addition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Management will conduct a dialogue with the country's authorities in order to obtain that (i) a waiver be granted to the Project Management Units (PMU) for the autonomous responsibility for procurement processes when the system set up at the level of the ministry responsible for the technical supervision of the project does not work, (ii) the contracts concluded are no longer subject to tax verification procedures prior to their registration and signature and (iii) the renewal of the contracts of PMU experts is based on the evaluation of their performance, based on predetermined criteria (<b>COML, Q1 2021</b>).</li> <li>■ In 2021, Management will conduct an analytical study on "the challenges of portfolio management in Mali", including a comparison with other multilateral development banks and Mali's bilateral partners. The thrusts of this analytical study will be taken into account within the framework of the dialogue on reforms to be proposed in the next budget support programme (<b>COML, Q4 2021</b>).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendation 5</b> - Encourage project officers to take full advantage of the lessons learned from the Operations Academy with a view to improving the quality at entry of operations: systematic linkage of the results of each operation with the results of the pillar to which it contributes; a coherent and feasible results measurement framework, including clear links between outputs and outcomes (evaluability); definition of mechanisms for ownership and sustainability of the achievements of operations by beneficiaries; financial evaluation; and critical aspects of project management (human resources, etc.). Project officers will organise these same types of training for national implementation teams in ways that are adapted to the country context and available resources. These measures will strengthen results-based management and enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness.</p>	<p><b>APPROVED.</b> Management takes good note of these recommendations, which it has already begun to implement. A programme for training project management units (PMUs) in Bank rules and procedures (in procurement, financial management and disbursements) is implemented annually and will continue on a virtual basis. The Bank regularly and in a personalised manner assists PMUs in procurement matters. Nine PMUs have benefited from this assistance through one or more working sessions. This assistance will continue during the confinement period. In addition, in terms of human resources, the Bank will equip the country offices in countries in transition with a mix of skills suited to their environment. Thus, the Mali Country Office team must be strengthened with the necessary staff and skills to match the areas the Bank plans to intervene in (i.e. with experts in fragility, transport, energy, etc.).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The 11 experts (100%) of the country Office, will have completed their online courses of the Academy of Operations by the end of 2020 (<b>COML, Q1 2021</b>).</li> <li>■ Management will organise two capacity building sessions per year for PMU experts (in procurement, financial management, environmental monitoring, etc.) for the 2020-2024 projects and programme (<b>COML, Q4 2021</b>).</li> <li>■ Management will conduct dialogue with the country and ensure that in the projects of the new CSP 2020-2024, local key experts are no longer designated by the authorities, but are appointed as a result of an open competitive recruitment process that is subject to the Bank's prior review. This provision was used in projects approved in 2019 and will be taken into account in a quality at entry check list of Mali projects, to be included as an annex in CSP 2020-2024 (<b>COML, Q1 2021</b>).</li> </ul>



# Introduction

This report covers the CSPE or AfDB assistance to Mali over the period 2005-2019. It presents the development outcomes achieved by the Bank, measures its performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and implementation impacts, and draws relevant lessons to guide the Bank's future 2020-2024 assistance strategy in Mali. The evaluation thus contributes to improving development effectiveness and learning.

The team was not able to visit or meet with key informants at project sites due to the surge in violent incidents across the country (Annex 10). This report presents Mali's national development context and Bank assistance between 2005 and 2019, the evaluation methodology, the evaluation findings and conclusions, the lessons learned, and recommendations for action.

## Mali's Development Context

### Geographic, Political, Economic and Social Context

**Geography:** With a surface area of 1,241,238 km<sup>2</sup>, Mali is a landlocked country in West Africa<sup>4</sup>, connected by paved road to all its neighbours except Algeria. In 2019, the country had a population of 19.6 million, of which 49.7% were women. The population is predominantly rural (57.6% in 2018) and young, with 67% being under 24 years of age (Annex 1<sup>5</sup>).

**Political context:** Despite the advent of democracy in 1992 and the signing of the peace agreement with the Tuareg rebels in 2006, Mali experienced a coup d'état in March 2012. The country has thus been weakened by regular outbreaks of violence (Annex 2).

**Economy:** Economic growth averaged around 5% per annum, with a downward trend occurring over the evaluation period (6.5% in 2005 to 5% in 2019)

(Annex 1). The Malian economy posted growth higher than the average for the sub-region (3.7%) and Africa (3.4%) in 2019. It was driven by the primary sector (38% of GDP), which employs one-third of the workforce and generates about 75% of external revenue.<sup>6</sup> Gold and cotton account for 86% of exports. Gross national income per capita increased by almost 63%, from USD 390 in 2005 to USD 610 in 2011. The manufacturing sector is lagging, with only 3% of cotton processed locally. Tax revenue mobilisation is structurally weak.

**Social Indicators:** Households comprise an average of 10.5 persons.<sup>7</sup> The unemployment rate was estimated at 7.9% in 2017.<sup>8</sup> Life expectancy stood at 60.09 years in 2019, with an infant mortality rate of 93.12 per 1000. The gross primary enrolment rate (75.6%) was below the average for the sub-region in 2016 (89.5%) and Africa in 2015 (103%)<sup>9</sup>. Regarding the Human Development Index (HDI), Mali ranked 184th out of 189 countries in 2019.<sup>10</sup>

### Box 1: Fragility in Mali and the Factors at Work

Fragility is "a condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse or violent conflict." (AfDB, 2014:16). In Mali, the security crisis has had humanitarian consequences: 5.2 million people are food insecure, basic social services are non-existent, 34,353 people were internally displaced in 2016 and 199,385 in 2019. Five categories of fragility factors have been identified: (i) Political, security and institutional factors: Domestic policy challenges have repercussions on institutions, security and external relations; (ii) Economic and financial issues: Economic growth, a source of resilience, is not inclusive despite a rate averaging nearly 6% per year between 2013 and 2017; (iii) Social and issues inequalities: The growth level is not high enough to reduce poverty; (iv) Environmental challenge: Environmental issues and manifestations of climate change are not a priority, given that the country is confronted with more pressing political, security, social, economic and financial difficulties; (v) Regional and international issues: The size of the territory, its geographical position, along with its (uncontrolled) borders with seven countries, places the country at the centre of regional geopolitics from the very onset.

**Source:** AfDB, *Evaluation Report on Mali's Resilience to Fragility and Conflict: Mali on the Road to Stability and Transformation*, June 2018

### Box 2: Agriculture at the Heart of the Country's Economic Transformation

**Production.** Agriculture accounts for 40.2% of GDP and 65.3% of jobs. Cotton accounts for 15% of GDP and 12.95% of exports, or more than XOF 335 billion in value added in 2018 and 1,784 permanent jobs and 2,112 seasonal jobs. Mali produces 4.3 million tonnes of cereals, largely covering national needs. It also produces 3.18 million tonnes of rice, twice as much as national demand, but imports 261,790 tonnes, which deepens the current account deficit. Mali has the largest livestock population in West Africa after Nigeria. The country's livestock consists of indigenous breeds of cattle, sheep, goats and camels adapted to the environment.

**Opportunities and potential:** Less than 3% of cotton production is processed, a boon for agro-industries. The country exports live cattle, in the absence of modern slaughterhouses and dairy units. The fisheries sector covers half of the 199,730 tonnes of fish products demanded per year and exports only 9%. Mali has a plethora of assets: (i) great agro-ecological diversity; (ii) 43.7 million hectares of agricultural land, 93% of which is unexploited; 2.2 million hectares of irrigable land; (iii) 2,720 billion m<sup>3</sup> of groundwater; (iv) an available labour force that makes up 78% of the total population and includes a rural component; (v) 5,500 hectares of poorly developed aquaculture sites, out of the 895,000 hectares that could be developed, including 620,500 hectares of lowlands, ponds and plains; and (vi) over 30 million hectares of grazing land. Since 2006, the Agricultural Orientation Law (LOA) and its implementing instruments put in place the institutions required for the rapid development of the agricultural sector.

**Source:** AfDB. (2020). *2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper Completion Report combined with the 2019 Country Portfolio Performance Review*, Annex 5, pp. xiv-xx.

**Inequalities:** Inequalities between women and men, between urban and rural areas, between Northern and Southern regions have increased. The Gini index went from 0.32 in 2009 to 0.42 in 2011, then to 0.35 in 2016 and 0.34 in 2017.<sup>11</sup> The literacy rate is lower for women than for men. Unemployment affects women (58.8%) more than men and is five times higher in Bamako than in Sikasso and more pronounced among young people aged 15-34 (55% in 2018 in Gao).<sup>12</sup> In 2017, HIV/AIDS prevalence was estimated at 1.6% for women against 0.9% for men.<sup>13</sup> In 2017, the poverty rate was higher in rural areas (53.6%) than in Bamako (4.7%) and other cities (39.9%). Rural inhabitants are vulnerable to ecosystem degradation, which directly impacts their livelihoods and food security.<sup>14</sup>

## National Development Policies

To address the above challenges, the GoM prepared national development and poverty reduction plans (Figure 1).

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2002-2006) aimed to reduce the incidence of poverty from 63.8% in 2001 to 47.5% in 2006 and to create 10,000 jobs annually through institutional development and the improvement of governance and participation. The 2nd Generation PRSP (2007-2011) adopted in November 2006, known as the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP I), aimed to promote redistributive growth and poverty reduction.



The GPRSP II (2012-2017) also focused on promoting growth, strengthening long-term foundations for social and institutional development, and governance. After the 2012 coup d'état, the 2013-2014 Sustainable Recovery Plan (PRED) was prepared, as well as the 2013-2018 Government Action Program (GAP) and the 2012-2017

GPRSP. The 2016-2018 Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (CREDD) was aimed at achieving the Sustainable Development Objectives (SDOs) by 2030. Finally, the 2019-2023 CREDD was validated in 2019. Annex 11<sup>15</sup> provides a non-exhaustive list of sector-specific policy documents.

### Box 3: Monitoring Profile (of Global Partnership) – October 2016

**Major development challenges.** The Malian economy remains insufficiently diversified and vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices and to climate change. It is necessary to develop the agri-food and manufacturing industries. In the area of infrastructure, there is the challenge of linking production and consumption areas while connecting the different regions of the country to each other and to neighbouring countries. Mali's high population growth presents major challenges for poverty reduction. One of the main issues at stake is that of restructuring the State and enhancing its means of action by deepening the decentralization process. The achievement of tangible progress in the area of governance appears to be a key factor in helping to strengthen citizens' confidence in the State and its institutions.

Source: [http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Mali\\_28\\_10.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Mali_28_10.pdf)

Figure 1: Country Development Plans (2002-2018)



Source: Authors



# Bank Assistance to Mali (2005-2019)

During the period covered, the Bank implemented the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, the CSP 2013-2014 and the CSP 2015-2019 (Table 1). The RBCSP 2005-2009 was extended until 2011. In 2012, Mali experienced a coup d'état leading to the suspension of the preparation of the CSP 2012-2017, which was backed by the GPRSP 2012-2017. The Bank and the Government of Mali agreed, on an exceptional basis, to prepare a Transition Management Support Strategy for Mali for the period 2013-2014. The implementation of the CSP 2015-2019 has been completed.

## Strategic Priorities of the Bank<sup>16</sup>

In 2014, the Bank conducted a study on the drivers of fragility in Mali. In the same year, the country was included in the harmonized list of "countries in situations of fragility."<sup>17</sup> The Bank chose to support the country's economic growth by establishing an enabling business environment, building the capacity of the State and communities, and developing basic socio-economic infrastructure (hydro-agricultural schemes, energy, roads, schools, water and sanitation facilities, etc.).

Over the period 2005-2019, the Bank increased its assistance to Mali by almost 40% compared to the previous 30 years (Table 2). The Bank is involved

in 5 to 7 sectors (Tables 1 and 3). Agricultural and multi-sector operations together account for at least half of the Bank's commitments in the country. In 2013-2014, these operations absorbed up to 82% of the Bank's resources. Selectivity is the key determinant of aid effectiveness (AfDB, 2013:10;<sup>18</sup> AfDB, 2014:14;<sup>19</sup> AfDB, 2020). The systematic application of the fragility lens will serve as a mechanism for focusing the Bank's programming and operations on the areas where they can have the greatest impact, but these areas will vary according to the context (AfDB, 2014:14). The Bank did not justify the choice of sectors of intervention with a coherent presentation of the comparative advantages it has developed over Mali's other partners, including available operational capacity (human resources), the experience of successful past operations, and knowledge accumulated through economic and sector work (ESW).

The share of resources absorbed by the energy, and water and sanitation sectors has increased (Table 2). However, agricultural and multi-sectoral operations have remained at the core of the Bank's priorities, accounting for over 58.7% of the cumulative net amount of the portfolio (Table 3). The Bank has maintained a steady flow of resources to the other sectors (water and sanitation, energy, transport, social and finance), in line with successive national development plans.

**Table 1:** Key Data on the Bank's Assistance Strategy (2005-2019)

Data	CSP 2005-2011	CSP 2013-2014	CSP 2015-2019
Date approved	25 Oct. 2005; 12 Dec. 2008	8 May 2013	4-November 2015
Pillars	i. Improvement of private sector competitiveness and environment; and ii. Capacity building for the poor and strengthening of their participation in growth.	i. Mitigate the impact of the crisis and strengthen the population's resilience; and ii. Consolidate the State's stability and the foundations for economic recovery.	i. Enhancing governance for inclusive growth; and ii. Infrastructure development to support economic recovery.
Key areas of intervention (by UA allocation)	7 Agriculture (36%); Multi-sector (38%); Water & Sanitation (11%); Energy (0.5%). Social (5%); Transport (8%); and Finance (2%)	5 Agriculture (47.3%); Multi-sector (29.3%); Water & Sanitation (22.7%); Energy (0.5%); and Social (0.3%)	7 Multi-sector (22.1%); Energy (15.8%); Transport (38.5%); Social (5.6%); Agriculture (3.4%); Water & Sanitation (0.6%); and Finance (14.0%)
Number of (planned) operations at the CSP approval	16	8	19
Number of operations approved (at the CSP completion or to date)	18	10	23
Planned amount (UA)	260.3 million	147.9 million	462.5 million
Approved amounts (UA)	365.033 million	213.39 million	442.119 million
Number of planned non-lending operations (ESW*)	5	3	3
Number of ESW conducted	1 <sup>20</sup>	1	1

\* ESW: Economic and Sector Work.

Sources: Various Country Strategy Papers (2005-2019); various combined CSP completion reports and Country Portfolio Performance Reviews (2005-2019).

**Table 2:** Trends in the Bank's Portfolio in Mali (1994-2019)

Sectors of intervention	Distribution (% of commitments)		Distribution (in UA million)		Trend
	1994-2004 (30 years)	2005-2019 (15 years)	1994-2004 (30 years)	2005-2019 (15 years)	
Agriculture	37%	27%	212	200	-6%
Multi-sector	20%	30%	115	216	+87%
Water and sanitation	7%	8%	40	78	+95%
Energy	1%	9%	6	44	+630%
Transport	9%	12%	52	121	+132%
Social	22%	9%	126	28	-78%
Finance	4%	5%	23	42	+82%
<b>Total commitment amount</b>			<b>554</b>	<b>730*</b>	<b>+31%</b>

\*Amounts have been rounded for convenience. The total amount is correct.

Source: AfDB SAP PS data (2019).

## Analysis of the Portfolio of Approved and Non-cancelled Operations (2005-2019)

During the period, the Bank Group approved 72 operations<sup>21, 22</sup> for a total amount of over UA 879 million, of which 8 operations worth UA 149 million were cancelled (Annex 13<sup>23</sup>), leaving a total net amount of UA 730 million. The public sector comprises 19 projects, three of which are co-financed from the resources of the Delegation Agreement for Indirect Management (PAGODA) with the European Union to the tune of EUR 70 million each. The private sector (finance and industry) accounts for 11% [of the active portfolio].<sup>24</sup> The number of the Bank's operations dropped by half during the crisis period that followed the coup d'état of 2012 (Table 3, Annex 13<sup>25</sup>). A record number of 12 operations was posted in 2018. Net approvals increased to UA 136 million in 2013. Of the Bank's five priorities (High 5s), operations intended to


"Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa" were the highest in number (47%), followed by those designed to "Feed Africa" (18 %) (Annex 13). Eleven sources of financing were mobilized (Annex 12), including the African Development Fund for 39 operations (54%), the Fragile States Facility for 10 operations (14%) and the African Development Bank for 6 operations (8%). Annex 12 of Volume II presents the portfolio analysis charts.

As regards the Bank's contribution to knowledge building, non-lending operations<sup>26</sup> accounted for about 15% of the portfolio during the period, with 11 Economic and Sector Works (ESW). One to five ESWs<sup>27</sup> were planned during each CSP, corresponding to 22%, 19% and 9% of the indicative portfolio of the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, CSP 2013-2014/2015 and CSP 2015-2019, respectively. Only one study was carried out per CSP, representing achievement rates of 20%, 33% and 33% respectively.

**Table 3:** Strategic Sectors of Bank Assistance between 2005 and 2019

Sector	CSP 2005-2011		CSP 2013-2014		CSP 2015-2019		TOTAL	
	N°	Net amount	N°	Net amount	N°	Net amount	N°	Net amount
Multi-sector	6	91,937,175.72	5	64,573,000.00	8	59,150,600.00	19	215,660,775.72
Agriculture	6	86,804,248.86	8	104,334,585.19	3	9,167,905.54	17	200,306,739.59
Transport	2	17,898,692.32	0	0.00	6	103,154,285.31	8	121,052,977.63
Energy	2	958,904.32	1	1,092,362.93	3	42,435,704.97	6	44,486,972.22
Water and sanitation	3	26,738,251.33	1	50,000,000.00	1	1,612,676.06	5	78,350,927.39
Social	1	12,643,375.45	1	728,241.95	4	15,000,000.00	6	28,371,617.40
Finance	1	4,444,336.70	0	0.00	2	37,518,950.04	3	41,963,286.74
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>241,424,984.70</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>220,728,190.07</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>268 040 121.92</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>730 193 296.69</b>

Source: AfDB. SAP PS data (2019).

**Figure 2:** Status of Bank Operations in Mali for the Period 2005-2019

Source: AfDB, SAP PS internal data.







# Evaluation Methodology

**Theoretical approach:** The evaluation was designed to: (i) answer stakeholders' questions in a credible manner; (ii) influence the practice of the Bank and the Malian authorities regarding the formulation and implementation of the assistance strategy and development operations; and (iii) increase the country's program evaluation capacity. The period to be covered, the evaluation questions and the factors to be considered in the choice of methodology were defined together with all stakeholders.

**Period covered and purpose of the evaluation:** The evaluation covers the period 2005-2019 (Table 1). Each CSP has a results chain at three levels (country, pillar and project). Operations (programs and projects) are grouped by priority result areas or pillars. A total of 109 operations are covered, including 64 operations approved between 2005 and 2019<sup>28</sup> and not cancelled, and 45 operations approved before 2005 and completed or closed between 2005 and 2019.<sup>29</sup> The latter operations have been included to take into account the results achieved during the evaluation period by operations from all previous CSPs whose implementation was delayed or extended.

**Evaluation criteria and questions:** Following the methodology of Preskill and Jones (2009:5<sup>30</sup>), the team met with stakeholders within the Bank and in the country to determine their specific expectations and finalize the evaluation questions while complying with IDEV institutional commitments regarding CSPE<sup>31</sup> modalities. Nineteen questions relating to relevance (1), effectiveness (3), sustainability (3), efficiency (2), impact (2), institutional performance of

the Government of Mali (3) and that of the Bank (5) were defined. Five other questions related to ongoing thematic evaluations at IDEV were added: (a) Independent evaluation of the Bank Group's Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2014 - 2019 (2) and (b) Evaluation of the Bank's Self-Evaluation Systems and Processes (3). These questions are repeated in-extenso in the header of each conclusion below and Annex 3.

**Data and collection methods:** Primary data were combined with secondary data. Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews<sup>32</sup> during the three missions to Bamako. Secondary data were collected from documents<sup>33</sup> downloaded from the Bank's internal Document and Archives Management System (DARMS), from the internet, or shared by key informants and Bank project officers.

**Data analysis and ratings:** The data analysis was guided by the evaluation matrix (Annexes 14 to 22<sup>34</sup>) and the reconstructed theories of change (Annexes 23 to 26<sup>35</sup>). For each question, the indicators<sup>36</sup> were defined and grouped by evaluation criteria. They were evaluated and scores assigned on a scale of 1 to 4<sup>37</sup> according to the frequency, the sum or the average obtained in each of the six sectors of Bank assistance to Mali, as per the rating scale (Annex 6). The final score is the rounded down simple arithmetic average. An outcome-harvesting (Wilson-Grau, 2014;<sup>38</sup> Wilson-Grau and Britt, 2012:1-2)<sup>39</sup> or outcome mapping (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo, 2001:19)<sup>40</sup> approach was used to collect and analyze the data needed for impact-related questions.

### Limitations of the evaluation and mitigation strategies adopted

■ **Incomplete data.** The evaluation team did not have access to project sites to collect primary data due to insecurity and travel restrictions.<sup>41</sup>The monitoring and evaluation system for the current line of credit does not systematically document development outcomes at the level of intermediate and final loan beneficiaries (SMEs and microfinance institutions). Some

data on completed operations are unavailable or inappropriate for the purposes of this evaluation. Some project officers were unavailable for the various reasons mentioned above.

■ **The reliability of certain secondary data is not verifiable.** Certain data on inconsistent operations in various documents have been discarded; others have been reconciled using maintenance data. The score was assigned based on plausible or corroborated data (by triangulation).



# Evaluation Results

The relevance, sustainability and efficiency of the Bank's interventions were deemed satisfactory, although some aspects need to be corrected for the performance to be fully satisfactory. At the institutional level, the Bank had to find the human resources required to overcome the recurrent operational difficulties experienced throughout the period 2005-2019. A self-evaluation system that focuses on the measurement of development outcomes and learning could be helpful in this regard. The private sector and civil society could serve as complementary strategic levers for building the resilience of the State to achieve inclusive and sustainable growth.

## Relevance

The evaluation found that the relevance of the Bank's assistance was satisfactory in terms of its linkage with the people's needs and the Government's expectations, at both the CSP and operational levels. However, the involvement of civil society and the private sector could provide the Bank with additional strategic leverage for stimulating inclusive growth.

### ***Assistance aligned with the Government's needs and expectations***

**The Bank took into account the national context and satisfactorily met the expectations of the authorities.** All the CSPs are explicitly based on the main thrusts of national development policies (Annex 28).<sup>42</sup> The RBCSP 2005-09 is anchored on the strategic thrusts of the 2002 PRSP. The Bank agreed to extend this RBCSP until 2011 to better target current rural development needs and align its planning schedule with that of the new Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP), the

Government's second-generation PRSP covering the period 2007-2011.<sup>43</sup> Following the coup d'état of 22 March 2012, the Bank and the Government of Mali agreed on the 2013-2014 Transition Management Support Strategy (TMSS) to help the country cope with the economic and social repercussions. The Bank based the CSP 2015-2019 on the GoM's new 2012-2017 GPRSP and the study on drivers of fragility (Annex 2). Operations approved between 2005 and 2019 in all sectors have objectives that are in line with either component of the national benchmark strategy, except for 90% of social sector operations.

**The Bank has responded satisfactorily to the people's needs, especially in areas prone to insecurity.** In designing infrastructure operations, it generalized ancillary developments to provide the population with basic services, prioritizing multi-sectoral operations that offer a range of basic services rather than single-service social sector operations (4% of the portfolio). For the Government of Mali, the Bank's flexibility in its strategic choices, especially during crisis, was commendable. The presence of a Bank Country Office in Mali and the involvement of the Government<sup>44</sup> from the design to execution phases of operations enabled continuous and regular dialogue with the authorities of the country.

**The private sector and civil society complain of receiving inadequate attention from the Bank.** Five per cent (5%) of the Bank's commitments were devoted to the private sector<sup>45</sup> In a context where the State is fragile, lacks capacity and is confronted with high levels of corruption,<sup>46</sup> these non-state actors provide a strategic opportunity to achieve the objectives of inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

### ***Strategic priorities consistent over time with stagnating allocations***

**In the course of the past three CSPs, the Bank allocated all its resources to building national capacities and creating conditions for strong but inclusive growth** (Table 1). Indeed, the country's development challenges did not fundamentally change during the evaluation period, although they became more severe with the collapse of State institutions after 2012 and the much-criticized surge in corruption and misappropriation of public funds. The volume of Bank allocations to Mali is stagnant: UA 241 million, UA 220 million, and UA 268 million for the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, SAGT 2013-2014/2015, and CSP 2015-2019, respectively. The various stakeholders agree that these allocations are not commensurate with the Bank's needs and ambition for the country.

### ***A selective choice for agricultural and multi-sectoral operations***

In February 2020, the Bank proposed a selectivity index<sup>47</sup> that measures the level of focus on the Bank's High 5s, the size of the operation compared to the volume of resources available to the country, the share of the investment volume devoted to infrastructure, and the level of mainstreaming of the four crosscutting issues (gender, climate change, policy dialogue, and fragility). However, this report defines selectivity based on the share of resources allocated and not so much on the number of operations implemented.<sup>48</sup>

**The Bank has been selective since the agricultural sector and multi-sector operations have been predominant in its assistance strategy in Mali over the period, if not for the past 30 years.** Together, these two sectors accounted for 74%, 76% and 25% of commitments in CSPs 2005-2011, 2013-2014 and 2015-2019, respectively, or an average of 58.7% between 2008 and 2019 (Table 1). This average stood at 57% between 1994 and

2004 (Table 2). Furthermore, the Bank has been responsive and flexible, maintaining a steady flow of resources to other sectors to meet the requests of the authorities.<sup>49</sup> The share of resources allocated to emerging sectors, energy and transport thus witnessed a dramatic increase (Table 2).

**Faced with the selectivity requirement, the Bank has had a two-phased strategy:** a main selective phase, which focuses on sectors that contribute directly to the achievement of the ultimate objective of the assistance (agriculture to build the resilience of rural communities by creating or strengthening their livelihoods, and multi-sector operations to build State capacity and provide the people with basic collective services. As for the secondary phase, it is based on the need to adapt quickly to the Government's request and hardly takes into account the Bank's available capacities and its comparative advantages (experience, knowledge, available resources, etc.)<sup>50</sup> over Mali's other partners. This flexibility is highly appreciated by the Government which views the Bank as a premier partner. There is little evidence in the CSPs to show that the Bank draws lessons from the accumulated experience. No reference is made to IDEV's work, particularly the evaluation of the Bank's 1994-2004 assistance to Mali. Apart from the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, the CSPs do not explicitly explain the links between the situation of the sectors and the choices made at the second phase. However, the expected outcomes of each operation, as described in the results-based logical framework (RBLF) of the evaluation report, are not systematically linked to the targeted outcomes of the pillars of the assistance strategy.

## **Effectiveness**

Effectiveness is unsatisfactory. Margins could be gained in the achievement of CSP objectives and the delivery of operational outputs through portfolio performance improvement plans designed and implemented in a results-based manner.

**The Bank's performance is unsatisfactory.** Most outcome indicator targets for the "Feed Africa," "Industrialize Africa" and "Improve the quality of life

for the people of Africa" High-5 priorities were not met between 2006 and 2018 (Table 4).

**Table 4:** Achievements by High 5 (2006-2018)

High 5	2006-2018		
	Expected	Achieved	Gap (%) *
<b>Feed Africa</b>			
Persons benefiting from the improvement of agriculture,	1,583,370	1,602,524	1%
» Including women	796,427	804,813	1%
Agricultural land with better water management (ha)	12,316	11,832	-4%
Rural population using improved agricultural technology,	58,171	42,444	-27%
» Including women	28,628	20,966	-27%
Agricultural inputs provided: fertilizers, seeds, etc. (tons)	8,925	6,855	-23%
Feeder roads built or rehabilitated (km)	1,715	2,018	18%
<b>Industrialize Africa</b>			
Persons benefiting from investment projects,	277,804	277,804	0%
» Including women	133,847	133,847	0%
Individual land-owning farmers and SME benefiting from financial services	110,077	100,353	-9%
Persons with proper access to transport,	375,429	415,965	11%
» Including women	189,713	210,494	11%
Roads constructed, rehabilitated or maintained (km)	565	565	0%
<b>Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa</b>			
Direct jobs created,	147,374	125,326	-15%
» Including for women	73,685	62,661	-15%
Persons trained in all Bank operations,	42,253	31,901	-25%
» Including women	21,093	15,918	-25%
Persons benefiting from improved access to education,	777,788	785,269	1%
» Including women	500,382	505,195	1%
Persons with access to new or improved water and sanitation facilities,	474,373	465,169	-2%
» Including women	243,009	238,397	-2%

\*This sign – indicates performance that is too low to meet the target.

Source: Data from 2006-2018 PCRs compiled by SNDR.1, 18 February 2019.

**The Bank's effectiveness in the various operational aspects considered<sup>51</sup> was deemed satisfactory, except in the water and sanitation sector, where the performance was unsatisfactory.** An average of 53% of the strategic objectives of the CSPs (pillars) was achieved, or 67%, 50%, 49% and 45% respectively for agriculture, social services, water and sanitation, and governance (multi-sector). All approved and completed or closed operations for 2005-2019 in the agricultural, social, energy and transport sectors contributed through their immediate outcomes to the achievement of strategic outcomes of the pillar to which they are linked. In this regard, the water and sanitation, and governance operations respectively accounted for 50% and 71% of the outcomes.

**In the water and sanitation sector,** the Bank has mainly contributed to the development of drinking water supply and sanitation infrastructure and human resources. Interventions in the sector have been intermittent and sporadic – a situation that has hampered the achievement of the expected outcomes. Before the Bank intervened in 2006 under the Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Project (PAEPA), the drinking water access rates in Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou stood at 70%, 50% and 44%, respectively. The target average was 57%. In 2016, the average rate was 54.6%. The rate of access to sanitation is estimated to have improved from 5% to 12% in the regions of Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou. Moreover, 34% of the operations delivered all the expected outputs, with rates of 100% in energy and 71% in governance and 0% in the other sectors, representing an average of 75% for the portfolio as a whole.

***In terms of operational efficiency, underperformance is linked to various difficulties.***

**Delays.** Non-fulfilment of conditions precedent; lengthy legal procedures or administrative red tape related to contract award and execution, and

payment of compensation to households displaced by the projects.

**Lack of capacity, expertise and/or staffing.** incomplete composition of the team of experts for the supervision mission; NGOs and other subcontractors in charge of carrying out the works, particularly infrastructure works, lack expertise and experience, or are under-equipped, leading to delays and additional costs; under-staffing of branch offices of project implementation units (PIUs); and the government services concerned have few qualified staff, few tools and/or an insufficient budget. Lack of involvement of the devolved State services (delegated project owner), due to inadequate resources or vagueness in the distribution of roles and responsibilities.

**Poor quality of operations at entry.** Absence or poor quality of the front-end engineering design; flaws in project design; inappropriate choices or under-estimation of costs; and unrealistic schedules.

**Frequent change of project officers at Bank.** Inadequacy of the resources (financial and human) available for assistance to Mali.

**Sluggish pace of procedures at the Bank and/or poor understanding of disbursement procedures** by service providers (NGOs and enterprises), including supporting document requirements.

**Difficult national and/or local context,** particularly political conflicts and resistance to reforms within certain government services.

**Governance operations are faced with two efficiency-related problems:** (i) the difficulty in closing AfDB projects, given that it is not clear where the balance of project funds should be spent at the end of the project, and (ii) the limited amount of budget support allocations.

## Sustainability

Sustainability is satisfactory. The Bank involved the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of operations, built local capacity, set up various mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the achievements, apart from the mobilization of local resources for the upkeep and maintenance of project facilities and services upon completion. It satisfactorily ensured compliance with the required environmental and social safeguard measures, despite two petitions relating to land grabbing and inequitable compensation of displaced persons.

### *Ownership<sup>52</sup> of operations by beneficiaries*

**Beneficiaries and endogenous actors were satisfactorily involved in project design and implementation.** They participated in the choice of the sites and the monitoring of the implementation of all completed agriculture and energy projects. In the social sector, all projects recruited local sub-contractors, service providers and suppliers. Furthermore, local administrative authorities were involved, especially in the supervision of activities. In the transport sector, the stakeholders were involved in the design of 60% of the projects, which led to a high level of ownership. The situation is unsatisfactory in the water and sanitation sector, where one project out of two follows this approach.

**Various mechanisms for ensuring the sustainability of achievements have been satisfactorily put in place.** All the agricultural projects have implemented conventions and protocols in cooperation with the devolved services of line ministries, non-governmental organizations and farmers' organizations. The energy sector is an example of such cooperation since it has a High-Level Committee on Interconnection Study, which brings together all the government services concerned for consultation on various project-related issues emanating from the study. In the social sector,

the Community Development Support Project in the Kayes and Koulikoro Regions (PADEC) has done the same regarding income-generating activities (IGAs). In the governance sector, the high mobility of staff and the low capacity of government services hamper the sustainability of the Bank's achievements by undermining the management of the assistance provided to the country. In the transport sector, road maintenance, rehabilitation and development works have been carried out and users now enjoy an acceptable level of service. Overload control systems and, more generally, transport facilitation measures (juxtaposed checkpoint, customs interconnection, etc.) have systematically encountered implementation obstacles.

**Mechanisms for mobilizing local revenue required for the upkeep and maintenance of project facilities and services after completion are not common in the Bank's operations in Mali.** Only half of the projects approved over 2005-2019 and completed or closed in the agricultural and water and sanitation sectors have put such mechanisms in place. The same is true for tax revenue mobilization, where Mali ranks sixth out of the eight WAEMU countries.<sup>53</sup> The integrity and transparency of the management of resources mobilized locally for the upkeep and maintenance of facilities remain a challenge in an environment of widespread corruption.

**All project execution units (PIUs) are integrated into the services of line ministries.** This is one of the conditions precedent to first disbursement, which allows these services to capitalize on the know-how and take ownership of the materials and equipment procured during project implementation.

### *The Bank has built local capacity*

**The Bank has made a very satisfactory contribution to local capacity building.** All completed or closed agricultural, energy, and water

and sanitation projects for 2005-2019 included training or logistical support components, as did half of the social sector projects. Three out of four transport projects had a technical support component. Sixty-one percent (61%) of governance (or multi-sector) projects carried out one or more of these activities. According to public authorities, capacity building is still needed given the weaknesses observed in Government services. Budget support contributes to meeting this need to allow the continuation of public governance reforms.

### ***Compliance with environmental standards and allocation of necessary resources***

**The Bank has satisfactorily ensured compliance with the environmental and social safeguards laid down for Categories I & II operations approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed.** All agricultural projects implemented and documented mitigation measures. The same applies to water and sanitation projects, although there is no evidence of effective implementation. In contrast, three out of five social sector operations included mitigation measures. In the transport sector, the ESMPs/ESIAs were published on time for 4 out of 5 projects. All PIUs for energy projects had an environmental monitoring officer, so too did half of the agricultural sector projects. There was an environmental monitoring budget allocation in all projects with ESMPs, particularly in the agricultural and water and sanitation sectors. A land dispute in connection with the Modern Mill of Mali (3M) Project was referred to the Bank on September 23, 2018. The first mission fielded to monitor the implementation of the action plan adopted to resolve this dispute found that the Bank had not met its obligations due to budgetary constraints.

## **Efficiency**

Efficiency was deemed satisfactory, as evidenced by the increasing demand from authorities and project officers for multi-sectoral operations. However, significant efforts still need to be made in terms

of compliance with budgets and implementation schedules, including the timeframes for issuance of no-objection notices by the Bank. Disbursement rates are low due to the difficult country context and inadequate staffing at the Country Office.

**The impact of the choice to implement integrated projects on the efficiency of implementation is noticeable.** The authorities and project officers encountered during the evaluation were positive about the desirability of operations that offer a variety of basic services to the target population.

**Compliance with budget allocations is satisfactory for operations approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed.** All energy and transport projects are within budget. Overruns concern 80% of social sector projects, 50% of water and sanitation sector projects and 11% of governance projects. Budgetary and technical support operations of limited duration (1-2 years) are less exposed to the phenomenon.

**Compliance with operational schedules is highly unsatisfactory.** Implementation delays are frequent, with extensions being virtually systematic. Only energy sector projects suffered no delays. The delays affect all social sector and water and sanitation projects, 40% of agricultural and transport projects and 36% of governance projects. In most of these sectors, the problems are related to procurement and to difficulties in meeting the conditions precedent to effectiveness, which prolong the average time lapse between approval and effectiveness.

**The overall disbursement rate is satisfactory,** with an average of 62%. For governance, energy, agriculture and water and sanitation operations, the rates stand at 86.2%, 78.7%, 75% and 62%, respectively. Conversely, the rate for social sector operations is very unsatisfactory at 8.5%, due to difficulties related to implementation and the fulfilment of conditions precedent to the disbursement.



## Impact of Bank Assistance

The impact of Bank assistance is unsatisfactory. Fifteen years of State capacity-building by the Bank certainly averted the collapse of the State but failed to generate inclusive growth. The private sector, mostly SME/SMLs in high potential sectors like agro-industry and energy, can play a greater strategic role alongside the State to improve the results of development projects.

**The impact of the Bank's assistance during the period was unsatisfactory.** The incidence of poverty fell from 48% in 2006 to 45% in 2017. Maternal and infant mortality fell but life expectancy rose (from 51 years to 55.9 years). The Gender Inequality Index fell from 0.723 in 2005 to 0.678 in 2017, while the Gini Index on income inequality declined by 0.03 points between 2006 and 2017. Thanks to the Bank assistance, the travel time between Bamako and San Pedro Port reduced by two hours, increasing the corridor's share of international trade, which was around 35% initially. As part of the SREP Program, the Bank initiated baseline studies on rural electrification and regional/back-up interconnections which gave rise to three projects in the CSP 2015-2019. Although access to DWSS is far from universal as planned, the Bank contributed to the construction of a network of key infrastructure in Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou (410 new boreholes with MP,<sup>54</sup> 13,154 individual sanitation facilities and 113 public latrines) and the rehabilitation of 220 MP boreholes and 97 tank/interceptor wells. Service was extended to 720 villages, with approximately 460,000 and 109,500 more people having access to drinking water and sanitation at home respectively. This result is questionable. Before the project in 2006, the drinking water access rate was 70%, 50% and 44% respectively<sup>55</sup> in Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou. But now it has dropped to 54.6% on average, which is below the initial target of 57%. Table 5 provides some statistics.

**As part of its mandate, the Bank contributed satisfactorily to mitigate the drivers of insecurity in the country.** After stopping operations after the March 2012 coup d'état, the Bank promptly responded with flexible budget support operations and an emergency humanitarian assistance for people affected by the food and security crisis in northern Mali. It designed the 2013-2014 Transition Management Support Strategy with the GoM and participated in preparing the first plan in 2015 and 2016 as well as in the Joint Identification and Evaluation Mission (MIEC), alongside the other partners of Mali.

## Consideration of Crosscutting Aspects

**Consideration by the Bank of crosscutting issues linked to environmental protection, resilience, gender and youth employment is satisfactory, with the inclusion of explicit goals related thereto.** Although these aspects are considered at several levels in CSPs and Bank operations (presentation and analysis of CSP context, pillars, rationale, and objectives or outcomes), they are not adequately captured by environmental, gender or youth employment indicators. The composition of CSP preparation teams is still inadequate to capture them. Concerning operations, all water and sanitation, energy and transport sector projects have explicit goals for gender, youth employment and resilience-building. The proportion is 80%, 52% and 50% for social, governance and agriculture sector operations respectively. In the social sector, projects are mostly executed by women and the needs of girls are taken into account in the construction of school latrines. Female-specific IGAs were also financed, contributing to enhancing gender equality.

**Table 5:** Frequency of Late Preparation and Commencement of Operations in Mali (2005-2019)<sup>61</sup>

	Delay between approval and signature <sup>62</sup>	Delay between signature and effectiveness <sup>63</sup>	Delay between signature and first disbursement <sup>64</sup>
Private sector operations	33%	0%	10%
Public sector operations	11%	31%	26%

Source: AfDB internal SAP PS data, 2019

## Performance of the Government of Mali

Government's performance for harmonization, aid coordination and fulfilment of commitments to the Bank was satisfactory. However, the malfunctions of Government departments and project implementation units led to the cancellation of 8 operations, making 11% of the portfolio.

### **Aid coordination and harmonization are satisfactory, thanks to the efforts of technical and financial partners (TFPs) than to the Government.**

There are three levels of coordination: (a) global coordination around CREDD; (b) sector and thematic coordination around 12 thematic groups; and (c) the "floating" level made up of ad hoc groups<sup>66</sup>. This coordination mechanism strengthens policy dialogue and the harmonization of interventions. It is animated by the Troika (composed of 3 TFPs each year), thematic/sector groups and the Technical Pool (TFP secretariat). Mali and the Troika have held on average 4 meetings every year between 2013 and 2019. Many other dialogue frameworks extended to non-State actors were put in place. All sectors combined, 33 TFP meetings were held from 2005 to 2015 and 22 from 2015-2019.

### **Communication among Mali's development partners is satisfactory.**

Collaboration and information exchanges are done mostly within the coordination bodies described earlier. Regarding the AfDB/EU PAGODA, communication is unsatisfactory due to the reduced number of missions undertaken by the Bank's energy experts who are not based in Mali. Both institutions –

AfDB and EU – are kept abreast of developments during their respective missions through meetings initiated by either of them, telephone calls or formal/electronic mail, which encourages joint financing and facilitates the implementation and monitoring of jointly financed operations.

### **The Government of Mali fulfilled its commitments to the Bank satisfactorily.**

Ongoing dialogue within the Troika and other aid coordination bodies encourages GoM to honor its commitments towards TFPs. The reality is different from one sector to another. In agriculture, all commitments were fulfilled, albeit late. Overall, 87.5% of commitments (4 out of 5 projects) were fulfilled in the social sector; 80% (24 out of 30 projects) in the energy sector, 75%<sup>67</sup> in governance (multisector) and 57% in water and sanitation. In the transport sector, the GoM implemented two-thirds of its commitments under the CSPs, progressing significantly over past periods marked by reform inertia. During the 2005-2019 period, 8 of the 72 operations (11%) were cancelled due to Government's failure to comply with its commitments and delays in other operations.

## Bank's Institutional Performance

### **The Bank's institutional performance has been unsatisfactory due to repeated portfolio management-related problems.**

Nevertheless, the Bank aligned its resources with country priorities. Communities were involved in the design and implementation of most sector operations, but non-State actors are left out in the policy dialogue process during the preparation of CSPs.

**The Bank involved all stakeholders, albeit unsatisfactorily, in the design, implementation and monitoring of interventions.** The Bank's strategic choices as stated in CSPs are the result of the process of policy dialogue initiated by the government. Non-State actors (civil society and the private sector) deplored their absence during these discussions. Some ministries deemed their participation marginal during this process, pointing accusing fingers at the virtual monopoly of the Ministry of Economy and Finances. In October 2019, drawing early lessons from this evaluation, the Bank involved these actors in the policy dialogue during the 2020-2024 CSP preparation mission fielded by the Bank in Bamako. At the level of projects, the parties concerned were systematically involved via diverse participatory mechanisms depending on the sector concerned (public consultation, recruitment of local sub-contractors, etc.).


**The Bank satisfactorily mobilized available resources (performance-based allocations, TSF, trust funds, partnerships, joint financing) to support the country's development efforts.** Bank allocations to Mali did not vary significantly from one assistance cycle to another. The number of operations fell by half after the 2012 crisis. The Bank allocated UA 365 million, 213 million and 442 million to the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, SAGT 2013-2014 and CSP 2005-2019, respectively. At the request of Mali's authorities, the Bank mobilized external funds to supplement TSF ADF resources, also opening the Private Sector Window to Mali. Regarding human resources, the proportion of international staff at the Field Office fell as from 2017. During the period, 4 in 10 projects on average were managed from the Bank's Field Office. However, actors continue to deplore the reduced number of supervision missions and the abnormally long time taken to obtain the Bank's no-objection opinion. The net professional vacancy rate is 50%.

In 2005, the Bank regained its place in the energy sector after over one decade of absence. All sectors combined, the Bank was ranked fourth donor and third multilateral donor in 2006. It has led the Energy

sub-group since 2008. It also led TFPs in 2011, the Private Sector Development thematic sub-group since 2012 and the Economy and Finance thematic sub-group from 2013 to 2016.

According to the actors met, the Bank has a comparative advantage due to: (i) its long experience with reforms support programs in emergency post-conflict situations, especially in countries of the sub-region; (ii) its ability to rapidly prepare budget support operations aligned to the priorities of countries in crisis; and (iii) the experience garnered during the implementation of capacity-building projects.

**The at-entry quality of operations remains poor, despite the constant measures featuring in Portfolio Performance Improvement Plans (PPIP).** CSPs have improved over the cycles.<sup>58</sup> The analysis is more relevant, better structured and spotlights key influential factors. The CSP 2015-2019 makes more systematic use of international indicators and available analytical studies. All mid-term CSP and completion reports underline the poor quality at entry of operations and outline improvement measures. In the governance sector, the structure, format and quality of selected indicators, the results-based logical frameworks (RBLF) of operations and the Bank's CSPs have improved significantly after 2013. Dissatisfaction persists concerning the link between outputs and outcomes which is sometimes difficult to establish.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, there is no clear link between the 2 key components of the Bank's governance operations: private sector development and public finance management (PFM).<sup>60</sup> The results chain of each operation is not systematically articulated in appraisal reports with the strategic outcomes of the CSP pillar. Reports merely attach operation names to the indicative program and corresponding CSP pillar. Such marked departure in change theory raises the question of whether the Bank's contribution to the development outcomes obtained by the country can be assessed. Problems are recurrent (occurred 2 to 3 times during the 3 periods), which indicates difficulties in successfully implementing PPIP measures). The potential for improved performance

**Figure 3:** Recurrence of PPIP Measures, 2005-2019

Source: Various CSP completion and portfolio review reports

was stifled by the routine way PPIPs are designed and implemented founded on a “culture of approval” and not one of results. Apart from organizational culture, an inappropriate work environment (incentive systems, availability of resources including leadership) can hinder the successful implementation of the PPIP. There is a need to support project managers to prepare and implement performance improvement plans in a development project management context.

**Timeliness underperformance was highlighted in the above assessment of the efficiency criterion, despite continuous improvement.** The average time from signature to effectiveness of the Mali portfolio is higher than the Bank’s average time but has been improving over the years.

**Integrated projects have a leveraging effect on development effectiveness, judging from the demands of the authorities and project managers.** Integrated projects are projects that offer the target communities a range of services from several sectors in a single package. They include related works in energy and transport infrastructure. All integrated projects in agriculture achieved other development outcomes in addition to the ones planned.

**Public communication, and especially collaboration with the local press and civil society, is highly unsatisfactory.** It does not reflect the Bank’s status as a partner of choice in the eyes of GoM and national opinion. Budgetary constraints were cited to justify the Field Office’s limited engagement with the local media to implement a real communication plan with inserts in local newspapers and other media events. The office has no communication links with civil society. This results in low visibility with the general public. The Bank’s added value is quite clear to the Government, mainly because of its flexibility and specific sensitivity to Mali’s special challenges, despite a diversity of opinions regarding the Bank’s role and potential.

## Fragility and Resilience

Unsatisfactory. The Bank considered fragility in the design and implementation of CSPs and operations post-2012. Significant progress has been made in building the resilience of the State and populations. However, this has been insufficient to sustainably address fragility and achieve inclusive growth.

After the March 2012 coup d'état, the Bank was among the first partners to engage policy dialogue with GoM on fragility issues and support Mali's post-transition efforts. In 2014, then in 2018, it carried out an in-depth qualitative study on the drivers and risks of fragility that hamper the country's development. These studies informed the changes made to the 2012-2017 CSCRP and the formulation of 2013-2014 PRED, which inspired SAGT 2013-2014 and Government's Action Plan 2013-2018 and paved the way for Mali's access to TSF (Transition Support Facility) Pillar I resources. The precedent conditions "Strengthening of peace and security" and "Consolidation of a stable macro-economic framework" are inspired directly by the five categories of fragility actors identified in the above-mentioned study. Apart from the RBCSP 2005-2009/2011, all subsequent CSPs made fragility central to the Bank's assistance strategy in Mali. This mainstreaming is less satisfactory for agriculture, and water and sanitation. At the level of operations, fragility and resilience were more or less taken into account: 12 out of 13 governance projects (92%); 3 out of 4 transport projects<sup>65</sup> (75%); and in 50% of agriculture, social, and water and sanitation

projects. However, the link between the results chain of operations and the expectations of CSP is not always explicit and seamless.

**The Bank made significant progress in addressing fragility and building the country's resilience.** After the 2012 political crisis, the Bank financed an emergency humanitarian assistance operation in 2013 for UA 0.6 million which contributed to meeting the food and medical care needs of 9,200 to 9,700 persons in the affected regions of Gao and Tombouctou. Moreover, 88% of the 366,210 jobs created out of the 620,000 targeted are occupied by young people. Boxes 4 and 5 show the level of resilience capacity-building respectively of the populations through agricultural operations, and the State and economy through budget support and public policy reforms. Table 6 shows that Mali exceeded the targets set for the proportion of PL (professional level) staff and the proportion of projects managed at the Country Office level. The same is true for the average project preparation cost which is 38% less expensive than the target for 2019. But the net professional vacancy rate remains abnormally high in Mali.

#### Box 4: Building the People's Resilience Through Agriculture

The Agricultural Orientation Law (2006) and the Rural Development Master Plan were adopted as part of the implementation of the RBCSP 2005-2011. Cereal production increased by 54%, from 3 750 000 tons in 2005 to 5 777 728 tons in 2011. The food security stock soared by 144% (AfDB, 2011). The Baguinéda Irrigation Scheme Intensification Project (GDP) increased the production of rice (77%), maize (523%), tomato (375%) and onion (194%) (Annex 8) (AfDB, 2012). As part of the implementation of the 2013-2014 TMSS, the Bank provided nearly 711 tons of food to about 9 200 insecure households. The Multinational Support Project for the Cotton-Textile Subsector (PAFICOT) contributed to the surge in yields for cotton (16%), maize (102%), sorghum (45%) and millet (102%) (AfDB, 2016). The Regional Project on Sustainable Management of Endemic Ruminant Livestock (PROGEBE) helped to boost milk (23%) and meat (26%) production (Annex 8) through genetic improvement and the conservation of the natural habitat of ruminant livestock (AfDB, 2017). The Project in Support of the Development of Animal Production in the South-Kayes Area (PADEPA-KS) improved access to pastoral infrastructure through the construction of vaccination parks, slaughter areas, livestock markets, feed storage stores, and 130 kilometres of rural roads (AfDB, 2017). The CSP 2015-2019 led to the creation of 52 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 5 095 new jobs, especially for youth and women (AfDB, 2019). Rice and cereal production exceeded the target by 53% and 28%, respectively. The Bank helped to strengthen food and nutrition security by increasing the average yields of paddy rice to 13.68 tons/ha, of tomatoes and onions to 155.15 tons/ha, and of potatoes to 44 tons/ha. These increases amounted to an additional crop production of 93 144.99 tons and animal production of 578.68 tons.

### Box 5: Building the Capacity of the State and the Economy

With Bank support, program budgeting is practised in all ministries in accordance with WAEMU public financial management guidelines. A 2015-2017 strategic and operational reform action plan was developed and implemented. Government services have procedure manuals. As part of the private sector development support effort, 52 SMEs were established and 5 095 jobs created, particularly for young people and women. According to a senior Government official, "PAGE is one of the projects that the Government is proud of because not only was it designed to meet the needs of the beneficiaries but was implemented with their involvement in a highly participatory manner. Consequently, the project has achieved very good results."

**Table 6:** Some Indicators of the Fragility-Related Outcomes Measurement Framework

Indicators	AfDB (2013)	Fragility Situation	
		Target 2019	Mali 2019
<b>Decentralization: Coming closer to clients</b>			
Professional staff in charge of operations (%)	39	15	24
Projects managed from field offices (%)	50	50	64*
<b>Human Resources: hire and mobilize staff</b>			
Proportion of female staff (%)			18
Proportion of female management staff (%)			6
Proportion of women in the professional category (%)	27	40	
Net rate of vacancy — Professional staff positions (%)	6	<5	50
<b>Resource optimization: higher profitability</b>			
Loan project preparation cost (UA Thousand)	71	80	50

\*This statistic concerns the period after the adoption of the Strategy for Addressing Fragility in June 2014.

Source: Administrative data of the Bank Country Office in Mali, December 2018.

## Bank's Self-Evaluation System

The Bank's self-evaluation system is deemed unsatisfactory. Apart from issues related to accessibility and data quality, it is not clear how it contributes to learning for greater development impact.

**The self-evaluation system<sup>66</sup> is not effective for projects and country strategies.<sup>67</sup>** All combined CSP and CPPR reports and combined mid-term CSP and CPPR reports are available. Reports on operations were prepared but are hard to get independently since task managers must approve their release.<sup>68</sup> When available, these internal documents provide more information on the outputs delivered than they do on credible data on development results (outcomes) at the level of the target groups.

**From an operational point of view, the self-evaluation system is relevant and coherent.** It feeds into the Bank's performance measurement framework and helps establish the Bank's flagship publication: the Annual Development Effectiveness Review. The evaluation team did not have independent access to this database. At its request, the Bank's Corporate Results Department (NRDS) provided a picture of the Bank's performance over a period (2006-2018) close to the evaluation period (2005-2019). The Bank's project information system (SAP PS) did not allow the extraction of all the portfolio data required for results-based monitoring.

**The self-evaluation system's contribution to learning and the scope of development could not be measured with accuracy.** The outlines required for each CSP stage and project cycle guarantee

learning. Thanks to the CSP mid-term reviews, portfolio performance reviews and supervisions, PPIP action plans could be assessed and updated and the necessary assistance provided to project teams on the ground. The measures recommended in the PPIPs of CSP mid-term review and completion reports are often carried forward from year to year because problems persist from one year to the other. The evaluation was unable to determine the cause of this situation: insufficient learning, lack of incentive or unsuitable conditions for the implementation of recommendations. One weakness of self-evaluation

is the absence of adversarial analysis. Reports often prioritize the points of view of task managers at the level of the Bank and implementation teams in the country. The other stakeholders are marginally involved, if at all. The Bank is struggling to promote appropriate institutional arrangements that give substance to a real culture of results and quality. The database on the performance and results of the SNDR lacks certain key indicators for assessing Bank assistance to the country, which limits the effectiveness of data triangulation.





# Conclusions

The Bank has achieved notable results in terms of the relevance of its assistance, the promotion of ownership and mechanisms for environmental and social sustainability. However, a significant effort remains to be made in improving operational effectiveness and achieving development results.

Operations related to crosscutting issues need to be better articulated with the results expected at the level of the CSP pillars. The Bank would be more effective if learning is placed at the heart of the self-evaluation system rather than compliance with the required frameworks.

## Relevance

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
1. To what extent were the CSP priorities aligned to the directions of the Mali's national development policy, the choice of Mali's authorities and the needs of the target populations'? To what extent is the national context taken into account in the CSP?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> All CSPs are explicitly aligned with the thrusts of national development policies. The goals of all operations approved between 2005 and 2019 in all sectors are explicitly connected with one or several components of the national reference strategy, except for the social sector. The choice of multisector projects and related infrastructure project works made it possible to provide the basic services demanded by the populations. However, civil society and the private sector deplore the lack of attention from the Bank. The Bank's assistance strategies were based on the fragility factors that the country was facing.

## Effectiveness

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
2. To what extent has the Bank's strategy in Mali achieved the expected results? To what extent have the projects implemented contributed to the strategic results set out in the CSPs?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> Most of the performance indicator target levels of the priorities "Feed Africa", "Industrialize Africa" and "Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa" were not met between 2006 and 2018, although the strategic goals of CSPs (pillars) were met.
3. To what extent have the projects made it possible to meet the needs of the populations and the expectations of the Government of Mali, especially in areas exposed to insecurity?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> At the height of the crisis in 2013, the Bank strengthened people's livelihoods and put in place the infrastructure necessary for access to basic public services, including in the northern regions. Its budget support helped to restore fragile state capacity. The system for monitoring and evaluating the results of development operations remains to be perfected. Effectiveness is more problematic in the water and sanitation and social sectors.
4. What were the internal and external operational difficulties faced by the projects in Mali that limited the results of Bank interventions (low staff numbers, high staff turnover, long response time to requests for ANO/administrative delays, division of labor and coordination between COML and HQ, synergy between departments and articulation of sector strategies, etc.)? What are the internal and external factors that contributed to the achievement of the results?	Political conflicts, armed violence, resistance to reforms and increased corruption within certain public administrations complicate the context of Bank assistance to Mali. Operational difficulties are recurrent at the level of both the Government, the project implementation units and the Bank, despite repeated measures to improve portfolio performance without making any significant changes.

## Sustainability

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
5. What is the level of ownership of Bank projects, especially agricultural projects?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> Beneficiaries and endogenous actors were involved in all operations from the design stage to implementation. All the completed agricultural projects involved the beneficiaries in the choice of sites and implementation monitoring. All PIUs are integrated into their supervisory ministries, which guarantees the capitalization of know-how and ownership of materials and equipment acquired by the projects. Various mechanisms were put in place to ensure the sustainability of project assets. Mechanisms for mobilizing local revenue to ensure the upkeep and maintenance of project works/services post completion are few and far between; where they exist, management transparency must be monitored.
6. To what extent have the Bank interventions strengthened or mobilized local capacity? In what areas was capacity built?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> Nearly 3 of the 4 projects provided training, logistical support or technical assistance. Budget support strengthened the public finance management capacity of public administrations.
7. To what extent has the Bank ensured compliance with its environmental and social standards?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The Bank ensured compliance with the required environmental and social safeguards. The PIUs concerned have an ESMP monitoring officer and some have a dedicated budget for environmental and social monitoring which guarantees the good operation of the whole arrangement. Due to budgetary constraints, the Bank did not honor its obligations under the adopted action plan to resolve disputes sparked by land grabbing and non-compliance with the Project M3 compensation measures.

## Efficiency

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
8. What is the impact of choosing to carry out integrated projects on the efficiency of implementation, that is, the integration of several different service sectors and the concentration of interventions in a smaller geographical area?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The authorities and project managers want multi-sector operations that offer several basic services to target populations at once since this brings efficiency gains by avoiding more operations in the portfolio. There is no data on the impact of targeting smaller territories.
9. To what extent has the Bank complied with deadlines and budgets allocated for the implementation of its interventions?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> Nearly 3 out of 4 projects stayed within the initial budget, and almost 3 out of 5 are behind schedule. Disbursement rates all stand below 90% with an average of 62%. All sectors are affected by this poor performance, but the case of the social and water and sanitation sectors is more disturbing.

## Impact

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
10. What impact do the Bank's interventions have on the populations and inequalities (regions, Gender, poverty, etc.)?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> The main contribution has been the strengthening of the network of basic socio-economic infrastructure in agriculture, for water and sanitation, transport and energy. The travel time between Bamako and the Port of San Pedro has been shortened to by two hours, increasing the share of this corridor in international trade. The country is interconnected to the sub-region's electricity network. The Bank has constructed significant individual drinking water and sanitation infrastructure in Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou. Thanks to the Bank support, conditions were put in place for private sector development and the creation of SMEs and jobs, mostly for women and youth. Fifteen years of State capacity-building prevented its collapse, but this did not bring about inclusive growth. The private sector represents a strategic opportunity for the Bank to achieve more development results. However, there is no rigorous system for measuring development results.
11. To what extent have the Bank's interventions, including budget support, contributed to reducing insecurity?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The Bank contributed to alleviating the sources of insecurity in the country through an emergency humanitarian assistance in 2013 and by safeguarding rural livelihoods through agricultural operations and credits granted to SME/SMLs on lines of credit put in place.

## Performance of the Government of Mali

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
12. How effective has harmonization and donor coordination been in Mali? What is the level of complementarity of the Bank's interventions with those of GoM's other partners?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> Harmonization and donor coordination are driven more by the Technical and Financial Partners than Government. The Bank is a leading participant mostly in the energy sector where it has regained its place, after over a decade of absence.
13. Is communication between Mali's development partners suitable? How to exchange information for more effective collaboration, especially in the framework of AfDB/EU PAGODA?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> Collaboration and information sharing are mostly done within the Troika, thematic groups, but also via electronic mail and telephone calls. TFPs deplore the physical distance of the Energy Expert.
14. To what extent has GoM fulfilled its commitments under the CSPs?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The Government of Mali met its commitments towards the Bank. However, 8 out of 72 operations (11%) were cancelled during the reporting period, for non-compliance with the agreed conditions. Regular consultation with TFPs encourages Government to keep its commitments.

## Bank's Institutional Performance

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
15. To what extent did the Bank involve all stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of its interventions? Are CSPs imposed on the country and beneficiaries?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> Civil society and the private sector found their participation inadequate during policy dialogue and projects. The Bank involves national stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of its operations.
16. Are the Bank's procedures and resources adequate for the ambitions of Mali's CSPs, including the ADF resource allocation level, seeing their budgetary needs? Is COML non-operations budget commensurate with its role as a first-choice partner of GoM? To what extent could COML use project resources to participate in events that are important for the country?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The Bank mobilized available resources to support the country's development efforts. Net Bank allocations to Mali in the 2005-2019 period rose to UA 730 million, increasing by nearly 40% compared to the 1994-2014 period (UA 554 million). COML was understaffed with a net professional vacancy rate of 50% in December 2019.
17. To what extent did the Bank's interventions consider crosscutting issues such as the environment, resilience, gender and youth employment?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The Bank's CSPs and operations have explicit objectives related to the environment, resilience, gender and youth employment. However, the composition of CSP and project preparation teams is sometimes inadequate for such matters.
18. Did integrated projects create a leveraging effect by producing more significant development outcomes? To what extent did the introduction of ancillary features in projects (thematic/sector integration) improved the satisfaction of the needs of populations in the project areas?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> The authorities and project managers want multi-sector operations that offer several basic services to the target population at once. However, most of the performance indicator target levels for the priorities: "Feed Africa", "Industrialize Africa" and "Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa" were not met between 2006 and 2018.
19. Are the Bank's communication efforts and the resulting level of visibility / notoriety enough to position the Bank favorably in Mali? How do the target populations (final beneficiaries) perceive the Bank's assistance?	<b>Very unsatisfactory.</b> The Bank has renown despite its low visibility; its presence in the local press does not reflect its operations on the ground and the image it conveys as a partner of choice. COML points to budget constraints to justify the communication deficit in the local media and civil society.

## Fragility and Resilience

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
20. To what extent was fragility reflected in the design of the Bank's CSPs and operations in Mali?	<b>Very satisfactory.</b> Two out of 3 CSPs are built on assistance pillars aiming to address fragility and build the resilience of the State, the populations and the economy. This stems directly from knowledge derived from studies of the drivers of fragility in the country.
21. To what extent have the CSPs and the corresponding operations achieved their goal of helping to reduce fragility and build the resilience of the country?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> The Bank has made significant progress in terms of building the resilience of the State and the population, but this remains inadequate to sustainably address fragility and achieve inclusive growth.

## Bank's Self-Evaluation System

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions
22. What was the performance of the self-evaluation systems and process at the level of projects and country strategies?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> Most expected reports on CSPs and operations are produced but are not readily accessible. The Bank's project related information system (SAP PS) is not flexible to accommodate the needs of different stakeholder categories.
23. To what extent were self-evaluation systems and processes relevant and coherent?	<b>Satisfactory.</b> The system is coherent but lacks information on the results obtained by development projects.
24. To what extent were self-evaluation systems and processes efficient, effective and how did they impact the quality of development and organizational learning?	<b>Unsatisfactory.</b> The system's use for both individual and organizational learning for greater impact is marginal. It participates more in a "culture of approval" than in a committed effort based on results.





# Key Lessons

1. It is possible to blend selectiveness and flexibility in the configuration of the Bank's assistance. In Mali, the Bank has (for over 30 years) chosen to devote one-quarter or more of allocated resources to agriculture, another quarter or more to multisector operations that offer target communities a wide range of basic services to meet their varied needs (or 57% to 82% of allocated resources to two sectors). This also leads the country's authorities and national opinion to recognize that they have "a faithful friend" who helps in difficult times on what is perceived as important at this time.
2. The Bank can achieve significant and concrete results, even in difficult contexts, when:
  - a. It develops strategies and operations in a participatory manner with the Government and civil society;
  - b. It develops projects in synergy with other TFPs;
  - c. It establishes clear results frameworks based on which results can be monitored and measured;
  - d. It adopts more flexible approaches in fragile situations; and
  - e. It responds quickly to emergencies.
3. Effective collaboration between the Bank and other TFPs is indispensable for Mali's development, even without the leadership of the government of the country.
4. Building State capacity considered as the sole actor is inadequate to create inclusive growth in Mali. Although over 30 years of Bank assistance in this option prevented the collapse of the State, the results of development operations are not significant. The Malian private sector, including SME/SMIs, is maybe a strategic opportunity for the Bank to achieve bigger development outcomes.
5. To achieve higher performance levels, more is needed than just identifying bottlenecks and preparing a portfolio performance improvement plan for operations. The Bank has been raising the same problems in several CSPs and adopted similar or identical improvement measures but without much success. Other ingredients are necessary. Should the internal constraints of the team itself be first addressed? Should the team move from the "culture of approval" to one of results, where each daily task is justified by an explicit institutional result?





# Recommendations

## Greater Impact of the Bank on the Country's Development

1. Increase the private sector's share in the portfolio, mostly in sectors of the real economy with high growth potential like agro-industry, transport and energy. This includes encouragement and support to expedite the study of projects initiated by private enterprises.
2. Increase the Bank's contribution to knowledge by conducting more ESWs and build data collection capacity so that sector choices and operational designs should be based on cogent and credible factual data.

## Media Presence and Enhanced Field Office Engagement with Different Categories of Development Partners in Mali

3. Develop and implement in the Country Office a communication and civil society involvement plan; The Office could develop products like a prospectus on the results of each operation (using the incident mapping or collection method).

## Better performance in the implementation of operations

4. Review current PPIP design and implementation practices and, if possible, involve an independent facilitator; this facilitator will help the Office to determine why measures adopted every year in PPIPs since 2005 have not had any significant impact and find a holistic solution to portfolio management problems that hinder the achievement of the Bank's development outcomes in the country.
5. Encourage project managers to take full advantage of the lessons of the operations academy to improve the quality at entry of operations: systematically articulate the results of each operation with the results of the pillar to which they contribute; create a coherent and feasible framework for measuring results, especially with clear links between outputs and outcomes (assessable); define mechanisms for beneficiary ownership and sustainability of project achievements; conduct financial evaluation; and examine critical aspects of project management (human resources, etc.). Project managers will organize the same type of training sessions for national implementation teams following procedures suited to the country context and available resources. These measures will strengthen results-based management and enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency.





## Annex 1: Mali's Macro-Economic and Social Data (AfDB)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	West Africa (2019)	Africa (2019)
<b>Basic information</b>																	
Area ('000 Km2)	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	1 220	5 032	29 527
Total population ('000)	12 775	13 203	13 651	14 113	14 581	15 049	15 514	15 979	16 449	16 934	17 438	17 965	18 512	19 077	19 658	386 908	1 306 320
Urban population ('000)	4 103	4 342	4 596	4 863	5 141	5 426	5 718	6 018	6 327	6 648	6 985	7 338	7 708	8 093	8 493	181 869	565 871
Rural population (% of Total population)	67.9%	67.1%	66.3%	65.5%	64.7%	63.9%	63.1%	62.3%	61.5%	60.7%	59.9%	59.1%	58.4%	57.6%	56.8%	53.0%	56.7%
Population density (per km2)	10.47	10.82	11.19	11.57	11.95	12.33	12.71	13.10	13.48	13.88	14.29	14.72	15.17	15.64	16.11	76.87	44.24
Gross National Income per capita (US \$)	390.00	410.00	470.00	520.00	560.00	600.00	610.00										
Labor market participation - Total (%)	37.60	37.51	37.45	37.42	37.40	37.40	37.28	37.22	37.18	37.16	37.06	37.12	37.19	37.31	37.47	34.05	38.14
Human Development Index (Out of 188 countries)							175.00	176.00	176.00	179.00	175.00		182.00				
Gini index		38.99				33.02											
Percentage of undernourishment (% of population)	11.10	9.80	8.60	7.70	7.20	6.90	6.70	6.40	5.90	5.60	5.70	6.00	6.30				
<b>Demographic Indicators</b>																	
Population Growth Rate - Total (%)	3.29	3.35	3.39	3.39	3.31	3.21	3.09	3.00	2.94	2.94	2.98	3.02	3.04	3.05	3.04	2.69	2.52
Urban population growth rate (%)	5.79	5.83	5.85	5.81	5.71	5.55	5.38	5.24	5.13	5.08	5.07	5.06	5.03	5.00	4.94	3.77	3.31

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	West Africa (2019)	Africa (2019)
Population <15 years (%)	46.87	47.08	47.24	47.36	47.44	47.49	47.72	47.87	47.95	47.97	47.95	47.85	47.72	47.54	47.30	43.41	40.04
Population ≥ 65 years (%)	2.93	2.90	2.87	2.84	2.80	2.74	2.71	2.66	2.62	2.57	2.53	2.52	2.51	2.51	2.50	2.81	3.61
Dependency ratio (%)	97.60	98.01	98.22	98.22	97.97	97.46	97.56	97.28									
Sex ratio (per 100 woman)	99.08	99.24	99.40	99.56	99.69	99.80	99.87	99.91	99.94	99.97	100.02	100.08	100.16	100.24	100.32	102.27	100.27
Female population aged 15-49 (% total population)	22.22	22.15	22.11	22.08	22.07	22.08	22.01	21.98	21.98	21.99	22.02	22.08	22.14	22.21	22.31	23.32	24.17
Life expectancy at birth - Total (year)	49.00	49.40	49.80	50.20	50.61	51.03	51.44										
Life expectancy at birth - Female (year)	52.68	53.46	54.17	54.81	55.38	55.87	56.33	56.77	57.23	57.70	58.19	58.70	59.19	59.65	60.09	59.10	65.34
Crude birth rate (per 1,000)	48.53	48.22	47.84	47.40	43.90	43.90	43.90	43.90									
Crude death rate (per 1,000)	16.37	16.03	15.67	15.30	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50									
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000)	105.98	104.13	102.27	100.41	98.55	96.71	94.90	93.12									
Fertility rate (per woman)	6.79	6.76	6.72	6.67	6.61	6.55	6.47	6.40	6.32	6.23	6.15	6.06	5.97	5.88	5.79	5.09	4.35
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000)	714.00	707.00	697.00	674.00	652.00	630.00	617.00	617.00	610.00	601.00	587.00						
Woman using contraception (%)	7.70	7.80	8.20	8.70	9.20	9.60	10.20	10.70	11.60	12.50	13.50	14.20	14.90	15.60	16.30	21.10	38.37
<b>Access to basic services</b>																	
Access to electricity - total (%)	17.90	16.60	20.80	22.27	24.03	25.28	26.86	25.60	30.13	33.00	37.60	39.75	43.09				
Access to electricity in rural areas (%)	3.32	1.54	3.45	3.40	5.65	-	-	-	0.07	2.71	7.28	9.31	11.71				


	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	West Africa (2019)	Africa (2019)
Access to drinking water sources - Total (%)	56.70	58.70	60.80	62.80	64.80	66.90	68.90	70.90	73.00	75.00	77.00					72.62	71.61
Access to sources of drinking water in rural areas (%)	46.10	47.90	49.70	51.50	53.30	55.10	56.90	58.70	60.50	62.30	64.10					61.59	60.38
Access to health facilities - Total (%)	20.20	20.60	21.10	21.50	22.00	22.40	22.90	23.30	23.80	24.20	24.70					25.26	39.67
Access to health facilities in rural areas (%)	13.30	13.60	13.80	14.10	14.40	14.70	15.00	15.30	15.50	15.80	16.10					18.01	31.27
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)	6.34	6.56	6.98	6.74	6.85	6.88	6.82	5.80	7.14								
<b>Environment and Agriculture</b>																	
Agricultural land (% of total area)	33.10	33.16	33.27	33.23	33.23	33.64	34.13	34.13	33.77	33.77	33.77	33.77	33.77				
Woman in agriculture (% of employed women)	40.02	54.29	53.68	54.92	54.48	54.62	53.80	54.38	52.04	51.95	51.52	51.56	51.21	50.85	50.53		
CO2 emissions (Metric ton per capita)	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08							
<b>Education</b>																	
Gross Enrollment Rate (%)																	
Primary education - Total	73.94	76.76	79.29	81.27	82.71	83.43	84.20	80.91	76.06	77.08	75.68	77.17	80.17	75.60		89.47	102.96
Primary education - Women	64.96	68.39	71.31	73.83	75.67	76.95	78.27	75.42		72.40	71.54	72.29	75.64	71.60		86.89	100.59
Secondary education - Total	25.83	27.71	30.31	33.73	36.67	39.29	41.23		41.82	44.02	41.72	42.99	41.52	41.03		44.09	46.47
Secondary education - Women	19.64	21.04	23.99	26.39	28.97	31.94	33.85		36.67	37.41	36.84	36.61	37.07	37.00		40.91	43.16

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	West Africa (2019)	Africa (2019)
Percentage of GDP in education (%)	3.52			3.42	3.87	3.34	3.75	3.48	3.28	3.65	3.80	3.10					
<b>Macroeconomic indicators</b>																	
Real GDP growth (%)	6.53	4.66	3.49	4.77	4.68	5.41	3.20	(0.80)	2.30	7.00	6.00	5.80	5.40	4.70	5.00	3.74	3.43
Inflation (%)	6.40	1.54	1.41	9.10	2.22	1.40	3.10	5.30	(0.60)	0.90	1.50	(1.80)	1.80	1.70	0.43	8.90	9.20
Growth rate per capita (%)	3.15	1.27	0.10	1.34	1.32	2.14	0.11	(3.69)	(0.63)	3.94	2.93	2.70	2.29	1.60	1.90	1.02	0.88
Import of goods and services (% of GDP)	34.92	36.19	37.82	40.99	34.05	38.00	29.72	31.80	39.93	38.14	39.62	40.35	35.97	34.00	37.37	21.55	29.80
Export of goods and services (% of GDP)	22.99	28.43	24.15	25.27	21.73	22.84	22.73	27.86	25.34	22.56	24.04	23.45	22.11	22.96	23.24	17.47	23.87
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(8.83)	(5.56)	(8.59)	(10.89)	(6.43)	(11.14)	(5.06)	(2.19)	(2.89)	(4.71)	(5.32)	(7.25)	(6.45)	(4.10)	(5.43)	(1.88)	(4.15)

Source: AfDB Data Portal. Download at: <https://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/nbyenxf/afdb-socio-economic-database-1960-2020>

# Annex 2: Chronology of Salient Events in Mali (2001-2019)

## Evaluation Period 2005-2019



Source: Authors



## Annex 3: Detailed Methodological Note

### Evaluation Approach

This evaluation focuses on using the results and the evaluation process itself to inform decisions and improve performance (Patton 2008).<sup>69</sup> It has been designed to: (i) give credible answers to stakeholders' questions; (ii) influence the Bank's and Malian authorities' practices in the design and implementation of the assistance strategy and development actions; and (iii) strengthen the country's program assessment capacity (Figure A3.1).

Using a participatory approach with all stakeholders, the team defined the period to be covered, evaluation questions of specific interest and factors to consider in methodological choices to culminate in credible results. An exploratory scoping mission was undertaken in the country from 3 to 8 December 2018 to elicit and/or deepen ownership of the exercise by those concerned and prepare its adoption into the practices of national actors and the Bank. With the support of the Bank Field Office in Mali (COML), the review team organized semi-structured interviews<sup>70</sup> with 44 stakeholders<sup>71</sup> in Mali, 16% of them women, spread in 14 structures (excluding the Bank Office) as follows: Government departments (43%), Technical and Financial Partners (22%), the private sector (14%), civil society (14%) and consultants (7%).

### Review Period

The review period is from 2005 to 2019. The most recent review of the Bank assistance in Mali covered the 1994-2004<sup>72</sup> period and the next CSP is planned for 2020-2024.

### Purpose of the Evaluation

This evaluation concerns the Bank's assistance in Mali (Table A3.1). Each CSP presents a results chain at three levels and response measures in the form of operations (programs and projects) grouped into priority output areas or pillars.

Some results were obtained by operations which had not been approved under the 2005-2019 portfolio. These are operations approved before 2005 but completed or closed between 2005 and 2019 due to delayed implementation. As a result, this evaluation concerns (a) operations approved between 2005 and 2019 and not cancelled (Annex 4); and (b) operations approved before 2005 and completed or closed between 2005 and 2019 (Annex 5). Table A3.1 below summarizes the situation of operations under review.

### Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The team used the Preskill and Jones method (2009:5<sup>73</sup>)<sup>74</sup> to finalize the evaluation questions based on (a) the priority concerns of respondents about Bank strategies and programs in Mali, and (b) the commitments of IDEV (2020) concerning ESPPs.<sup>75</sup> The concerns raised by various categories of respondents were collected through semi-structured individual or group interviews (SSI) conducted during the above-mentioned exploratory scoping mission. The ensuing questions (Table A3.2) have to do with the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact at the three levels of outputs (Figure A3.2). They also concern the performance of the Government of Mali and that of the Bank.





Figure A3.1: Contribution of the 2005-2019 CSPE to the Bank's Enhanced Effectiveness

Figure A3.2: Output Levels of Bank Assistance



Source: IDEV (2016 :15)

Table A3.1: Operations Covered by the evaluation

Sector	Approved Operations (2005-2019)					Operations approved before 2005 and completed 2005-2019	Total Operations Concerned
	Number of Approved Operations	Number of Ongoing Operations	Number of Completed Operations	Number of Closed Operations	Sub-total		
Agriculture	0	12	4	1	17	26	43
Finance	0	3	0	0	3	0	3
Multisector	1	2	16	0	19	2	21
Energy	0	4	2	0	6	0	6
Social	2	2	2	0	6	11	17
Transport	4	2	2	0	8	3	11
Water and Sanitation	0	2	3	0	5	3	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>109</b>

Source: Data AfDB SAP PS (2019)

Table A3.2: Evaluation questions

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions
Relevance	1. To what extent do the priorities set out in the CSP correspond to the directions of the country's national development policy, the choice of the Malian authorities and the needs of the target populations? To what extent is the national context taken into account in the DSP?
Effectiveness	2. To what extent has the Bank's strategy in Mali achieved the expected results? To what extent have the projects implemented contributed to the strategic results set out in the CSPs?
	3. To what extent have the projects met the needs of the people and the expectations of the Government of Mali, particularly in areas exposed to insecurity?
	4. What were the internal and external operational difficulties faced by the projects in Mali that limited the results of the Bank's interventions (low staff number, high turnover of staff, long response times to requests for ANO/administrative delays, division of labor and coordination between COML and HQ, synergy between departments and articulation of sector strategies, etc.)? What are the internal and external factors that contributed to the achievement of the results?
Sustainability	5. What is the level of ownership of the Bank's projects, especially agricultural projects?
	6. To what extent have the Bank's interventions strengthened or mobilized local capacity? In what areas was capacity built?
	7. To what extent has the Bank ensured compliance with its environmental and social standards?
Efficiency	8. What is the impact of the choosing to carry out integrated projects on the efficiency of implementation, i.e. the integration of several different service sectors and the concentration of interventions in a smaller geographical area?
	9. To what extent has the Bank complied with the deadlines and budgets allocated for the implementation of its interventions?
Impact	10. What is the impact of the Bank's interventions on populations and inequality (regions, gender, poverty, etc.)?
	11. To what extent have the Bank's interventions, including budget support, contributed to reducing insecurity?
Effectiveness - institutional performance of the Government of Mali	12. To what extent are donor harmonization and coordination effective in Mali? What is the level of complementarity of the Bank's interventions with those of the other GoM partners?
	13. Is communication between partners in Mali's development suitable? How to exchange information for more effective collaboration, especially in the framework of AfDB/EU PAGODA?
	14. To what extent has the GoM fulfilled its commitments under the CSPs?
Effectiveness - Bank's institutional performance	15. To what extent has the Bank involved all stakeholders in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of its interventions? Are CSPs imposed on the country and beneficiaries?
	16. Are the Bank's procedures and resources adequate for the ambitions of Mali's CSPs. including the ADF resource allocation level. seeing their budgetary needs? Is COML non operations budget. commensurate with its role as a first-choice partner of GoM? To what extent could COML use project resources to participate in events that are important for the country?
	17. To what extent did the Bank's interventions consider crosscutting issues such as the environment, resilience, gender and youth employment?
	18. Did integrated projects create a leveraging effect by producing more significant development outcomes? To what extent did the introduction of ancillary features in projects (thematic/sector integration) improved the satisfaction of the needs of populations in the project areas?
	19. Are the Bank's communication efforts and the resulting level of visibility / notoriety enough to position the Bank favorably in Mali? How do the target populations (final beneficiaries) perceive the Bank's assistance?

Source: Interviews with stakeholders (Dec. 2018).

### Box A3.1: Questions Related to Ongoing Thematic Evaluations

*Independent evaluation of the Bank Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, 2014 – 2019*

**Relevance - F1:** To what extent is fragility reflected in the design of Bank CSPs and operations in Mali?

**Effectiveness - F2:** How far do CSPs and their corresponding operations achieve their goals of contributing to reduce fragility and build resilience in the country?

*Assessing the Bank's self-evaluation systems and processes*

**Effectiveness - A1:** How do the self-evaluation systems and processes perform at the level of projects and country strategies?

**Relevance – A2:** To what extent were self-evaluation systems and processes relevant and coherent?

**Efficiency/Effectiveness/Impact – A3:** To what extent are self-evaluation systems and processes efficient, effective and impact the quality of development and organisational learning?

IDEV added other questions to inform some ongoing thematic evaluations.

### Data and Collection Methods

The evaluation combined some primary data and mostly secondary data. The team conducted 68 interviews including 6 of them in group, face-to-face, with 83 key informants<sup>76</sup> (77%), videoconferencing (4%), telephone (17%) or through a combination of means including email (2%). Most key informants work in the public administrations across the country (69%), at the Bank (13%) or other development partners (11%). This data supplements those collected during the exploratory scoping mission of December 2018. Documents<sup>77</sup> are the main source of evaluation data. The project sites where beneficiaries and project implementation agents are found were not accessible due to the insecurity in the country.<sup>78 79</sup>The Bank's internal document and archive management system (DARMS<sup>80</sup>) was put to use. Other documents were obtained directly from current or former project managers, some of who no longer are in Mali or even at the Bank. Close to 46% of staff currently involved or having participated in the design and/or implementation of projects at one time or another in the project life cycle and who were met shared documentation in their possession, not always available to other actors. The documentation obtained concerns the Bank's sector strategies and assistance/operational strategies in Mali, as well as the country's successive development plans (Annex 14<sup>81</sup>). The latter were obtained directly from interlocutors met in ministries during the exploratory scoping mission or downloaded on the website of the TFP platform in Mali ([www.maliapd.com](http://www.maliapd.com)). Mali's macroeconomic and social statistics (Annex 1) are taken from the Bank's data portal.<sup>82</sup> Data on operations (or projects) is presented in individual briefs.

### Data Analysis and Rating of Evaluation Criteria

Data analysis was guided by the reconstituted evaluation matrix and change theories (Annexes 15-23).<sup>83</sup> The frequencies, sums or averages of each indicator was assessed, depending on whether it was qualitative and quantitative. On that basis, scores were awarded for each criterion in each of the 6 major sectors<sup>84</sup> of Bank assistance in Mali, based on the scoring scheme (Annex 6). To obtain reliable scores, the scoring scheme has a set of quantified indicators for each evaluation question. The final score is the simple arithmetical average, rounded down to the lower value, on a scale of from 1 to 4. The outcome harvesting (Wilson-Grau, 2014<sup>85</sup>; Wilson-Grau and Britt, 2012:1-2)<sup>86</sup> or outcome mapping (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo, 2001: 1 - 19)<sup>87</sup> approach was used for impact-related questions.

The team continued implementing the project to standardize an ESPP database structure (qualitative and quantitative). Thanks to this structure, diverse and more rigorous and reliable statistical analyses and tests will be conducted on the different units of analysis: country, period, CSP, pillar, operation, etc.

### Conduct of Evaluation


Three missions had to be fielded to Bamako: (a) the exploratory scoping mission from 3 to 7 December 2018; (b) the data collection mission from 9 to 28 June 2019 undertaken by 6 individual sector consultants (agriculture, multisector, energy, water and sanitation, transport and social). Each produced an assessment report<sup>88</sup> and project performance assessment forms for each operation (or individual sheets); and (c) the mission to share the preliminary evaluation results from 15 to 19 December 2019. The reports were proofread three times over by 11 members of the external evaluation reference group and 3 internal peer reviewers (Annex 9).<sup>89</sup> Figure 6 below shows a flow diagram of the conduct of the evaluation.

### Limitations of the Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies Adopted

The main limitations are the following:

- **Data is incomplete.** Appointments were taken late. The receptionist at the Mali Field Office ceaselessly made telephone calls to negotiate, which increased the success rate. The evaluation team could not access the project sites to collect primary data due to insecurity and travel restrictions. The solution to recruit a firm specialized in conducting surveys in areas of insecurity of the Centre and North was rejected. The team contacted the LoC focal point, but the M&E system does not document achievements at the level of the intermediate and final beneficiaries of loans (SMEs and microfinance institutions). It keeps statistics on credit operations but does not record development results. Data for some operations are unavailable or inappropriate for this evaluation. Some project managers were unavailable for various reasons mentioned earlier.
- **The reliability of some secondary data cannot be verified.** There are some inconsistencies in data for the same operation taken from different documents. Interviews helped to clarify some cases. Doubtful data was not used in the analysis and scores were determined based on plausible or corroborated data (by triangulation).

Figure A3.3: Evaluation Plan



Source: Authors

## Annex 4: Operations Approved and Not Cancelled in Mali (2005-2019)

Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effective-ness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Markala Sugar Project - Agricultural Component	12/6/2010	6/2/2011			6/30/2015	28,970,000	-	0%	Terminated
The Irrigation Development Program in Bani Basin and Selingue (PDI-BS)–Phase I	5/27/2009	6/17/2009	11/12/2009	11/18/2009	12/31/2019	44,000,000	37,989,600	86%	Ongoing
Project for Food Security Consolidation Through Development of Irrigation Farming	12/3/2013	1/23/2014	10/6/2014	10/6/2014	12/31/2019	33,856,000	12,303,270	36%	Ongoing
Project for Food Security Consolidation Through Development of Irrigation Farming	12/3/2013	1/23/2014	1/23/2014	12/1/2014	12/31/2019	2,144,000	677,075	32%	Ongoing
Koulikoro Region Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (PreSAN-KL)	9/17/2014	10/27/2014	3/26/2015	3/26/2015	12/31/2019	3,000,000	275,700	9%	Ongoing
Koulikoro Region Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (PreSAN-KL)	9/17/2014	10/27/2014	3/26/2015	3/26/2015	12/31/2019	6,491,000	1,677,274	26%	Ongoing
Koulikoro Region Food and Nutrition Security Enhancement Project (PreSAN-KL)	9/17/2014	10/27/2014	10/27/2014	12/1/2014	12/31/2019	26,725,562	10,992,224	41%	Ongoing
Agricultural Transformation Support Program	8/18/2017	3/26/2018	3/26/2018	3/26/2018	12/31/2019	988,437	51,893	5%	Ongoing
Baguinéda Irrigation Scheme Intensification Project	11/30/2005	5/19/2006	6/1/2007	7/24/2007	12/31/2011	14,920,000	14,920,000	100%	Closed
Emergency aid against the spread of avian influenza	10/6/2006	12/28/2006			12/31/2007	359,118	-	0%	Completed



Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Project in support of the Development of Animal Production in the South-Kayes Area (PADEFA-KS)	4/18/2007	5/17/2007	11/14/2007	6/25/2008	12/30/2016	14,728,010	14,728,010	100%	Completed
Diversification of the Activities of Moulin moderne du Mali (M3)	9/17/2014	12/19/2014	12/19/2014	5/20/2015	12/18/2021	1,257,768	1,257,768	100%	Ongoing
Diversification of the Activities of Moulin moderne du Mali (M3)	9/17/2014	12/19/2014	12/19/2014	5/20/2015	12/18/2021	12,577,683	12,577,683	100%	Ongoing
Diversification of the Activities of Moulin moderne du Mali (M3)	11/4/2015	10/14/2016			12/18/2021	738,813	-	0%	Ongoing
Diversification of the Activities of Moulin moderne du Mali (M3)	11/4/2015	10/14/2016			12/18/2021	7,612,535	-	0%	Ongoing
Support project for the cotton-textile sector in the 4 countries	11/29/2006	2/1/2007	1/23/2008	4/30/2008	9/30/2015	8,475,653	8,475,653	100%	Completed
Sustainable management of endemic ruminant livestock project	1/25/2006	10/16/2006	1/18/2008	9/26/2008	6/30/2016	4,316,465	4,316,465	100%	Completed
Food insecurity resilience building program	10/15/2014	12/12/2014	4/1/2015	7/31/2015	6/30/2020	18,195,000	1,713,969	9%	Ongoing
<b>Agriculture</b>						229,356,044	121,956,584	47%	
Line of credit to the Malian Bank of Solidarity	7/6/2011	11/18/2014	11/18/2014	2/5/2015	9/30/2018	4,537,729	4,537,729	100%	Ongoing
Trade finance line of credit BSIC Mali	5/16/2018				12/26/2018	6,600,333	-	0%	Approved
Development Bank of Mali DBM	10/18/2018				12/8/2025	24,628,318	-	0%	Approved
<b>Finance</b>						35,766,380	4,537,729	33%	
Structural Adjustment Program IV (SAP IV)	12/12/2005	12/29/2005	4/6/2006	4/18/2006	12/31/2007	34,921,676	34,921,676	100%	Completed
Support program for the growth and poverty reduction strategy (SPGPRS)	9/24/2008	10/13/2008	12/17/2008	12/17/2008	12/31/2011	33,000,000	33,000,000	100%	Completed
Support project for decentralization and regional economic development (SPDRED)	9/26/2007	11/16/2007	8/6/2008	8/6/2008	12/31/2013	2,102,177	2,102,177	100%	Completed

Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Support project for decentralization and regional economic development (SPRED)	9/26/2007	11/16/2007	8/6/2008	8/6/2008	12/31/2013	1,413,323	1,413,323	100%	Completed
Additional loan to the Support program for the growth and poverty reduction strategy (SPGPRS)	11/30/2009	12/1/2009	3/3/2010	3/5/2010	6/30/2011	5,500,000	5,500,000	100%	Completed
Second Support program for the growth and poverty reduction strategy (SPGPRS II)	10/26/2011	10/26/2011	12/16/2011	12/19/2011	12/31/2013	15,000,000	15,000,000	100%	Completed
Economic governance support project (EGSP)	7/1/2013	11/26/2013	11/26/2013	4/15/2015	12/31/2018	9,970,000	9,171,403	92%	Completed
Emergency program to support economic recovery (EERSP)	5/8/2013	5/10/2013	11/4/2013	11/4/2013	12/31/2014	20,000,000	20,000,000	100%	Completed
Emergency program to support economic recovery (EERSP)	5/8/2013	5/10/2013	5/10/2013	10/21/2013	12/31/2014	20,000,000	20,000,000	100%	Completed
GRSP - Governance and recovery support program	12/17/2014	12/17/2014	3/17/2015	3/17/2015	12/31/2015	8,263,000	8,263,000	100%	Completed
GRSP - Governance and recovery support program	12/17/2014	12/17/2014	12/17/2014	12/22/2014	12/31/2015	6,340,000	6,340,000	100%	Completed
Economic governance reform support program	12/14/2016	1/17/2017	4/25/2017	5/24/2017	12/31/2017	9,395,400	9,395,400	100%	Completed
Economic governance reform support program	12/14/2016	1/17/2017	1/17/2017	1/30/2017	12/31/2017	11,853,200	11,853,200	100%	Completed
Economic governance reform support program	12/14/2016	1/17/2017	4/25/2017	5/24/2017	12/31/2017	1,902,000	1,902,000	100%	Completed
National land use plan	2/28/2017	5/18/2017	5/18/2017	5/18/2017	12/31/2019	1,000,000	383,200	38%	Ongoing
Economic governance reform support program	11/4/2015	11/27/2015	11/27/2015	12/3/2015	12/31/2018	15,000,000	15,000,000	100%	Completed
Economic growth support program phase I (EGSP I)	12/15/2017	12/22/2017	2/26/2018	2/26/2018	12/31/2018	9,000,000	9,000,000	100%	Ongoing

Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Support project for the competitiveness of the Malian economy	7/12/2018	9/14/2018			12/31/2022	10,000,000	-	0%	Approved
<b>Multisector</b>						214,660,776	203,245,379	91%	
Mini Hydropower Plants and Related Distribution Networks Development Project (PDM-Hydro)	12/4/2017	1/11/2018	1/11/2018	6/14/2018	12/31/2023	20,000,000	130,000	1%	Ongoing
Mini Hydropower Plants and Related Distribution Networks Development Project (PDM-Hydro)	9/17/2018				12/31/2023	6,248,653	-	0%	Ongoing
Mali Segou Solar PV Power	10/31/2016				9/1/2020	6,888,273	-	0%	Approved
Mali Segou Solar PV Power	6/19/2018				9/1/2020	4,545,980	-	0%	Approved
Mali Segou Solar PV Power	3/6/2017				9/1/2020	17,955,900	-	0%	Approved
Investment plan SREP	11/15/2011	1/24/2012	1/24/2012	12/10/2012	7/31/2016	143,647	143,647	100%	Completed
Support project for the promotion of renewable energies	10/22/2014	11/27/2014	11/27/2014	6/3/2015	1/31/2019	1,077,354	390,972	36%	Ongoing
Study of the Guinea-Mali Interconnection Line (FOMI)	1/12/2011	6/2/2011	11/19/2012	11/19/2012	12/31/2016	813,256	813,256	100%	Completed
225 KV Guinea-Mali Electric Interconnection project	12/13/2017	1/11/2018	6/26/2018	6/26/2018	12/31/2021	16,100,000	-	0%	Ongoing
<b>Energy</b>						73,773,063	1,477,875	26%	
Support for the Bamako digital complex	9/7/2011	9/9/2011	2/14/2012		9/30/2017	14,000,000	-	0%	Terminated
Support project for the socio-economic reintegration of the population of northern Mali	11/30/2016	1/17/2017	1/17/2017	4/4/2018	12/31/2021	1,902,000	-	0%	Ongoing
Support project for the socio-economic reintegration of the population of northern Mali	11/30/2016	1/17/2017	1/17/2017	4/4/2018	12/31/2021	8,098,000	60,735	1%	Ongoing
Community Development Support Project in the Kayes and Koulikoro Regions (CDSP)	5/3/2006	6/2/2006	10/30/2006	5/11/2007	5/15/2015	12,643,375	12,643,375	100%	Completed

Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effective-ness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Emergency humanitarian aid for populations affected by security and food crises in northern Mali	7/12/2012	9/6/2012	9/6/2012	2/25/2013	5/31/2013	718,236	-	0%	Completed
Project for the economic empowerment of women in the shea sector	12/3/2018				12/31/2022	2,200,000	-	0%	Approved
Project for the economic empowerment of women in the shea sector	12/3/2018				12/31/2022	2,800,000	-	0%	Approved
<b>Social</b>						42,361,611	12,704,110	14%	
Additional loan to Mali: WAEMU / Ghana - road program I:	5/5/2009	5/13/2009	1/12/2010	1/12/2010	12/30/2013	6,505,697	6,505,697	100%	Completed
Project to Widen the Carrefour de la Paix - Woyowayanko Bridge - Point Y	9/27/2010	10/14/2010	3/15/2011	12/22/2011	12/31/2015	11,392,995	11,392,995	100%	Completed
Transport development and facilitation project	11/26/2015	1/25/2016	4/4/2016	6/6/2016	6/30/2021	31,060,000	11,448,716	37%	Ongoing
Transport development and facilitation project	11/26/2015	1/25/2016	4/4/2016	6/6/2016	6/30/2021	15,530,000	4,143,404	27%	Ongoing
Development Program for the Malian Branch of the Trans-Saharan Road	12/11/2018				12/31/2020	7,860,000	-	0%	Approved
<b>Transport</b>						72,348,692	33,490,812	53%	
Drinking water supply project for the City of Bamako from the locality of Kabala (DWSP Bamako/Kabala)	10/9/2013	11/26/2013	6/26/2014	6/26/2014	12/31/2020	50,000,000	20,450,000	41%	Ongoing
Drinking water supply and sanitation project in the regions of Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou	6/11/2008	7/30/2008	2/6/2009	2/6/2009	12/31/2015	17,162,495	17,162,495	100%	Completed
Drinking water supply and sanitation project in the regions of Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou	6/11/2008	7/30/2008	7/30/2008	2/4/2009	12/31/2015	8,194,137	8,194,137	100%	Completed
Support project for the implementation of the Integrated Water Resources Management Action Plan	1/7/2010	5/28/2010	5/28/2010	10/22/2010	6/30/2016	1,582,842	1,582,842	100%	Completed

Operations approved from 2005 to 2018	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effective-ness Date	Date 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
Development studies of the Master Plan and the Investment Program of the Integrated Development and Climate Resilience Project in the Delta 2 plains	9/11/2017	1/22/2018	1/22/2018	4/18/2018	3/31/2020	1,646,565	96,324	6%	Ongoing
Bamako City Sanitation Project	1/11/2017	1/12/2017	4/21/2017		12/31/2022	15,000,000	-	0%	Approved
Bamako City Sanitation Project	1/11/2017	1/12/2017	4/21/2017		12/31/2022	15,000,000	-	0%	Approved
<b>Water &amp; Sanitation</b>						108,586,039	47,485,798	50%	

Source: AIDB Internal Data SAP PS, 2019

## Annex 5: Operations Approved Before 2005 and Completed/Closed in 2005-2019

Projects Approved before 2005 and Completed or Closed between 2005 and 2019*	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date of 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
PROJECT SOUTH MALI II	5/25/1992	11/3/1992	12/27/1993	2/14/1996	12/31/2005	7,357,754	7,357,754	100%	Completed
RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROJECT IN THE MOPTI REGION	10/10/2001	10/26/2001	9/17/2002	9/17/2002	6/30/2011	14,927,579	14,927,579	100%	Completed
DEVELOPMENT OF MOYEN-BANI PLAINS PHASE I	12/15/1997	2/20/1998	12/31/1998	3/29/1999	3/10/2014	19,770,000	19,770,000	100%	Completed
DAYE-HAMADJ PLAINS RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROJECT	11/3/2000	4/26/2001	12/17/2002	12/20/2004	5/31/2010	7,589,887	7,589,887	100%	Completed
II° LINE OF CREDIT TO THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK	12/12/2002	2/14/2003	2/24/2004	2/24/2004	12/31/2010	14,848,554	14,848,554	100%	Completed
SUPPORT PROJECT FOR THE SEED SECTOR	6/4/2001	7/11/2001	4/22/2002	12/16/2002	12/30/2009	5,390,917	5,390,917	100%	Completed
MANINKOURA IRRIGATED PERIMETER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	10/18/2000	12/15/2000	1/14/2002	2/18/2002	3/31/2008	12,463,444	12,463,444	100%	Completed
FEASIBILITY STUDY OF THE HYDROAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	4/11/2002	5/28/2002	11/20/2003	11/20/2003	8/31/2006	531,388	531,388	100%	Completed
STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF THE DOUE ZONE	9/19/2001	10/26/2001	5/6/2002	5/6/2002	6/30/2006	545,468	545,468	100%	Completed
DJENNE CIRCLE DEVELOPMENT STUDY	5/19/2004	8/26/2004	1/12/2005	1/31/2005	12/31/2009	1,027,210	1,027,210	100%	Completed
SUPPORT FOR LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHEAST	9/11/2002	1/23/2003	11/5/2003	8/20/2004	12/31/2011	10,708,779	10,708,779	100%	Completed

Projects Approved before 2005 and Completed or Closed between 2005 and 2018*	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date of 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
CONTINENTAL FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROJECT	10/6/2004	11/5/2004	12/27/2005	5/19/2006	12/31/2012	8,184,770	8,184,770	100%	Completed
ANSONGO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	10/27/1999	2/7/2000	2/15/2001	2/15/2001	5/31/2010	9,415,418	9,415,418	100%	Completed
MERIC DISSEMINATION PROJECT - MALI	9/26/2003	10/21/2003	2/5/2005	2/5/2005	6/30/2011	2,905,743	2,905,743	100%	Completed
INVASIVE AQUATIC WEEDS - MALI	9/22/2004	11/5/2004	7/4/2006	7/4/2006	12/31/2011	1,206,423	1,206,423	100%	Completed
MALI - CREATION OF SUSTAINABLE FLY FREE ZONES	12/8/2004	2/14/2005	1/20/2006	5/29/2006	12/31/2014	3,321,847	3,321,847	100%	Completed
<b>Agriculture</b>						151,899,907	147,585,315	96%	
GOOD GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT (GGSP)	12/20/2002	1/16/2003	1/16/2003	10/29/2003	3/30/2008	1,431,919	1,431,919	100%	Closed
COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAM TO PAS III	7/19/2004	8/26/2004	1/17/2005	1/28/2005	12/31/2005	8,600,000	8,600,000	100%	Closed
<b>Multisector</b>						10,031,919	10,031,919	100%	
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION STUDY	9/24/2003	11/21/2003	8/9/2004	8/9/2004	1/30/2009	1,100,442	1,100,442	100%	Completed
EDUCATION III -PROJECT TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	11/20/1997	12/17/1997	4/12/1999	9/17/1999	12/31/2006	9,992,058	9,992,058	100%	Closed
EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT	9/24/2003	11/21/2003	11/12/2004	8/2/2005	12/31/2011	11,845,142	11,845,142	100%	Closed
SUPPORT PROJECT FOR THE HEALTH AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	11/21/2001	1/15/2002	7/29/2002	7/4/2004	12/31/2009	14,985,862	14,985,862	100%	Closed
SUPPORT PROJECT FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST HIV / AIDS	9/8/2004	11/29/2004	11/29/2004	11/10/2005	12/30/2011	8,126,999	8,126,999	100%	Completed
POVERTY REDUCTION	3/24/1999	5/18/1999	8/13/2001	8/13/2001	12/31/2005	9,894,756	9,894,756	100%	Closed
<b>Social</b>						77,525,676	77,525,676	100%	

Projects Approved before 2005 and Completed or Closed between 2005 and 2018*	Approval Date	Signature Date	Effectiveness Date	Date of 1st Disbursement	Expected Closing Date	Amount Approved	Amount Disbursed	Disbursement Rate	Project Status
<b>ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT</b>	10/8/1997	11/25/1997	7/22/1998	5/3/1999	12/31/2007	450,688	450,688	100%	Completed
<b>Transport</b>						24,667,063	24,667,063	100%	
RURAL DWSS PROGRAM	12/17/2003	3/25/2004	3/25/2004	7/25/2005	6/30/2012	975,556	975,556	100%	Closed
BAMAKO SANITATION DIRECTOR DIAGRAM	3/24/2004	8/26/2004	8/26/2004	3/28/2007	6/30/2009	776,515	776,515	100%	Completed
<b>Water &amp; Sanitation</b>						9,004,313	9,004,313	100%	

\* The data of each project correspond to those of the oldest operation in terms of approval date (if two operations have the same approval dates, then the data in the following column is considered; for example, the signature date and so on).

Source: AfDB Internal Data/SAP PS, 2019



## Annex 6: Scale of Rating Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Relevance</b>	1. To what extent do the priorities in the DSP correspond to the directions of the country's national development policy, the choice of the Malian authorities and the needs of the target populations? To what extent is the national context taken into account in the CSPs?	More than 75% of the strategic objectives (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are explicitly articulated on the national priorities set out in the relevant national development policy document.	50-75% of the strategic objectives (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are explicitly articulated on the national priorities.	Less than 50% of the strategic objectives (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are explicitly articulated on the national priorities.	None of the strategic objectives (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are explicitly articulated on any of the national priorities.
	2. To what extent has the Bank's strategy in Mali achieved the expected results? To what extent have the projects implemented contributed to the strategic results set out in the CSPs?	More than 75% of the national goals/results of the 3 CSPs are achieved.	50-75% of the national goals/results of the 3 CSPs are achieved.	Less than 50% of the targets of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are explicitly articulated with the components defined in the relevant national development policy document.	Less than 50% of the strategic objectives/results (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are achieved.
<b>Effectiveness</b>		More than 75% of the strategic objectives/results (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are achieved.	50-75% of the strategic objectives/results (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are achieved.	Less than 50% of the strategic objectives/results (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are achieved.	None of the strategic objectives/results (pillars) of the 3 CSPs are achieved.
		More than 75% of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.	Less than 50% of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period provided immediate results that contributed to any strategic outcome (pillars) of any of the 3 CSPs.

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<p>3. To what extent have the projects achieved the needs of the people and the expectations of the Government of Mali, especially in areas exposed to insecurity?</p>	<p>More than 75% of the projects approved before 2005 and completed or closed after provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.</p>	<p>50-75% of projects approved before 2005 and completed or closed after provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.</p>	<p>Less than 50% of projects approved before 2005 and completed or closed after provided immediate results that contributed to either strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.</p>	<p>None of the projects approved before 2005 and completed or closed after provided immediate results that contributed to any strategic outcome (pillars) of one of the 3 CSPs.</p>
	<p>4. What were the internal and external operational difficulties faced by projects in Mali that limited the results of the Bank's interventions (low staff number, high staff turnover, long response time to ANO requests/ administrative delays, division of labor and coordination between COML and HQ, synergy between departments and articulation of sectoral strategies, etc.)? What are the internal and external factors that contributed to the achievement of results?</p>	<p>More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period delivered all the expected outputs.</p>	<p>50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period delivered all the expected outputs.</p>	<p>Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period delivered all the expected outputs.</p>	<p>None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period delivered all of the expected outputs.</p>
		<p>More than 75% of respondents declare that the projects fulfilled the expectations of the targeted populations</p>	<p>50-75% of respondents declare that the projects fulfilled the expectations of the targeted populations.</p>	<p>Less than 50% of respondents declare that the projects fulfilled the expectations of the targeted populations.</p>	<p>None of the respondents declare that the projects fulfilled the expectations of the targeted populations.</p>
		Doesn't apply	Doesn't apply	Doesn't apply	Doesn't apply

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Sustainability</b>	5. What is the level of ownership of the Bank's especially agricultural projects?	More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period involved target communities.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have implemented a sustainability arrangement.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period involved target communities.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period involved the target communities.
		More than 75% of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have implemented a sustainability arrangement.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have implemented a sustainability arrangement.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have implemented a sustainability arrangement.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have implemented a sustainability arrangement.
		More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented a revenue-collection scheme to finance recurring expenses.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented a revenue-collection scheme to finance recurring expenses.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented a revenue-collection scheme to finance recurring expenses.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented a revenue-collection scheme to finance recurring expenses.
	6. To what extent have the Bank's interventions strengthened or mobilized local capacity? In what areas was capacity built?	More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have their PIUs integrated into the services of the supervising ministry.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have their PIUs integrated into the services of the supervising ministry.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period have their PIUs integrated into the services of the supervising ministry.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period do not have their PIUs integrated into the services of the supervising ministry.
		More than 75% of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented one or more activities to strengthen the country's technical or institutional capacity.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented one or more activities to strengthen the country's technical or institutional capacity.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented one or more activities to strengthen the country's technical or institutional capacity.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period implemented an activity to strengthen the country's technical or institutional capacity.

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Sustainability</b>	7. To what extent has the Bank ensured compliance with its environmental and social standards?	More than 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 documented the implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures, including the precedent conditions.	50 to 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018, have documented the implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures, including the precedent conditions.	Less than 50% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018, have documented the implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures, including the precedent conditions.	None of the cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 has not documented the implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures, including the precedent conditions.
		All cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 published the ESIA and ESMP summaries within deadline (time between PAR approval and the date of publication on the website).	More than 50% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 published the ESIA and ESMP summaries within deadline.	Less than 50% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 published the ESIA and ESMP summaries within deadline.	None of the cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 published the ESIA and ESMP summaries within deadline.
		More than 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period effectively appointed an official within the PIU to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP and/or the resettlement/compensation of the affected population.	50 to 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period effectively appointed an official within the PIU to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP and/or the resettlement/compensation of the affected population.	Less than 50% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period effectively appointed an official within the PIU to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP and/or the resettlement/compensation of the affected population.	None of the cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period effectively appointed an official within the PIU to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP and/or the resettlement/compensation of the affected population.
		More than 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have a budget allocation to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP, and is disbursed as reported in supervisory record of the Bank or the borrower.	50 to 75% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have a budget allocation to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP, and is disbursed as reported in supervisory record of the Bank or the borrower.	Less than 50% of cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have a budget allocation to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP, and is disbursed as reported in supervisory record of the Bank or the borrower.	None of the cat I & II projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have a budget allocation to monitor and report on the implementation of the ESMP, and is disbursed as reported in supervisory record of the Bank or the borrower.

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Efficiency</b>	8. What is the impact of choosing to carry out integrated projects on the efficiency of implementation, i.e. the integration of several different service sectors and the concentration of interventions in a smaller geographical area?	The integration of ancillary services to projects is positively associated with all dimensions of efficiency. The concentration of several interventions in a geographic area is positively associated with all dimensions of efficiency.	The integration of ancillary services to projects is positively associated with more than 2 dimensions of efficiency. The concentration of several interventions in a geographic area is positively associated with more than 2 dimensions of efficiency.	The integration of ancillary services to projects is positively associated with less than 2 dimensions of efficiency. The concentration of several interventions in a geographic area is positively associated with less than 2 dimensions of efficiency.	The integration of ancillary services to projects is not positively associated with any of the dimensions of efficiency. The concentration of several interventions in a geographic area is positively associated with none of the dimensions of efficiency.
	9. To what extent has the Bank complied with the deadlines and budgets allocated for the implementation of its interventions?	More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original budget (not cost overrun). More than 75% of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original timeframe (effective implementation duration/ planned duration=1). The average disbursement rate for projects approved between 2005 and 2018 is 90% or more. Administrative costs for every UA 1 million spent decreased over the period.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original budget 50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original timeframe (some delays). The average disbursement rate for projects approved between 2005 and 2018 is between 60 and 90%. Administrative costs for every UA 1 million spent did not increase (stagnant) during the period.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original budget Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original timeframe (frequent delays). The average disbursement rate for projects approved between 2005 and 2018 is between 60 and 50%. Administrative costs for 1 million UA spent increased over the course of one or the other CSP.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original budget None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 are within the original timeframe (systematic delays). The average disbursement rate for projects approved between 2005 and 2018 is less than 50%. Administrative costs for every UA 1 million spent increased over the period.

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory Inequality has decreased over the period	3. Satisfactory Inequality did not worsen over the period	2. Unsatisfactory Inequality increased by less than 5% over the period	1. Highly Unsatisfactory Inequality increased by more than 5% over the period
<b>Impact</b>	10. What is the impact of the Bank's interventions on populations and inequalities (regions, gender, poverty, etc.)?				
	11. To what extent have the Bank's interventions, including budget support, contributed to reducing insecurity?				
<b>Effectiveness - institutional performance of the Government of Mali</b>	12. To what extent are donor harmonization and coordination effective in Mali? What is the level of complementarity of the Bank's interventions with those of the other GoM partners?	During the period, the Troika held 5-6 meetings per year	During the period, the Troika held at least 4 meetings per year	During the period, the Troika held less than 4 meetings per year	During the period, the Troika did not hold any meetings
	13. Is communication between Mali's development partners appropriate? How to be exchange information for more effective collaboration, especially in the framework of the AfDB/EU PAGODA?	Mali's partners are very satisfied	Mali's partners are satisfied	Mali's partners are dissatisfied	Mali's partners are very dissatisfied
	14. To what extent has the GoM fulfilled its commitments under the CSPs?	Mali has fulfilled all its commitments/precedent conditions	Mali has fulfilled at least 4/5 of its commitments/precedent conditions	Mali has fulfilled less than half of its commitments/precedent conditions	Mali has not fulfilled any of its precedent conditions/commitments

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Effectiveness - institutional performance of the Bank</b>	15. To what extent has the Bank involved all stakeholders in the formulation, implementation and follow-up of its interventions? Are CSPs imposed on the country and beneficiaries?	All stakeholder categories were involved at all stages of the CSP.	All stakeholder categories were involved at one stage or another of the CSP.	All stakeholder categories were not involved at either stage of the CSP.	Only public administrations were involved in the CSP.
	16. Are the Bank's procedures and resources adequate for the ambitions of Mali's CSPs, including the ADF resource allocation level, seeing their budgetary needs? Is COMIL non commensurate with its role as a first-choice partner of GoM? To what extent could COMIL use project resources to participate in events that are important for the country?	<p>The proportion of PL staff at COMIL has increased significantly.</p> <p>The proportion of projects managed from COMIL has increased significantly.</p> <p>The volume of resources available to the GoM has increased significantly.</p>	<p>The proportion of PL staff at COMIL has increased.</p> <p>The proportion of projects managed from COMIL has increased.</p> <p>The volume of resources available to the GoM has increased.</p>	<p>The proportion of PL staff at COMIL remained unchanged.</p> <p>The proportion of projects managed from COMIL remained unchanged.</p> <p>The volume of resources available to the GoM remained unchanged.</p>	<p>The proportion of PL staff at COMIL has decreased.</p> <p>The proportion of projects managed from COMIL has decreased.</p> <p>The volume of resources available to the GoM has decreased.</p>
	17. To what extent did the Bank's interventions consider crosscutting issues such as the environment, resilience, gender and youth employment?	More than 75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have explicit goals for youth resilience, gender or employment.	50-75% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have explicit goals for youth resilience, gender or employment.	Less than 50% of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have explicit goals for youth resilience, gender or employment.	None of the projects approved between 2005 and 2018 have explicit goals for youth resilience, gender or employment.

Evaluation criteria	Specific questions	Rating scale			
		4. Highly Satisfactory	3. Satisfactory	2. Unsatisfactory	1. Highly Unsatisfactory
<b>Effectiveness - institutional performance of the Bank</b>	18. Did integrated projects create a leveraging effect by producing more significant development outcomes? To what extent did the introduction of ancillary features in projects (thematic/sector integration) improved the satisfaction of the needs of populations in the project areas?	All integrated projects have achieved other development outcomes in addition to the key expected results.	More than half of the integrated projects achieved other development results in addition to the main expected results.	Less than half of the integrated projects achieved other development outcomes in addition to the main expected results.	None of the integrated projects achieved other development results beyond the key expected results.
	19. Are the Bank's communication efforts and the resulting level of visibility / notoriety enough to position the Bank favorably in Mali? How do the target populations (final beneficiaries) perceive the Bank's assistance?	Target populations are very satisfied.	Target populations are satisfied.	Target populations are dissatisfied.	Target populations are very dissatisfied.
		All respondents are aware that the AfDB group is the source of funding for the project from which they are a beneficiary.	At least 2/3 of respondents are aware that the AfDB group is the source of funding for the project from which they are a beneficiary.	Less than 50% of respondents know that the AfDB group is the source of funding for the project from which they are a beneficiary.	Less than 25% of respondents know that the AfDB group is the source of funding for the project from which they are a beneficiary.



## Annexes in Volume II: Technical Annexes

The annexes are only available in French. Volume II : Technical Annexes can be found on the following page:  
<http://idev.afdb.org/en/document/mali-country-strategy-and-program-evaluation-period-2005-2019>

- Annex 7: List of Persons met during the Exploratory Scoping mission
- Annex 8: List of Persons met during the Data Collection Mission
- Annex 9: Members of the External Evaluation Reference Group
- Annex 10: Map of Insecurity in Mali (violent incidents reported)
- Annex 11: Some Sector Policies, Strategies and Programs in Mali (2005-2018)
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- Annex 23: Theory of Change (CSP 2015-2019)
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- Annex 26: Theory of Change (RBCSP 2005-2009)
- Annex 27: Semi-Structured Interview Guides (Exploratory Scoping Mission)
- Annex 28: Alignment of CSPs with National Priorities
- Annex 29: Bibliography

## Endnotes

1. Access to the sea is thousands of kilometers away.
2. They comprise economic and sector-specific studies, technical assistance, policy dialogue, review, and aid coordination.
3. Qualitative indicators have been quantified in order to increase the (inter-rater) reliability of the rating.
4. The country is thousands of kilometers from the sea: Conakry (980 km), Dakar (1238 km), Abidjan (1227 km), Nouakchott (1430 km), Tema in Ghana (1973 km) and Lomé in Togo (1967 km).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, the statistical data are those of the AfDB statistical portal, summarized for Mali in Annex 1.
6. Mali Economic Outlook: <https://www.afdb.org/fr/countries/west-africa/mali/mali-economic-outlook>
7. [Http://surveys.worldbank.org/publications/mali-eac-i-2017-socio-demographic-characteristics-households](http://surveys.worldbank.org/publications/mali-eac-i-2017-socio-demographic-characteristics-households)
8. International Labor Organization ([link](#))
9. The figures may be higher than 100% because they include students who are older than the official age group (e.g., repeaters). In addition, if there is late enrolment, early enrolment or repeating, the total enrolment may exceed the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education.
10. Human Development reports: <http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/tend/MLI/fr/SP.POP.IDH.IN.html>
11. AfDB. CSP 2015-2019 Mid-Term Review
12. Permanent Modular Household Survey 2017/2018 ([link](#)) - [http://www.instat-mali.org/contenu/eq/rana17pas3\\_eq.pdf](http://www.instat-mali.org/contenu/eq/rana17pas3_eq.pdf)
13. UNAIDS ([link](#))
14. AfDB. 2005. Mali: 2005-2009 Country Strategy Paper. Country Operations Department West Region, p.13.
15. Vol. II, Technical Annexes.
16. For further details, read Alonso Valckx, Daniel Patrick. 2019. Mali: Country Strategy and Program Evaluation for the period 2005-2019, Country Strategy Paper Summary Note. Internal report, 19 July 2019, 9 pages.
17. The Bank and the World Bank have established the harmonized list on the basis of the following agreement: A state or country is in a situation of fragility if: (i) the harmonized average of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is less than or equal to 3.2 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high) of 16 criteria grouped in 4 clusters; or (ii) the country has hosted peacekeeping forces in the last three years.
18. AfDB. (2013). At the Centre of Africa's Transformation: Strategy for the Period 2013-2022, Strategy Paper, 37 pages.

19. AfDB. (2014). African Development Bank Group Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2014-2019. Strategy Paper, 54 pages, Transition Support Department (ORTS).
20. The Bank conducted two additional studies (Assessment of Water Resources in the Office du Niger Areas and the Gender Profile) and initiated a Diagnostic Study of Economic Growth Constraints in Mali which were not planned in the RBCSP.
21. The list of operations is provided in Annex 8.
22. As defined in SAP PS: Cancelled (approved project, ongoing or not, that has been cancelled), Closed (project completed with a completion report), Completed (project completed without a completion report).
23. Vol. II: Technical Annexes.
24. AfDB. (2020). Mali: 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper Completion Report Combined with the 2019 Country Portfolio Performance Review, April 2020.
25. Vol. II: Technical Annexes.
26. Non-lending activities aim to generate knowledge so as to improve empirical knowledge in a potential area of intervention and inform action. It includes economic and sector-specific studies, technical assistance, policy dialogue, aid review and coordination.
27. Study on Energy Conservation Development Strategy in Mali, 2010; Study on Fragility Factors in Mali, 2014.
28. Comprehensive list of approved operations for the period 2005-2019 (Annex 4).
29. Comprehensive list of operations approved before 2005 and completed or closed between 2005 and 2019 (Annex 5).
30. From Preskill Hallie & Nathalie Jones. 2009. A Practical Guide for Engaging Stakeholders in Developing Evaluation Questions. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Evaluation Series; Available at <https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/toolkits/toolkits/2009/rwjf48595>.
31. IDEV. (2020). Evaluation Manual. African Development Bank.
32. The interview guide is provided in Annex 11. Interviewers were asked to provide useful contacts based on the "snowball" sampling technique.
33. All this documentation is available on request.
34. Vol. II: Technical Annexes.
35. Vol. II: Technical Annexes.
36. Qualitative indicators have been quantified in order to increase the (inter-rater) reliability of the rating.
37. Highly satisfactory (4); Satisfactory (3); Unsatisfactory (2); Highly unsatisfactory (1). The rating scale defines each rating.
38. Wilson-Grau Ricardo. 2018. Outcome Harvesting: Principles, steps and evaluation applications, Charlotte, NC, USA: Information Age Publishing (IAP).

39. Wilson-Grau Ricardo, and Heather Britt. 2012. Outcome Harvesting, Revised November 2013. Cairo, Egypt: Ford Foundation, MENA Office.
40. Earl Sarah, Fred Carden, and Terry Smutylo. 2001. Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs. Ottawa (Ontario), Canada: International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
41. Security risk maps during the evaluation (Vol. II: Annex 10). It was envisaged that primary data collection in these areas would be carried out by a local specialized firm. This option was discarded due to lack of authorization by the Bank's legal and security services, despite the advocacy of the evaluation team.
42. Vol. II: Technical Annexes.
43. Consistent with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (March 2005).
44. Other categories of national actors, in particular civil society and the private sector, were involved in the policy dialogue in the context of the preparation of the 2020-2024 CSP, thus taking into account the grievances raised during the discussions held in the context of this evaluation.
45. These private sector operations comprise: the Markala Sugar Project, Modern Mill of Mali (M3) Diversification Project, and SCATEC Energy Project. The agricultural component of the Markala Sugar Project was cancelled.
46. In the ranking of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Mali moved from 95th out of 167 countries in 2015 to 120th out of 180 countries in 2018.
47. AfDB. (2020). Enhancing the Bank's Selectivity and Development Focus - Guidelines for the 2020 Pilot Project. Document ADB/BD/WP/2020/30, 18 February 2020, 28 pp.+ annexes, Delivery, Performance Management and Results Department (SNDR).
48. The index proposed by the Bank includes the definition adopted for this report. However, it is our definition that is applied, because the evaluation team became aware of the pilot project on 6 June 2020, when the report was in its second round of peer review.
49. According to the AfDB Group Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2014-2019, flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances, both positive and negative, are key to effective participation and the Bank will aim to strike a balance between risks and opportunities (p. 20).
50. The 2005-09 CSP (Annex 9) describes the positioning chosen by the Bank, while the 2015-19 CSP analyses the volume of financing provided by each of Mali's partners.
51. Effectiveness aspects considered: a) percentage of the national objectives/outcomes of the three CSPs are achieved; b) percentage of the strategic objectives/outcomes (pillars) of the three CSPs are achieved; c) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period provided immediate outcomes that contribute to any of the strategic outcomes (pillars) of any of the three CSPs; d) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period delivered all expected outputs; e) percentage of expected outputs that were delivered by projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed; and f) percentage of projects approved before 2005 and completed or closed after they have provided immediate outcomes that contribute to any of the strategic outcomes (pillars) of one of the three CSPs.

52. Indicators related to ownership mechanisms are: a) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period that involved the target communities; b) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period that have implemented a mechanism to ensure the sustainability of achievements; c) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period that implemented a revenue mobilization mechanism for the financing of recurrent expenses; and d) percentage of projects approved between 2005 and 2018 and completed or closed during the period with a PIU that is integrated into the services of the supervisory ministry.
53. AfDB. (2020). Mali: 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper Completion Report Combined with the 2019 Country Portfolio Performance Review. April 2020, p. 3
54. Manual pumps.
55. AfDB. PAEPA Gao, Koulikoro and Ségou Project Appraisal Report.
56. Mid-term review of the RBCSP 2015-2019.
57. Excluded are ongoing projects and those for which information on precedent conditions is not available (PABG, PASC RP II, PACE I, PACEM, SNAT). Included: PAS III, PAS IV, PADDER, PASC RP I, PUARE, PAGE PARGE I and II, PAUGRE).
58. Maybe due to changes in the drafting template. This assessment could not be concluded for want of data.
59. For PUARE, it is not clear how Outcome I: an increase in the “Gross rate of enrolment” can be the direct outcome of the mere redeployment of Government workers and the rehabilitation of premises”. In fact, the review note of this program’s project completion report (PCR) confirms the absence of such a link, pointing out that “with regard to education, no positive impact is observed on the indicators despite the redeployment of the administration in the affected regions”. Similarly, for PAGE, it is difficult to establish a link between the increase of outcome I concerning the improvement of CPIA indicator 15 “Service provision and operational effectiveness of the public administration” and outputs that include only training sessions.
60. For example, what is the relationship between “Strengthening of public management transparency mechanisms” (component I) of PAUGRE and “Support for the revival of private sector activities”?
61. All operations, including cancelled ones.
62. 3 months after approval after 4 November 2015, 6 months before and 1 month for private sector operations.
63. 5 months for the public sector and 9 months for the private.
64. 3 months for public before November 2015, making 24 months.
65. In the transports sector, fragility and resilience are not directly reflected in projects, except in the Transition Management Support Strategy 2013-2014.

66. The performance indicators of the self-evaluation system include: (A). % of required CSP reports submitted; (B). % of required reports on operations submitted; and (C). % of operations with 2 supervision missions per year.
67. The Bank's self-evaluation system serves as basis for the design of CSPs and portfolio operations but also guides implementation: mid-term CSP report, CSP completion reports and country portfolio performance review (CPPR) reports, sometimes combined with the first two; back-to-office supervision mission report, the implementation progress and results (IPR) report, the mid-term project report (MRP) and the project completion report (PCR). It helps to anticipate abnormalities and obstacles and to define suitable corrective measures (portfolio performance improvement plan) for more development results.
68. Several specific cases of difficulties to access these reports: the task manager has been replaced or now holds a different position in another country; he is unavailable (refuses to collaborate, goes on leave, etc.); or he has left the Bank. Sometimes, consultants who were involved in an operation are contacted.
69. Patton, M. Q. (2008). *Utilization-focused evaluation* (4. Ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. p. 667.
70. The interview guide features in Vol. II, Annex 28. The interlocutors were invited to provide useful contacts following the "snowball" sampling technique.
71. The list of institutions and persons met are given in Annexes 7 and 8 in Volume II, Technical Annexes.
72. AfDB Group. 2005. Mali: Evaluation of the Bank Group's Assistance. Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV), 7 April 2005
73. Preskill Hallie & Nathalie Jones. 2009. *A Practical Guide for Engaging Stakeholders in Developing Evaluation Questions*. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Evaluation Series; Available at <https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/toolkits/toolkits/2009/rwjf48595>
74. According to these authors, "evaluations will always be conducted so as to increase the probability for results to be used for learning, decision-making and action. One way to improve their use is to prepare a set of evaluation questions that capture the perspectives, experiences and ideas of as many persons, groups, organizations and communities as possible. As potential users of the evaluation results, their contribution is essential to set the orientation and direction of the evaluation."
75. IDEV. (2020). *Evaluation Manual*. African Development Bank
76. The complete list of interlocutors features in Vol. II, Annex 7.
77. All this documentation is available on request.
78. Insecurity maps during the evaluation (Annex 10).
79. The project to entrust primary data collection on the sites of operations in areas of insecurity to a specialized firm in Mali was abandoned, due to lack of authorization by the Bank's legal and security services despite the advocacy of the evaluation team.

80. DARMS: Document and Archive Management System
81. Vol. II: Technical annexes
82. <https://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/nbyenxf/afdb-socio-economic-database-1960-2020>
83. Vol. II: Technical annexes
84. These scores were awarded by the consultant tasked with assessing the assistance in the sector. Adjustments were sometimes necessary to take into account the reality of the factual data provided by the consultant.
85. Wilson-Grau Ricardo. 2018. Outcome Harvesting: Principles, steps and evaluation applications, Charlotte, NC, USA: Information Age Publishing (IAP)
86. Wilson-Grau Ricardo, and Heather Britt. 2012. Outcome Harvesting, Revised November 2013. Cairo, Egypt: Ford Foundation, MENA Office
87. Earl Sarah, Fred Carden, and Terry Smutylo. 2001. Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs. Ottawa (Ontario), Canada: International Development Research Center (IDRC).
88. The six sector evaluation reports are available on request.
89. Vol. II: Technical annexes



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Independent Development Evaluation  
African Development Bank







## About this Evaluation

This report summarizes the findings, lessons and recommendations from an evaluation of the African Development Bank's assistance to Mali over the period 2005-2019. It presents the development outcomes achieved by the Bank; measures its performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact; and draws relevant lessons to guide the Bank's future strategy.

Whilst the relevance, sustainability, efficiency and inclusion of cross-cutting aspects were all rated satisfactory, the evaluation found that effectiveness was unsatisfactory due to delays caused by lengthy legal procedures and administrative red tape; inadequate capacity in terms of expertise and staffing; poor quality at entry; frequent change of project officers at the Bank; low understanding of the Bank's disbursement procedures by service providers; and difficult operating context characterized by fragility and insecurity. The evaluation drew key lessons related to: i) selectivity of Bank assistance; ii) participatory strategies and a clear results framework; iii) better collaboration with key partners; iv) a better capacity building approach; and v) improved portfolio performance management plans.

The evaluation made five recommendations, including: i) increase the private sector's share in the portfolio; ii) increase the Bank's contribution to knowledge by conducting more Economic and Sector Works and build data collection capacity; iii) develop and implement a communication and civil society involvement plan in the Country Office; iv) review current Portfolio Performance Improvement Plan design and implementation practices; and v) encourage project managers to take full advantage of the lessons of the operations academy to improve the quality-at-entry of operations.



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